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
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
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
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
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
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From the Author

ON
THE USES AND APPLICATION
OF
CAVALRY IN WAR,
FROM THE TEXT OF BISMARCK,
WITH PRACTICAL EXAMPLES SELECTED FROM
ANTIENNT AND MODERN HISTORY;

BY
NORTH LUDLOW BEAMISH,
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A LA SUITE IN THE SERVICE OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF
HANOVER, AND LATE CAPTAIN IN HER MAJESTY'S FOURTH OR ROYAL IRISH
REGIMENT OF DRAGOON GUARDS, ETC. ETC. ETC.
AUTHOR OF THE HISTORY OF THE KING'S GERMAN LEGION.

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MONK, DUKE OF ALBEMARLE.

TO
HIS MAJESTY
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KING OF HANOVER,
ROYAL PRINCE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND,
DUKE OF CUMBERLAND,
DUKE OF BRUNSWICK AND LUNEBURG, ETC. ETC.

AS THE SOVEREIGN OF THAT GALLANT PEOPLE,

WHOSE

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P R E F A C E .

FINDING that my translation of Count von Bismark's "Lectures on the Tactics of Cavalry," which met with so favourable a reception from the British public in 1827, was out of print, and that the attention of our military authorities had been again directed to the important subject of the equipment, armament, and general organization of the three arms of the Service, I conceived that a reprint of the original work would be likely to prove acceptable; and I have taken advantage of the opportunity which the publication afforded, to add to the practical illustrations contained in the notes of the former volume, a large number of well-authenticated details bearing on the text. For many of these I am indebted to friends who have been eye witnesses of the scenes described, but my acknowledgments are principally due to Sir Archibald Alison's admirable "History of Europe," a work which, whether we consider the general correctness of its details, the eloquence of its diction, or the

philosophic spirit which it displays, stands unrivalled in English literature, and the remarkable success of which conveys a higher testimony of its excellence than any commendation which individual feeling might suggest.*

Count von Bismark's original publication, which forms the text of the present volume, made its first appearance in 1818, under the title of "*Vorlesungen über die Taktik der Reuterei*," and may be considered as the digest of the author's labours in the re-organization of the Wirtemberg Cavalry, with which he was entrusted immediately after the close of the last continental war. A second edition was published in the following year; in 1821 the work was translated into French, and the third and last edition, from which the present revised translation has been made, appeared in 1826.

Instead of appending my observations as notes, according to the plan adopted in the first edition, I have placed them in the form of commentary, continuous with the text, an arrangement which will be found more convenient to the reader; while, being in smaller type, they will readily be distinguished from the original lectures.

These observations have been considerably extended and amplified, while various omissions and alterations, rendered necessary by recent changes in British tactics

* All the marginal references to this work apply to the "Library Edition," published by Blackwood, 1849-1850, and are simply designated "Alison," while those referring to the same author's "Life of Marlborough," are given with the full title, "Alison's Life of Marlborough."

and equipment, have been made in many portions of the commentary; but the main object has been steadily kept in view, namely, to exemplify and illustrate the true uses and application of cavalry by reference to the actual operations of war, and well authenticated results.

The changes and modifications in the formation, equipment, movement, and armament of the British Cavalry, which I have ventured to suggest, may be thus enumerated:—

1. The assimilation of all cavalry—heavy and light—lancers, hussars, dragoon-guards and dragoons—into one homogeneous establishment of *light cavalry only*—the household troops being excepted.
2. The general adoption of *the lance* as the main weapon—a revolving pistol, carried in the waist-belt, being also supplied to each man; and a *fifth division*, armed (in lieu of the lance) with light needle-rifles, loaded at the breech with cylindro-conoidal shot, and otherwise constructed on the principle of the Prussian “*Zündnadelgewehr*”—to be attached to each squadron.

These divisions, consisting of picked men, to act as skirmishers, and on all occasions where fire-arms can be advantageously employed. They may also be united into one squadron when required: the rifle to be either slung across the back or hung by the swivel.

3. The cavalry soldier not to exceed five feet eight inches in height, and ten stone in weight. The horses to be light, strong, swift, hardy, and of high courage, not exceeding fifteen hands; the saddles to be of the old heavy dragoon pattern, but with moveable pannels, and made as light as is compatible with durability.
4. The shabraque, sheep-skin, sabretasche, girdle, surcingle, heavy head-gear, and cloak (a water-proof cape being substituted for the latter), as well as the hussar-pelisse, to be all discontinued, as also the carbine-bucket and straps, and every effort made to reduce the weight carried by the horse, to *at least* sixteen stone. The sword-scabbard to be either of solid leather, or lined with wood throughout.
5. Every cavalry soldier to be provided, previous to an engagement in which artillery are expected to take a part, with the means of spiking guns and carrying them off.
6. Movements by *Divisions* to be substituted for movements by *Threes*, and *rank-entire* for two deep—the rear rank being formed in second line as reserve.
7. Every regiment to be provided with bits of various degrees of severity, and not to remain limited to the same powerful lever for all horses, without

any reference to the sensibility of the animal's mouth.

8. Annual encampments and field drill, with practical instructions in patrolling, reconnoitering, advanced guards, rear guards, &c.
9. The establishment of a CAVALRY COLLEGE, for the special instruction of cadets who may desire to enter the cavalry service. Here, horsemanship, the use of the sword, lance, carbine, a knowledge of the horse—the veterinary art—to be united with a short course of mathematics, fortification and military drawing ; and a certificate from this college to be made an indispensable condition of all appointments to a regiment of cavalry—not excepting the household troops.
10. Exchanges from cavalry to infantry, and *vice versa*, to be strictly prohibited.
11. A first class certificate from the senior department of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, to be an indispensable qualification for every staff appointment, whether personal or general, and the personal staff of cavalry and infantry generals, to be selected exclusively from their respective branches of the service.

Reasons for the adoption of these several changes will be found spread over the commentary and appendix, supported, for the most part, by well-authenticated facts,

or the opinions of experienced and acknowledged authorities ; and I trust that the suggestions which I have thus ventured to submit to those who have the power to introduce improvements into an important arm of the service, will be received in the same spirit in which they are offered, namely, a sincere desire to render the British cavalry as effective in the field, as it is unquestionably superior in appearance, physical force, equipment, intrepidity, and all that relates to the *matériel* and *personnel* of mounted soldiers—to any cavalry in the world.

LOTA PARK,
Cork, June, 1855.

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ON THE USES AND APPLICATION
OF
CAVALRY IN WAR.

CHAPTER I.
TACTICS—STRATEGY.

A DEFINITION.

SO MANY opinions have been expressed upon the subject of tactics, strategy, and the art of commanding armies in general, that the young soldier, who has not been supplied with the necessary preliminary information, must receive therefrom confused and incorrect ideas.

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I.

The different opinions which have been expressed upon the subject of tactics and strategy, are the natural consequences of the progressive improvement in the art of war. The heavy tactics of Tilly, which were pre-eminent at the beginning of the 17th century, gave place to the improved system of Gustavus Adolphus; the courteous tactics of the "Augustan age" yielded to the progress of science and the genius of the great Frederick, and the wars of the French revolution introduced a rapid and vigorous mode of making war, which far exceeded the former methods in effective results. Napoleon's brilliant campaign in Italy in 1797, marks the commencement of this system, the distin-

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Alison, iv.
184.
Creasy, 38,
note.

guishing features of which were accumulating troops in a central situation, separating the wings of the enemy, and thus with general inferiority of numbers, bringing rapidly a larger force upon the detached body than the enemy could oppose to it at that point. Thus did Napoleon conquer at Monte Notte, Mondovi, Lonato, Medola, Rivoli, Arcola, &c.; and thus, in a manner that excited the surprise of all Europe, in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. But the ex-Emperor has not the merit of originating this system of tactics, for the great Theban general Epaminondas, the victor of Leuctra and Mantinea, three hundred years before the Christian era, acted on the plan of concentrating an overpowering force upon some decisive point of the enemy's line, while he kept back or "refused" the weaker part of his own.

The qualifications which a consummate general should possess, may be divided into two branches, one of which can be acquired, but the other must be innate: that is to say, into the scientific part, or that which can be mathematically constructed, and into the philosophical part, or that which depends upon the sound judgment of a well regulated understanding. The difference is as great as that which exists between the knowledge of a thing and the ability to carry it into execution; but the possession of one only of these qualities falls short of the ideal, and both united in one man are indispensable to form the perfect general.

The greatest generals have always been scientifically educated. Cæsar, Turenne, Montecuculi, Frederick II., &c., were all authors.

Xenophon deserves a high place in the list of literary commanders: the *Cyropædia*; the History of the retreat of the ten thousand Greeks; the continuation of the History of Thucydides—all shew that the author was not only a skilful commander, but an elegant historian. Pyrrhus has

generally been considered one of the greatest masters in the art of war, even Hannibal spoke of him as the most learned and greatest captain that had ever existed. In modern times the Archduke Charles of Austria, Bulow and Jomini have ably laid down the rules of modern tactics, and so far as the art of war is capable of being established upon fixed principles, have clearly defined and demonstrated it.

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I.

Grundsätze
der strategie.
Traité des
grandes
operations
militaires.

It has been observed that the greatest generals have often composed regulations, wherein they have entered into the most minute details of the service, while, on the other hand, men who have never commanded a company, have written on the higher branches of tactics, and given instructions for the remodelling of entire armies: nay, many only sit behind their desks, and draw up critical military histories out of the despatches of the army.

The axioms, abstract ideas, and mathematical formula relating to war, are to be treated as a science, to be logically developed and laid down as principles; but the talent to apply these principles at the head of an army, to employ practically that which the science of war teaches theoretically, is more than science—it is that great art which Theobald calls the *transcendental* part of the art of war.

It is a partial undertaking to describe a war in which one has not served, and the facts of which have not been received from the general commanding. The commander in chief of an army is always dependant on the commissary-general. The commissariat rules the decisions of the general with despotic power.

Observers who are distant from the scene of action, are always apt to blame the general who does not meet their eager interest in events by rapid movements, and a quick succession of engagements, ignorant of the endless

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difficulties that are opposed to him—great falls of rain—impassable roads, which often in one week, change the moral condition of the troops in such a manner as to render them scarcely recognizable. When the soldier, exposed to all weathers—marching through morasses by day; lying on the wet ground in cold nights; in tattered clothes, barefoot, wretched and miserable; the horses without shoes or forage, the soldier struggling against hunger in consequence of the provision waggons being unable to proceed;—in fine, when an army combats all these disadvantages, and therefore becomes paralyzed in its operations, the distant critic remains ignorant of the facts, because the commander of the army refrains, out of prudence, from stating in his official reports, the real condition of the troops. It is usual, and easy, to judge by the result, and not by the preceding circumstances. *

Rogniat.
St. Cyr. ap.
Alison, xi. 24,
84, 89, 303,
301.

Want of magazines and a deficient commissariat have been productive of greater losses to armies than severity of weather or casualties in action, a striking evidence of which was exhibited in Napoleon's Russian campaign. The enormous losses of the French army on that fatal occasion have been generally attributed to a more than usually severe and early northern winter, but the fact is that November had opened before snow fell, and previous to that month, five sixths of the army had perished from famine and disease. Rogniat estimates these losses at not less than 245,000 men and 70,000 horses; so that the effective strength of the large multitude of armed troops which crossed the Niemen on the 24th June, numbering upwards of 300,000 men and 100,000 horses, became reduced before the commencement of the winter, to 55,000 men and

* Voltaire says, "Un general victorieux n' a point fait de fautes aux yeux du public, de même que le general battu à toujours tort, quelque sage conduite qu' il ait tenu." Also Frederick the Great: "In truth *fortune* alone determines *fame*; he who is favoured by her is applauded; he who is slighted by her is condemned."

12,000 horses. By the march through Lithuania alone, and before any casualties in action had taken place, the French lost one third of their number; so that little is really to be ascribed to the climate, but everything to Napoleon's tortuous maxim, that "War should support War." By the attempt to carry out this wretched doctrine his army lost more men than might have been expected in the most sanguinary campaign, before the greater part of it had ever seen the enemy, and to this also may be attributed the horrifying fact that after the bloody battle of Borodino (Sep. 7, 1812,) the very wounded of the French army, numbering 38,000 men, had no other food than horse flesh! In short the French Emperor had rashly precipitated himself into the heart of an enemy's country without magazines or provisions, and the want of these, independent of any difficulties from climate, would have obliged him to retire, even if Moscow had never been destroyed.

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Alison,
xi. 94, 64.
et seq.

There is no art that requires greater natural gifts than the art of war: mind and body must here co-operate, and both must be sound and vigorous. The talent to seize, as it were, with a glance, the advantages or disadvantages which may arise from the situation of ground or troops, and to single them out from all other objects (*coup d' œil*)—this characterizes the man born to become a general.

This *coup d' œil*, namely, that comprehensive one, which, in unexpected results, and in the most violent changes of fortune and calculation, enables the general to discern quickly and to judge correctly of his situation, and then with firm determination, to extort, as it were, from fortune, that which she will not freely give; or prudent and judicious, to extricate himself from a dangerous position—this is not to be acquired; this can be reduced to no general *formula* or be delineated upon plans and "black

boards." but is, in the strictest sense of the word,
CHAP. I. *military genius!*

The author does not appear to be supported in this position by writers on tactics, the most eminent of whom admit that the *coup d'œil*, although generally a natural gift, may also be acquired. In the *Nouveau Dictionnaire Militaire*, the *coup d'œil* is stated to be "sometimes a gift of nature, but also the fruit of study, application, and a sincere desire to do well"; it is, after all, says the author, "secret judgment." Guibert observes:— De là il s'ensuit que les officiers superieurs ne sçauroient trop s'attacher a *former* le coup d'œil des officiers qui sont a leurs ordres, à exercer euxmêmes le leur, a le fortifier contre les illusions que les differences de terrain produisent, &c.

The Chevalier Folard gives us, "Le coup d'œil réduit en principes et en methode."

The King of Prussia issued special instructions to his officers of cavalry relative to the coup d'œil.

The author of the "Military Mentor" devotes a whole Chapter to "acquiring the coup d'œil;" Cyrus is said to have pursued hunting in his youth more for the purpose of *acquiring* the coup d'œil than for the pleasures of the chase. But nothing can be more conclusive than the opinion of that able and experienced general the Archduke Charles, who thus treats the question:—

Grundsätze
der Strategie.

"But that penetrating *coup d'œil* which embraces all things, is possessed by him only who, by profound study, has sought out the nature of war, who has acquired a perfect knowledge of its rules, and who is, as it were, identified with its science. The faculty of deciding with confidence is only to be found in that man whose own experience has proved to him the truth of acknowledged maxims, and who knows how to apply them; in fine, who feels in his positive knowledge, "a conviction of the infallibility of his judgment." The coup d'œil appears to exist totally independent of ocular vision, or at least, perfection of sight: Alexander the Great, Gus-

tavus Adolphus, Frederick II., and Napoleon—all possessing the military coup d'œil to the greatest extent—were *short sighted*. “La” says Segur, “couché sur ses cartes, dont sa *vue courte* le forçait de se rapprocher ainsi, Napoleon suivait des yeux l’armée Russe.” Dumourier was nearly blind when he was last employed. Davoust was so near-sighted that at the battle of Auerstadt in 1806, he could neither see the Prussians nor the position which they occupied, and yet, although their force was nearly double that of the French, Davoust was the conqueror. “Malgré cet inconvenient,” says the Marquis de Chambray, the accomplished author of “Philosophie de la Guerre,” “Davoust fut un des generaux de Napoleon qui acquit le plus de gloire par le succès qu’il obtint.”

CHAP.
I.

Chambray,
192.

Zisca, the famous general of the Hussites, “whose name,” Mosheim tells us, “became a terror to his enemies,” gained his most celebrated battles of Kamnitz and Ausig, when totally *blind*. “Ne pouvant,” says Folard, “plus voir par les yeux du corps, il voit tres clair des yeux de l’esprit.” Gilpin after describing the wound which so nearly proved fatal to the veteran, thus continues:—“He was now totally blind; his friends, therefore, were surprised to hear him talk after his recovery, of setting out for the army, and did what was in their power to dissuade him from it, but he continued resolute.” At the battle of Kamnitz, January 13, 1422, he appeared in the centre of his first line, guarded, or rather conducted by a horseman on each side, armed with a pole axe. When his officers informed him that the ranks were all well closed, he waved his sabre round his head, which was the signal for battle, and his troops, rushing to the charge, completely defeated the Imperial army. At Ausig his extraordinary presence of mind and well directed rebuke, prevented the retreat of his irresolute troops, and changed the fortune of the day. His masterly retreat from Prague, soon after, at the head of a little band of 400 men, who were obliged to cut their way through some thousands of the enemy, is an almost unparalleled instance of judgment and intrepidity.

Guibert
Folard. Grun-
dsätze der
Strategie.
Segur l. 79.
Chambray.
192. *Diarium*
Belli Hussi-
tici. Gilpin's
Lives of
Reformers.
Theobald.
L'Enfant.
Hist. de la
guerre des
Hussites.

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I.

But genius must be cultivated—without reflection and actual experience, without being corrected and enriched by science, genius can only be considered a happy natural talent.

Grundsätze
der Strategie.

“We shall find,” says the Archduke Charles, “proofs sufficient in the pages of history, that those commanders of armies whose talent was rather *acquired* than natural have, when they have united perseverance and boldness with discernment in their projects, triumphed over those who had nothing beyond *genius* to trust to.” Perhaps, after all, the rarity of great generals is more owing to want of opportunity, than to the absolute deficiency of men possessing the talent to command. It has been said that “the situation makes the man,” and we see frequent instances of persons filling high public stations with credit and even distinction, who, without having been given opportunity or the means of shewing what they could do, would probably, have carried on “the noiseless tenor of their way” to the end of the chapter.

Tactics are the art of placing troops in positions for battle, and of manœuvring them with advantage. Simple positions and movements of troops are called evolutions; the combination of evolutions is called a manœuvre; and the art of applying these manœuvres to the operations of war, in such a manner as to obtain the object in view, is called tactics.

Strategy is the science of designing and determining the plan and course of operations of a war. Tactics are the *art*, strategy is the *science* of war. The science being the product of the understanding, can only be acquired by study; but innate talent is requisite for the art. This doubtless may and must be cultivated, yet never can be acquired by those who are deficient in natural abilities, no more than a man can be a great

musician without having any natural talent for music. This is self evident; and daily experience shews that, on many occasions, extremely well informed officers, who have composed unexceptionable plans of operation, possess neither the talent to conduct nor to dispose their troops in the field of battle: nay, many officers of high rank are incapable of manœuvring a squadron on parade, while, on the contrary, men who are unable to form any plan of operations, often lead their troops to victory with wonderful ability.

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Napoleon, we are told by Segur, never devised any other than a "vague plan," when he had a great object in view, and Suwarroff had no plan of operations but a sort of instinct which taught him to seek out the enemy, wherever he was to be found. And yet so highly were the strategical abilities of this wonderful man estimated by Moreau (an unexceptionable judge) that he is stated to have said, "Je donnerais toutes mes campagnes pour celle de Suisse de general Souwarroff." The Russian veteran was at this time 70 years old, showing, as in the cases of Marshal Radetzky, Blucher, and others, that nominal age is no barrier to efficiency in the field, when vigour of mind and body, personal courage and indomitable perseverance still exist. Suwarroff, says Alison, "was, perhaps, the only general, after Marlborough, who never sustained a defeat."

Segur. Hist.
de Souwarroff
455.

Alison, v. 52.

The line of demarcation between strategy and tactics is thus still more closely drawn: strategy is the design, tactics the actual execution of the operations of war.

Tactics or the art of war, require high and rare natural talents; strategy or the science of war, an acute and well regulated understanding.

Great experience and actual warfare are necessary to the formation of the tactician—in peace, the place of

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exercise, and the autumn drill are his school ; but the strategian can continue his studies throughout all seasons, in his room, for tactics are the talent of commanding troops, strategy the science of forming a plan for the operations of war.

Puysegur i.
Avant propos,
p. 2.

Puysegur makes the same distinction: " On peut sans guerre, sans troupes, sans armées, et sans être obligé de sortir de chez soi, par l'étude seule, avec un peu de géométrie et de géographie, apprendre toute la guerre de campagne, depuis les plus petites parties jusqu'aux plus grandes."

The union of art and science in one general forms the perfect commander.

The difference between art and science is clear in itself: when the human mind produces works which strike the senses and that not by judgment and inference, but solely by means of an innate power of invention and creation, in such a manner that certain universal principles can be from thence deduced and systematically laid down, that is an *art*; when, on the other hand, chiefly by the aid of higher intellectual powers, a system of truths is deduced by means of correct combinations of the most simple and undeniable principles, and becomes established—that is a *science*.

Art changes or renews itself as often as the elements from which it originates. Music, painting, sculpture, for example, change in proportion as they degenerate or advance.

That which is scientific is, *a priori*, absolute and clear, and always exists unchangeable in itself.

Euclid's Elements of Geometry, after thousands of years, still remain an invariable standard.

This relates to pure (mathematical) science, built on self-evident truths, but the definition of art and science applicable to the present question may be reduced to the simple expression of *science* plans but *art* performs. The *theory* of music, for instance, is a science, the *practice* of it is an art; the one is speculative, the other mechanical, and the same distinction may be drawn between strategy and tactics.

Tactics, or the art of war undergo changes by every system which a new war may bring forth: strategy, or the science of war, acts always by unchangeable rules.

The object of war is ever the same; but the means of carrying it on is subject to change.

The tactics of the ancients consisted in pressure and percussion. The invincible Macedonian phalanx was, however, obliged to yield in the end to the tactics of the Romans; the perfection of fire arms has done away with deep formations; the heavy fire of artillery has changed walls into ramparts; and the invention of *ricochet* firing has added *traverses* to them: the wars of the French revolution mark the seventh period in the art of war since the invention of gunpowder, and it will not be the last.

Strategy containing acknowledged truths, indicates on every theatre of war the points and lines which, in defensive warfare, must be maintained. It is not in the power of the general to alter these strategical points and lines; he who deviates from them will always be obliged to yield to him who conforms to them, unless the one commander can advance with such superior force from his bases of operation that the defensive rules of his adversary become inapplicable. If the superiority of one is so decided, he may, without risk, proceed by the shortest route to his last object of operation and there dictate

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 peace : neither fortifications nor armies can then check him in his gigantic course, and he can be conquered by nothing but a war of the people.

It is remarkable what trouble has been taken to point out and determine the line of demarcation between strategy and tactics : a difference has been made between strategical and tactical manœuvres ; nay it has been even maintained that manœuvres out of cannon shot, or out of the view of the enemy, were strategical, while those within this limit were tactical. It was further said that tactics treat of the movement of an army whose immediate object is an actual engagement, and that strategy, on the other hand, comprises the movements of an army so far as they are performed by marching : a difference has also been made between tactics and the art of war, and they have been represented as subjects of a totally different nature, whereas they are evidently one and the same thing.

In fine strategy has been rejected as an inappropriate term being derived from the Greek word *στρατηγος* which signifies the leader of an army, and the expression of higher and lower tactics has been substituted.

Great confusion has arisen from the attempt to define with accuracy the difference between strategy and tactics. Bulow describes the former as the science of the movements in war of two armies out of the visual circle of each other, or out of cannon shot ;—tactics the science and movements made within sight of the enemy, or rather the reach of his artillery. The Prussian general, however, soon after, becomes entangled in his own definitions, for he tells us that the advance in order of battle previous to an action is a part of tactics, while he allows that this movement may be made out of the reach of the enemy's cannon. It may also evidently take place out of

Bulow
 translated by
 Malortie.

sight of the front of his line, which is the explanation given by the author, of the term "visual circle." There are also cases, he admits, in which an army may be so near an enemy that although there is no possibility of being perceived by him, it is nevertheless necessary to be in a state of defence and prepared to manœuvre, as for instance, by night or in a wood. Such manœuvring would, according to the above definitions, come under the head of *strategy*, whereas it is obviously an operation of tactics.

"Strategy," says the Archduke Charles, "is the *science* of war : it constructs plans and determines the march of military enterprises ; it is, properly speaking, the science of commanders in chief. Tactics, are the *art* of war ; they teach the manner in which great designs can be executed." Again : "Strategy prepares battles, and leaves to tactics the trouble of gaining them." The French translators of the Archduke's work do not appear to be at all satisfied with these definitions, and make the following remarks : "La distinction faite par l'auteur pour définir deux branches d'une même science nous paroît un peu trop recherchée. Pourquoi ne pas dire que la stratégie est l'art de diriger des masses sur les points décisifs, et la tactique celui de les y engager." This view would reduce each branch to an *art* ; but count Bismark's definition is more comprehensive ; Tactics are the *art*, strategy is the *science* of war.

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I.

Principes de
la Stratégie
traduit de
l'Allemand.
I.—41.

A military operation can only be considered correct when it is designed and executed according to the principles of strategy and tactics : that is to say when, first, the most powerful objects and lines have been selected according to the principles of strategy, ensuring perfect safety of operation ; and secondly, when the movement and position of troops, whether on a march, in position, or in cantonments, is conducted according to those rules of tactics which permit of an advantageous engagement at any moment.

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Every military operation and every manœuvre must therefore, be established upon the principles of strategy, and executed according to the art which we are taught by tactics.

If strategy designs not only the general plan of operations of a campaign, but also that of each particular operation in it—the determined points and lines, the possession of which is necessary in order to gain the intended object ; tactics teach by what positions, movements, and engagements, these projects of strategy can be accomplished.

When a general neglects the application of strategical principles, we see battles take place which have no other object than to increase his military reputation by a new victory.

History tells us of entire campaigns in which several bloody battles have been fought, without any important results ; because those battles did not take place upon strategical points.

As well in regard to strategy as tactics, every military operation may be divided into three parts, viz. :

Strategical. 1st—the subject or basis of operation ; 2nd, the object ; and 3rd, the lines of operation.

Tactical. 1st Position ; 2nd Movement ; 3rd Engagement. By basis of operation is understood those strategical points which are connected with each other by means of roads of communication. These points must be fortified, in order to collect thereon the means indispensable to the carrying on of war, and to secure them against any operation of the enemy.

An army acts defensively when it confines itself to the maintenance of those strategical points, of which it is

already in possession ; while, on the other hand, its operations are offensive, when it advances from these points, in order to gain other strategical points.

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The points which are to be attained in offensive warfare are called objects of operation, and the roads by which they are attained, lines of operation.

CHAPTER II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CAVALRY.

CHAP.
II.

EVERY military organization consists in the accordance of three powers :

1st. The *physical* ; that is, the soldier in the years of vigorous manhood, well clothed, fed, and amply provided with all the materials for attack and defense.

2nd. The *moral*, or the courage and spirit of the soldier for, and in battle.

3rd. The *intellectual*, or the talent and genius of those in command.

The physical power is, as it were, the body, the moral power the mind, the intellectual power the very soul of the military organization.

The combination of these three powers can alone constitute a whole—a military being—an army. All are necessary to the existence of this being: two tones in music will not make a chord: if any one of these three powers be wanting, that being is, and continues to be, imperfect.

To proceed with the analysis: an army consists of three different descriptions of troops; artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

Each description is complete in itself; each has its distinct characteristic: the gunner, for example, is in

battle directed only by the art which he practises ; the infantry perform their duty quietly and collectedly ; the cavalry—impelled by excitement—boldly and impetuously.

From these characteristics may be deduced the qualifications which the leaders of the different arms should possess.

Many nations of antiquity were partial to cavalry, and so long as the art of war was still in its infancy, or more properly speaking, so long as the sword, bodily strength, dexterity and personal courage gained the victory, battles were generally decided by cavalry. It is, however, metaphysically true, that the fire of youth, which is so significantly personified by cavalry, soon subsides ; particularly since the judicious practice of the ancients has been departed from—that of giving the command of this arm to a person of youthful high-promising talent—to a truly warlike character.

The number of cavalry in the armies of ancient nations was always diminished as those nations advanced in civilization and military discipline. When the Roman discipline was at its height, that nation had little cavalry ; it was the same amongst the Greeks and Persians in the time of Cyrus, and under the empire of Alexander the Great ; and as the Roman discipline relaxed and their cavalry increased, the empire approached to its decline and fall. Amongst undisciplined and unenlightened nations, cavalry is the *first* arm ; amongst those where discipline and illumination have advanced, it is the *second* ; but a second so necessary to the operations of the first, that no victory can be completed without its assistance. Napoleon depended much upon his reserve cavalry, which rendered him brilliant service in the consular campaigns ; and the want of this force in 1813, marred many of his best planned enterprises. But the French Emperor appears to have had an exaggerated notion of the value of

Histoire
de Polybe.

Alison.
xi. 407.

horse, for we find him asserting emphatically to Las Cases, that cavalry, "supposing the men on both sides to be equal in number, equally brave, and equally well led, *must always break infantry*." If this opinion had been delivered previous to the battles of Quatre Bras and Waterloo, it would not be a matter of so much surprise, but when we recollect that the former was gained by the British almost without the aid of cavalry, while Ney brought 5,000 horsemen into the field, including the far famed cuirassiers of Kellermann; and that the utmost efforts of the most daring and devoted French cavalry at Waterloo, failed in repeated attempts to break the British squares,—we are at a loss to account for the ex Emperor's judgment. The battles of the Pyramids and of Mount Thabor would also, it might be supposed, have led him to a different conclusion, for here there was not only equality in bravery and leadership, but superiority in number, on the part of the Mamelukes, and yet the French squares remained invincible. At Mount Thabor (April 1799) 6,000 European veterans were opposed to 30,000 Asiatics, 15,000 of the latter being formidable cavalry; but Kleber, drawing up his little army in squares, maintained the unequal combat for six hours, until reinforcements arrived, and the Turkish cavalry were dispersed. At the battle of the Pyramids (1798) which decided the fate of Egypt, the most daring intrepidity of 7,000 Mamelukes could make no serious impression on the French squares; for although Dessaix's division, in consequence of having been entangled in a wood, was not completely formed when the foremost of the Mamelukes came upon them, and 30 or 40 of the assailants penetrated into the square, yet on the formation being completed before the main body of the horsemen arrived, a rapid fire of grape and musquetry drove them off. With dauntless intrepidity they pierced through the interval between Dessaix's and Regnier's divisions, and riding round both squares, strove to find an entrance; but an incessant fire from every front mowed them down as fast as they poured in at the opening. Furious at the unexpected resistance, the Mussulmen horse-

Siborne. 89.

Alison.
ix. 631, 632.

men dashed their horses against the rampart of bayonets and threw their pistols at the heads of the grenadiers; while many, who had lost their horses, crept along the ground and cut at the legs of the front rank with their scimitars. But in vain; multitudes perished under the rolling fire which Alison. iv. 587, et seq. issued incessantly from the serried files, and at length the survivors fled in consternation to their camp, and were finally routed with great slaughter, the victors losing only 200 men.

Amongst the antients, the general of cavalry was always the second in command of the army. This situation was given to men of the most brilliant genius, and was looked upon as the school of a commander in chief. Hannibal commanded the cavalry in his father's army, and when he became commander in chief, entrusted it to his brother Asdrubal.

The greatest commanders of modern times must have recognized this truth, for Seidlitz, in his thirtieth year, was made general of cavalry by his great King.

Buonaparte recognized and followed this maxim, but was less fortunate in his choice, for Murat was nothing but a bold soldier, without any talent for command.

"Murat," said Napoleon, "was a most singular character. O'Meara, in Alison. iv. 17, 18. He loved, I may rather say, he adored me. With me, he was my right arm—without me, he was nothing. Order Murat to attack and destroy 4,000 or 5,000 men in such a direction, it was done in a moment; leave him to himself, he was an *imbecile* without judgment. In battle he was, perhaps, the bravest man in the world: his boiling courage carried him into the midst of the enemy, covered with plumes and glittering with gold; how he escaped was a miracle, for from being so distinguished a mark, every one fired at him. Every day Murat was engaged in single combat with some of them, and returned with his sabre dripping

with the blood of those he had slain. He was a Paladin in the field, but in the cabinet, destitute of either decision or judgment."

More energy—more youth* is required for attack than for defense: defense is often merely a matter of necessity; a single man is easily excited to ward off an attack, but the attack itself always requires resolution; consequently attack pre-supposes more self confidence (so entirely the characteristic of youth) than defense.

The predominating principle of cavalry, however, consists in attack; for even in a defensive position, the real attack of the enemy can only be averted by an anticipatory attack.

Hist.
K. G. legion.
i. 161, et seq.

The truth of this principle was strikingly exhibited at the brilliant cavalry affair of Benavente in 1808, one of the few instances on record where one body of cavalry *awaited the charge* of another; and although the attacking squadrons were not so successful in the second charge as in the first, owing to the unfavorable nature of the ground, there can be no doubt that, all other things being equal, a body of cavalry that *awaits the charge* of another will surely be defeated, if attacked with boldness and impetuosity. The following were the circumstances, as communicated to the author by an eye witness, and the same details shew the admirable qualities of the Hanoverian hussars, as well as the prudence and boldness of their officers, which, as will be seen in the present instance, prevented the British cavalry from being surprised:—After the crossing of the Esla by Sir John Moore's army, Dec. 28, 1808, the 3rd hussars of the King's German legion remained as rear guard on the left bank until evening, when they also passed that river, and soon after midnight, the bridge was blown up. The hussars

* By *youth* nothing more is understood here than that strength of will which is peculiar to the truly military character at any age: there are youths of 60, and old men of 20.

were here promised a day's rest from the harassing duties of the rear guard, which they had performed with admirable fortitude and efficiency since the commencement of the retreat. A party of 20 only, under cornet von der Hellen, was taken to complete the outlying picquet; and the rest were ordered to unsaddle and make up their horses for the night, holding themselves in readiness to move off to the rear the next morning. Fortunately for the British cavalry, however, major von Linsingen took upon himself to modify this order, and directed that the horses of the third hussars should not be unsaddled; the river might, he thought, be forded, and the rear guard surprised: he, therefore, cautioned the men, by no means to consider themselves sure of being allowed to pass the night undisturbed.

The event verified this precaution. At day break the French were observed moving down towards the broken bridge, which proving impassable, they made several attempts to find a ford; but the swollen state of the river rendered these abortive, and they finally plunged into the stream and swam across.

Colonel Otway commanded the outlying picquet, and having sent to apprise Lord Paget (who commanded the cavalry) of the enemy's apparent intention, this active officer immediately called in his advanced posts, and gave orders that the main body of the picquet should join him without delay. These orders were not, however, promptly complied with, and the French, amounting to about 500 chasseurs of the Imperial Guard, had pressed in the detachments to within half a mile of Benavente, when colonel Otway fearing that the British cavalry might be surprised in their quarters, determined to make a stand with the small force of 60 men, which was at his disposal; and accordingly took up a position on the road where the mud walls of some gardens in the suburb afforded protection to his flanks, and there awaited the slow approach of the enemy.

Sixty men of the inlying picquet now came opportunely to the assistance of the detachments, and colonel Otway, seeing

that the enemy had halted one squadron considerably in advance of the rest, resolved to take advantage of this disposition, by charging the body thus advanced. The French squadron *awaited the charge*, and was completely routed, the officer commanding it being killed on the spot; but the rear squadrons coming up immediately in support, the picquets were obliged to retire to their former position. Meantime the alarm had been sounded in Benavente, and the 3rd hussars of the king's German legion, prepared by the prudent caution of their commanding officer, quickly repaired to the place of assembly. Without waiting for the general parade of the regiment, captain von Kerksenbruch and lieutenant Janssen hurried all the men they could immediately collect, amounting to nearly three troops, to the scene of contest; and increasing the effect of the small number by forming them in *rank entire*, these officers, by their prompt and judicious dispositions, enabled the retreating horsemen to prepare for a second charge. This attack, conducted by general Steward and colonel Otway, was, as the first, *awaited by the enemy*, but owing to the deep clayey ground through which the allied cavalry had to pass, did not produce a like impression on the French squadrons; great havoc was, however, made by the British sabre, and both sides becoming intermixed, a scene of desperate individual conflict ensued. The French had much the advantage in numbers, and the affair would probably have ended unfavourably to the allied cavalry, had not the main body of the legion hussars, under major Burgwedel, and the remainder of the outlying piquet arrived. Lord Paget, also, now galloped into the field, and having quickly restored the British squadrons to order, headed a third charge against the enemy. This was completely successful: the Imperial chasseurs were driven into the river, and many became easy marks for the carbines of their pursuers. Arrived on the opposite bank, however, the French spiritedly wheeled about, and succeeded in wounding some men by firing across the river; but meantime two pieces of British horse

artillery had unlimbered close to the bank, and the first shot falling in the midst of those that had rallied, soon decided their retreat. General Lefebvre Desnouettes commanded the French cavalry on this occasion, and was captured by a young private of the legion hussars, named Bergmann, who subsequently received the Guelphic medal and pension for his gallantry.

In this principle the characteristic of cavalry is directly contained; and hence it is easy to infer why this arm so seldom possesses generals of distinction, especially in those armies where chance or seniority appoints the generals of cavalry.

Without a bold commander, cavalry will furnish nothing worthy of remark for the annals of history; and a general who does not partake of this conviction, can only succeed when his adversary's ideas are more obscure and erroneous than his own, or when he is more unskilful and remiss.

If it must be allowed that cavalry in the last wars has seldom performed any actions of importance, or decisive of the battle, the cause is less to be attributed to the cavalry itself than to the generals who commanded it; and directly in this particular an injustice has been done, for the *species* has been blamed for what the *individual* has committed. The injustice has been continued, for the unskilful generals remained, and the cavalry sank continually lower.

Thus is the immortal neglected and sacrificed on account of the mortal—the cause on account of the person!

Meantime it was wished that the result of a battle should be less determined by chance, and attention was directed to the infantry, which although not so brilliant

in results, is yet more certain, and for that very reason is to be considered as the principal branch of an army. The excellence of infantry has remained nearly the same in all ages, whereas the cavalry always vacillated according to the talent of its commanders.

We very rarely meet in life with men at the same time rational and unreflecting; but many who are rational and reflecting.

The combination of "rational and unreflecting" appears somewhat paradoxical, and indeed the German terms *vernünftigen unbesonnenen*, scarcely admit of a comprehensible translation into English. The author evidently means to say that a man possessing reason and prudence seldom acts with vigour, enthusiasm, or what is commonly called *dash*. Murat was a *dashing* cavalry leader, but certainly not a *prudent* one, and the same may be said of many of the revolutionary generals, whose grand objects were *glory*, distinction and individual advancement, without reference to general results. Wellington possessed this rare combination in a remarkable degree.

Jones's
War in Spain.
14.

"The French commanders in Spain," says colonel Jones, "were little fitted to appreciate that combination of *prudence* and *boldness* so happily blended in the conduct of their opponent."—"This contrasted conduct offers the highest display of *prudence*, judgment and *boldness*, forming so pure an example of the legitimate use of battles, as must have been incomprehensible to the French commanders of the revolution, and by such they were constantly foiled, and the superior force under their command rendered of no avail." A somewhat analogous sentiment to that expressed in the text, occurs in Hamlet's instruction to the players:—"For in the very torrent, tempest, and, as I may say, whirlwind of your passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give it smoothness." Wallenstein seems also to have possessed this rare combination of antagonistic qualities.

Conspiracy
de Valstein.
636.

“To *boldness*,” says Sarazin, “or rather temerity, in the conception of his plans, he united *prudence* and activity in their execution.”

A sufficient number of able generals of infantry has been found at all times, in all armies, but very rarely *one* of cavalry.

The famous Macedonian phalanx withstood the numerous cavalry of Darius: the Swiss have proved that good infantry is invincible. The English in India and the French in Egypt never feared those swarms of cavalry which Lloyd considers the best, because they attack irregularly.

The English in India under Sir Eyre Coote (1767) Alison, iv. resisted, for weeks together, under a tropical sun, the incessant charges of Hyder Ali's formidable cavalry, a force to which his successes were mainly attributable, and Napoleon had no apprehension of the Mamelukes, so long as his infantry were steady and preserved their formation in square.

Murat was unable to overcome with his cavalry a close mass of ten thousand isolated Russian infantry which retreated like a blazing ball, on the 14th August, 1812, over the small plain, on the other side of Krasnoi.

This memorable evidence in favor of infantry is thus Alison. xi. 35, 36. graphically described by Alison:—“Marshals Ney and Murat who headed the leading column of the army, overtook near Krasnoi, general Newerofskoi, who with the rear guard of 6,000 foot and 1,200 horse, was slowly retreating in the direction of Smolensko. This little corps, which had been detached by Barclay to the other side of the Dnieper, found itself assailed on all sides by 18,000 horse, without the possibility of obtaining assistance from its comrades, who were on the opposite side of the river. The head of the

retreating column being overtaken and stopped by the light cavalry of the French, the horsemen who formed the advance were speedily driven into the ranks of the infantry, and the situation of the Russians was the more critical from the inexperienced nature of their troops, who were new levies that had never seen fire. Many generals in such circumstances would have deemed resistance impossible and proposed a surrender, but Newerofskoi thought only of his duty. Instantly forming his little army into two hollow squares, which were soon after united into one, he retired slowly and in admirable order over the immense open plains which adjoin the Dnieper, enveloped on all sides by innumerable squadrons, who charged them more than *forty* times during the day, and in some instances, *broke through the rampart of bayonets*, and cut down the Russian officers in the very centre of the square. Nevertheless they always formed again; and this little band of heroes, still forming a lesser square, when the larger was broken or weakened by loss, steadily retired ~~during~~ the whole day, repulsing by an incessant rolling fire the repeated charges of the French cavalry and at length, on the approach of night, reached Kortinia with unbroken ranks, though with the loss of 1100 men and 5 pieces of cannon."

It is amusing to read M. de Segur's apology for the French cavalry on this occasion. After stating the many ineffectual attempts of Murat to break the Russian squares, and admitting that the French cannon alone was able to "breach this living fortress," he thus concludes:—*La cavalerie Française eut l'honneur de cette journée. L'attaque y fut aussi acharnée que la défense opiniâtre; elle eut plus de mérite, n'ayant à employer que le fer contre le fer et le feu; le courage éclairé du soldat Français étant d'ailleurs d'une nature plus relevée que celui des soldats Russes, esclaves dociles, qui exposent une vie moins heureuse, et des corps en qui les frimas ont emoussé la sensibilité.*" To this frozen sensibility and docile slavery, however, the Russian general was indebted for the preservation of his little force.

When such examples are supported by the calculation of the expense of cavalry as compared with infantry, it naturally follows that the former loses daily in importance.

Cavalry will probably in future times, only maintain the rank of frigates, and will no longer occupy a place in the order of battle: it will only be considered serviceable in reconnoitering, for advanced posts, rear-guards, convoys, &c., until some eminent talent on a throne discerns its strength—out of the whole body of officers, places the ablest, most resolute, steady, and boldest at its head, and, in future wars, overcomes those nations, who, following the spirit of our time, (ever less productive in truly warlike characters) neglect the cavalry.

The first generals of every age were always impressed with a conviction of the importance of cavalry and sought to give it a preponderance. Epaminondas was indebted for the greater part of his fame, to the Thessalian cavalry; Philip and his son Alexander, sought the friendship and assistance of this celebrated cavalry, which so essentially contributed to their victories.

But all commanders of armies have not known how to derive advantage from cavalry, which is best suited to great and rapid enterprises, because but few possessed the art of seizing the true moment, when to employ and when to spare their cavalry.

Hannibal shines in both respects. If he employed his cavalry to great advantage on the day of battle—and his most brilliant victories, although not always gained by cavalry were yet, however, constantly prepared and completed by it—his attention was always directed, after the battle, to the preservation of this decisive, but very expensive and delicate description of troops. After the

battle of the Trasimenus, where he conquered Flaminius, and after he had penetrated to the territory of Adria, he had the horses washed with old wine, and bestowed great attention upon their wounds.

The Romans must have often paid dearly for the deficiency and bad condition of their cavalry; and Hannibal said that this cavalry appeared to him, as little to be dreaded, as if the hands and feet of the horsemen were tied.

This witticism which is attributed to Hannibal by Livy and Plutarch, arose from the extraordinary conduct of the Roman horse at the battle of Cannæ, where, immediately upon being engaged with the Carthaginian cavalry, they *dismounted and fought on foot!* This undeniable proof of their just claim to the title of dragoons, according to the definition of Doctor Johnson,* is thus recorded by Polybius: "When the Spanish and Gallic cavalry, advancing from the left wing of the Carthaginians, approached near the Romans, the contest that ensued between them was then indeed most warm and vehement, such as resembled rather the combat of barbarians than a battle fought by disciplined and experienced troops; for instead of falling back and returning again to the charge, as the custom was in such engagements, they were now scarcely joined when, *leaping from their horses, each man seized his enemy.*" Modern tacticians are at a loss to account for this strange manœuvre on the part of the Roman horsemen, who, being armed with swords not exceeding thirteen inches in length, could have had no chance in the *melée* against even indifferent cavalry. Yet antient writers state that the Romans were particularly successful in this mode of attack: "*Quo haud dubie superat Romanos*" says Livy. Niebuhr, however, seems to doubt not only the alleged advantages, but also the fact itself, reasonably observing that it was inconceivable "how, with their arms,

Hampton.
i. 216.

Niebuhr.
ii. 204, note.

* "DRAGOON, a kind of soldier that serves indifferently either on foot or horseback."

they could even be equal to troops of the line, to say nothing of deciding the battle." Cæsar tells us of that antient and warlike people, the Suevi, that they often dismounted during the battle, the horses being accustomed to *remain in their places and wait for them*. Many instances however, have occurred as well in antient as modern times of cavalry having been effectually opposed by dismounted horsemen : Procopius relates that two generals of the Emperor Justinian not having sufficient force to resist the Persian cavalry, caused their horsemen to dismount, and, forming on foot, to oppose their lances to the enemy's cavalry. "The Persians, halted, not knowing what to do ; they could not break the battalion of lancers, for the horses were frightened at the points that were presented to them, and the Persians retired in disgrace without producing any effect." The same want of confidence in the natural position of their mounted force appears to have occurred with the English at the battle of Crecy, where, according to Froissart, the King made a barricade of carts and waggons, behind which all the horses were placed, their riders being dismounted and fighting on foot. Péré Daniel also confirms this statement, and we find the same thing occurring at the battle of Cocherel in the reign of Charles V ; at Agincourt in 1415, and on several occasions in the reign of Charles VII,—tending to shew the unfitness of cavalry for positions of *defence*, however formidable in well timed and determined *attack*.

Comm.
L. iv.

Procop.
Sec. Hist.
c. viii.

Hist. Mil.
Française.
i. 323.

Hannibal—the renowned Hannibal was well acquainted with cavalry and knew how to take advantage of it ; even from the Numidian horsemen, than whom, according to historians, none of worse appearance could be found—and who may be compared to the Cossacks of the present day—Hannibal knew how to obtain great services.

The horses of these Numidians were small thin animals without saddles, and threw up their heads ; the horsemen,

who were badly clothed, managed their horses with a strap of leather or a whip.

On the Trajan column the Numidian horsemen are represented in a state of almost perfect nudity, having no covering but a small mantle like a capucins, without arms of either attack or defense, and in every respect having as little pretension to the name of cavalry as can be well imagined. Mountfaucou gives the following explanation of one of the figures, representing a horseman mounted on a small slight horse, from which a Roman soldier seeks to drag him by the hair of the head:—L' image qui suit nous représente un cavalier Numide, qu'un soldat Romain prend par les cheveux et abbat à terre: il a toutes les marques d'un cavalier de cette nation; tout son habit n'est qu'un petit manteau sur les épaules qui flotte en l'air, en sorte que son corps est tout nu, ce qui revient à ce que, dit Claudian, des cavaliers Numides, qu'ils branlent des javelots de la main droite, qu'ils étendent leur manteau de la gauche, et qu'ils sont nus. Il n'y a ni javelot, ni lance, cette arme lui sera apparemment tombée des mains. Le cheval n'a ni bride, ni selle, ni poitrail ni croupière à la manière des Africaines. Il ne faut point s'étonner qu'un grand homme à pied puisse prendre un cavalier Numide par les cheveux, car les chevaux des Numides, dit Strabon, sont petits, mais légers à la course; ils sont dociles à un tel point qu'avec une baguette on les mène comme on veut, et qu'il y en a même qui sans être attachée suivent leur maître comme des chiens." Folard treats this representation on the Trajan column as "*une pure reverie de sculpture*," and says he is persuaded that "although the Numidians might have been thus clothed in their own country, yet that in the armies where they served, they must have been lightly dressed." However this may be, and allowing for the imagination of the artist as regards the Trajan column, there appears to be no doubt that the Numidian cavalry managed their horses *without bridles*, for Polybius, in describing the order of battle at the Ticinus,

Montfaucou.
Antiq. Expliq.
T. iv. c. vii.
L. iii. p. 83.

expressly states, that Hannibal threw into the centre of his line, all the *bridled* and heavy cavalry, and placed the Numidians on the wings, that they might be ready to surround the Romans." Antient writers also call the Numidian horsemen "*gens inscia freni*" from this ignorance of the use of the bridle, which indeed, appears to have been common to all the African nations.

" Hic passim exsultant Numides, *gens inscia freni* ;
 Quis inter geminas per ludam mobilis aures
 Quadrupedem flectit non cedens virga lupatis."

Silins Italicus, lib. i. l. 215.

But we need not go beyond the Irish peasantry for an illustration of the practicability of managing a horse without a bridle—indeed of still more remarkable docility on the part of the horse, for in Connaught the rider may be seen guiding the obedient quadruped without even the assistance of a twig, but simply by means of the open hand applied to the neck of the animal ! Personal observation.

It was not until the victories of the formidable Hannibal had devastated Italy, that the Romans began to improve and increase their cavalry.

The battle in which the Carthaginian general Xantippus made Regulus prisoner was decided by cavalry. In this battle the Carthaginians had twelve thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry ; the Romans fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, the Romans were old tried soldiers ; Xantippus had just raised his army ; but he calculated on his cavalry,—chose a plain, and won the battle.

Xantippus was probably more indebted to his 100 ^{Hampton. i. 42.} elephants than to his 4,000 horses, on this occasion. The Roman infantry exceeded that of the Lacedæmonian general by 3,000 ; it was composed of veteran troops, and had been so admirably drawn up by Regulus, that no cavalry could

Lucian.

have made any impression on it; but the error which the Roman general committed in not leaving intervals between his columns, sufficiently great to allow the elephants of the Carthaginian army to pass through, brought on the destruction of his troops, and the loss of the battle; the greater part of the Roman infantry were trodden down under the enormous weight of the elephants. Antiochus Soter was indebted to the same means for his victory over the Galatians, but he was more candid as to the cause. When the Macedonians placed a crown upon his head, after the victory, he is reported to have said:—"We ought to blush with shame at boasting of a victory, of which sixteen beasts have all the merit."

Hannibal gained the battle of the Ticinus in Italy by his cavalry only.

This fact cannot be admitted as a proof of the relative superiority of cavalry over infantry. The battle of the Ticinus was virtually a *cavalry action*, for although Scipio brought some wretched light armed foot to support his cavalry, they took to flight at the commencement of the battle, terror stricken at the name, or formidable appearance of, the Carthaginian horse. The cavalry of Hannibal was always superior in *quality* to that of the Romans—the Numidians, half naked as they were, generally putting their opponents to the route—and at the battle of the Ticinus was so much so in *number* as considerably to outflank that of Scipio. The Carthaginians had also the stronger motive of fighting, as it were, for their existence; retreat was impossible, and death was preferable to submission: indeed nothing but the height of imbecility could have led Scipio to hazard an engagement under such disadvantageous circumstances.

Polybius expressly says: The Carthaginians owe not only their victory of Cannæ, but all their more early victories, to the preponderance of their cavalry, and

thereby gave a lesson to all nations, shewing how advantageous it is to surpass the enemy in cavalry.

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II.

This observation coming from so deservedly celebrated a writer as Polybius, is, doubtless, entitled to much weight, but closer enquiry would lead us to seek in other causes than their superiority in cavalry, the success of the Carthaginians. The defeat of the Romans at Cannæ, and on all other occasions in this war, appears to be more attributable to the ignorance of their generals and the want of discipline of their troops, than to any arbitrary proportion of the particular branches of which their armies were composed. If Varro had taken advantage of his superiority in numbers at Cannæ, by extending his line and outflanking Hannibal, instead of forming his legions into deep masses, and thereby diminishing his front, the result of the battle would, in all probability, have been very different. The conduct of the Roman consul on this occasion appears quite inexplicable. Completely deceived by the intended retreat of the skilful Carthaginian, whose inferior numbers gave him no hope for success but in stratagem, Varro not only suffered his centre to advance into the very heart of the enemy's line, but completed his own destruction by weakening his flanks to support it; until at length the whole of his numerous legions were caught in the trap which had been artfully prepared for them. Even when the consul perceived the stratagem of Hannibal, he made no effort to restore the battle, but betook himself to flight, and left the undisturbed possession of the field of battle to the enemy. The small superiority *in number* of the Carthaginian cavalry, which only exceeded that of the Romans by 400, could never have decided a battle where 40,000 infantry were opposed to almost double that number, which is the general estimate of the Roman force; in fact it was not until the Roman infantry had been already surrounded and thrown into confusion that Asdrubal, at the head of the Numidian horse, assisted to complete that destruction which the incapacity of Varro had brought upon the Roman army. The many defeats which the Romans experienced in their wars with Hannibal, have

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been principally caused by the want of ability on the part of the generals who commanded them: Scipio lost the battle of the Ticinus by his imprudence in attacking, without any support, a body of cavalry superior both in number and discipline to his own. Sempronius fell into the ambuscade which Hannibal had prepared for him at the Trebia, from the unpardonable oversight of omitting to reconnoitre the country in which he was about to be engaged. Flaminius, notwithstanding the example of his predecessor, fell a sacrifice to the same want of precaution at the Trasimenus, and Varro, at the battle of Cannæ, was an easy victim to the stratagem of his more skilful adversary. The disparity of the two armies in point of discipline and experience should also be considered: In the second Punic war the Roman soldiers were nearly all *new levies*, while the armies of their opponents were veteran or at least experienced troops. "From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war," says Adam Smith, "the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three great generals, who succeeded one another in the command, first in chastising their own rebellious slaves; afterwards in subduing the revolted natives of Africa; and lastly in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which Hannibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army. The Romans, in the meantime, although they had not been altogether at peace, yet had not during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence; and their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Hannibal encountered at the Trebia, Trasimenus, and Cannæ, were militia opposed to a standing army; and this circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than any other, to determine the fate of those battles."

Adam Smith.
iii. 62.

The best Roman generals of that time: Fabius, Plancus, &c., avoided plains on account of this deficiency in cavalry, and took up their positions upon hills.

Meantime the Romans sought to amend their errors and gradually to re-establish a proper proportion between their cavalry and infantry. At the battle of Zama in Africa, the cavalry of Scipio amounted to the fourth part of his army; that of Hannibal was smaller in number and therefore overcome; and when the victorious cavalry of the Romans, having returned from the pursuit, attacked the Carthaginian phalanx in flank and rear, twenty thousand men were cut down in one moment, and Carthage became subject to Rome.

The numerical superiority of Scipio's cavalry at the battle of Zama, no doubt contributed to complete his victory, and render it more brilliant, but the injudicious order of battle which Hannibal adopted, gave to his adversary those advantages to which he was principally indebted for success. Indeed the Carthaginian general seems to have been, on this day, deserted by his usual ability in tactics and fertility in resource. Instead of availing himself of his superiority in infantry by opposing Scipio with a greater force than that of the Roman army, he formed his troops into three lines without intervals. The ponderous columns of Scipio attacked the first line with impetuosity—drove it upon the second, which, being formed without intervals, was carried away by the fugitives of the first line, and if the soldiers of the third line had not presented their spears to their flying comrades, the whole army of Hannibal would have become one mass of confusion: Hannibal, says Folard, "*fut vaincu, et il devoit l'être.*"

Folard
Comm:
Polybe.

It would be easy to adduce instances from that great age in which the characteristic of cavalry shews itself like a splendid development of a powerful mind, which, since the use of fire arms has kept the combatants at a greater distance from each other, becomes more and more lost.

More importance is now attached to positions than to battles, and it is often considered greater—even more

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honorable, to avoid than to give battle. Examples always descend in their operation, and it is therefore not a matter of surprise that single divisions of troops should exhibit more skill in avoiding than executing a charge; indeed the instances of troops coming into actual contact, and fighting with the naked sword, become every day more rare. It is the age of prudence, for prudence is always the excuse of that body, which not awaiting the charge of the enemy, previously retires.

The recent brilliant victories achieved by the British arms in India and the Crimea furnish a practical commentary on the author's observations, shewing that, however distant from the age of chivalry, personal contact is not shunned in modern times, nor is "discretion" altogether admitted by European commanders to be "the better part of valour."

We dwell with pleasure on that brilliant period, when the system of chivalry was the system of war in Europe.

At this epoch tactics consisted in the combats of knights, personal bravery, bodily strength and dexterity determined battles: the knights were covered with iron, rode entire horses, carried lances, swords, and clubs.

We are powerfully arrested by the magnanimity of this (in its true meaning) iron age.

Strange as, what is termed, chivalry may now appear, still it must be allowed that it was high spirited to fight for opinions when they were regarded as true and just. Without some particular opinion no character is worthy of respect, and every independent mind is not without peculiarities and oddities. The more uniformity we meet with in the characters of individuals, the less national character exists: the individual Englishman is odd, but there exists in England a national character.

Fighting was pleasure to the old Knights, but they preferred fighting on account of their opinions ; the more the object had of the spirit of adventure in it, the more gratification did they experience. Religion which had its champions amongst them, was one of the strongest of these causes. Loyalty and friendship were held sacred by them, and the colours of their lady loves were the highest stimulants of their valour ; and although our young men of the present day become effeminate from love, and think they have a right to withdraw from danger on account of a wife and children, yet amongst the Knights, these circumstances stimulated their valour.

Tacitus tells us of the Germans :—" In the hour of danger it was shameful for the chief to be surpassed in valour by his companions—shameful for the companions not to equal the valour of their chief. To survive his fall in battle was indelible infamy. To protect his person and to adorn his glory with the trophies of their own exploits were the most sacred of their duties. The chiefs combated for victory—the companions for the chiefs ; The noblest warriors, whenever their native country was sunk in the laziness of peace, maintained their numerous bands in some distant scene of action, to exercise their restless spirit and acquire renown by voluntary dangers."

Who does not willingly dwell upon such noble images ? Surely we should not endeavour to destroy that which has descended to us from former times ; namely strength, and strength is needful to a nation !

The system of chivalry did not disappear at once, but assumed by degrees the form of our present cavalry. Charles VII. of France established the first standing cavalry in the year 1445.

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Hist.
Mil. Franc.
i. 153.

This organization was not made without considerable doubt and apprehension as to its success. "The King," says Père Daniel, "fit ce reglement après avoir beaucoup délibéré sur ce sujet à cause des inconvéniens qu' on apprehendoit. Le projet fut de réduire la gendarmerie à quinze compagnies, qui seroient commandées par autant de capitaines et entretenues en tems de paix, et en tems de guerre, et de congédier tout le reste."

This example was approved of, and could be so much the easier followed because the preponderance of the great monarchies no longer permitted knights to wage war on their own account. They, therefore, willingly entered into the service of others, by which they obtained occupation, pay, and at the same time, food for their ambition.

Of all the nations which have had cavalry as well in antient and modern times, the European and of them the German have brought it—if not in number, yet in internal organization—to the greatest perfection, and have executed with it the boldest enterprises.

The Poles, Hungarians, Mamelukes, and Cossacks would scarcely assent to the latter part of this doctrine, and as little is it in accordance with the bold achievements of the Mahratta horse in our early Indian wars. Almost all Hyder Ali's successes were gained by his cavalry, which an eloquent historian has described as "rivalling that of the Parthians in swiftness, equalling that of the Mamelukes in daring, and approaching that of the Tartars in numbers." The same authority tells us that the principal strength of the Turks, like that of other Asiatic nations, has always consisted in their cavalry, an observation more applicable to the former than the present period of their history. "Every Turk is by nature a horseman. From their earliest infancy they are accustomed to the saddle; from childhood upwards their horses are their companions; in youth their principal exploits and rivalry,

Alison
x. 447.

consist in the management of their steeds, and in mature years all their journeys are performed on horseback." There are great varieties however, it appears in the qualities of the Turkish cavalry, none being comparable to the Spahis who inhabit Mount Hæmus:—These are accustomed from their infancy "to climb the wooded declivities of their native hills, and early acquire an extraordinary skill and hardihood in the management of their horses. A Spahi will often ride at full gallop up hills, over torrents, through thick woods, along the edge of precipices or down steeps where an European cavalier would hardly venture to walk. This extraordinary boldness increases when they act together in masses. When so assembled, they dash down rocks, scale scours, and drive through brushwood in the most surprising manner. No obstacles intimidate, no difficulties deter, no disorder alarms them. The attacks of such bodies are in an especial manner to be dreaded in rugged or broken ground, where European infantry deem it impossible for cavalry to act at all. The heads of two or three horsemen are first seen peeping through the brushwood or emerging out of the steep ravines by which the declivities are furrowed. Woe to the battalion or division that does not instantly stand to its arms or form square on such vedettes appearing. In an instant 500 or 1000 horsemen scale the rocks—with loud cries they gallop forward upon their enemy—the Turkish scimitar is before their horses heads, and in a few minutes a whole regiment is cut to pieces." Such were the Turkish horsemen of Mount Thabor and the Pyramids, and the same daring characterizes their Asiatic brethren the Cossacks, who in 1813 had also acquired a more regular organization, so that they frequently broke squares and performed all the duties of regular cavalry. "But they shone as light troops:—Mounted on their hardy little horses they have frequently been known to travel 100 miles in the 24 hours, loaded with arms and plunder, and in the heaviest marching order they plunge into rivers, tread morasses, explore thickets, and cross the most fearful deserts, whether parched by the heats of summer, or charged with

Alison
x. 581.

CHAP.
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the snows of winter. No army with the Cossacks in its front need fear a surprise; none with them heading the pursuit of it can be secure against one, their velocity, activity and courage, render them peculiarly dangerous to a retreating, often fatal to a flying enemy. When the rear guard halts, and a respectable force collects to oppose their incursions, they never hazard an attack, but fly without hesitation, like the Parthians of old, till a more favorable opportunity of renewing the pursuit occurs; and when the enemy again retires, they press upon his retreating columns, inundate the country on all sides of his line of march, and are frequently to be seen a hundred miles in advance of the main body of the pursuing foe."

The Spaniards owed their victories at the conquest of America, next to their fire arms, principally to their cavalry, on account of the fear which the horses caused amongst the inhabitants of Peru and Mexico, to whom these animals were quite unknown; and in the revolt of the Spanish colonies from the mother country nearly all the victories of the Independents were gained by cavalry.

At the battle of Ceuta, gained by Prince Eugene over the Sultan Kaara Mustapha, the German cavalry cut down or drove into the Theisse, more than 10,000 Turks. When the Duke of Alba entered the Netherlands in 1567, he brought with him ten squadrons of lancers. This Alba was the first who brought his cavalry into such a state as to act with order, and in masses; but his opponent Maurice of Nassau exceeded him. Being at first deficient in cavalry the Netherlands caused troopers to be raised in Germany who had neither complete armour nor lances, yet signalized themselves under the name of German horse: even the French called them *reiters* (horsemen.) From the superiority which Maurice gave this cavalry he conquered in the fields of Tornhout, Tiel, &c.

At the battle of Leipsic or Briettenfeld, Sept. 7, 1631, Gustavus Adolphus had great apprehensions of the excellent Austrian cavalry, which under the command of the bold Pappenheim, appeared formidable. His own cavalry, nine thousand in number, was not inferior in discipline and bravery to the cavalry of Tilly, which amounted to thirteen thousand, but it was not so well mounted. If Tilly lost this battle, in which both armies were of equal strength, namely thirty-seven thousand men, the cause is not to be attributed to his cavalry, but to the faults which he himself committed, and which the bravery of his veteran regiments could not repair.

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Naylor states that Gustavus could not conceal his uneasiness, when he compared the accoutrements of his own cavalry with those of the Imperial cuirassiers, the latter being completely cased in iron, and mounted upon large and powerful chargers, while his own were, for the most part destitute of armour and mounted upon horses comparatively weak and diminutive.

Civ. & Mil.
Hist.
Germany
i. 155.

Historians do not agree as to the numbers of the contending armies at this battle. Harte who professes to follow Chemnitz, says that "the Swedish army consisted of 8,000 foot and 7,000 horse, the Saxons in nearly equal strength, though 4,000 were cavalry." The Imperial army he puts down at 44,000. Gualdo makes the force of the allies 40,000, while Puffendorf contents himself with saying "Supra septuagintá quinque millia bellatorum patentissima planitie concurrebant."

Harte.
Gualdo 19.
Puffendorf
iii. 29.

The error of Tilly appears to have consisted in directing his efforts against the fugitive Saxons, without attending to the situation of Pappenheim, who had been repeatedly repulsed by the Swedish right wing—forming his infantry into ponderous masses, thereby contracting his front and exposing himself to be turned; and placing his artillery in such a situation as to render it, in a great measure, unavailable. It must, however, be recollected that Tilly was

CHAP. completely forced into this battle by the impetuosity of
 II. Pappenheim; and that his character, at this period, had
 undergone a complete revolution. According to the evidence
 of contemporary writers "his courage and confidence, the
 result of victory in thirty-six decisive engagements, at once
 forsook him, and the guilt of Magdeburg overshadowed his
 soul, leaving it a prey to the most gloomy anticipations."

Schmidt
 v. 4.
 Harte ii. 16.
 Puffendorf
 iii. 29.

Charles XII. paid much attention to his cavalry, and taught them to perform evolutions with extraordinary rapidity. In 1767 he rode two horses to death at the review of a regiment; in the winter of 1705 he compiled a new regulation book: indeed the cavalry under this monarch, acquired a distinction till then unknown, and he brought it to such perfection in the northern wars, that it became quite formidable.

But in the reign of Frederick the Great, the cavalry reached its highest perfection and was truly invincible.

Under the command of general Seidlitz, the cavalry no longer appeared as a stop-gap, and frequently an inactive one in the line of battle, but as an active operator in the victory, which, like the overflowing stream, carried away and destroyed everything before it with irresistible force; but Seidlitz always kept a mass of cavalry together, and possessed the secret of hitting the right time for boldness and that for precaution. How bold and brilliant he appears at Rosbach and Zorndorf, how circumspect and cautious at Kunersdorf?

Seidlitz was certainly a perfect cavalry general: a century often passes over before a second is found in the same army: this is no hypothesis—it is experience.

Frederick William von Seidlitz was born at Klene, 1722. When yet a boy his many adventurous pranks announced the future bold horseman. At seven years old he rode

between the sails of a windmill in full action; in 1738 he entered the king's service, and was taken prisoner in the first Silesian war, but soon after liberated. At the age of 23 he was promoted to the rank of Major; took the Saxon general von Slichtling prisoner at the battle of Hohenfriedburg; and particularly distinguished himself at the battle of Sorr in 1745. In 1755 he was colonel commandant of a cuirassier regiment; at the battles of Lowositz and Collin he confirmed his former reputation; in 1757 he drove Marshal Soubise out of Gotha in such a hurry, that he was able to entertain his king with the dinner that had been prepared for the dainty Frenchman. His boldest and most successful enterprise was at Rosbach in 1757, where he commanded the whole cavalry and gained that memorable battle. Frederick, in deserved acknowledgment of his services promoted him in his 35th year, to the rank of lieutenant-general, and made him a knight of the Black Eagle. After the battle of Zorndorf where he took several batteries with his cuirassiers, the king embraced him and said: "For this victory also I have to thank you." After the surprise at Hochkirk he covered the retreat; at the battle of Kunersdorf he was obliged to leave a well selected position, in consequence of an order from the king; the battle was lost, Seidlitz was wounded and brought to Berlin. The loss of this battle having been openly attributed to the untimely order which the king had given, Frederick became cold towards Seidlitz, and did not allow him to take any part in the war for some time; they were, however, soon after reconciled, and Seidlitz concluded his war-like deeds at the victory of Friedberg in 1762: he died in 1773.

Under the statue of this distinguished cavalry officer in Berlin is the following inscription: "This is the image of the noble Seidlitz, general in the Prussian service. Of friends of men the kindest—of heroes, the bravest: he loved his king; he loved truth: too great for honours obtained by flattery; too great for riches obtained by plunder: benevolent, he spared the lives of men—brave, he never

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II.

Real
Encyclopædie
ix. 69, 70.

CHAP. spared his own. Warriors cut roses for the altar with your
 II. swords—generals, sacrifice—friends, weep.”

A great cavalry general—that is to say a general who possesses the talent of manœuvring masses of cavalry, is as rare a phenomenon as a great commander in chief. The movement of cavalry requires a quick *coup d’œil*—a calm firm mind—a boldness sometimes rash, sometimes cautious—in a word much talent.

Often is boldness, which decides when exhibited at the proper time, destructive when the general excites himself and his troops unseasonably.

The movement of cavalry at a trot is three times quicker than that of infantry in quick march ; therefore Ziethen’s answer to his king applies to a cavalry general—“ The moment I see the enemy my dispositions are already made.”

Life of
 Ziethen,
 translated by
 Beresford.

Ziethen was one of the favourite generals of Frederick the Great, and colonel of the celebrated “ Death’s head hussars.” He served upwards of 70 years, and died in 1806 at the age of 86, “ uniting,” says his biographer, “ wisdom with courage, contempt of danger with perseverance, dexterity with presence of mind, and activity with the most perfect command of temper: He conceived his plans with the progressiveness of the rising storm, and executed them with the rapidity of the thunderbolt.” His passion for a military life betrayed itself at a very early period. “ Whenever a soldier passed through his native village (Wustrau) on furlough, a circumstance that rarely happened, young Ziethen followed him closely, could never sufficiently admire him, and eagerly sought to imitate and resemble him. At this period the Prussian soldiers wore their hair in a *queue*; and every Saturday young Ziethen obtained his father’s leave to go to Ruppín, a German mile from Wustrau, where a soldier of the garrison with whom he had become acquainted,

dressed his hair *à la Prussienne*, and made him a large *queue* well stiffened and powdered, which served to ornament him for the ensuing week: Ziethen was, at this time, only nine years of age.

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As this work is intended to treat merely of the tactics of cavalry, the author cannot be expected to describe the intelligence and higher professional knowledge which generals of infantry require, especially in unfortunate actions, out of which infantry has so much more difficulty in retiring than cavalry.

The reputation of cavalry, for instance, is not effected if it retires even in disorder, after a repulse, whereas obstinate perseverance is required from the infantry. Even under the most unfavorable circumstances, infantry can never suffer itself to fall into disorder with impunity; and once in disorder—once thrown out of position, order is difficult to re-establish.

Imprudence committed with cavalry is not followed by such fatal consequences, and cavalry even put to flight, often re-appears in a few moments confident and victorious. This is caused by the rapidity of its movements; whereas, and precisely because of the slow movement of the infantry, the most experienced presence of mind is required to perceive the true moment that determines battles.

An open flat country is the ground upon which cavalry appears in its full perfection. Great rapidity in all manœuvres is its first and most eminent quality, and by which it has obtained that superiority which so many fields of battle testify. But a leader is necessary on whose personal qualities rests the inexhaustible source of all successes.

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This has been acknowledged time out of mind—acknowledged even by those who were prejudiced against the cavalry; as for example, Folard, who is, forsooth, convinced of the worthlessness of cavalry, and believes that an army can operate right well without it, but, however, with great *naïveté* confesses that cavalry which is good and brave, and whose commander knows its strength, and has courage to put it in motion, would at any time ride down extended battalions.

“Infantry,” says Folard in another place, “can never stand against cavalry, particularly since the former have given up the use of the pike.” In the Spanish wars of the succession in 1701, an officer of that nation was seen to dash with one hundred horses, through a battalion of English (which are certainly not despicable troops,) and to return back, in order to renew the attempt.

It is to be regretted that the author has not given any authority for, or particulars of, this remarkable achievement on the part of the Spanish horse, who certainly never exhibited such an evidence of the characteristics of cavalry during the Peninsular war. On the contrary, they appear to have been far from efficient. The Spaniards fought well behind walls or in their native fortresses, as Guerillas, but want of discipline was fatal to their general operations, and without the Swiss and Walloon guards the victory of Baylen would not have graced their arms. However at the period alluded to by the author, the Spanish cavalry must have enjoyed considerable reputation for we find Folard stating:—
“Si la cavalerie Espagnol connoissoit sa force, il n’y a rien qui pût lui résister, a moins que de combattre dans un endroit reserrée en lignes redoublées, et avec tant de troupes qu’ on pût la casser et rompre la violence de son choc avant qu’ elle put atteindre a la dernière. Quant a l’infanterie, elle ne sauroit jamais résister contre cette cavalerie, encore

moins depuis la suppression des piques.” The German term, *Spanische Reuter* applied to *chevaux de frize*, would seem, however to imply that the Spanish cavalry were employed more in defence than attack, an application far from characteristic of cavalry.

Also general Lloyd, who is against having much cavalry in consideration of its expense and little utility, contradicts himself eight pages afterwards, and says, “If your infantry is bad, your cavalry and infantry must be increased, as these are two means of keeping the enemy at a certain distance.”

Montecuculi was well acquainted with the superiority of cavalry. “The most important act of an army,” says the general, “is the battle, and the most effective force which operates therein is the cavalry: it must consequently decide the event. If the cavalry be beaten, the battle is irretrievably lost: if, on the other hand successful, the victory is always complete.

And yet the same author tells us:—“L’infanterie est comme la base et le soutien de l’armée, soit pour les batailles, soit pour les sieges, et c’est avec elle que les Romains et les Suisses on fait des choses si admirables. L’infanterie doit donc faire la principale force, et la plus grande partie de l’armée!”

The battle of Würzburg in 1796, supports this position; it was determined by cavalry; but from the battle of Marengo in 1800 may be learned how ineffective cavalry is when deficient in a suitable leader.

The battle of Würzburg was no doubt, decided by cavalry, and determined the campaign, but it should be recollected that, on this occasion, 30,000 French, of all arms, were opposed to 31,000 Imperial infantry and 13,000 splendid cavalry. “The French were drawn up on the right bank of

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Alison.
iv., 189, 184.

the Maine, from Würzburg to Schweinfurth partly on a series of heights which formed the northern barrier of the valley, and partly on the plains which extended from their foot to the shores of the river. Jourdan imagined that he had only to contend with a part of the Austrian force, and that the Archduke had returned in person to make head against the republicans on the Danube, but, instead of that the Austrian prince had rapidly brought his columns to the right bank, and was prepared to combat his antagonist with superior forces. A thick fog which concealed the armies from each other favored the motions of the Imperialists, and when the sun broke through the clouds at 11 o'Clock, it glittered on the numerous Austrian squadrons drawn up in double lines on the meadows adjoining the river. The action commenced by Kray attacking the left flank of the French while Lichtenstein spread himself out in the plain followed by Wartensleben, who coming up on the left bank of the Maine, threw himself at the head of the cavalry into the river, and followed close after the infantry, who had defiled along the bridge. The French general Grenier, who was stationed at the menaced point, made a vigorous resistance, with the republican cavalry and light infantry, but the reserve of the Austrian squadrons having been brought up, Jourdan was obliged to support the line by his reserve of cavalry. A desperate charge of horsemen now took place, and the Imperialists were, at first repulsed, but the Austrian cuirassiers having assailed the republican squadrons when disordered by success, they were broken, thrown into confusion, and driven behind the lines of infantry. Meantime the Austrians were victorious on the French centre and right, and victory declared for the Imperialists."

Grundsätze
der Strategie.

It is worthy of remark that in this action, the French cavalry, as at Benavente, (see page 20) *awaited the charge* of their impetuous opponents: "This manœuvre," says the Archduke, "was completely successful: the French cavalry, which had *awaited the charge* without stirring, was over-

thrown." Much blame is attributed to Jourdan for the loss of the battle, as he not only divided his force, but suffered his left wing to remain entirely unprotected. He also placed his cavalry in the first line, and opposite to that of the Imperialists, which was much more numerous.

With regard to Marengo, it has generally been quoted as evidence of the decisive influence of cavalry when opportunely applied, and the promptitude and ability of a cavalry leader, for unquestionably Kellermann's cuirassiers determined the battle in favor of the French, and placed Napoleon on the consular throne. But the details may also, at the same time, be made use of to shew the insufficiency of numbers without an able head, for the Austrian cavalry greatly exceeded that of the republicans, and if properly led ought to have crushed their opponents. The details of Kellermann's celebrated charge are thus given by himself:—"Dessaix had driven back the enemy's tirailleurs on the main body, but at the aspect of this formidable column of 6,000 Hungarian grenadiers, our troops hesitated. I was advancing in line, even with them, on the right of the road, being rather concealed by some vineyards, and observing everything which passed. It was no doubt, at this instant, that Dessaix received his death wound, for after a tremendous discharge from the enemy, I perceived our line waver. It bends and is on the point of giving way—the Austrians pursue in haste—they are in disorder, and in confidence of victory: I perceive this—I am in the midst of them, and they have laid down their arms. All this passed in less time than it has taken me to write these half-dozen lines,—Thus did 200 men cause 6,000 grenadiers to lay down their arms."

Notes on
Campaign
of Army of
Reserve
in 1800,
p. 52, note.

The defeat of Melas at Marengo has been attributed to his mistake in detaching 2,500 horse to oppose the advanced guard of Suchet who had reached Acqui in his rear, for if these squadrons had poured in upon the French fugitives on the left, the defeat of that flank—already in frightful disorder from the unflinching advance of the

Allison,
v. 376.

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Alison,
v. 373.

Hungarian infantry—would have been complete. But the Austrian general considered the victory gained, and having had two horses shot under him, retired to Alessandria, exhausted with fatigue, leaving the command to the chief of his staff. Dessaix, however, restored the battle with 4,000 men at 4 o'clock, and Kellermann completed the triumph of Napoleon.

Ibid.
v. 381, note.

A similarity has been traced between the crisis at Marengo and that at Waterloo, an advance of infantry and a charge of cavalry having determined the action in both instances, but the British and German squares were in an impregnable position up to the period of their first advance, whereas the republicans at Marengo had broke and fled, and according to Dessaix's reply to Napoleon, at 4 o'clock, the battle was then "completely lost." Kellermann's cuirassiers changed the defeat into a victory.

Alison's
life of
Marlborough,
i. 174.

It is remarkable that in alluding to decisive battles gained by cavalry in modern times the author has made no mention here of either *BLenheim* or *Ramilles*, on both of which occasions Marlborough's horse decided the battle. At *Blenheim*, August 1704, Marlborough, having gained firm footing on the other side of the *Nebel*, made his dispositions for a general attack. The cavalry were drawn up in two lines directly in front of the enemy, having the infantry immediately in their rear. Tallard seeing the weakness of his line, from want of infantry, had drawn 9 battalions from the reserve and posted them near the centre. Marlborough brought up three Hessian battalions to front these, and then drawing his sword, led the advance. "Indescribably grand was the spectacle which ensued. In compact order, and the finest array, the allied cavalry, mustering 8,000 sabres, moved up the gentle slope in two lines—at first slowly, as on a field day, but gradually more quickly, as they drew nearer, and the fire of the artillery became more violent. The French horse, 10,000 strong, stood their ground at first firmly: the choicest and bravest of their chivalry were there: the banderoles of almost all the nobles in France floated over their

squadrons. So hot was the fire of musquetry and cannon when the assailants drew near that their advance was checked: and the battle was kept up, for a few minutes only by a fire of artillery. Gradually, however, the fire of the enemy slackened; and Marlborough, taking advantage of the pause, led his cavalry again to the charge. With irresistible vehemence, the line dashed forward at full speed, and soon the crest of the ridge was passed. The French horsemen discharged their carbines at a considerable distance with little effect, and immediately wheeled about and fled. The battle was gained: the Allied horse rapidly inundated the open space between the two villages, and the nine battalions in the centre were surrounded, cut to pieces and taken. They made, however, a noble resistance, and the men were found lying on their backs in their ranks, as they had stood in the field."

Marshal Tallard attributed the loss of the battle altogether to the bad conduct of the French cavalry, thus admitting the decisive effect of Marlborough's tremendous charge. "Le gros de la cavalerie *à mal fait, je dis très mal*, car on n'a jamais rompre un escadron des ennemis." The loss of the French and Bavarians in this memorable battle was not less than 40,000 men, while that of the Allies did not exceed 11,000, but how important and widely extended were the results! "The blow struck at Blenheim," says Alison, "resounded through every part of Europe. It at once destroyed the vast fabric of power which it had taken Louis XIV, aided by the talents of Turenne, and the genius of Vauban so long to construct." Instead of proudly descending the valley of the Danube, and threatening Vienna, the French were driven in the utmost disorder, across the Rhine. The surrender of Traerbach and Landau gave the allies a firm footing on the left bank of that river—the submission of Bavaria deprived the French of that great outwork—the Hungarian insurrection was pacified;—Prussia was induced to cooperate in a more efficient manner in the common cause;—the parsimony of the Dutch gave way

Tallard,
in Alison's
Marlborough,
i. 176, note.

Alison's
Marlborough,
i. 186.

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Creasy's
16 decisive
battles,
p. 418.

before the triumph of success, and the Empire, delivered from invasion, was preparing to carry its victorious arms into the heart of France. What would have been the consequences to Europe had Marlborough's charge of cavalry been unattended with success, and Marshal Tallard become the victor? "Beyond all question," says Professor Creasy, "if Louis XIV. had gained the battle of Blenheim, a universal despotic dominion would have been established over the bodies; a cruel spiritual thralldom over the minds of men. France and Spain united under Bourbon princes, and in a close family alliance—the empire of Charlemagne with that of Charles V.—the power which revoked the edict of Nantes and perpetuated the massacre of St. Bartholomew, with that which banished the Moriscoes and established the Inquisition, would have proved irresistible, and beyond example destructive to the best interests of mankind."

Alison's
Marlborough,
i. 247.

At RAMILIES, May 1706, the charge of 20 fresh squadrons of the reserve cavalry restored the battle, and secured Marlborough's success. "In this emergency, when nothing was as yet decided, the twenty fresh squadrons, which Marlborough had so opportunely called up from the allied right, were seen galloping at full speed, but still in regular order, on the plain behind this desperate conflict. Halting directly in rear of the spot where the horse on both sides were so vehemently engaged, they wheeled into line, and advanced in close order and admirable array to the support of the Duke, who was now hard pressed by the French guards. At the same time the Danish squadron, led by their brave commander the duke of Wirtemberg, debouched between the morass of Mehaigne and the right flank of the household troops, and assailed them with loud cries in flank; while the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, with the Dutch guards, and Obdam's dragoons, dashed round their rear towards Ramilies. Encouraged by these powerful reinforcements, the whole allied cavalry re-formed, and led by Marlborough in person, swept forward in three lines, with loud shouts, to the attack of the now intimidated, and disheartened French, who no

longer withstood the onset, but turning their horses heads, fled with precipitation." The losses of the enemy in this battle amounted to 13,000 men in killed and wounded, besides 15,000 who deserted. They lost also 52 guns, the whole of their baggage and pontoon train, all their caissons, and 80 standards. Amongst the prisoners were the princes de Soubise and Rohan, and a son of Marshal Tallard: the loss of the Allies in killed and wounded was only 3,633, of which the unusually large proportion of 1,066 were killed, shewing the intensity of the struggle.

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II.

Alison's
Marlborough,
i. 261.

The false point of view in which many generals of cavalry have considered their force has often done it irreparable injury.

On the day of battle—at that lucky moment when fame is to be acquired, the cavalry should never be spared; but the greatest attention must be paid in order that it may appear on such a day effective, which can only be accomplished by keeping up the condition of the horses; for the difference between horses and men is essential, and it should never be left out of view that there is no such thing as working upon the moral feeling of horses, and their good will is not to be taken into account. The soldier may be animated by words; and by flattering his sense of honour he may be excited to new deeds and new exertions; but not so the horse. Cavalry exhausted by unusual fatigue, requires months to recover. Horses have doubtless stronger constitutions than men, but extraordinary efforts have also their limits, and if these exertions are carried to excess, the loss sustained from horses, exhausted from want of forage, often amounts, in a few nights, to an incredible extent; and the bivouacs, when left in the morning, become images of horror.

A horse neglected in shoeing, for example, is generally unserviceable for the whole campaign. By far the

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greater number of the horses sent to the dépôts have bad feet, and more than the half of these become totally unserviceable, and thus the fine imposing appearance of the cavalry is lost. That such is the fact must be acknowledged, and does not admit of contradiction ; but the real cause is never traced to its source—the personal influence of the commander.

The condition of the French cavalry on Napoleon's advance to Moscow in 1812 furnishes a remarkable illustration of the serious consequences attendant upon inattention to the important points mentioned by the author. On that memorable invasion, and before any part of the cavalry had been engaged, "the horses perished by thousands from the combined effects of incessant rain and unwholesome provender." Above 10,000 dead horses were found on the highway leading from the Niemen to Wilna. On the 3rd November 1812, the morning state of the French army shewed only 12,000 out of 80,000 horses which Napoleon had led in person across the Niemen. "Many horses," says St. Cyr, "might have been gained to the army, if it had been possible to allow them to take a few days' repose;" but the untiring Cossacks beset their flanks and rear: "the Russians established a chain of partizans round the invading army, which cut off all their foraging parties and soon held them imprisoned in their cantonments. The militia of the contiguous provinces, aided by the Cossacks of the Don formed a vast circle round Moscow, occupying every road, and cutting off all supplies of provisions. The want of forage was so severely felt that the cavalry were obliged to penetrate to a considerable distance in quest of subsistence, and these detachments fell, in most instances, into the hands of the enemy the report from Murat announced the alarming intelligence that one half of the whole surviving cavalry of the army had perished in these inglorious encounters."

Alison,
xi. 4.
xii. 314.

Ibid.
xi. 114.

CHAPTER III.

TACTICS OF CAVALRY.

TACTICS consist in position, movement, and attack. There are positions and movements in battle and out of battle. In the following chapters we will return to the subject and first only treat of the important position in battle, and of the battle itself.

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We will pass over the establishment and organization, and all that belongs to the equipment and formation of the individual man and horse, in order to bring a regiment to the unity of identity (*Einheit der Identität*) so that it may be like a manageable machine in the hands of the general.

These are the proper elements of the service, and are founded partly on the national character, and partly on the taste or will of the commander. They are generally considered elements of tactics, or elementary tactics; but if tactics be the art of war, what is here understood as elements of the service cannot be considered as belonging to them.

The equipment and formation of recruits is not an art, else every commissary and corporal would be a tactician.

Although Marshal Saxe derives the word tactics from the Romans marching in time (*tact*), we understand

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something more, at present, from tactics than riding and drill: these are the mechanism of war.

The gallant marshal was an indifferent etymologist. The word tactics has no connexion either with the English word *tact* or the Latin *tactus*, but is simple Greek—*ἡ τακτική* (*tékhē*), the art of drawing up troops, from *τάσσω*, to arrange in order.

A modern Anglo Saxon grammar contains a derivation that may vie with that of the Marshal:—*Tense*, says the author, comes from *tensus*, stretched!—it used to be derived from *temps*.

Horsemanship—the formation of horsemen in general, is very important, and to be considered as the foundation but no more tactics itself than a foundation is a building. Pure military operations in actual war respecting troops belong to tactics. In peace there can be no more tactics than strategy, for real military operations can naturally never be thought of in peace.

Strategical operations are attained in war by means of the position, movement and attack of troops.

The elements of service are now prescribed in all armies by means of regulations, and these should be so carefully formed that from the private soldier to the colonel of the regiment all duties should be determined and clearly expressed. Real examples, taken from the histories of particular wars, might follow the theorems as proofs of their correctness, while the names of those officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, who had distinguished themselves, being mentioned in the book, would excite the ambition of the young soldier, and this book of the elements of service might become the mentor of the army.

This suggestion of the author is deserving of the attention of those entrusted with the compilation of Her Majesty's cavalry regulations, which in their present dry mechanical form, present so little practical or interesting matter to the

young officer. A book containing not only theoretical manœuvres but practical illustrations of their utility and application would be a most desirable substitute for the present "regulations." How many young officers of cavalry—and the same observations apply to other branches of the service—are there who periodically act their part in the complicated manœuvres of the "red book," without knowing the application of a single movement? Nay even arrive at the art of repeating correctly the words of command, without comprehending the ultimate object of the evolution, and would consequently be much puzzled if called upon to explain its design, or demonstrate its application. This disadvantage to the officer and injury to the service might be remedied by the addition of explanatory notes to each manœuvre, shewing its application with reference to an enemy and illustrating its utility by citing cases (if any) where it had been successfully employed. The unnecessary intricacy of our present manœuvres the theoretical parts of which are incomprehensible to the young officer, adds much to perpetuate the ignorance of the principles on which they are founded. Movements more simple and practical would be easier understood and more correctly performed, and the military student, instead of being at the outset discouraged by theorems and combinations the value of which he is unable to appreciate, would be stimulated in his search for information by a conviction of their utility. Looking to the operations in actual war, we shall find that the movements of cavalry are, without exception, simple in the extreme, consisting principally of reduction and extension of the front, advances in line, movements *en échelon*, *en échiquier*, deployment and formation of column, &c.; and we seek in vain for great results proceeding from the complicated combinations of the drill ground.

A modern writer seeks to reduce Cavalry Tactics to algebraical formula* which, however ingenious, will scarcely obtain converts in this practical age; and we would rather direct the attention of the recruit to the simple operations of

* *Tracts on Cavalry Tactics*, Mortimer, London 1854.

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a Seidlitz, a Ziethen, a Murat, a Platoff, or an Anglesea, than induce that *hesitation* which must naturally follow a too careful and mathematical consideration of consequences in the presence of the enemy. The movement to be studied by the young cavalry officer above all others is *the rapid, vigorous, close, and determined charge in line.*

As in the Artillery, the *matériel* is distinguished from the *personnel*, the former being applied to the guns, ammunition, waggons, &c., and the latter to the effective men; and as, according to Theobald, the distinction holds good with regard to the art of war in general, the ammunition and provisions being considered as *matériel*, and the army itself *personnel*, so may we, in a more limited sense, apply the same distinction to the cavalry. The horses, horse appointments and arms will, in that case, form the *matériel*, and the men, in its true meaning, the *personnel*. Just as the most able artillery can do nothing with unserviceable guns, so can neither the most experienced cavalry have confidence with bad horses; and the campaign of 1812 has shewn that cavalry, once dismounted, is no longer formidable.

Napoleon had, in Moscow, about ten thousand dismounted cavalry, among whom was the author of this work, then ill. They were formed into companies, battalions and regiments, and armed like infantry, but after the first three days retreat from the Kremlin, this fine organization was destroyed. The men dispersed to the right and left of the road, in search of food, and either fell into the hands of the Cossacks, or were killed by the inhabitants.

How much more importance the cavalry itself attaches to the *matériel* than to the *personnel* may be seen from this that its strength is never reckoned, as in infantry, by the number of men, but by the number of horses.

Gustavus Adolphus recommended his cavalry to make crooked cuts at the heads and necks of the enemy's horses in order, by wounding them, to cause confusion in their ranks.

In modern times also, commanders of battalions have, with great success, ordered their men to aim at the horses of the attacking cavalry, adding, as a reason, "if the horse is down, the rider is no longer formidable."

Bulow details circumstantially in his "spirit of modern warfare," the effect which the want of forage has upon the movement of an army. "One imagines himself ruined," he says, "on reading the calculation of general Tempelhoff, and seeing the enormous number of horses which an army requires: one fears that they would eat down a whole quarter of the world."

Therefore it should be the particular care of cavalry officers to preserve the *matériel*. The horses must have rest and time to eat; they must be kept well shod, and the horse appointments preserved in the best order.

Cavalry has seldom occasion to send effective horses to the rear, in consequence of not having a sufficiency of men; but it occurs oftener that dismounted men are retained. The *personnel* appears of less importance, not on account of itself, but because, if there are means of keeping up the *matériel*, the *personnel* is never deficient; in fact, a dragoon well understands, under the pretext of foraging, how to take care of himself. Hence comes the constant complaint "the cavalry plunder," because cavalry officers would rather tolerate what cannot indeed be well prevented, than neglect their duty—the support of the *matériel*. This is one of the evils attendant upon war.

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Hist. of
my own time,
i. 124.

The French have reduced this doctrine to an axiom:—
“Pour établir le corps d’une armée, il faut commencer par le ventre.” If this plain rule, says Tempelhoff, “be once forgotten there can be no military operations.” Frederic the Great gives us an amusing instance of attention to these precepts: “During the skirmish some pigs were heard squeaking in the village of Pless. This was the signal for a truce; the Pandours left the Prussians, and ran to the village to kill animals which they were fonder of eating than they were of fighting.” A similar attack on swine was made by the British army on their retreat from Burgos, with this difference, that the sportsmen had not withdrawn from more important operations to engage in the chase.

POSITION OF CAVALRY.

Cavalry can only act offensively. Offensive operations require strength and energy: defensive, prudence and precaution.

Cavalry must have open ground in order to display its force or employ its energy. According to Theobald, this ground should be level and hard, or a gentle declivity.

The point which it is to defend must either lie in its front or flank, in order that the whole force of the charge may be directed there when the point is threatened. Infantry, on the contrary, must be placed upon the line which it is intended to defend.

It follows from this that cavalry is never judiciously placed when in front of natural obstacles, but should be always at a distance, in order that a charge may be executed with force; for example, behind villages, defiles, small woods, &c. To place cavalry, as a protection to it, behind a battery, is only to sacrifice it without an object: it is better placed sideways, because cavalry acts much safer in flank attacks; especially in oblique lines.

One of the first operations on the day of battle should be to place a large mass of cavalry in several lines, at a certain point, which under the command of a general, should support the moment of attack with the rapidity of lightning. This general should receive his orders only from the commander in chief, and should be, in every sense of the word, a general of cavalry.

It is not altogether agreed on where the cavalry should be placed in battle. It was long the custom to place it on the flanks, but the disadvantage arose that the troops could not support each other; and if the cavalry were beaten, the wings of the infantry were left without support.

It is probable that this separation of cavalry from infantry gave rise to the opinion of cavalry being unnecessary; and in fact, the two services appeared, in this manner like independent corps, which supported each other so little that it might rather have been said that each fought alone. If the cavalry were beaten, the infantry thought that it was lost, and no longer stood firm. This led the generals to direct their attention to the cavalry, and he who had a superiority in cavalry endeavoured, in the first instance, to overthrow that of his opponent, in order to ensure the issue of the battle.

In the thirty years war, Gustavus Adolphus generally placed platoons of infantry in the intervals of his cavalry, because the Austrian cavalry exceeded his, and he wished by that means, to strengthen his own.

This *mélange* of the two arms has found supporters, but without reason; if the cavalry were overthrown, the infantry, which was of no service to it, was lost.

Frederick imitated this disposition at the battle of Mollwitz, April 10, 1741, but confessed that it was defective.

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The field of battle itself shews, in most cases, the proper situation for cavalry. Where this is not the case, it must be placed in one mass behind the infantry; the rapidity of its movements allows of its being employed, unbroken, in many places during the battle. By this arrangement more solidity is given to the line of battle, not to mention that the soldier in the first line will fight with more spirit when he knows that there is a numerous support in his rear; while an opposite effect is necessarily produced on his opponent.

Whoever has observed the reflections of a common soldier will acknowledge the truth and justice of this principle.

"Small divisions of light cavalry," says the Archduke, "placed behind the first line of infantry, are sufficient, in order to pass through the intervals, when the advancing or retreating enemy lays himself open."

If this maxim be followed, and the remaining masses of cavalry united on one point, and under the command of a talented leader, the cavalry will do wonders.

The Archduke Charles further says: "The general to whom the cavalry is entrusted on the day of battle, should never be induced by the representations of other generals, to divide the mass of his cavalry, nor attempt to give them insufficient assistance with the fragments of it."

The Austrian generals seldom followed this principle: on all open parts of a position, in all plains through which a column of infantry had to pass, the cavalry was divided throughout it; the latter lost its solidity, and the former did not decide the battle.

The proper disposition of cavalry on the day of battle, has elicited as various and contradictory opinions from

military writers, as the general principles of tactics, each arrangement having its advocates and all basing their opinions upon actual results. "La méthode aujourd' hui," says Folard, "est de se ranger sur deux lignes, je ne disconviens pas que cette méthode ne soit bonne, quoi qu' on voie rarement que ses lignes se succèdent, tout dépend des têtes. Si une première ligne est battue, à moins d' une grande valeur et d' une conduite égale dans les chefs, it est rare que la défaite d' une première ne cause celle d' une seconde." The Chevalier then proposes his mode of reciprocal support, and recommends that the cavalry should be placed in one line flanked by platoons of infantry, two of which he places behind each squadron, and a company on each flank. Bulow says, "the cavalry ought to be placed behind the infantry unless particular circumstances modify this rule; when posted in a second line behind the foot, it preserves the advantages of spring and vigour." "In order that cavalry may be completely successful," says the Archduke Charles, "it is necessary that the first line should be followed by a second, and if possible, by a third line of fresh troops." Jomini, however, will not admit this necessity, and says, "La cavalerie déployée sur trois lignes, dans un espace flanquée, offre de graves inconvénients. En effet, les deuxième et troisième lignes, déployées derrière la première, partagent les dangers du feu d' artillerie, et d' une déroute sans pouvoir être mises en action: j' aimerai mieux des divisions de cavalerie disposée en colonnes, par escadrons, et placées suivant le terrain, que trois grandes lignes de cavalerie, qui sont presque toujours immobiles, et tres difficiles à manier."

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III.

Comm.
sur Polybe.

Ibid.

Bulow.

Grundsätze
der Strategie.

Traité
des grandes
opérations
Militaires.

The plan of placing platoons of infantry between squadrons of cavalry was practised also by the Scotch covenanters in the reign of Charles I.; but they appear to have had a description of infantry better suited to the purpose than that of either Frederick or Gustavus. "The Scotch parties of horse," says the Cavalier, "had always some foot with

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III.

De Foe.
Mem. of a
Cavalier,
2—87.
8—119.

Hist.
7 Years' War.

Alison,
vi., 617, 618,
note.

Siborn.

them; and yet if the horse galloped, or pushed on ever so forward, the foot were as forward as they, which was an extraordinary advantage. These were those they call *Highlanders*; they would run on foot, with their arms and all their accoutrements, and keep very good order too; and yet keep pace with the horse, let them go at what rate they would. . . . I cannot omit taking notice, on all occasions, how exceedingly serviceable this method was, of posting musqueteers in the intervals among the horse, in all this war: I never knew a body of horse beaten that did so." Even in cases where the cavalry were unsuccessful it does not appear to have always entailed, as stated by our author, the destruction of the foot, for Frederick tells us "that at the battle of Mollwitz, two battalions of grenadiers, which had been placed between the squadrons of the right, maintained their ground, after the defeat of the cavalry, and joined the infantry in good order."

Napoleon's first line was uniformly drawn up in battle array, and the second formed in squares of battalions,—the artillery and light horse being in front, with the heavy cavalry in several lines in rear of the whole. Thus if a charge of horse, which was frequently the case, broke the first line, it passed while disordered by success, through the intervals between the squares, from whose front and flank it sustained a heavy fire, escaping which, the horsemen were suddenly assailed, when blown and dispersed, by a solid mass of heavy cavalry in the rear, which never failed to hurl them back in confusion through the squares, who by this time, had reloaded their pieces, and whose flanking fire completed their destruction. The British heavy cavalry brigades at Waterloo suffered from a similar disposition as regards the enemy's reserve horse, which meeting with no opposing support committed fearful havoc amongst the "Union brigade." Had Napoleon exercised the same caution with the mass of his cavalry, a different result might have been the consequence.

MOVEMENT OF CAVALRY.

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The movement of cavalry must be rapid and unexpected, and bear the character of determined confidence.

An effort should be made, by outflanking the enemy, to come unexpectedly on his flank, in order that no time should be given him for a counter movement.

This is more easy to perform against cavalry than infantry, because infantry can always form square before the cavalry can charge. It appears, therefore, more advisable, first to try the solidity of the infantry by single detachments, thereby fatiguing it, and thus reserve to the cavalry the advantage of the charge; for the failure of a charge is annoying, and re-acts very disadvantageously. This object is best attained by echelon movements. Some innovators have proposed employing the close column against infantry. By that, the last division, which suffers less of the fire, drives forward the leading divisions, according to the proverb "one wedge drives the other;" but since the perfection of fire arms, it has been found necessary to give up deep formations in such attacks.

There are cases where a sudden attack might be so decisive, that it would be a fault to lose the favourable moment by deploying; it is then indifferent in what manner the enemy is attacked, whether in open or close column, or in line; in order, or in disorder, an example of which we have in the case of general von Römer at the battle of Mollwitz; but this is only an exception to the general rule. The Austrian army under field marshal Neuperg, was nearly surprised by the king on this occasion. General Schulenburg commanded the Prussian cavalry, and von Römer the Austrian. When general Römer arrived he observed that the Prussians

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III.

were wheeled by squadrons to the right, in order to gain the village of Herrendorf, on which the right wing was to rest. Without deploying, but in column, as he was, Römer attacked his adversary at full speed, and overthrew him: both cavalry generals fell in this battle.

Jomini.

It should, however, be recollected, that the Austrian cavalry was, on this occasion, *three times stronger* than the Prussian, and ought to have defeated it under any circumstances;—"Römer," says Jomini, "le chargea en pleine carrière, et en colonne. Les *trente* escadrons qu'il menait culbutèrent facilement les *dix* escadrons Prussiens, dont chacun présentait le flanc gauche."

Flank movements may be executed in various ways. The Archduke Charles and Theobald justly recommend placing regiments in column behind the first line.

But—and particularly against cavalry, the enemy may be surprised by a change of front performed at a gallop, or by a formation in an oblique line. For this movement tried and experienced regiments are indispensable.

Echelon manoeuvres have many advantages, because they favour the formation of oblique lines. An echelon from the centre would greatly facilitate outflanking the enemy.

Journal
des sciences
militaires.
1—328.

Echelon movements, and what is generally called the *oblique* order of battle, are more accidental than premeditated, and, as after all successful results, we are too prone to attribute to talent and design, what is purely the effect of a happy combination of circumstances. The famous battle of Leuthen, which is so generally referred to by tacticians as the ideal of oblique formations, and the *chef d'œuvre* of Frederick the Great, will be found, on investigation, not to have been conducted on such scientific principles as is generally believed; and tactical rules deduced from that battle would be fallacious. Perhaps the only true view which has yet been taken of the disposition of the Prussian

army at the battle of Leuthen will be found in the *Journal des Sciences Militaires* from the pen of general Vaudoncourt, who at the close of a minute enquiry into the operations of Frederick on that day, observes: "On voit, par ce bref exposé, que l'ordre oblique, employé par Frederic II. à Leuthen, n'a dû son succes qu' une surprise complète, rendue possible par la négligence et les fautes multipliées des generaux Autrichien's." Captain Rösch of the Prussian service, has demonstrated in the most satisfactory manner, that the attack *en échelon* is not maintainable in theory; "for if the leading division of an échelon advances within musquet shot of the enemy's line, its flank will receive a greater fire than its own, and will, therefore, insensibly describe an arch backwards; the opposing portion of the line, which thus pours a destructive fire upon the flank will not be prevented by the second échelon, because it is at too great a distance, and would scarcely venture to fire from the fear of hitting the inward flank of the preceding division. Thus the opposing line will shower its balls, without the slightest impediment, on the exposed flank; the leading échelon must be beaten, and if the battle be continued with the bayonet, it is only necessary that a platoon of the opposing line should be wheeled up on the flank of the leading échelon, while the front is engaged, to ensure the overthrow of that échelon before the succeeding division could come to its assistance: Thus the several échelons may be defeated in succession. But even allowing that the leading division should succeed in its attack, (which according to Bulow, could not possibly occur), it is not likely that any attack *en échelon* could long preserve its obliquity, for the enemy would naturally seek to establish a *parallel* order, and unless some insurmountable obstacles presented themselves, in the nature of the ground, must succeed in gaining the flank refused, and thus establish *equality* of position. The rapid movement of cavalry gives that arm a great advantage in échelon attacks; for if the first squadron should be successful, the second can immediately profit by

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Vaudoncourt,
in Jour. des
sci. milit.

Bulow. Spirit
of modern
system of
war, p. 168,
et seq.

CHAP. the confusion produced in the enemy's line. Echelon
III. attacks, also better enable cavalry to preserve order during
the advance ; but, as in most cases, cavalry should be only
Bulow. employed to take advantage of the faults committed by
infantry, and to profit by its disorder, so should its attacks
be limited to rapid and vigorous charges *in line*.

ENGAGEMENT OF CAVALRY.

A charge of cavalry is very uncertain, and the least unexpected resistance often causes it to fail.

Hence it follows as a rule to surprise the enemy when possible, but on the other hand, to guard well against a surprise. The first can be effected by rapid movements upon one or both flanks of the enemy, or even upon his second line, if we have superiority of numbers ; the latter is effected by uniting the whole force, in order to keep up a superiority, and placing the troops in one, two, or three lines, according to circumstances : at the same time taking care to guard the flanks.

The attack must be performed with that impetuosity which can alone ensure success.

But because the charge requires the application of every power, and the cavalry is thereby brought to a great pitch of excitement, which is succeeded by the opposite extreme of exhaustion ; and that the effective charge is the immediate result of the greatest exertion, and thereby the alignment is lost on account of the unequal power of the horses ; therefore at the moment when the gallop is increased to the charge, no means must be left untried to excite that spirit of enthusiasm, even to ferocity, which all brave cavalry possess during an attack. Strength is exhausted in the application, and in proportion to it ; so that after the maximum of exertion

comes that of exhaustion. We should, therefore, endeavour to ensure success before the excitement subsides.

Cavalry is never weaker, nor easier to overcome, than after a successful charge.

Before the horses recover their breath, and the men are again able to exert themselves, tumultuous noises are heard—each individual wishes to relate to his friend or comrade what has particularly happened to himself—but no word of command is attended to. In vain the trumpet sounds the “*recall*”; in vain the senior officers exert themselves to re-form the line—should a fresh force of the enemy appear at such a moment, the attacking party will retreat as quick as they before advanced; but a second line, pushed forward afterwards, at a trot, would provide against such misfortunes.

This characteristic description of a cavalry charge, and the evidence which it affords of the necessity on all occasions of a *reserve*, to repair the damage too often caused by prolonging a successful onset until disorder entails defeat or severe loss, were strikingly illustrated at the memorable battle of Waterloo, on the part both of the British and French armies. In the celebrated charges of the Household and Union brigades, the regiments intended as reserve, excited by the enthusiasm of the moment, joined, heedless of previous orders, the attacking squadrons, and when lord Anglesea, endeavouring to restore order after the confusion which followed the charge, sought for the supporting regiments, they were nowhere to be found, for they had joined in the general attack. The French reserve of lancers then came down upon the exhausted assailants, and a fearful slaughter ensued, the Union brigade returning from the contest with half its numbers, and only saved from entire destruction by the well-timed succour of the light cavalry brigades.

The details of this remarkable combat are so instructive

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that they cannot be too much studied by the young cavalry officer, and the following abstract, made principally from Siborne's excellent account of the campaign of Waterloo, may fix the leading incidents on his mind:—

Siborne.
266, et seq.

The Earl of Uxbridge, on perceiving the advance of the French cavalry by La Haye Sainte, as also the approach of the infantry columns which formed the attack on the British left wing, decided on a simultaneous charge by the heavy cavalry brigades of lord Edward Somerset and sir William Ponsonby, the former against the enemy's cavalry, the latter against his infantry. Riding up to lord Edward Somerset he ordered him to prepare to form line with the 1st and 2d life guards and 1st dragoon guards, keeping the Blues in reserve, while similar orders were given to Ponsonby for the Royal dragoons and Enniskillens, holding the Scots' Greys in reserve. Lord Anglesea placed himself in front of the left of Somerset's brigade, so as to be about the centre of the line when both brigades should unite: the light cavalry were on either flank.

The French line of cavalry, as it advanced, presented an imposing appearance. They had ascended the brow of the ridge on which the Anglo-allied infantry were posted, ready for their reception. A vigorous fire was opened upon them from two British horse-batteries, but a few seconds sufficed to restore order—their trumpets sounded the charge, and amid shouts of *Vive l'Empereur* they rushed to the attack. The British household brigade, animated by an equal degree of enthusiasm, had already been put into charging speed, and just as the cuirassiers came close upon the squares, and received a fire from their front faces, the two lines dashed into each other with indescribable impetuosity. The shock was terrible. The British, in order to close as much as possible upon the cuirassiers, whose swords were much longer than their own, seemed for a moment striving to wedge themselves in between the horses of their infuriated antagonists. Swords gleamed high in air—now clashing violently together—now clanging heavily upon resisting armour—

riders, vainly struggling for mastery, quickly fell under the deadly thrust or well delivered cut ; horses plunging and rearing, staggered to the earth or broke wildly from the ranks ; but the superiority of the British was speedily made manifest, and the cuirassiers were driven down from the ridge.

The first collision did not occur, however, along the whole extent of the opposing lines, for Somerset's was not parallel to that of the cuirassiers, and as its right was thrown forward, this came first in contact with the enemy, and the collision followed in succession, in the direction of the allied left, until interrupted by a hollow way through which a cross road runs into the Charleroi road. The cuirassiers on the right of the French were suddenly thrown out of their speed by coming on this hollow way, into which they descended abruptly and confusedly, and as they began to urge their horses up the opposite bank, they beheld the 2d life guards, coming in full speed towards them. Immediately they fled away down the hollow road, followed by this regiment, which was in equal disorder from having to push its way down the steep banks adjoining the intersection of the roads. These cuirassiers, after having rushed in upon their own infantry skirmishers congregated in that quarter, reined up their steeds, and fronting their pursuers, engaged them individually ; but soon the French inferiority was apparent, and they either submitted or fled.

Siborne.
266, et seq.

No sooner did Ponsonby perceive the household cavalry in motion, than he led on his own brigade, and here the Greys although intended to form the reserve, came up in line with their comrades, and the whole charged the French infantry column, the leading portion of which soon yielded. The British dragoons having the advantage of the descent, mowed down the mass, which, bending under the pressure, spread out in all directions, and a sergeant of the Greys captured an eagle of the French "Invincibles."

Without pausing to re-form, those of the Greys who had forced their way through, or on either flank, of the mass, rushed onward against the leading column of the French right brigade.

CHAP.
III.Siborne.
257, et seq.

This body, lost in amazement at the suddenness and wildness of the charge, and its terrific effect upon their countrymen on the higher ground in front, were not prepared to receive cavalry; their outer files opened a destructive fire, but to such a degree had the impetus of the charge been augmented by the rapidly increasing descent of the slope, that the horsemen had neither the power or will to check their speed, and plunging with irresistible force, into the mass of bayonets, the entire column tottered and sank, crowds of prisoners attesting their discomfiture.

The charge of the union brigade was equally brilliant along the remainder of the line. The Royals brought their centre squadron to bear upon the head of the leading French column, which was seized with a panic, and after an irregular fire, faced about and endeavoured to regain the opposite side of the ledge. But the Royals were upon them before this could be effected—captain Clarke-Kennedy captured an eagle, stabbing the bearer; and the whole became so jammed together that they were completely helpless, and gradually a scattering flight ensued, many throwing down their arms and surrendering in despair.

The Enniskillens, which formed the centre regiment of the brigade, did not come quite so soon into contact with the French infantry as the flank regiments, but they dashed down the slope with equal impetuosity, the right and centre squadrons bearing down upon the 55th French regiment, while the left squadron charged the 54th. A feeble and irregular fire was all the resistance made by the enemy—the dragoons were amongst them in a moment; the slaughter was tremendous, and the number of prisoners immense. Meantime the household brigade continued to charge down the slope on the right and partly on the left of La Haye Sainte, and bringing their right shoulders forward, the 1st life guards pressed the rear of the cuirassiers, which became choked up between the high banks of a road beyond the orchard. Many finding their retreat impeded, faced about, and a hand to hand encounter ensued, which was suddenly

terminated by a destructive fire poured down upon the life guards from the top of the banks. The king's dragoon guards, leaving their struggle on the right, boldly ascended the enemy's position, and they were joined, on the left, by the 2d life guards. With these were now mingled the Royals and Enniskillens, while further to the left were the Greys—the whole line without a semblance of regularity, madly pursuing their wild career. Then it was that lord Anglesea, seeing the danger to which the whole cavalry division was exposed by recklessly continuing an attack; which if now terminated, would have been attended with comparatively little loss, eagerly sought for the support upon which he had calculated, but no support was to be found, for the reserve regiments had joined, without orders, in the general charge! In vain did the prudent chief direct the halt and rally to be sounded—neither voice nor trumpet was heeded, and, in a few seconds more, the British brigades were seen crowning the enemy's position. The Greys, with many of the Royals and Enniskillens, dashed in amongst the batteries, and then wheeling sharply to the left, rode along the line of guns in that direction, sabring the gunners and stabbing the horses, until they became aware of a body of French lancers, moving down upon them. They then fell back, but with the horses so blown and exhausted that they were soon overtaken by the lancers. Both british brigades were now in full retreat; Somerset's regained the position without any serious loss, but Ponsonby's, and particularly the Greys, suffered severely from the French lancers and chasseurs, the greater part being in a state of the utmost confusion and exhaustion, while their opponents were infinitely more numerous, and mounted on horses perfectly fresh. This brigade was reduced to a single squadron, and both brigades, which went into battle two thousand strong, could now scarcely muster 200 sabres. But the achievement had been unparalleled. Two French columns 5000 strong had been completely destroyed, 3000 prisoners were taken, and 40 guns rendered useless.

Siborne.
257, et seq.

Alison,
xiv. 26.

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Siborne. 257,
et seq.

The French lancers charged in open column on one flank, while the remainder extending in open lancer order, towards their left, rapidly spread over the plain, darting upon the stragglers and wounded of the British cavalry, and thus the gallant sir William Ponsonby received his death wound. At length Vandeleur's light brigade came up in support of Ponsonby's; the 12th charged the only remaining French column yet intact, which speedily gave way, and the British dragoons coming upon the right flank of the pursuing lancers, rolled them up. The 16th charged obliquely the front of the lancers, whose further advance was thus completely checked, and these two British regiments carrying every thing before them, drove the French horsemen down again to the foot of the valley.

Thackwell's
second
Sikh war.
40 to 48.

One of the grand difficulties in the management of cavalry is to know *when to stop* a successful attack—how to reap the greatest benefit with the least loss; excitement too often overpowers reason, and the good effects of the first onset are often lost or weakened by prolonging the attack. In the splendid charge of the 14th dragoons at Ramnugger under the lamented Havelock, when the Sikhs, completely routed, threw away their standards and took to flight, the impetuous British leader was not content, but dashing down a steep declivity, where the horses sank deep in mud and sand, his force became exposed to such a fire from the enemies well served batteries, that upwards of fifty men were killed and wounded, and the English army had to deplore the loss of two of its most distinguished cavalry soldiers, Cureton and Havelock.

If the enemy could be engaged on all points, and then a fresh line advanced, victory, as at Würzburg, would be always certain.

Whoever has seen the fine and numerous cavalry of the allied powers in 1813 and 1814, must have regretted that no general in chief was placed at its head. What would not such cavalry then have performed?

A victory is not brilliant—not perfect, where cavalry do not follow it up ; but the loss of a battle is destructive—fatal to the enemy which is determined by cavalry.

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The battle of Salamanca furnishes a brilliant illustration of the author's doctrine : On this occasion the allied cavalry on the British right, broke in like a flood, into the openings of the French infantry and the whole of Thomières division was routed with the loss of 3000 men. While this brilliant achievement took place in one part of the field; Le Marchant's heavy dragoons and Anson's light cavalry bore down upon the enemy's bewildered ranks in another direction—whole companies threw down their arms and fled ; five guns were taken by lord Edward Somerset with a single squadron, 2000 prisoners were made in a few minutes, and the whole French left, utterly broken and disordered, were thrown back into the wood, and, in a military point of view, annihilated.

Alison.
x. 360.

But the most brilliant and decisive charges of cavalry during the whole war, according to the judgment of general Foy, were those made by the heavy brigade of the king's German legion, at Garcia Hernandez, on the following day, (July 23, 1812,) when three squares of French infantry were broken, 1400 men made prisoners, and the last attempt at a rally on the part of the enemy, completely defeated. The details are instructive :—The wreck of the beaten French army under Clausel, had taken the road to Peneranda by the village of Garcia Hernandez. The approach from the Tormes in this direction was through a narrow marshy valley, along which ran a small rivulet bounded by steep banks. The road was rough and stony, and so confined as to cause a great extension and consequent delay of the cavalry in their march ; and nearly an hour elapsed before the head of the column had cleared the defile, and reached the stony plain beyond it. The German dragoons under Bock formed the rear, having Anson's light brigade in front, and soon the whole were in full trot towards the village of Garcia Hernandez. After proceeding about a league in this direction, the

Foy.
i.—290, 291.

Hist.
K. G. legion.
ii. 80, et seq.

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Hist.
K. G. legion.
ii. 80, et seq.

leading brigade came in sight of the enemy, who were found advantageously posted, with some squadrons of cavalry in line, on the plain in front; several battalions of infantry in square on the heights in advance and to the right of these; and some guns in the intervals.

The French infantry and artillery being, at first, concealed by the inequalities of the ground, the brigades were ordered by lord Wellington to attack the cavalry, and their pace was accordingly increased to a gallop. The German regiments, confined by the narrowness of the valley, had been unable during their progress, to move upon a larger front than sections of threes, and now, being in echelon of squadrons, from the right, they attempted to form line upon the leading squadron without halting. Hurried forward, however, by the excitement of the moment, this squadron, under captain von Hattorf,—having also in front general von Bock, the field officers of the regiment, and colonel May of the English artillery, who brought the order from lord Wellington—dashed on without waiting for the remaining squadrons, and made straight for the enemy's cavalry. The left wing of the French horsemen retired from the charge of Anson's brigade, and those in front went about on the approach of Hattorf's squadron; but in the pursuit, the flank of the squadron became exposed to the fire of the infantry on the heights, by which colonel May and several men and horses were wounded, and the pursuit was discontinued.

Captain Gustavus von der Decken, who commanded the third or left squadron of the 1st dragoons, seeing that if he advanced according to the order given, his flank would be exposed to the fire of a dense infantry square, formed the daring resolution of attacking it with his single squadron. This square stood on the lower slope of the heights, and obedient to the signal of their chief, the German troopers advanced against it with order and determination, while a deafening peal of musquetry from the enemy greeted their approach. Arrived within a hundred yards of the point of attack, the gallant squadron leader, struck by a ball in the

knee, fell mortally wounded, and lieutenant von Voss, with several men and horses, were killed; but instantly captain von Uslar-Gleichen, who commanded the left troop, dashing forward, placed himself at the head of the squadron, and re-animating his followers by word and example, while another shower of bullets carried destruction into their ranks, the intrepid soldiers forced onward, and bringing up their right flank, appeared before the enemy's bayonets on two faces of the square.

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Hist.
K. G. legion.
ii. 80, et seq.

The two front ranks, kneeling, presented a double row of deadly steel, while, in the rear of these, the steady musquets of four standing ranks were levelled at the devoted horsemen. At this critical moment, when the sword was about to be matched against the firelock, and the chivalrous horseman with the firm foot soldier—when victory hung yet in equal scales—an accidental shot from one of the kneeling ranks, which killing a horse, caused it and the rider to fall upon the bayonets—gave the triumph to the dragoons!

For a path was now opened, and the impatient troopers rushing in amidst the blazing fire, while men and horses fell fast before the musquets of the French infantry, their firm formation was destroyed, and the whole battalion was either cut down or taken prisoners.

Captain von Reitzenstein, who commanded the second squadron, seeing the success which had attended the daring onset of his comrades, and being also impeded in his forward movement by the difficulties of the ground, decided upon following up the discomfiture of the infantry, and attempting the second square which stood on the edge of the heights. He was received with a steady and destructive fire, by which lieutenant Heugel was killed and lieutenant Tappe severely wounded; but the moral force of the French infantry had been shaken by the fearful overthrow which they had just witnessed, and some timid individuals leaving their ranks, Reitzenstein and his ready followers rushed in—the square broke, and the greater part of the battalion was either cut down or captured.

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Hist.
K. G. legion.
ii. 80, et seq.

A third square was instantly formed by those few who had escaped from destruction, and some cavalry came to their support. Against these captain baron Marshalck led the third squadron of the second regiment, and being joined by the left troop of the second squadron under lieutenant Fumetty, charged and dispersed the enemy's cavalry; then riding boldly at the infantry, broke and completely overthrew them. The wreck of the routed battalions now rallied and attempted to make a stand on a rising ground near the high road to Peneranda, where they again formed a connected body. Marshalck and Fumetty led their troopers a second time to the charge, but this little force had become too much reduced and the horses were too fatigued to admit of any impression being made upon the enemy. The French received the attack as well with a heavy fire as a shower of stones, to which (ammunition probably failing) they now had recourse; von Usar was killed, Fumetty wounded, and several men and horses were struck down: no further attempt was made by the dragoons, and the enemy resumed their retreat. The loss of the German brigade in this brilliant combat was 4 officers, 48 noncommissioned officers and soldiers, and 67 horses killed; 2 officers, 56 noncommissioned officers and soldiers, and 46 horses wounded, and 6 men and 4 horses taken. The French had few casualties in proportion to their numbers, but many of the prisoners, the whole of whom amounted to nearly 1400, were wounded; among the captives was the chevalier Mollard, who commanded the brigade.

Foy.
i. 290, 291.

General Foy alluding to this combat, says "L' Angleterre entretenait aussi deux regimens de dragons et trois de hussards, appartenant au corps étranger, dit King's German Legion. Ils ont surpassé la cavalerie nationale pour le service des avant gardes et pour la bataille. La charge la plus audacieuse de la guerre d' Espagne a été fournie le lendemain de la bataille des Arapiles par l' Hanovrien Bock, a la tête de la brigade pesante de la legion Allemande."

CHAPTER IV.

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE ENGAGEMENT.

THE art of attack is the most difficult part of tactics. The moments for attack must be shewn, as well as those of position and manœuvre ; but that tranquillity and calmness, which is so necessary to ensure success, does not extend to the engagement itself.

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The human heart plays too important a part in the collision to admit of this branch of the art of war being brought under one regular point of view.

The cause can be nowhere found but in the human heart of two lines of cavalry resolutely advancing to the charge, and when arrived at from fifty to sixty paces of each other, one line suddenly going about and taking flight.

Guibert gives the following description of what generally occurs at an affair of cavalry :—“ Communément un de deux escadrons allant à la charge, ou n'arrive pas sur l'ennemi, ou ne l'attend pas. Celui dans lequel se trouve la moindre quantité de courage flotte, se dérange, tourbillonne par les ailes, fuit, ou ne rend plus qu'un combat très court et sans vigueur. Mais lorsque les deux escadrons ne sont composés que d'hommes et de chevaux aguerris et exercés au même point, voici comment se passe leur charge : les rangs s'enchassent mutuellement, les chevaux cherchent d'eux mêmes les intervalles ; les cavaliers se joignent corps à corps ; tout se mêle au point que les escadrons passent les uns

Essai
générale de
tactique.
i. 187, note.

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derrière les autres, et dans cette mêlée, ce sont alors les chevaux les plus agiles et les hommes les plus adroits qui décident le combat.”

Will it not be granted also that many commanding officers instead of being calm and composed, fall into a passion, and scream instead of commanding; thereby not only confusing their troops but themselves; so that at last, they do not know what they are doing. It cannot, however, be denied that courage is capricious, and that troops will fight better on one day than on another.

When marshal Saxe has already remarked that the same troops who were beaten behind entrenchments, have gained the victory when they made the attack, we may well be of opinion that nothing is more variable than the courage of a soldier.

It is no easy matter to alternate the days of courage and timidity—*a tempo*, as they say in the fencing school.

Great example—the constant coolness and composure of the officer who is placed at the head of the troops; the confidence of the private soldier in his leader, and the belief that he does nothing without an object—control the irresolution of the soldier and are the means of counteracting the capriciousness of his courage.

The commander, as has been shewn, should use his utmost exertions to excite the enthusiasm of his troops at the moment of the charge; but there should be no necessity for increasing his own courage. The soldier is a severe observer and judge of his officer; he does not expect from him the qualifications of a combatant, but with better reason, those of a commander: the precise moment when battles are determined would be an interesting subject for the observation of the philosopher.

This moment takes the young soldier by surprise, while the veteran foresees, nay, often knows the result of the battle before it has commenced.

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This foreknowledge is founded partly on the moral condition of the troops, which may have arisen from previous misfortune or want of provisions, but more often from their want of confidence in the capacity of their leader.

The loss or gain of a battle depends often upon some small unimportant accident, not taken into the calculation of the general. Von Bretschneider relates the following remarkable instance of accidental success :—"The great discovery which I now communicate to the world more than fifty years after the event, is nothing less than the cause why the battle of Kollin was gained. I was at that time in the Saxon *chevaux legers*. We stood in order of battle from morning till noon, on a rising ground indeed, but a little covered by the summit of the mountain, behind which we could no more see the enemy than they could see us. On our right flank the cannon roared so incessantly that we could hear but little of the fire of small arms. Immediately near us, a village which the Croats had occupied was set on fire; we, remained, however, at rest and unoccupied. Before me, as I stood in the ranks, was a shady tree, under which colonel von Benkendorf, of prince Charles's regiment, had established his dinner table. This circumstance made a deep impression on my memory, because the ham which the colonel was eating, and the *garde du vin* which he emptied, appeared to me then of more importance than anything else. Scarce had he finished his bottles, when lo! the aide-de-camp of field marshal Daun rode along the front, bringing an order for all

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commanders of brigades and regiments to retire, naming the point of re-assembly. He had scarcely gone when colonel von Benkendorf rode up to the top of the hill, and coming back with a red face, called out—"The enemy are coming on!—those that wish may retire; but let all brave fellows follow me!" So we all followed him for we were all brave fellows. We Saxons rushed in upon the infantry and cut them to pieces; the Austrian regiment St. Ignon, which stood by us, followed our example, and so, by degrees, the whole of Nadasti's cavalry. The battle was gained. If we had followed the aide-de-camp's directions, it would have been lost. Now comes the grand problem:—Would colonel von Benkendorf have taken this daring step if he had not finished his last bottle? I say *quod non*, because even now it always annoys me to think, in the extreme urgency of my stomach, that the man should eat and drink before my nose, without taking the least notice of me or my wants. Thus is the victory of Kollin, like many thousand great events in the world, to be attributed to the bottle."

It is strange that so curious a detail as that which is here quoted by the author, should have escaped the enquiries of both Lloyd and Tempelhoff. The latter who has given a most circumstantial account of the battle of Kollin, thus describes the conspicuous part taken by the Saxon colonel on that day:—"The most important events frequently take their rise from the merest trifles, as was the case in this battle. Had it not been for lieutenant colonel von B—— of the Saxon regiment of cavalry, who happened to observe that the ground between Kretzoeor and the wood could not be maintained by cavalry, and that general Nadasti saw the justice of the remark, and that infantry were ordered to take up the ground, *that cavalry* would, in all probability, have been routed by general Zieten; and general Halser, when

Tempelhoff,
Hist 7 years'
war.

he had obtained possession of the village, might have taken their army in flank and rear." Jomini is also silent as to the alledged stimulant; however, Bretschneider's story may not be the less worthy of credit, for we have an instance, in later times of similar consequences from like causes. "On the 16th May," says Müller, "Buonaparte ordered the bridge of Lodi to be stormed. The French grenadiers and carabiniers being chiefly selected on this occasion, *drank deep of brandy*, and then obeyed the commands of their chief under a shower of grape shot." In like manner the Russians at the Alma and Inkermann are said to have been primed with an ardent spirit called *raki*, before those engagements.

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Müller.
science of
war, iii. 400.

"Quid non ebrietas designat? Operta recludit,
Spes jubet esse ratas, ad prælia trudit inertem."

HORACE, B. I., Epist. vi., l. 16.

The circumstances which cause troops to lose their self-possession are often inexplicable. Marshal Villars relates that at the battle of Friedlingen, the French infantry had completely broken the Austrians, and pursued them through a wood into a plain on the other side, when suddenly somebody called out "We are cut off."

Some squadrons, it appears, which were seen by this victorious infantry in the rear, and which were erroneously imagined to be the enemy's cavalry, caused them to fly in the greatest disorder, and even without either being attacked or pursued; and notwithstanding all the exertions of the marshals and generals, nothing could bring them to stand again.

Had not the French cavalry, at the same time, completely routed the Austrians and thus retained the victory, marshal Villars would have lost the battle.

The two incautious words of "Threes about" at Chillianwallah proved fatal to Pope's brigade, and led to the

CHAP. melancholy self destruction of an estimable and gallant officer.
 IV. "About this time," says captain Thackwell, "a halt took

Thackwell's
 2d Sikh war,
 p. 134, et seq.

place. The Sikh cavalry skirmished in front of the British line, being emboldened by its temporary hesitation. It was now that the order 'Threes about' was distinctly heard by some men of the 14th dragoons. They turned with the rest, the Goorchurras in hot pursuit; thus the turning of two troopers was sufficient in the jungle to occasion the retrograde movement of the whole brigade! In the impetuosity of the rush, the 14th were pushed against the troops of horse artillery; guns, gunners and waggons were every where upset, and to crown the confusion, the Goorchurras, following close in the rear of the dragoons, entered the ranks of the artillery along with them."

"Our vocabulary will not allow of giving an adequate description of the confusion—regiment pressing against regiment—trooper hastening trooper—officer vying with soldier in speed. The horses becoming unmanageable, often carried their riders to the rear of the baggage escort. When once this brigade was in retreat, its movements might be comprehended under the designation of a panic. The few Goorchurras in pursuit were magnified by the disordered imaginations of the fugitives into thousands, and *saute qui peut* was the general result."

Modern history furnishes sufficient examples to shew that troops which, like solid walls, have withstood the hottest fire, and could not be overcome, yet have retired precipitately, after the commander has ordered the retreat.

The whole scene is changed—Where a few moments before, great lines were seen, the army now appears vanishing in columns of retreat—the thundering of the cannon ceases—all is solemn stillness.

It can be easily imagined what effect all this must have upon the minds of the soldiers, and this is the psychological part of war.

If a battle be once irretrievably lost, any attempt made to restore it, is fruitless : the bravest regiments yield to the attack, even when they have a decided advantage in point of numbers.

The whole mental tone is as rapid in its changes as fortune. When a man has no longer any hope of success, every exertion is irksome to him, and he shrinks from danger : a few individual characters alone can resist this impulse, but they are hurried away with the rest.

The astounding results of the battle of Waterloo may be explained by this cause. The moral force of both armies was equal. The French had even a stronger motive ; they fought for their existence : nor did the physical force in the evening preponderate to their disadvantage, for they brought forward against the attack on their right flank, a corps of the army which had not yet been under fire ; and yet once the line of battle was lost, what unprecedented disorder and flight !

If from fifteen to twenty thousand men had been placed in Genappe with determined orders either to die there or check the victory of the enemy, further misfortune might have been prevented.

A few cannon shots and the bugle of the Prussians were sufficient to make the flight general.

A more remarkable error of Napoleon was omitting to take any efficient steps to retard the progress of Bülow's corps through the defiles of St. Lambert, which might have been easily effected by occupying the wood of Paris with a detached body of infantry. Had this been done the Prussian aid might have been so obstructed as to secure to Napoleon the power of advancing against Wellington with almost the entire of his force, and thus defeating both armies in detail. The error of not occupying the wood of Paris was fatal to the development of Napoleon's original design.

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Without diminishing the numbers actually opposed to the allied army, he might easily have detached the whole of Lobau's corps against the Prussians, and thus prevented them from debouching from the defiles. With regard to making a stand at Genappe after the defeat of the Guard, it would appear that such had been the intention of the French commander, for several waggons were found upset in the defile, so as to obstruct the crossing of the bridge, and there can be no doubt that with good management of these materials, and steady resistance on the part of the rear-guard, the pursuit of the allied army might have been seriously impeded; but the sound of the Prussian advance invariably put the enemy to flight. A remarkable expedient is related as having been practiced by Gneisenau on this occasion: seeing that the fugitives always took fright at the sound of the drum, he ordered the last remaining drummer to mount one of the horses that had been disengaged from Napoleon's travelling carriage, and then to keep up with the cavalry, and beat the drum without intermission. "In this manner the Prussian advance passed through Quatre Bras, and even the heights of Frasne were left free to them, whilst the affrighted foe completely scattered and dispersed, endeavoured to escape by Gossellies, Marchiennes and Charleroi."

Siborne, 381.

The French translation of this work contains the following note upon the author's allusion to the battle of Waterloo:—"Les pertes énormes que les alliés ont éprouvées dans cette journée, prouvent de rest avec quelle valeur les Français ont combattu leurs innombrables ennemis. D'ailleurs, n'étaient-ce pas ces mêmes Prussiens que nous avions si souvent battus? n'étaient-ce pas aussi ces Anglais qui n'avaient jamais osé nous attendre que derrière des retranchemens inexpugnables, et qui ne nous attaquaient que quand ils étaient les plus nombreux?" (*Tactique de la cavalerie, traduit de l'Allemand par Max J. de Schauenburg, chef d'Escadron &c.*, c. iv. p. 61, Note.

It is painful in the present united position of France and England, to observe upon the latter part of this statement which could not, however, be passed over without contra-

diction :—There are few actions on record where the troops of England and her allies have been opposed in *equal numbers* to those of the French, and it would be difficult to point out *one* where they have been *superior*. Indeed our most celebrated victories over the French have been gained with an *inferiority* of numbers. At the battle of CRESSY (1346), Edward's army was not *one-fourth* of that of the French, the proportion being 30,000 to 156,000 ; at POCTIERS (1356), the Black Prince had only 12,000 men, not one-third of whom were English, while the army of king John of France amounted to upwards of 60,000 ; at AGINCOURT (1415), the French army were *four times* greater than the British ; at BLENHEIM (1704), the French brought into the field nearly 60,000 men, and ninety pieces of cannon, while the allies had, at most, 56,000 men of different nations, and 50 pieces of cannon ; at RAMILLIES (1706), the allied army amounted to 35,000 infantry, and 29,000 cavalry, to which the French opposed 40,000 infantry and 35,000 cavalry. At OUDENARDE (1708), the French army exceeded that of the allies by 12,000 men, and at MALPLAQUET and MINDEN they were also superior in number, with the advantage, in the former action, of a triple entrenchment. FONTENOY might almost be added to the list, for it was the *Irish brigade*, and not the French army which gained that victory. To continue the enquiry : At MAIDA (1806) Sir John Stuart's gallant corps of 4,800 men, supported by six pieces of light artillery and eight mountain guns, but without a single squadron of cavalry, defeated the army of Reynier, consisting of 7,000 French infantry, 600 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery ; at CORUNNA (1809), Sir John Moore's exhausted army of only 15,000 men, after a retreat of 200 miles, and under all the disadvantages of inferiority of position, want of cavalry and artillery, defeated Soult's army of 30,000 men well supported by cavalry and artillery, and with all the advantages of superior moral force ; at BAROSA (1811), Sir Thomas Graham with 4000 men routed marshal Victor, who had nearly double that number in the field ; at TALAVERA (1809), 22,000 British engaged

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Macdonald's
land battles.
i. 49, 52, 67,
68.

Ib. 87, 88.

Ib. ii. 34,
et seq.

Ib. ii. 45,
74, 365, 401.

Ib. ii. 101.

Hist. Mem.
of Battle of
Maida.

James
Moore's
Narrative.

CHAP.
IV.Alison, ix.
420, 422.Siborne.
230, 231.Paul's
Letters.

for two successive days (27th and 28th July) and ultimately defeated 55,000 French. In fact it was not until the spring of 1813 that the contending armies in the Peninsula became on anything like an equality, and the result of that equality is well exhibited in the brilliant victories of SALAMANCA, VITORIA, THOULOUSE, &c. WATERLOO now comes to complete the picture. At that battle, so glorious to the British arms, the whole allied force, including German Legion, Hanoverians, Brunswickers, Nassauers, and Dutch Belgians was only 67,661 sabres and bayonets, with 156 guns, while the forces of Napoleon numbered 68,900 with 246 guns; But deducting the Dutch-Belgians who formed so large a portion of the allied force, namely 17,784 men and 32 guns, which contributed little or nothing to the glorious result, and the real effective troops on the side of the British becomes reduced to 49,877 men and 124 guns, of which the pure English regiments numbered only 23,991 men and 78 guns. Napoleon was also far superior in cavalry, the French horse amounting to 13,792, while the English and Germans little exceeded 9000. Again, the French troops were veteran soldiers of the same nation; the *elite* of their army, whereas the greater part of the British and several battalions of Hanoverians had never before been engaged; "the moral feelings of the English," also, as a celebrated writer observes, "were depressed the night before the battle, below their ordinary tone, while those of the French were exalted to a degree of confidence and presumption unusual even to the soldiers of that nation."

Yes—AGINCOURT may be forgot
And CRESSY be an unknown spot,
And BLENHEIM's name be new;
But still in story and in song,
For many an age remembered, long
Shall live the towers of HOUGOUMONT,
And field of WATERLOO.

SCOTT.

Alison's
Marlborough,
i. 181.

"It is remarkable," says Alison, "that by far the greatest defeats ever experienced by the French *on land*, Cressy,

Azincour, Poitiers, Blenheim, Ramilies, Oudenarde, Salamanca, Vitoria, Waterloo, all came from the arms of England."

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As to "*retranchemens inexpugnables*," without recurring to MALPLAQUET where, according to some writers, the French had made for themselves "a perfect citadel," it will be quite sufficient to remind M. de Schauenburg of Marshal Soult's entrenched position on the Nivelle in 1813. The account of lord Wellington's attack on that formidable line of works, completely reverses the fact which the French translator would establish. "The position on the Nivelle," says colonel Jones, "had many great natural advantages; it was taken up with judgment, and neither labour nor expense had been spared, for three months to strengthen it to the utmost." Soult had, besides, 70,000 men applicable for its defense, and yet this formidable position was carried with trifling loss. The candour of Guibert on the general question of the comparative merits of French and English troops presents a strong contrast to the assertion under notice:—Speaking of the defeat of the French at Cressy, Poitiers, &c., this enlightened writer concludes:—"Aucune nation n'a perdu de batailles aussi honteuses, aussi decisives, que la nôtre, aucune n'en a gagné si peu de decisives et de complètes."

Jones's
Sieges.

Essai general
de tactique,
i. 176.

Again, it has been truly observed:—"When the hostile lines actually met, and the national resolution was fairly put to the test, the British soldiers, from the very beginning, successfully asserted their superiority. It is a most extraordinary fact, but one which this history will abundantly demonstrate, that in every battle between the English and the French, from the beginning to the end of the Peninsular war, without exception, the former were victorious although they were, for the most part, inexperienced at first in actual warfare, and their opponents had been trained in fifteen years of conflict and victory."

Alison,
viii. 430.

Where, but in the human heart can the causes of this be found? Psychology can alone explain it.

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IV.

Great preparation is necessary for the moment upon which the loss or gain of a battle depends.

Frequently when the battle has continued for many hours, along the entire line, the general endeavours to destroy some weak point of his adversary, and this is the application of that high talent—that cool experienced eye—that gifted glance, which no study can teach, but must be *innate*.

Hence prudent generals endeavour—when this moment of decision approaches, and they perceive the superiority of the enemy's force—to escape the *crisis*, and draw off their army before the charge, and consequently before the lines are broken; and this is called *breaking off a battle*.

But to conceive, and ably to execute this resolution, requires a mind unswayed by passion—a real military character.

It was by such conduct that the crown prince, afterwards king of Wirtemberg, rendered himself so distinguished at Montereau 18th February, 1814. The battle of Witepsk, July 1812, was broken off by the Russians in a similar manner,

The crown prince of Wirtemberg exhibited great judgment, firmness and gallantry at the combat of Montereau, but that action cannot be placed on the same footing with that of Witepsk, or at all considered as illustrative of “breaking off a battle,” for the allies were overpowered by superior numbers, and retreated with considerable loss. Napoleon advanced with 20,000 men including the old guard and cuirassiers, and 60 pieces of cannon, while the prince of Wirtemberg could only oppose 12,000 combatants and 40 guns; he therefore drew off his men towards the bridge over the Seine in his rear. The retreat was at first conducted in good order, but as the Wirtembergers descended the steep

face of the heights of Surville, they got entangled in a hollow way through which the road passes, and fell into confusion—infantry, cavalry and artillery breaking their array and rushing headlong to the bridge. The prince royal exerted himself, with great skill and intrepidity, to stem the torrent, and was at one time nearly enveloped by the French cavalry, bravely fighting with his own hand to gain time for the troops, the greater part of whom succeeded in crossing; but the close and concentric discharge of such an overpowering mass of artillery carried destruction into the ranks of the fugitives, and the French chasseurs, pressing on the retiring columns, drove them out of Montereau, with the loss of 3000 killed and wounded, 2000 prisoners, six guns and four standards. The loss of the enemy was about the same in killed and wounded, principally caused by the well served Wirtemberg artillery from the heights of Surville.

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Alison, xii.
527, 528.

The combat of Montereau was one of the most obstinately contested of the whole campaign, and was considered by Napoleon, at the time, to have saved his capital. So greatly excited was the ex-emperor on this occasion, that he is stated to have resumed his former occupation, and pointed a gun himself, saying on the expostulation of an old gunner at the danger to which he thus exposed himself, "Courage my friends! the bullet which is to kill me is not yet cast"

Alison,
xii. 528.

At Witepsk on the other hand, July 1812, every arrangement had been made for a decisive battle, when it was abruptly broken off, by the Russians suddenly retiring during the night. The skill and secrecy with which this movement was effected took Napoleon completely by surprise, and he would not, at first, give credit to the statements made to him on the subject. Brilliant watch fires had been kept up in the Russian lines throughout the night of the 27th, but meantime the whole army broke up from its encampment, and when Murat with 10,000 horse and 2000 light troops, approached the enemy's position in the morning he found their camp deserted. Not a waggon, weapon or straggler had been left behind, and when the French advance

Alison,
xi. 21.

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reached the point of separation of the two roads to St. Petersburg and Moscow, they could not make out which road their opponents had taken !

While the conqueror, content with having driven off his adversary, retires triumphantly over the field of battle, time is afforded to the conquered to continue his retreat without great loss, which cannot be increased, because his regiments remain still in order, and fit for action.

By a resolution of this kind the commander no more loses the confidence of his army than the troops do their courage, which is much more likely to happen when they wait for a serious decision, because this is always accompanied with great loss. In the bulletins of the army it is then stated "From important considerations the army has taken up a stronger position," and this is generally so far true that such an army, in a very short time after, acts imposingly on the offensive.

When both sides have fought obstinately without any result, that is an indecisive battle, and both armies, not without reason, claim the victory, as neither has been beaten. Both commanders then date their despatches from the field of battle, and retire respectively, as was the case at Eylau, in February 1807.

Benningsen's withdrawal in the night gave the nominal victory at Eylau to Napoleon, but it was accompanied with losses that nearly proved ruinous to his arms. "If" says the eloquent historian of Europe, "Napoleon did not sustain a positive defeat, he underwent a disaster which had well nigh proved his ruin. The loss on both sides was immense, and never in modern times had a field of battle been strewed with such a multitude of slain. On the side of the Russians 25,000 had fallen, of whom 7000 were already no more : on that of the French upwards of 30,000 were killed or wounded,

and nearly 10,000 had left their columns, under pretence of attending to the wounded, and did not make their appearance for several days afterwards. The other trophies of victory were nearly equally balanced : the Russians had to boast of the unusual spectacle of 12 eagles taken from their antagonists, while the French had captured 16 of the Russian guns, and 14 standards : " Napoleon himself also narrowly escaped capture.

The most difficult point in the attack-instruction of cavalry is to determine when infantry may be charged in the safest and most advantageous manner. According to Theobald the attack cannot safely be made until the infantry evince disorder or shew openings ; and this seems right.

It is true that, according to the laws of mechanics, a line of cavalry in motion ought to ride down a line of infantry, if it might be supposed, without psychological reference, that troops could be considered as mere machines.

When it is necessary to attain a great result, there can be no doubt that brave cavalry, under the command of a chief who is intrepid and impressed with the necessity of conquering, will overthrow any infantry ; but success thus gained, is attended with considerable loss.

From the superior tactics of the infantry, and its advanced state of organization, it is very difficult for cavalry to attack it with advantage. These superior tactics consist in the quick formation of masses, and in a well supported and destructive fire.

Hence result two grand principles for cavalry, in all attacks they may make against infantry : 1st to suffer the effect of cannon shot to precede the charge, and secondly, never to attack infantry when it has taken up that favorable position which resolutely expresses : " only come on ! "

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This is supposing that the infantry has not been previously enfeebled by unfavorable circumstances, such as continued rain, from which the musquets miss fire, as at Grossbeeren and Dresden, (August 1813), or that want and misfortune have not enfeebled the moral element. In the latter case the cavalry have only to ride boldly forward to obtain success; but where the moral element has not been weakened, a charge of cavalry in line will seldom succeed.

For if the infantry to be attacked, be resolute, and exhibit no weak points, it is not so much prudence as duty to consider before proceeding to the attack, whether the gain would be proportioned to the loss.

In such cases, the same object is often attained by manœuvring to surround the enemy, which moment does not, certainly afford, the amusement of a massacre.

There are officers who place great value upon such a massacre, and expect this spectacle from the cavalry, under all circumstances.

Doubtless it is a truly grand sight, when a line of cavalry, determined on the charge, rushes like a tempest over a plain, breaks in upon the infantry, and destroys it like a hurricane.

On the 25th March 1814, at Fère Champenoise, several French squares were completely cut to pieces.

At the battle of Dennewitz, 6th September 1813, the Prussian cavalry cut down two regiments of French infantry.

At Rideau, 1st May 1809, the regiment of Baden dragoons under colonel von Heimroth, made a charge upon a battalion in square, which it completely annihilated.

At the battle of Cateau, in Flanders, 26th April 1794, colonel prince von Schwartzburg, at the head of six

*The cavalry cut
on these 3 occasions
6200 in total.*

Austrian and twelve English squadrons, attacked a column of French infantry; two thousand men were cut down; twenty-two guns, twenty-nine ammunition waggons, and one hundred and thirty-six horses taken, together with general Chapuy, commanding the column, and two hundred and seventy-seven men.

On the 22nd August 1796, the Archduke Charles, with cavalry alone, beat Bernadotte at Zeiningen.

Marshal Saxe tells us of two Austrian battalions having been sabred by a swarm of Turks, at the battle of Belgrade: "Except count Neuperg" he says, "who commanded these battalions, and who had the good fortune to be mounted; and an ensign who, with his colour, held by my horse's tail, and who was a great burthen to me, no one escaped."

At Melazzo the victorious Austrian infantry, notwithstanding their fire and steadiness, were surrounded by the Spanish cavalry and cut to pieces.

Frederick the Great beat the Swedes at Fehrbellin with five thousand horse and twelve guns, although they were superior in number.

The duke de Vendome, with his cavalry alone, annihilated the Spanish infantry at Marseilles.

At the battle of Mons-en-Puelle, the cavalry of Philip the Fair attacked the Spanish infantry: their leader, William von Julich, and the greater part of this infantry perished on the spot.

Many examples of this kind are to be found in history.! but those are still more numerous where attacks of cavalry against infantry have failed.

At Waterloo all the efforts of the French cavalry were fruitless. On this account it is always necessary to observe whether the *appearances are favorable*, and that

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is precisely what, as has been stated, can be submitted to no rules, but is innate talent, and makes the art of attack the most difficult problem in tactics.

The comparative merits of cavalry and infantry have been frequently made the subject of discussion by military writers, and facts have been readily brought forward on either side, in support of the favoured theory ; but we apprehend that if the question is to be determined numerically, the instances of success will be found far more numerous on the side of the bayonet than the sabre:—Miltiades, in the plains of Marathon, with 10,000 Athenian *infantry*, defeated the Persian army, consisting of 100,000 foot, and 10,000 horse. The Persian cavalry at Plataea was completely defeated by the *infantry* of Pausanias. Alexander the Great was indebted for all the crowns of Asia to the Macedonian phalanx. With this *infantry* he overturned the whole empire of the Persians, and made his victories resound along the banks of the Ganges, the Hydaspes and the Indus. Rome owed all her conquests to those famous legions which were the basis of her armies, and the neglect of this *infantry* was the period of her debility and decline. It was by an attack of some picked cohorts that Cæsar routed the Pompeian cavalry. The military reputation of Russia was established by means of her *infantry*, the organization of which, in the days of Peter the Great, enabled her to cope with and ultimately to subdue the hero of Sweden. The heroic deeds of the Swiss *infantry* in the reign of Charles the Bold, Louis XII, and Francis I, proved the total inefficiency of cavalry against steady determined *infantry*. At the battle of Dreux, the Swiss infantry sustained for a length of time, the attacks of the cavalry of the prince de Condé ; and after their battalions had been broken and penetrated, they rallied,—repelled the cavalry of the count de la Rochefoucault—bade defiance to a host of Lansquenets ; and finally, having been assailed on all sides by fresh squadrons of Reiters and French cavalry, retired by platoons in good order, to the admiration of both armies. And yet the Swiss infantry were at that time, principally

Pere Daniel.
Hist. de la
Milice
Française,
ii. 221.

armed with pikes, having had, for a long period only one-third provided with fire arms; but their battalion squares bristled with pikes 18 feet in length, upon which the French *gens d'armes* could make no impression.

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The British army furnishes us with many brilliant examples of the superiority of infantry over cavalry, one of the most remarkable of which occurred at the battle of Mifden, August 1759, when six regiments of English *infantry*, supported by two regiments of Hanoverian guards, charged sixty squadrons of French cavalry, which they drove before them without any other assistance than that of their own artillery.

Macedonald's
land battles.
ii. 263.

"In vain," says the narrator of this remarkable encounter, "did the French cavalry attempt to rally; they could not look this little corps of *infantry* in the face. In vain was it taken in front and flank by their artillery; its resolution was not to be daunted." The ill-disciplined Highland *infantry* of the Pretender, at PRESTON PANS in 1745, attacked and put to flight two regiments of regular horse, which never once attempted to make a stand or charge their pursuers. At the battle of FONTENOY, the French cavalry were unable to make any impression on the British *infantry*, and had not marshal Saxe brought up the Irish brigade, the duke of Cumberland would certainly have gained the battle. At Alexandria, in 1801, the republican horse in vain endeavoured to break the British *infantry*. On this occasion the 28th regiment was attacked, at the same moment, in front and rear, and fought, as afterwards at Quatre Bras, back to back. With admirable coolness they opened their ranks on the approach of the cavalry—let the squadrons pass, and instantly closing them again, threw in so destructive a fire that nearly the whole perished on the spot. Sir John Stuart, as before shewn, beat Reynier at MAIDA, by *infantry* alone.* At FUENTES DE HONOR (May, 1811) the British infantry retired in squares over an open plain for more than three miles, repelling every effort of Montbrun's formidable cavalry, who were obliged to give up the pursuit, leaving 500 horses on the field.

Alison,
v. 584.

* See ante, p. 87.

CHAP.
IV.

Alison. ix.
548, 550.

Hist. K. G.
legion. ii. 18,
et seq.

Alison. xii.
601, 615.

This was one of the most perilous moments to the British army in the whole Peninsular war, and perhaps the only occasion when its able chief was nearly experiencing a defeat; but the British infantry averted the impending blow. "Slowly, and in perfect order, the squares of the 1st, 7th and light divisions, retired, flanked, on either side by the terrible cuirassiers of Montbrun, flushed with the newly won glories of Wagram; pressed in rear by the columns and batteries of Ney's corps, which had broken the Russian army at Friedland. In vain their charging squadrons swept round these serried bands, and the light of the British bayonets was for a time lost in the blaze of the French cuirassiers. From every throng the unbroken squares still emerged, pursuing their steady way, amidst a terrific fire," until they reached the position on the Coa, which defied the French attack. At EL BODON, in the month of September of the same year, two weak battalions of British *infantry* (5th and 77th) supported by 300 of the first king's german legion hussars, and two batteries of Portuguese artillery, retired in good order for six miles before 2000 French cuirassiers; one regiment, the 5th, having previously *attacked the cavalry*, driven them down the hill, and retaken two guns from the astonished horsemen! A somewhat similar exploit occurred at the re-capture of Rheims by Napoleon in 1814, when the Russian regiment of Riazan formed square on the field of battle, and not only repulsed the repeated attacks of the enemy's cavalry, but pierced through the forest of sabres which surrounded them and bore off their dying commander. In the same manner at the battle of Craone (1814) the Russian regiment of Shirvan, having exhausted their cartridges, and being surrounded by cavalry, three times forced their way through, with fixed bayonets, bringing with them all the officers that had been either killed or wounded. Ney was defeated at QUATRE BRAS by the British, Hanoverian, and Brunswick *infantry*, almost unaided by any cavalry, while the French had 5000 chosen horsemen, including the far-famed cuirassiers of Kellermann. Here also we have another instance of infantry attacking

cavalry with success. The 42nd and 44th British regiments had been formed in two small squares, and being completely surrounded by French cavalry, seemed destined to become a sacrifice to their repeated and impetuous attacks, when Picton, being unprovided with cavalry, decided upon assailing the horsemen *with his infantry*, and thus rescuing the squares. With this view he united the Royals and 28th regiments into one column, and led them into the midst of the enemy's cavalry. The whole extent of ground in their front appeared to swarm with lancers, *chasseurs à cheval*, and cuirassiers; a considerable portion of whom were now seen forming up preparatory to an attack upon the column, but Picton continued advancing until the last moment, when he suddenly formed square. In this position the two regiments sustained repeated and furious charges, which were invariably repulsed, and although the lancers individually rushed forward, and frequently wounded the men in the ranks, yet all efforts to effect an opening completely failed. On one occasion the French cavalry made a simultaneous attack upon three of the faces of the British square, but the firm infantry reserved their fire until the horsemen approached within a few yards of their front, when the assailants were hurled back in wild disorder, horses and riders tumbling over each other in the greatest confusion. "Such was the battle of Quatre Bras," says Siborne, "a battle in which the British, Hanoverian, and Brunswick *infantry* covered itself with imperishable glory, to estimate the full extent of which, we must constantly bear in mind that the whole brunt of the action fell upon that *infantry*, and that throughout the greater part of the day, it was totally unaided by any cavalry." The French army are not without similar instances of the superiority of *infantry* over cavalry. The battle of the PYRAMIDS in 1798, and that of MOUNT THABOR in 1799, both attest the excellence of the well disciplined foot soldier. At AUERSTADT again, in 1806, the Prussian cavalry, although in overwhelming numbers, and led on by the intrepid prince William of Prussia, failed in their repeated charges on the French *infantry*. On this

Siborne. 86,
87, 108.

CHAP.
IV.Alison. vii.
227.

Ib. ix. 46.

occasion, the prince, at the head of a powerful body of cavalry, furiously assailed the division of Morand just after it had formed, but these veteran troops, with admirable coolness, threw themselves into square, and, with rapid discharges, received the repeated and impetuous attacks of the Prussian horse. "In vain these gallant cavaliers, with headlong fury, drove their steeds up to the very muzzles of the French musquets ;—in vain they rode round and enveloped the squares. Ceaseless was the rolling fire which issued from those flaming walls ; impenetrable the hedge of bayonets, which the front rank kneeling presented to their advance. The heroic devotion of prince William in vain led them again and again to the charge ; still the fire continued, still the bayonets remained firm. At length he himself was wounded ; half his followers were stretched on the field, and the remainder sought shelter in flight." At ASPERN again, in 1809, we see the same results on the part of the Hungarian infantry against the French cuirassiers. "These gallant horsemen, cased in shining armour, shaking their sabres above their heads, and making the air resound with cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, dashed furiously upon the Austrian squares, which had scarcely time to form when the tempest was upon them. In vain Bessières, d' Espagne, and Lasalle, at the head of their powerful horsemen, swept round the insulated foot—routed the Austrian cavalry of the reserve, and enveloping the squares, summoned them to surrender. But no ! cut off from all other support, the brave Hungarians stood back to back, and kept up so vigorous and sustained a fire, that after having had half their number, including the gallant d' Espagne, stretched on the plain, the French cuirassiers were obliged to retire to their own lines, shattered, defeated, and mortified."

The Russians can also boast of infantry which successfully resisted masses of the best French cavalry led on by a Murat, and influenced by all the moral advantages of an advancing army far exceeding their opponents in number. The retreat to Smolensko in 1812, offers a striking instance of this character ; shewing also that even breaking a square of infantry

is not necessarily conclusive as to its ultimate fate :—On the 16th August 1812, the Russian general Newerofskoi who commanded the rear guard of 6000 foot and 1200 horse, the greater number new levies, which had never been previously under fire, found himself suddenly assailed near Crasnoi, by 18,000 horse under Ney and Murat. The head of the retreating column being overtaken by the light cavalry of the French, their small force of horsemen was driven in, and the Russian general was placed in a most critical position. Newerofskoi, however, did not hesitate. Forming his little force into two squares, soon afterwards reduced to one, he retired slowly, and in admirable order, over the vast open plain which adjoins the Dnieper, enveloped on all sides by the French squadrons, who charged the square more than *forty times* during the day, and in some instances, broke through the rampart of bayonets, and cut down the Russian officers in the very centre of the square. Nevertheless they always formed again; and this little band of heroes, still forming a lesser square, when the larger was broken, or weakened by loss, steadily retired during the whole day, repulsing, by an incessant rolling fire, the repeated charges of the French cavalry, until at length, on the approach of night, they reached Kortinia with unbroken ranks, though with the loss of 1100 men and five pieces of cannon. The Prussian *infantry* has been equally distinguished: At the battle of VAUCHAMPS (Feb. 1814) Blucher felt the necessity of retiring, and commenced his retreat in squares, the artillery being placed in the intervals. In this manner the retreat was continued along the high road, which traversed a flat and open country, running in a straight line between rows of lofty elms. On this the artillery retired, firing incessantly, while the squares of infantry marched abreast of it, in the fields on either side. They fell back slowly and in perfect order, as on a field day. “In vain the French cuirassiers, with devoted gallantry, and animated by the presence of the Emperor, swept round the steady walls of steel, and approaching to the very edge of the bayonets, strove to

Alison. xi. 36.

CHAP.
IV.

Alison. xii.
509.

Journal of
late major
Macready,
80th Regt.,
in United
Service Ma-
gazine. 1862.

force their way on, wherever the discharge of the cannon tore a chasm, or the fall of the wounded presented an opening. Instantly closing up, these noble veterans still preserved their array unbroken; and the squares, though sorely diminished, and leaving a stream of blood flowing from the dead and wounded, along their path, still presented an undaunted front to the enemy," and thus combating they reached Champaubert.

But the battle of Waterloo offers conclusive evidence on this question. Here a comparatively small body of *infantry* of various nations—many of them little better than newly-raised militia—were opposed for hours to the repeated attacks of one of the most numerous, gallant, intrepid, well-appointed and well-disciplined bodies of horse that Napoleon ever brought into the field, and what was the result?—The question is well answered by the gallant major Macready:—"In a few minutes after, the enemy's cavalry galloped up, and crowned the crest of our position. Our guns were abandoned, and they formed between the two brigades, about a hundred paces in our front. Their first charge was magnificent. As soon as they quickened their trot into a gallop, the cuirassiers bent their heads, so that the peaks of their helmets looked like vizors, and they seemed cased in armour from the plume to the saddle. Not a shot was fired till they were within thirty yards, when the word was given, and our men fired away at them. The effect was magical. Through the smoke we could see helmets falling, cavaliers starting from their seats with convulsive springs as they received our balls, horses plunging and rearing in the agonies of fright and pain, and crowds of the soldiery dismounted, part of the squadron in retreat, but the more daring remainder backing their horses to force them on the bayonets. Our fire soon disposed of these gentlemen. The main body re-formed in our front, and rapidly and gallantly repeated their attacks. In fact, from this time (about four o'clock) till near six, we had a constant repetition of these brave but unavailing charges. There was no difficulty in

repulsing them, but our ammunition decreased alarmingly. At length an artillery waggon galloped up, emptied two or three casks of cartridges into the square, and we were all comfortable."

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"*The best cavalry is contemptible to a steady and well supplied infantry regiment*; even our men saw this, and began to pity the useless perseverance of their assailants, and, as they advanced, would growl out "Here come these fools again! Their devotion was invincible."—
But in vain—

Each musqueteer's revolving knell,
As fast, as regularly fell,
As when they practice to display
Their discipline on festal day.
Then down went helm and lance,
Down were the eagle banners sent,
Down reeling steeds and riders went,
Corsets were pierced, and pennons rent;
And to augment the fray,
Wheeled full against their staggering flanks
The English horsemen's foaming ranks
Forced their resistless way.

SCOTT.

The attack of Vivian's brigade upon the French reserves offers a brilliant illustration of the judicious application of cavalry, and has been well termed the "Crisis" at Waterloo:—Perceiving the disordered condition of the French army, after the failure of the Imperial guard, he decided upon forming a front line with the 10th and 18th British hussars, holding the 1st hussars of the king's German legion in reserve, and leading the whole to the attack. The 10th advanced in echelon of squadrons; the 2nd dragoons of the legion came up on the right of the 10th, and charging the French cavalry in their front put them to flight, while the 10th, moving in rapid succession of squadrons, closed with the French horsemen who supported the squares of the guard, and drove them from the field. Adams's light infantry brigade had, in the mean time, swept the front of the British position, and soon the general advance of the allied troops proclaimed the victory.

Siborne. 359.

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The fortunate termination of a battle depends upon the good dispositions which have been previously made.

Whoever attacks without these favorable appearances, acts from passion, and passion leads to ruin.

If, however, the disposition of the battle be correct, and that it is conducted according to principles of tactics and circumspection, delay is unnecessary; and the execution of the attack itself, should wear the stamp of that bold and intrepid confidence, which, as has been shewn, always extorts the victory. Without this impetuosity, the attack of cavalry will not be followed by brilliant results.

Consideration is only to be used by a commander *before* the execution of the charge; when once the trumpet has sounded for the attack, all consideration should cease, except that of inspiring his troops.

He must, at this moment, resemble a young, courageous, thoughtless man, indifferent as to the issue of his actions, just, as the counts of Alençon and Flanders, at the battle of Cressy (1346) when they dashed upon the enemy, at the head of their cavalry, shouting "*à la mort.*"

The importance of *certain days* is felt, for which reason, on the day of battle, generals remind their troops of former triumphs, in order to impart to their army the same feeling which then led them to victory. "The sun of Austerlitz rises!" exclaimed Napoleon at the battle of the Moskwa, September 7th, 1812.

At five, the sun breaking through a fog, appeared in cloudless splendour: "It is the sun of Austerlitz!" said Napoleon, and immediately the trumpets sounded, the drums beat, and the following proclamation was read to the troops:—
"Soldiers! the battle is at hand which you have so long desired: henceforth the victory depends upon yourselves. It has become necessary and will give you abundance; good

winter quarters, and a speedy return to your country! Conduct yourselves as you did at Austerlitz, Friedland, Witepsk, and Smolensko; and let the remotest posterity recount your actions on this day: let your countrymen say of you all—He was in that great battle under the walls of Moscow.”

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According to M. de Segur, however, Napoleon's allusion to “the sun of Austerlitz” was not a happy one. “Il se levait,” says this general, “du côté des Russes, nous montrait à leur coups, et nous eblouissait.”

At the battle of Vitoria, June 21st, 1813, lord Wellington reminded his army, “that they were the brothers of the heroes of Trafalgar, and that they had before them the vanquished of Salamanca.”

History has preserved the most important speeches which generals have made to their troops on similar occasions. “Soldiers” said Buonaparte to his troops, at the battle of Marengo, about six o'clock in the evening, as he flew through the ranks, “remember that it is my custom, to sleep upon the field of battle!” and fortune which up to this moment, had been unfavorable to him, immediately changed.

Some very effective addresses have been also made in a far less lofty strain:—When the emperor Sigismund, for instance, had determined on attacking the camp of the Taborites, he simply said, pointing to the encampment:—“Soldiers! yonder lie your provisions!” “The hungry veterans” says Gilpin, “rushed on; the camp, thinned by numerous outposts, was instantly entered, and the Taborites could only die in its defense.” The gallant veteran Picton had a strange way of complimenting his division previous to an attack:—At the battle of Vitoria, where “the fighting division” so boldly carried the bridge in front of Puente Nueva, this intrepid general is stated to have put himself at the head of his troops, waved his hat, and led them on to the charge with

Gilpin's Lives
of Reformers.
i. 266.

Narrative of
an officer of
Staff Corps.
304.

CHAP.
IV.Grattan's
adventures
of the Con-
naught Ran-
gers. i. 195.Grattan. i.
216.Sketches of
campaigning
life. 229, 230.

the bland invitation: "Come on ye rascals! come on ye fighting villains!" an address which proved most effective, for the bridge was carried in a few minutes. At the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, his address to the 88th was somewhat more civilized:—"Rangers of Connaught," he exclaimed, "it is not my intention to expend any powder this evening. We'll do this business with the *could* iron." The following characteristic anecdote is also related of Picton:—The day after the siege of Rodrigo, some of the soldiers of the third division, passing the general, when they were more than usually elevated in spirits, called out. "Well general, we gave you a cheer last night: its your turn now!" to which appeal, the general, smiling, replied, taking off his hat: "Here then, you drunken set of brave rascals, hurrah! we'll soon be at Badajos!" English generals have never been famous for making long speeches to their troops, and the best style of harangue is certainly, as M. le Clerc says, "that which is suited to the time and place." This author cites a most pertinent address, made by an old British officer who commanded before Cadis in 1702: "Would it not be a disgrace," said he, "for you Englishmen, who live on good beef and pudding, to be beaten by those rascally Spaniards, who have nothing to eat but oranges and lemons?" Sir George Elder's address to his Portuguese caçadores at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, is perhaps the shortest on record "*Vamos Villa Real!*" The incident is thus related:—

"Craufurd, on all occasions of this nature, like some Greek hero, or Roman leader, was much given to eloquence, and always addressed a *speech* to his division The general, not speaking Portuguese, called upon lieutenant colonel Elder, commanding the 3d or Villa Real Caçadores, of the light division, to address some expressions of encouragement to his men. Elder, though in command of a corps of that nation's troops, unfortunately was as innocent of the vernacular of their language, as the general himself; his powers of speech, even in his own tongue, did not at all approach the oratorical or classical: more prompt in deed

than word, he conveyed his communications to his corps in a kind of Anglo-Portuguese, a species of *lingua franca* peculiar to himself, but which *they* understood. His men admired his courage, liked his conduct, and would have followed him anywhere. His battalion was in the very best possible state of discipline, and set an example to other corps. At this moment the firing commenced on the right with the third division. Craufurd again impatiently called out. ‘D—— it, Sir, why do you not obey my orders, and speak energetically to your men?’ Elder was puzzled, and at last roared out, ‘*Vamos, Villa Real!*’—which was about one of the greatest efforts at eloquence he had ever attempted in his life in any language. But it was effective.”

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Hannibal and Scipio both endeavoured to stimulate their armies before the battle of the Ticinus. The former even made some prisoners fight each other, in front of the line of battle, in order to animate his troops by the sight of a combat.

History does not authorize us in placing this construction upon the circumstance to which the author alludes. Hannibal's intention does not appear to have been that of endeavouring to excite his troops by the simple means of making two men fight; but from the comparison which he drew between the situation of his army and that of the prisoners, to shew them that they had no alternative but to *conquer or die*. The story is thus told by Polybius: Hannibal, wishing to animate his troops, contrived the following expedient: Having assembled his forces, he brought before them the prisoners taken in the Alps, who were loaded with chains, emaciated with hunger, and mangled with blows; he ordered some suits of Gallic armour, horses and rich military habits to be set before them, and then demanded which of them would try their fate in arms against the other, on condition that the conqueror should possess the spoils which they saw, while the vanquished should be released from his miseries by death. All showed the utmost eagerness to engage, and lots being

Hampton's
Polybius. i.
176.

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IV.

Livy. xxi.
cap. xliii.

ordered to be cast, every one prayed that the lot might be his. When the combat was decided, the Carthaginians agreed with the captives in thinking both the conquered and the conquerors equally happy." Hannibal, now finding that his contrivance had produced the desired effect upon the troops, proceeded to draw a comparison between the situation of the prisoners and his soldiers. Livy, who always puts a speech in the mouths of his generals, thus gives Hannibal's harangue upon this occasion:—"Si quem animum in alienæ sortis exemplo paulo ante habuistis, eundem mox in æstimanda fortuna vestra habueritis, vicimus milites; neque enim *spectaculam* modo illud sed quædam veluti *imago vestræ conditionis* erat. Ac nescio, an majora vincula, majoresque necessitates vobis quam captivis vestris fortuna circumdederit" &c. No more powerful appeal could be made to the exertions of the Carthaginians, than this illustration of the only alternatives of which their situation admitted, and Hannibal's object was fully answered by the result: Cyrus made use of a similar expedient to make the Persians revolt against the tyranny of Astiages.

It is important to elevate the moral force previous to a battle.

Napoleon caused the eagles of the guard to be covered with crape, which was not to be taken off until the enemy had been defeated.

The moral force of the soldier is often raised by increasing the physical. Before the battle of Höchstädt (Blenheim) in 1704, Marlborough remained quietly in his calash, and when the generals told him that all was ready for the attack, and that the army awaited the signal with impatience, he calmly observed: "The provisions are not yet given out."

Before the battle of Leuthen, December 5, 1757, Frederick tried every possible means to raise the depressed courage of the Silesian army. The king

appealed to the sense of honour of the officers, talked to the private soldiers, caused provisions to be distributed, and even wine was used as a means of cheering the spiritless troops.

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After a good breakfast a man goes into battle with much more courage than he does fasting. The battle of Ebersberg on the Traun, 3rd May, 1809, would not have taken place, if Massena had not had a capital breakfast at Lins, which the town gave him gratis !

The archduke Charles seems to have been of the same opinion. When his officers pressed him to commence the attack at the battle of Aspern, he ordered arms to be piled, and the troops to dine. The British, on the other hand, at Inkermann, Nov. 5, 1854, were called into action before they had tasted food ; and yet on this memorable occasion, so glorious to the British arms, 8,000 English repulsed nearly 60,000 Muscovites—a disproportion only exceeded by that at Narva, in 1700, when Charles XII raised Sweden to the pinnacle of military fame.

Alison. ix. 39.

Battles which take place in the afternoon are generally more violent than those which begin with sun-rise, but the latter are more decisive. A battle which is already determined at mid-day, is more perilous to those who have lost, because in proportion as strength is exhausted, courage is weakened.

Whoever has been in such situations can easily understand the miracle in Joshua: one really believes that the sun "*stands still*." If in former times, generals depended upon certain favorable omens, often even to superstition, this might have been done in order to obtain an influence over the minds of the army ; but there is a feeling in man which gives him a presentiment of good and bad fortune.

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Strength exhausts itself, so also does fortune. So long as the general is supported by the good will of fate, the most insignificant circumstances appear to be combinations of good luck ; but afterwards the wrath of fate follows the same general: then the most able arrangements—the most correct plans of operation—in a word the speculations of strategy, are wrecked by all the minute circumstances which, in tactical proceedings, now only combine to produce misfortune. If ever any general experienced this coincidence of circumstances, it was Buonaparte—who hung so long on fortune's girdle—at the opening of the campaign of 1815.

That passage of the old Testament “ And they were smitten with blindness,” enters into the life of almost every individual. Great and small ; renowned and unknown—almost every man experiences a time when an incorrect judgment of his situation leads him into errors which undermine his good fortune, and, as in a storm, drive him from his path.

The more elevated the station of the man, the more critical is this moment.

Commanders generally prognosticate this crisis. Thus did Hannibal forebode the loss of the battle of Zama ; he endeavoured to negotiate, but the proud Scipio laid the conditions too high.

Tilly—the hitherto unconquered Tilly—was dilatory and irresolute before the battle of Leipsic, and committed errors there : an internal foreboding warned him of his misfortune.

Attila wisely retreated from the walls of Rome with a conquering army, for the same sensation told him that in Rome he would find disgrace and death.

Frederick the Great, in the war of the Bavarian succession, knew that "fortune would be no longer favourable to him."

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When fortune leaves the general it is time that he should cover himself with the mantle of wisdom and moderation ; that is, to *make peace* !

It is above all things, difficult to judge correctly of the crisis of fortune, and then rightly to operate, because the passions, particularly those of ambition and pride, arrest the action of reason, flatter the understanding, and thereby interrupt the cool calculation of future events.

A too warm imagination, which withdraws itself from under the authority of reason, always causes its own punishment.

CHAPTER V.

ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY.

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V.

History shews us that great commanders have generally handed down to posterity the accounts of their wars and deeds in the shape of memoirs, but, for the most part, without stating the principles upon which they have acted.

The art of war was grounded upon custom and prejudice. The generals, who were, at the same time, authors, endeavoured rather to please than to instruct; they did not, perhaps, understand the art of instruction, and, consequently transmitted to us only their own customs and prejudices. Systems first arose when, in later times, men became partisans, through the study of these memoirs. As no body of instruction had yet been formed, either for the art or the science of war; as little was scientifically known on the subject, and consequently only the mechanical part of war was spoken of, and written upon, there arose a kind of anarchy, and each defended the customs and prejudices of that general, whom he had chosen as his model.

The warmth and enthusiasm displayed in support of the chosen model, rose in proportion as the ideas failed in that clearness which determines a man's own judg-

ment : The fewer ideas of his own a person possesses, the more warmly does he defend those of another.

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This period is particularly interesting, because it is the commencement of scientific illumination ; but we meet in it not only great errors, but what is always in the train of events—the animosities of antagonistic parties.

Breze, for example, takes it very ill that Folard should declare himself in favour of small squadrons, and denies him all pretensions to logic, because Folard is bold enough to say that what the great Condé had said of large squadrons, was no article of faith ! Breze considers this opinion as logically false as that by which St. Augustine endeavoured to prove that Mary had only one son, and therefore Christ no brothers !

Breze further contends that the prince of Condé, who often fought at the head of the French cavalry, had more right to pronounce an opinion upon this subject than Folard, who never commanded a single squadron.

Paradoxes always arise out of theories which are not the result of experience.

M. de la Balme takes the field still more violently against the Chevalier, and denies him all judgment ; the Marquis of Silva and Bonneville, on the other hand, support Folard.

In order to be independent of cavalry, the former wishes that *chevaux de frise* should be placed in front of the infantry ; the latter is for lengthening the musquets of the second and third ranks, in order to keep off the charge of cavalry.

This period, in which the supporters of certain customs and prejudices endeavoured to reduce them to a system, and contended amongst themselves, exhibits the want of solid principles.

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This time is not long past, and yet it must be admitted that even at the present day, certain prejudices prevail, not only with regard to forms and tactics, but also amongst the different branches of the service.

The infantry officer, feeling his value,—because every regular action displays masses of infantry,—because the maintaining or the seizing of a strong or important point, or generally, because the real wresting of the victory, is the result of the renowned deeds of the infantry—is, therefore, easily led to think that, with the exception of a few light cavalry for the sake of effect, the rest may be dispensed with.

The cavalry officer, on the other hand, proud of the history of all ages, which proves undeniably, that, without cavalry, no victory can be brilliant; and that a beaten army, unless followed up by cavalry, cannot be considered as beaten; but that a victory determined by cavalry, is always complete,—often runs into a reproachful haughtiness.

Towards the artillery, both arms conduct themselves without jealousy; and only on precipitate retreats, where it is often so difficult to protect and save it, do they wish the artillery away!

The claims of the different branches of the service are ingeniously put forward by the author of the “*Essay on the Art of War*,” who introduces an officer of each branch, as the advocate of his particular corps. In this fancied discussion the cavalry officer thus supports his pretensions:—“The horseman has, on his side, the two great springs of war, which ensure the success of the greatest enterprises—celerity in evolution; impetuosity and effect in execution. The infantry is that inert and massive part of an army, which moves with effort, as if it borrowed from the earth with which it is immediately in contact, the gravity natural to it. The

Essay on the art of war.
iii. 109, et seq.

cavalry is that assemblage of agile bodies, which, being connected with the earth, imitate by the rapidity of their course, that of the heavenly globes, and communicate life and vigour to the rest of the army."

"How much the success of military operations depends on promptitude and celerity of motion is well known. There are in war certain delicate conjunctures, which we must seize as we would kill game, flying, without which the moment of victory vanishes like a meteor. But can a mass of infantry, which only moves like machinery, be so proper to catch victory in its flight, like a bird on the wing? Sometimes it is necessary to make an impetuous onset, without allowing the enemy time to form; sometimes by a precipitate march, to anticipate the possession of some important and decisive post; sometimes to take the advantage, by a prompt and rapid manœuvre, of the situation of the enemy, who partakes himself of the disorder into which he has thrown others."

"Let us ask the conqueror of Cannæ, that great captain, who taught the most warlike of all other nations that they had yet to find in him a master in the art of vanquishing; let us ask him to what he was indebted for those military achievements, which constitute at this day, the admiration and astonishment of the most competent judges of the art? What contributed most to reduce Rome to such a humiliating condition? We ought to agree with Polybius, that it was his cavalry, always superior to that of the Romans, which gave the finishing stroke to their defeats. He had to oppose the most formidable infantry in the world: his own much inferior in numbers and bravery, would have given way a thousand times under the enormous weight of those daring legions; but the address and vivacity of his cavalry wonderfully supported the same qualities in his own mind. It was the celerity of its movements, the marches, counter-marches, the unexpected manœuvres of his flying squadrons, which snatched the victory from the Roman eagle; these were the preludes to those famous victories of the Trebia and the Trasimene lake, and prepared at Cannæ the tomb for more than 40,000 Romans."

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“Does not almost the whole detail of war depend on the effect produced by the operations of the horse, and the rapidity of its motions? It is required, for instance, to harrass an army; what so proper as the agility of the squadron for those little multiplied combats, which fatigue and wear away the most numerous armies, and are equivalent in detail to the most complete victories?” &c. The claims of the infantry, artillery, and engineers, are equally well put forward, and the author concludes by adjudging the *first* place to the infantry, the *second* to the cavalry, the *third* to the engineers, and the *fourth* and *fifth* to the *artillery* and light troops.

There is another prejudice to be added to these, namely, that which exists in all Europe against standing armies, and upon which subject opinions are divided even in the armies themselves.

The old disciplined soldiers of Philip the II, under an Alba, it is said, yielded to the Netherlanders, who had taken up arms for their freedom.

The Americans of the United States withstood the standing armies of England. The renowned armies of Germany, and their well tried tactics could not overcome the French national guard.

The distinguished army of Prussia fell in one battle before the soldiers whom liberty had reared.

However after these soldiers of liberty lay buried on fields of battle, and the new French armies were re-organized as standing armies (in which the soldier, without phantom or exaltation coldly follows the mere dictates of duty,) — these troops, which had been accustomed to march victorious through Europe, were, not unfrequently, conquered by militia (*land-wehrmänner*) who grasped their arms, inspired by hatred and revenge.

The Hanoverian *landwehr* fought at Waterloo with a bravery, firmness, and devotion worthy of the most experienced regular soldiers, the very centre of the allied position being held by the new raised brigade of Kielmansegge, forming part of the third division. These troops formed two squares, which were terribly mutilated by the attempt of the enemy to break the centre, and an opening was almost effected in this part of the line; for one flank of the right square, formed by the field battalions Bremen and Verden, was swept away—the square being reduced to the form of a triangle; and the left square, consisting of the field battalions Grubenhagen and Duke of York, fell back nearly broken. The commanding officers of both these squares had been struck down;—the ammunition had begun to fail;—of the brigadiers, count Kielmansegge alone was left to rally and reorganize the shattered remnants of the division; but this the gallant officer accomplished with a bravery and self-devotion which has never been exceeded, and the men having been, as far as possible, provided with ammunition, he resolutely led them back to their places in the position.

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Hist. K. G.
legion. ii. 373,
378.

“Of the four Hanoverian infantry brigades,” says Siborne. 393. Siborne, “that of Kilmansegge, and a part of Halkett’s were the most actively engaged They had been but recently and hastily raised; and yet the manner in which such raw soldiers withstood, as Kielmansegge’s brigade did, for so great a length of time, the most furious assaults made by the gallant and well-disciplined troops of France, would have conferred honor on long tried veterans.”

In Spain and South America, the same causes have been followed by the same results.

These facts, on which we rest without considering the causes from which they have proceeded, seem to give weight to the prejudices against standing armies.

The institution of the *landwehr* as it now exists in many German states, has called forth but a temporary

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paroxysm. In times of peace where this excitement is wanting, it must necessarily decline, even supposing that we were not to take into account the expense occasioned to the people by the equipment of these troops, and the circumstance of giving occasion to holydays, by which domestic economy is affected, and—Sunday being the general day for exercise,—religion and morality undermined: thus the peace of families is disturbed, and consequently, the well being of the state shaken to its foundation.

A state which places its entire dependance on an establishment of militia (*landwehr*) will be overcome by every conqueror in a single rapid operation: It is war that forms this description of troops, which history proves.

How long did the revolution of the Netherlands continue; and how many faults were necessary on the part of Spain, before it obtained a footing?

Without the assistance of France, the North Americans would perhaps, never have obtained their freedom.

The French national guard conquered only in consequence of the disunion of the coalition.

The loss of the battle of Jena was not so much the result of better tactics, as of superior strategy: the Prussian army had not formed in order of battle, but was attacked and beaten in detail.

In the years 1813 and 1814, the French army yielded to superior numbers: at the same time the genius of fortune had abandoned it.

In Spain it was the Duke of Wellington, and not the Spaniards that conquered the French.

The inefficiency of Spanish patriotism to overcome the French in the Spanish peninsula, is thus candidly admitted

by the marquis de Chambray in his learned treatise on the science of war, an avowal which does equal honour to his judgment and liberality :—" De nos jours pendant sept ans que Napoléon fit la guerre à l'Espagne pour l'asservir, ses troupes gagnèrent les batailles qu'elles livrèrent aux armées Espagnoles, et perdirent la plupart de celles qu'elles livrèrent à l'armée Anglaise. Les armées Espagnoles étaient pourtant nationales, remplies de patriotisme, et quelquefois de fanatisme : elle combattaient pour l'indépendance de leur pays, elles étaient animées de sentimens de haine contre les troupes de Napoléon. Les armées Anglaises, au contraire, étaient composée de troupes de différentes nations, et dont une partie était mercenaire." It has very generally been alledged that the Spanish troops in the Peninsular war, did not oppose that resistance to the French which the world was led to expect from their boasted patriotism and determined spirit—that a jealousy of British interference diminished their zeal, and that latterly they became mere inactive spectators of a contest, in which they believed England fought only for her own security ; but the heroic deeds of Romana, Castanos, Albuquerque, Palafox, Blake, Alvarez, and the ever vigilant guerilla chiefs, prove beyond dispute, that the patriotism of the Spaniards was more than *nominal*, and that if their unaided exertions were insufficient to expel the French from the Peninsula, it was the Spanish government and not the people that should be charged with imbecility. It was not the want of heart, but the want of head which failed in their contest with the republican forces. The officers were a conceited, ignorant, and inefficient body, while the men were almost always excellent, and possessed not only the moral spirit, but the physical qualities calculated to become the basis of a first-rate army. The Catalonian Miguelets, or smugglers, formed the finest materials for light troops, and the Valencian and Andalusian levies presented a physical appearance greatly exceeding that of both the French and English regular armies ; but how were these admirable materials applied ? Instead of discipline, system, order,—

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Philosophie
de la guerre.
cap. i. pp. 25,
26.

Alison. viii.
408.

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Alison. viii.
549, et seq.

Paaley. i. 279.

the smallest measures of prudence or precaution on the part of the government or military authorities, "so completely had the idea of their own invincibility taken possession of their minds, that they never once contemplated the possibility of defeat. All their arrangements were based on the assumption that they were speedily to drive the French over the Pyrenees. Nothing was foreseen or provided for, in case of disaster. There were no magazines or reserve stores—no fortified positions—no armed fortresses, and no money in the treasury! When the contest began in 1808, the soldiers were naked, without shoes, and rarely supplied with provisions; the cavalry were dismounted, the artillery in wretched condition: even the liberal supplies which had been sent from England were squandered or dilapidated by private cupidity, and seldom reached the objects of their destination; the inferior officers sold or plundered the stores; the superiors made free with the military chest; the central junta, instead of applying their minds to practical objects, occupied themselves with discussing the honorary titles which they were to bear, the salaries which they were to receive, and the uniforms in which they were to be attired, and thus materials out of which a splendid army might easily have been formed, became comparatively useless amid the mass of vanity, venality and cupidity with which they were allied." With regard to their jealousy of and ill will towards the English, it may be traced to the government, or its officers, but the people shewed the best spirit; the determined conduct of the people of Asturias and Galicia has excited the admiration of English historians. "The French," says Southey, "could have invaded no people, whom it would have been so easy to route, none whom it was so impossible to subdue." Patriotism is not a security against foreign invasion, nor, unaided, a sufficient means of repelling it. The warlike and intrepid Swiss in 1799 were as unable as the Spaniards, to prevent the inroads of the French, and there are numerous examples in history to support the same position; although Circassia's long con-

tinued and successful resistance to Russia, offers an exception to the contrary. The *patriotic* Romans were often beaten by the Carthaginians; the Athenians yielded to Philip; Greece fell before the Turks; the Poles, excited to the highest degree of enthusiasm by the *patriotism* of Kosciusko, in vain resisted the well disciplined battalions of Suwarroff.

A well regulated *standing army* is the only solid protection of a state. Philip of Macedon conquered by means of his standing army, the principal republics of antient Greece, and the great empire of Persia; Carthage was successful, and Rome ultimately victorious by means of a standing army. When the standing army of Rome degenerated into an undisciplined militia, it was unable to repel the inroads of the Germans and Scythians who invaded the western empire, and neighbouring states became then sensible that standing armies were indispensable for their protection.

In South America, small bodies of regular troops withstood the independents. Years of destruction,—anxiety,—alarm, are necessary to create that pitch of heroism which finally produces great results.

Heroism is a hot-house plant which does not thrive without careful nursing. War as the last appeal of states, requires preparation; and to attain this end, the arts of war and policy must act in accordance.

If a minister of war should devise a military establishment without considering the resources of the state, and lay it down as a maxim that the expense of it is unavoidable; or if public opinion be against the military, as consuming a large portion of the national resources—then would this accordance be still far distant. The welfare of the state is the principal object of the Sovereign; external safety is essential to this welfare, but the latter must not be obtained at the cost of internal prosperity.

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A standing army should never be made an object, but merely a *means*. The problem, therefore, is to render it a real school of instruction for war, in which not only a small number of citizens, but the whole nation should be brought up and educated for war, by means of each person capable of bearing arms, taking his yearly course of duty.

A state can only expect from its younger citizens the defense of its independence; but these citizens must have a military education, which can only be effected by their absence, for at least one year, from the paternal hearth.

By such a regulation, its proper position is assigned to that class whose honorable and important decision it is to set at stake fortune and life for the security of their country.

The soldier would, after completing his course of military service, enter into the local militia, which would be only intended for defensive war.

By this arrangement the military organization of a state is reduced into two classes, offensive and defensive. No country can isolate itself, and be purely offensive or purely defensive; both must be united: the possibility is only *intimated* here, we do not undertake to demonstrate it.

Cavalry belongs to the offensive and infantry to the defensive means of an armed power. Therefore the necessity for keeping up cavalry in time of peace is generally acknowledged, even by those who are of opinion that a state can exist with defensive means only.

Cavalry presupposes a careful organization, and cannot be easily formed on the breaking out of a war.

The necessity for keeping up an effective body of cavalry during peace is strongly exemplified by the late operations in the east, where the number of British cavalry was far under the proportion that has generally been considered indispensable to active operations in the field. An army of 25000 men was sent to Turkey in 1854, with only 2000 cavalry, or about *one-twelfth*, whereas the ordinary proportion of cavalry to infantry is *one-fifth*. Little, therefore, could be expected from the British cavalry, whose duties were necessarily limited to a very contracted sphere; and although the glorious but fatal combat of Balaklava proved the excellence of both our *matériel* and *personnel*, yet superior numbers, and an unequal contest with artillery and infantry, to which they should never have been exposed, decimated our ranks, and the want of forage, shelter, and every convenience for the preservation of the horse, in a severe climate, reduced the shattered remnant of our once noble squadrons, to a mere nonentity. The handful of cavalry which accompanied this expedition was preposterous. Even at Waterloo, where the British cavalry regiments did not number 500 horses each, the proportion to the whole contingent was still about *one-fourth*, and good service was effected, but our diminutive band of horsemen in Turkey was unworthy of the ample material which England possesses for a display of well appointed and disciplined squadrons.

The difficulty and delay attendant upon the formation of a cavalry regiment require that the peace establishment of cavalry should be upon a much larger scale than it has been; new raised squadrons can be of little service in the field: indeed may do much mischief, as the well known hussars of colonel von Hake at Waterloo strikingly testified; and when it is recollected that fully 12 months' instruction is required before the cavalry recruit and his horse can be rendered thoroughly fit for duty, it must be evident that the hurried augmentation of a dragoon regiment should be carefully avoided. A battalion of infantry may be suddenly increased without much deranging its action in the field—and it must

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be admitted that a great part of the British and Hanoverian infantry at Waterloo was little better than raw militia—but a few half-drilled dragoons—a few unbroken horses, will throw a whole line of cavalry into disorder, and defeat every effort of the most talented commander.

There exist as many different views and opinions respecting the formation of cavalry, as there are points of view under which it may be considered.

After various epochs have passed by, and that we have gone back from deep to extended formations, it has been finally determined that the first rank only can contribute to the charge, and that no weight or after charge can be effected by those placed behind; nor the rapidity increased, as may, perhaps, be thought with infantry. The result of this experience is that the cavalry of all the nations of Europe (except the Turks) are formed in two ranks.

The admission of the fact enunciated by the author, that *no impression can be effected by those who are placed in rear of the front rank* raises the question whether the system of “*rank entire*” would not be advantageously adopted in all movements of cavalry. Its advantages are manifold, and have been well put forward by general Bacon, who commanded the cavalry of the queen of Portugal with so much success, in 1833—1834. The principle recommendations appear to be as follows:—

1st. In one rank all movements are made with greater precision, and more rapidly, than in two ranks.

2d. One rank only being exposed to cannon fire, the casualties in action must necessarily be less.

3d. Re-formation after a charge is quicker and more readily effected.

4th. *Velocity*, the main element of success in a charge of cavalry, is increased by the freedom of action thus given to the front rank.

5th. The rear rank is too close to sustain the attack, or restore order in case of failure; whereas, formed as a reserve, in a distinct line, it can both aid the attack, and cover the retreat.

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Finally, as Lord Vivian writes in a letter to general Bacon, "the second rank is of little use but to fall over the first."

The following striking instances of useless losses caused by the employment of a second rank, are given by general Bacon in exemplification of his objections to the present prescribed formation of European cavalry:—

Appendix A.

"On the 28th July, 1813, a squadron of Spanish cavalry, whilst covering skirmishers, under the walls of Pamplona, had four horses disabled by a round shot, *two of them in the rear rank*. On the 10th of December following, at Bayonne, near the Mayor's house, a squadron of the 16th, in which I then served, was employed in covering the late colonel Ramsay's guns. A round shot knocked over three horses, *two of them being in the rear rank*, and, at the last charge, made by a part of the 10th Hussars at Waterloo, under the command of the honorable major Howard, in which he fell, *the rear rank lost as many men and horses as the front rank* from the fire of musquetry; and what was done on that occasion, would have been equally well done, had the rear rank been left behind, and at a far less loss of life. The loss was very great, and has left me one of the few survivors."

It has been objected that movements in one rank must necessarily be loose and unconnected, but this view is not supported by either theory or practice. On the contrary the movement of a cavalry regiment in a single rank should, speaking theoretically, be more connected, more perfect, and certainly more *rapid* than in two ranks, from the greater freedom of action and facility of movement which is thus obtained; and practice fully bears out the assumption. The duke of Wellington has given the highest testimony on this point, shewing that the rear rank in cavalry can only "augment its activity by a movement of disorder," and is therefore an incumbrance. Can there be a doubt that if our

Appendix B.

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weak light cavalry brigade at Balaklava (October 25, 1854), had been formed in *rank entire*, the rear rank being employed as a reserve, the loss would have been considerably less, while the charge would have been at least equally effective ?

It is unnecessary to say more on this subject ; or what might be easier, to select from history the epochs of this arm : we confine ourselves to the present times.

The English, French, Hanoverians, &c., adopt the division of companies, two of which form a squadron. The strength of a company is generally seventy five to eighty horses, consequently that of a squadron from one hundred and fifty to one hundred and sixty horses.

The author has been incorrectly informed upon these details : the term *company* is not applied to any portion of a cavalry regiment in the British service, the name which corresponds with the company of infantry being *troop* ; companies have been suppressed in the French service since 1815, and the Hanoverian cavalry is formed into squadrons, having one captain or squadron's-chief, one brevet captain (*staabs-rittmeister*) one first lieutenant, and two second lieutenants.

Ordonnance
provisoire
sur l'exercice
et les man-
œuvres de la
cavalerie.

According to the French cavalry regulations, a regiment is divided into squadrons, divisions, and subdivisions or *pelotons*, corresponding with our squadrons, half-squadrons and divisions, the squadrons being 48, the divisions 24, and the subdivisions 12 files.

The Austrian cavalry are formed in squadrons, two of which form a division. The strength of the Austrian regiments renders this arrangement necessary, a division often amounting to from three hundred to four hundred horses.

The Prussian cavalry was always and still is formed into squadrons from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and seventy horses.

However forms may differ, it should be remembered that nothing is of importance but what adequately accords with the two conditions :—*tactical* and *economical*, all of which may be comprised in the following short sentences :—

1. A regiment over one thousand horses loses more in mobility than it gains in strength. The colonel can neither with respect to the discipline or manœuvre, sufficiently oversee it.

2. A regiment under seven hundred horses, has no power in a charge ; and after a few attacks is too weak to maintain its place in line, as a regiment.

3. The same applies to squadrons over two hundred and fifty, and under one hundred and fifty.

The two latter axioms cannot be admitted, after the successful operations of the weak British regiments of cavalry at Waterloo, and the failure of the French horsemen with all the advantages of superior numbers on that day : indeed it must ever be a matter of surprise how so small a force of cavalry as that under the command of lord Anglesea at the attack of the heavy brigades on the French columns, could have effected so complete an overthrow. The following shews the effective strength of the British and king's German legion cavalry on the memorable morning of the 18th of June, 1815:—

1st brigade, major general lord Edward Somerset.

1st life guards	228
2nd ditto	231
Royal horse guards (blue)	237
King's dragoon guards	530
	1226

Siborne, Appendix, 534.

2d brigade, major general sir William Ponsonby.

1st, or royal dragoons	394
2d dragoons (Scots' Greys)	391
6th dragoons (Enniskillens)	396
	1181

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3d brigade, major general sir William Dörnberg.

1st dragoons, K. G. legion	462
2d ditto ditto	419
23rd light dragoons	387

1268

4th brigade, major general sir Ormsby Vandeleur.

11th light dragoons	390
12th ditto	388
16th ditto	393

1171

5th brigade, major general sir Colquhoun Grant.

2d hussars, K. G. legion	564
7th British hussars	880
15th ditto	392

1336

6th brigade, major general sir Hussey Vivian.

1st hussars, K. G. legion	493
10th British hussars	390
18th do.	396

1279

7th brigade, colonel sir Frederick von Arentsschildt.

3d hussars K. G. legion	622
13th light dragoons	390

1012*

Not a single regiment, it will be observed, fulfilled the condition laid down by the author, who limits efficiency to 700 horses; and even in the Hanoverian and Dutch-Belgian contingent, where the regiments were in most cases more than double the strength of the British, the largest did not exceed 690 horses; while none of these could be compared in efficiency with the English and king's German legion cavalry.

* It will be observed that, with the exception of the king's dragoon guards, which have a larger establishment by two troops, the German regiments were more effective than any of the British.

A regiment appears most moveable divided into four squadrons; the squadrons into four divisions; each division into two sub-divisions, and these again into four smaller divisions or sections, each consisting of four files.

The number four is very convenient, easy to be divided, and was adopted by the Greeks. By the use of this number much simplification is effected; the squadrons consisting of one hundred and twenty-eight horses. This form, as well as the term *regiment*, is of German origin. Prince Maurice of Orange commissioned certain officers to raise cavalry in Germany, over which, by virtue of their contract, they had the government (*regiment*)—the unlimited command, together with all prerogatives. The colonels then called these bodies of cavalry, which they had themselves formed, their *regiments*.

The regiment was divided into parts called *rittschaften*, over which a *rittmeister* (captain) had the command. The colonel had a lieutenant, as assistant and substitute in case of absence or sickness, called the colonel's lieutenant, and under him was an officer who had charge of the interior economy, field guards, &c., called the major or colonel's superintendent of guards, (*Obersts Wachtmeister*.)

The *Rittmeister* had likewise a lieutenant and a serjeant; the cornet carried the standard; four squadrons made a regiment, which never exceeded a thousand horses.

The Greeks and Romans added to their line cavalry, small troops of light horsemen, archers and slingers: The old knights had their esquires and archers.

Louis XIV, took some of the best horsemen and marksmen out of the squadrons, and formed platoons of them; he called them *carabiniers*, and employed them as flankers.

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The Hungarian hussars are the legitimate light cavalry of Europe ; the terms *skirmish*, to *skirmish*, were derived from their original manner of fighting.

The Prussian and Hanoverian cavalry, after they had acknowledged the sword as the chief weapon, formed always a number of the most active horsemen for skirmishing.

In 1812, the French had lancers with their cuirassiers.

The Cossacks have made a figure in modern times.

The advantage which a certain number of skirmishers—that is active horsemen who have acquired the manner of fighting in open lines—gives to the squadrons, is evident.

But, as whole regiments and squadrons, as well in regard to *personnel* as *matériel* (where no national cavalry exists, such as the Cossacks, Mamelukes, &c.) can never attain this perfection, it appears better to select those only who possess the necessary requirements.

If entire squadrons of flankers or skirmishers were formed, they would soon resemble those *élite* squadrons, which maintain a superiority on parade, but not in battle. If the men and horses for such squadrons of skirmishers, were chosen from the other squadrons, the rule would be as difficult as imperfect, for every captain regards that as lost, which, although for the general good, he loses from his own squadron : he endeavours, therefore, to withhold the best men and horses, on whom he places his trust on the day of battle.

It is otherwise if he forms a fifth or skirmishing division for himself, which he may consider as his property, which renders him service, and does him honor.

If a squadron is sent out, the skirmishing division goes with it. The captain can make occasional changes, according as a skirmisher does not accord with the

presupposition of his bravery and ability ; or by dishonourable conduct, shews himself unworthy to be a skirmisher.

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Besides, the full instruction of all is not, by this means, excluded ; only that these skirmishers, being more particularly attended to, are brought nearer to perfection. In this manner the organization will reach to a degree of completeness which neither squadrons of skirmishers, nor entire light regiments of that kind can ever attain. However, when the regiment manœuvres before an enemy, these fifth divisions should be formed into one squadron, and placed at the disposition of the colonel.

With regard to interior economy and instruction, the skirmishing divisions follow that of their squadrons. With respect to tactics, a separate squadron should be formed under the command of an intelligent second captain.

Thus a colonel has two arms : a regiment, consisting of four squadrons of *line* cavalry, for the actual charge, and a squadron consisting of four divisions of *light* cavalry, for skirmishing.

This system combines the attack in open and close line to a high degree of perfection.

The attack in close line is the charge of the first rank, with couched lance, executed with that impetuosity, which must, at all times, ensure success.

The attack in open line is that of fire arms, namely the carbine, which, when skilfully used, is always destructive in its operations.

If Gustavus Adolphus considered it advisable to unite fire arms with the charge of cavalry, and therefore, as has been already shewn, placed platoons of infantry in

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the intervals of the cavalry, it is evident that by means of the system here explained, the desired advantage would be obtained, without any disadvantage.

These skirmishing divisions never form in line with the regiment. While the regiment charges, the skirmishers fall on the enemy in flank and rear, and thus, by an effective fire, prepare the way for the attack of the regiment, weary the enemy's line and throw it into confusion.

As they ride the best horses, they can follow with determined bravery. On a retreat, their duty is still more important. It is not meant, that, in a regular battle they would be of no value. They would, certainly, not decide a battle, but the decision of a battle was never expected from *light troops*.

The skirmishing divisions of the whole, or part of the cavalry of an army, according to circumstances, may be united for the purpose of single brilliant exploits.

Whoever knows, from his own experience, how much must be combined,—man, horse, weapon—to form such skirmishers as are here described—whoever has experienced the immense labour which such an organization requires, and which never could be attained in entire regiments or squadrons, will acknowledge the advantages of a system which contemplates *divisions*, and not squadrons of skirmishers.

These skirmishers, or fifth men, would be, as well in regard to the *personnel* as *matériel*, a true *élite*, and, at the same time, a powerful lever for the ambition of the soldier.

When the regiment is in line, the four skirmishing divisions should be formed into one squadron. At reviews this squadron should be placed on the right

wing of the regiment: in action one half behind the right, and the other half behind the left wing.

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The formation and drill of skirmishers is a subject which has long called for revision in the British cavalry; and it is to be hoped that the attention of the present inspector-general will be directed to the organization of some more systematic arrangement than that which, at present, prevails. It cannot be expected that whatever men and horses may happen to be upon the flanks, or in any other part of a squadron, are those best suited to the peculiar and difficult duty of skirmishing, an operation which requires all the higher attainments of a cavalry soldier; whereas if a selection were previously made and a certain number of men in each troop drilled to this particular service, as suggested in the text, an efficient body would be always at hand to fall out as skirmishers. Twelve men, for instance, of known intelligence and activity, might be selected from each troop, for the purpose of being instructed and perfected in the duty of skirmishing; they should be chosen from amongst the best horsemen, the most expert swordsmen, and the best shots in the troop; uniting also the general qualifications of intelligence, quickness, and *esprit de corps*; they should be made to acquire a certainty of aim by frequent practice at the target from horseback;—entrusted with responsible commands and escorts, and be considered to have the first claim for promotion when found faithfully to fulfil these several duties. A regiment of cavalry, according to the proposed establishment of eight troops, would thus be enabled to take the field with four squadrons of the *line* numbering 384 horses, and an efficient squadron of skirmishers of 96 horses, making a total of 480 combatants.

The effective strength of a regiment in war, would amount, including the staff, to from 860 to 870 horses. If three regiments were united into a brigade, they would, at the opening of a campaign, bring into the

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field 2,500 horses, namely four fifths line, and one fifth light cavalry; a force which put in motion at the right moment, often decides.

The commander of such a brigade may, with boldness and confidence, undertake anything; for while he moves on to the attack with his phalanx of 2,000 men, the 500 light cavalry swarm around him, and protect his flanks and rear.

The plan of organizing a distinct body of men to act as skirmishers, was followed with great success, in the king's German legion during the Peninsular war, when ten picked men, armed with rifles, and called sharpshooters (*Scharfschützen*) were attached to each company of the line infantry. These riflemen, uniting in action, were thrown out as feelers, or charged in an independent body, and under the lamented major von Wurmb, were always distinguished. A gallant friend, to whom 29 years' experience as a cavalry officer in various quarters of the globe, including war service in India—has proved the value of well drilled skirmishers,*—and fully coinciding with the views here advocated, suggests the following establishment for a squadron of cavalry:—

		Files.	Men.	Horses.
In the ranks {	Line cavalry (lancers)	48	96	96
	Skirmishers (carbineers)	12	24	24
	Staff Serjeants and Serjeants ...	...	12	12
	Trumpeters	...	2	2
	Farriers.....	...	2	2
	Proportion of Band	...	4	4
	Batmen	...	10	10
	Sick and untrained	...	20	20
	Total		170	170

being 85 men and horses per troop.

* Lieutenant and Adjutant Dynon, 16th (Queen's) Lancers.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTINUATION.

Three horses' breadth is considered equal to one horse's length; one horse's breadth to one pace; one horse's length to three paces, the pace being equal to two and a half feet.

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In order to preserve the necessary distance for movement between the ranks (for the ground on which we manoeuvre before the enemy is seldom like that of the parade ground in time of peace), one pace must be added to the length, and then four horses' breadth will be equal to one horse's length.

The result of this calculation leads to the division by *fours*; however, in consequence of the awkward retiring of the second rank in the wheeling, this division has, at all times, had opponents.

This retiring of the second rank not only tires the horses, but on uneven or marshy ground is either impossible or difficult to perform.* Kalkreuth, therefore, hit upon the division by *threes*, which by an almost imperceptible reining back of No. 1 file of each three, during the wheel, is, of itself, sufficient to perform it. Other nations followed the Prussian cavalry; but experience

* Movements in "rank entire" instead of two deep, as suggested in page 124, would entirely remove this difficulty.

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shews that in flank marching by *threes*, the distances are easily extended or the horses cut.

Both methods have their disadvantages, particularly in quick deployments from close-column into line—the only movement, in point of fact, where the flank march by *threes* or *fours* is of importance.

The wheeling about in presence of an enemy, can neither be recommended by *threes* or *fours*; because the division leaders are not then in front of their divisions; and the colonel is therefore left, on such occasions, at the mercy of the rear rank.

At the battle of Dennewitz, September 6, 1813, a light dragoon regiment belonging to the army commanded by marshal Ney, went about by *fours* under a fire of musquetry, and in front of a numerous cavalry of the enemy, which was in march. It was an experienced regiment; old officers were at its head, and eight days before it had sustained a brilliant combat against four times its number. It did not retire in disorder, but continued its retreat at a steady walk; however, it made no halt!

At length, the colonel and the rest of the officers rode round the flanks, in front of the rear rank, made the regiment halt, and resumed the command.

Many officers of cavalry, therefore, prefer manœuvring by *divisions* before an enemy. Hence we come to subdivisions which, according to the before mentioned strength of the squadrons, would be eight files, the divisions being sixteen files.

With eight files, well closed up, wheels can be made in all directions—in line—open or close column, &c.; and in flank marching the breadth is the same as in wheeling by *fours*, where eight men are in front.

In wheeling *about*, the division commanders remain in front of their divisions, as they wheel with one of the subdivisions: in flank marching, they are on the pivot.

This tactical telling off by subdivisions renders that by threes and fours quite unnecessary; it not only simplifies the manœuvres, but also increases their precision and rapidity.

Movements by *threes* and fours should only be employed on a march.

One objection is still to be met: namely, that divisions of sixteen files would be too strong, and those of twelve files more convenient: the contrary, however, is the fact.

The column march, by divisions at a trot, is considered the most difficult movement for cavalry; and this is exactly caused by the weakness of the ordinary divisions of twelve files, for with squadrons it answers well.

Therefore, when manœuvring, the colonel is so often heard to call out: "distance! gentlemen, distance!—the distance must not be lost," and generally the distance is lost: an unsteadiness arises, and the movement is badly performed.

The more regiments, the longer the column, and the greater the difficulty of preserving order and regularity of movement.

It admits of easy explanation:—A division of twelve files, occupies, with the non-commissioned officer or guide, (*Führer*) thirteen paces in breadth; in column, four paces are allowed for the horse of the officer commanding the division, and eight paces for the two ranks, which make twelve: hence one pace only remains for the movement.

A march by divisions of twelve files in column, is therefore, in reality, a march in close column. It can be easily imagined that this must cause great difficulty

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in a trot or gallop, and on every change of direction, must occasion checks. The Saxon cavalry, on this account, manœuvre also by half squadrons.

With divisions of sixteen files, which, with the non-commissioned officers or guides at the flanks, occupy eighteen paces, nothing but advantage can result, without any possible disadvantage.

The comparative merits of moving cavalry by *divisions* or sub-divisions, and moving by *threes* have, at various times, occupied the attention of our tacticians, but notwithstanding the acknowledged inconvenience and defects of the latter system, it still forms the basis of all flank marching in the British cavalry regulations. The grand and insurmountable objections to moving by *threes* may be thus enumerated: 1st—unavoidable extension of files in flank marching; 2nd—repeated derangement of the *telling off* in action; 3d—the difficulty of performing the movement “*threes about*,” in deep ground, or with tired horses; and lastly, the serious inconvenience and disadvantage of manœuvring with the rear rank in front. Now all these objections are avoided in the system recommended by the author and practiced in the Wirtemberg cavalry, where sub-divisions of eight files (only exceeding columns of *threes* by two files) are substituted for *threes*, and a code of simple practical manœuvres laid down, founded upon this system. A deployment by *threes* cannot be otherwise than defective. No exertion on the part of the officers or men can prevent an extension of files, and hence that *closing in* after the *wheeling up*, which gives to the best drilled regiment the loose appearance of new raised yeomanry. Many an unfortunate dragoon is blamed for apparent faults, which are only the natural consequences of the system according to which he is instructed, and which no attention of his could possibly prevent: in short no precision in deployment can be attained by our cavalry so long as this defective mode of *telling off* is continued.

Officers of cavalry must on all occasions be in front ; and only on the retreat should a colonel and squadron officer remain in the rear ; that is to say, on the side next the enemy, in order to observe him, and remain master of the moment.

In 1814, a battalion of infantry, which was retreating during a hot engagement, in passing through a defile, was overtaken by the pursuing cavalry, and cut to pieces, because the commander was at the head of the column, where he could neither see nor hear, and not where, in retreat, he ought to have been,—at the rear of the column.

Those who prefer placing the officers of cavalry on the flanks of the divisions, give as a reason, that the front appears clearer and better, but, conceding this, utility should alone determine.

The officers are the leaders—the souls of the line ; they must, therefore, be placed in a situation where they can exercise their influence freely and without impediment : this is particularly the case with such an arm as cavalry, which acts more from moral than physical force ; and this cannot be effected in the line, but before it.

Officers placed *in* the line can no longer be considered as *leaders* : they are simply fellow combatants.

The Prussian cavalry, which from its brilliant deeds, may well be taken as an example, always placed the officers *in front* of the line : the old knights were always before their banners.

That the officers are thus exposed to greater danger, cannot be received as an objection, for we should entertain no very high opinion of an army, in the formation of which care was taken for bringing away the officers in safety.

But the pretext is in itself idle ; for there is no pro-

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tection against bullets but good luck ! On the other hand, the advantages of a form where the officers are placed in front of the line, are self-evident. They govern, as it may be said, the front: If the leaders are brave—and that we must presume—the whole line will be brave ; the officers, seen by the men who are committed to their command, appear now most brilliant at the charge ; the line in rear of them becomes their judge. The honorable ambition of being applauded by the men impels them forward, and they become what they ought to be, encouraging examples to the soldier.

In the first edition of this work, published in 1827, the writer strongly urged the advantages of placing the officers commanding half squadrons and divisions in front of their respective commands, and it was with much satisfaction that he saw the principle adopted in the cavalry regulations subsequently drawn up under the direction of the late lamented lord Vivian, then inspector-general of cavalry. The same principle is contained in the present regulations (corrected to 1851), but it yet remains to carry out the system fully, and place the division—as well as the half-squadron-leaders, in front of their men. This is, no doubt, of less moment so long as movements by *threes* are retained, but it is to be hoped that a system liable to the many objections which have been already enumerated, will be eventually abandoned, and the more practical movements by divisions or sub-divisions substituted in its stead.

The moral force of a regiment depends upon the reciprocal confidence of the commander and his soldiers. The colonel of a regiment is the soul of this moral force. What a regiment ! What a family of commanders and soldiers is that which,—both being animated by brave confidence—is influenced by no other feeling than that of military honor and renown !

As to the arming of cavalry opinions are not yet entirely of accord. The sabre is of various construction : that which can be used alike for *cut* and *thrust*, seems to be considered the most advantageous, as the horseman, when singly engaged, may both cut and give point, and must be prepared to receive both from his adversary.

The pistol can only be considered as a weapon of necessity ; its fire is uncertain, short, and seldom efficacious. One pistol is sufficient for a cavalry soldier, and the second holster should be applied to the transport of cleaning materials.

Although a cavalry soldier should never be allowed to place dependence on a pistol, yet the great improvement made in the construction of this weapon by colonel Colt, has added greatly to its importance, and many instances are recorded of lives having been saved by the use of the "revolver" during the late campaign in the Crimea (1854). But the cavalry soldier must place his main dependence on the sabre and the lance. Revolving pistols and revolving carbines have been suggested for the general use of all cavalry by many writers, and in the hands of *officers* the pistol would doubtless be used with judgment ; but the experience of American officers in the Mexican war shews that dragoons armed with revolving carbines cannot resist the temptation in action, to fire off all the balls in succession, and are then unable to reload. "When once they have their hands to the trigger," writes an intelligent and experienced American cavalry officer, "they cannot stop." A needle-gun-carbine is, on the other hand, not exposed to this objection, while the facility of loading at the breech admits of as rapid a succession of shots, as could be ever required on those occasions (covering a retreat or leading an advance) when the carbine becomes applicable. The merits of the Prussian needle gun are not yet appreciated in England, and a short description of it may be acceptable :—

Personal
Communica-
tion, MSS.

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Chesney on
Fire Arms.
271, 272.

Communic. of
major gen.
von Quistorp,
MSS.

The barrel is 34 inches long. It is rifled with four grooves, taking $1\frac{1}{4}$ turn in the length, and has a high backed sight. It is screwed into the end of a strong open guider or socket, having the chamber bored conically from behind, so that when the cartridge is placed in it, the shoulder of the ball, which is of a conoidal form, shall meet and be stopped by the projections of the ribs of the rifling, the body of the ball being of sufficient diameter to fill the full depth of the grooves. Inside the guider slides an iron tube, with a strong handle attached, and having a space at the front end next the barrel of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches in length. In the middle of this space is the needle conductor which is pierced with a small hole in its entire length, through which passes the needle that is to ignite the charge. This needle conductor is screwed from behind into a solid plate of iron in the tube, which plate, like the breech pin of the musquet, receives the re-actionary force of the charge. Behind this plate, there is a second tube of iron, having a spring with double catch attached, and carrying with it an inner small tube, with two projecting rings on one-half of its length, and a spiral spring on the other; and through this tube passes the *needle*, which is a thin steel wire pointed at the end and igniting the charge by percussion, the other end being screwed into a brass head, which again screws into the interior tube that carries the spiral spring. The ball, powder, and cap are all united in one cartridge; six rounds may be fired in a minute, and the range is from 800 to 1000 yards. The most important advantages of the needle gun, are: 1st—the preservation of the grooves of the barrel from rust after long exposure to wet weather. 2nd—the simplicity of the loading, rendering that operation practicable in almost any position, and under any circumstances. 3rd—getting rid of the following operations:—biting off the paper and shaking in the powder of the cartridge—drawing out and ramming down the ramrod—taking out and putting on the cap. 4th—the needle-gun may be exposed to wet for a long time without being rendered ineffective. 5th—the

barrel is not injured by abrasion from the ramrod. 6th—the fire is so clean that the barrel seldom requires to be washed out. 7th—the manner of loading is so simple that it can be easier learned by the recruit than the old method. 8th—the mechanism, with the exception of the needle itself, is not easily injured. 9th—the lock can be taken off and put together again quickly. With regard to the objection founded on the delicate structure of the needle itself, it is sufficient to state that one well-tempered needle will fire 2,000 cartridges: besides, one or two reserved needles can easily be furnished to each man, if required, and thus provide against accident.

A great mistake has been made in the experiments which have been carried on in England with the needle-gun, by using balls of too great weight, and too large charges of powder; hence the large escape of gas at the chamber—divergence of the needle—missing fire—derangement of the spring, and other consequences which might have been prevented by more careful loading; but the continuance of the use of this weapon by the Prussian infantry, after several years' experience, and its recent adoption by other German states, afford strong evidence in its favour. Besides, as colonel Chesney observes, "the liability of the piece to miss fire, and the more serious effect of the escape of gas, only take place (extensively at least in the latter case) after some fifty or eighty discharges, so that a general action might be fought before the piece even required to be cleaned." The power of the needle-gun to withstand damp was strongly exemplified at recent experiments in Hanover, when 100 cartridges which had been laid for four weeks in damp sawdust, were fired, and out of the whole number, only eight did not ignite.

Chesney on
Fire Arms.
276.

Communic. of
major Meyer,
MSS.

One battalion of each regiment of Prussian light infantry is, at present armed with the needle-gun-musquet, the other battalions being provided with the ordinary percussion musquet, which it has been lately proposed to rifle, thus bringing it somewhat into the condition of the modern

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British rifle. The main objection to all percussion appliances is their inevitable deterioration by time, for no preparation of detonating powder has yet been discovered that can be relied on longer than for about five years.

But another change is as much called for in the construction of the British cavalry carbine as the mode of ignition : it should be reduced in weight and length, and like the Bavarian carbine, rendered really *handy*. This arm is so light and short that the dragoon throws it over his right shoulder in preparing to mount, and the same in dismounting, whereas with our clumsy arms, the man must first bring his leg over to the offside, and then drag the carbine after him, over the horse's croup, reversing the movement in dismounting. This long and awkward process, with the strapping and unstrapping, renders the weapon, altogether, more an incumbrance than otherwise. To be of real service on an emergency, the carbine should be always either attached to the swivel, or slung across the back, after the manner of the Cossacks, Zouaves, and *Chasseurs d' Afrique*.

There are three serious objections to the present mode of carrying the carbine : 1st—it is not only inconvenient, but often actually hurtful to the man, by knocking about when he is moving at a rapid rate, and still more so in leaping. 2nd—much time is lost in unstrapping and springing it for use. 3d—when the horse is killed, the man is without his carbine (which would often be so useful to him under such circumstances)—for in action there would be seldom time to unstrap the carbine and carry it off : besides, if the horse falls on the off side, it would be utterly impossible ; and should a horse slip up with his rider, and fall on the off side, the man would be so jammed in by the carbine, that he would not be able to move or extricate himself without assistance ; and thus would be further exposed to serious personal injury. By keeping the piece constantly attached to the swivel, these evils would be avoided, while any inconvenience that might arise from this suspension of the weapon, might

be met by small rings of leather attached to the off side of the saddle, into which the carbine could be slipped, when not in use.

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VI.

The basis of all modern improvements in small arms is the elongated cylindro-conoidal shot, invented by captain John Norton, of the 34th regiment, in 1823, but which, disparaged and discountenanced by the Woolwich authorities, was not admitted into the British army until 1853, after captain Minié, of the French service, had appropriated the invention to himself, and received a handsome reward from a generous and enlightened government. This projectile at once extended the range, and increased the precision and penetrating power of the bullet, besides facilitating the loading of the piece, and adding greatly to the convenience of the soldier. The ultimate results of this invention cannot be over estimated. Cavalry may now be reached by musquet fire, before they can arrive within charging distance, and the same means will enable skirmishers to pick off artillery men at their guns, while out of the range of cannon fire: captain Norton has since applied his invention to large ordnance, marine artillery, and various explosive projectiles, but, like many an ingenious inventor, has neither received acknowledgment, encouragement or reward, and lives to see his good name "filched from him," while years of labour, expense and anxious thought have brought not even an honorary distinction to qualify the asperities of official neglect, and cheer the retrospection of declining years.

Appendix C.

Captain Minié's friends do not pretend that this officer made any important improvements in small-arm projectiles until the year 1848, when the elongated shot—miscalled in England "*Minié ball*" was first introduced in France; whereas there is incontrovertible evidence to shew that captain Norton submitted to the Woolwich committee in 1823, a projectile of precisely similar character, with the additional advantage of being available both as a *shell* and *shot*. Captain Minié, no doubt, added the metal cup or *culot*, which he considered necessary to cause the expansion of the

Memoir of
Minié in
Lond. Illust.
News, March
3, 1866.
Un. Serv.
Mag. Aug.
1853, art.
"Norton's
Projectiles."
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shot into the grooves of the rifle, but experience has shewn that this adjunct is quite superfluous, nay injurious, and it has been long discontinued. Captain Minié is *chef d'escadron*—has apartments and a workshop at Vincennes, and was presented by the Emperor with a gratuity of 20,000 francs, in acknowledgment of his services. A public subscription has been set on foot in England to provide him with “a substantial testimonial of the national gratitude,” and yet the same invention for which this fortunate Frenchman has thus obtained undying fame and substantial remuneration, when submitted to the Woolwich authorities by one of our own countrymen 25 years before it was first made known in France,—was scouted and derided as visionary and valueless!!!

The lance is only applicable to the attack and charge, and then solely in close line. A lance of 11 feet in length is the true weapon of attack for cavalry against infantry. The French cuirassiers made a new era in modern history; at Essling, May 21, 1809, their firmness saved the army from destruction. If they had been armed with lances, as the knights of former times, they would nearly have approached perfection, and with their moral force, no infantry could have withstood them.

The French cuirassiers, no doubt, exhibited great intrepidity on many occasions during the revolutionary campaigns, but the battle of Essling can scarcely be numbered amongst the scenes of their success. The Austrian squares on this occasion, like the British at Waterloo, resisted every effort of the steel-clad horsemen, who dashed through the intervals with intrepidity, and charged to the bayonet's point. But not one square was broken, not a single column gave way; and the French grievously shattered by the terrible fire of musquetry, were soon after charged by the enemy's reserve cavalry under Lichtenstein, and driven back in disorder on their own infantry. With regard to any increased efficiency which cuirassiers might

Alison. ix. 38,
et seq.

derive by the addition to their armament of an 11 foot lance or lancers from the addition of a cuirass, it seems more than doubtful, looking to the maintenance of the main element in a cavalry charge—*velocity*. As well in the Peninsula, as during the Russian campaign, lancers produced remarkable results, but they were *light cavalry*, unencumbered with armour. The Polish lancers, at Albuera, under cover of a mist, and by getting in rear of general Steward's division, carried destruction into the ranks of the English infantry, and must have left a strong impression of the power of their weapon, then almost unknown to our soldiers. At Leipsic also, in 1813, the long lances of the Russian Cossack guard under Orloff Denizoff, were more than a match for the sabres of the French cuirassiers; at Eylau, again, 600 Cossacks of the Don, under Platoff, defeated 70 squadrons of Murat's cuirassiers, and restored the battle, shewing the advantage, in both cases, to have been altogether on the side of the lance; and its effects at Waterloo were far more severely felt by the allied army, than all the weight and thunder of the cuirassiers. Colonel Frederick Ponsonby of the 12th light dragoons (afterwards lancers) whose miraculous escape at Waterloo is so well known, gives strong evidence in favour of this weapon:—"The lances," he writes, "from their length and weight, would have struck down my sword, long before I lost it, if it had not been bound to my hand." Napoleon's body guard was pierced through and overthrown by the Cossacks, on the 25th October, 1812, when the Emperor himself narrowly escaped capture: in fact these active horsemen were far more formidable than the *élite* squadrons of the Imperial guard, not excepting the cuirassiers. The great superiority which the Russians maintained throughout the whole contest in *light cavalry*, (and of these the Cossack lancers were the best) was the main cause of their success, and "the youths of the Don and the Ural now point to the cuirasses of the French horsemen, and the standards of the Imperial guard, preserved in their churches, as prizes worthy to be associated with the trophies

Alison. xii.
222.

Ib. vii. 353.

Letter to lady
Beaumont in
Batty's
Waterloo.Alison. xi.
129.

Ib. x. 379.

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of Trebizond or the spoils of Constantinople." The best cavalry in the world are *light cavalry*, and amongst these the Hungarian hussars and the Polish and Cossack lancers are admitted to be the best. Why then should our men and horses be loaded with useless weight? King James I. sarcastically observed of armour, that "it not only protected the wearer, but prevented him from injuring any other person," and the reply of the life guardsman to George IV., when asked in what costume he would like to fight such another battle as Waterloo, should never be forgotten:—"Please your Majesty, in my shirt sleeves."* The nominal distinction of heavy and light cavalry in the British service has no reference whatever to actual weight; at one period some of our regiments of hussars were actually heavier than the heavy dragoons! and even now there is little difference.† For all practical purposes we may therefore assume the weight of our heavy and light cavalry (the household troops excepted), to be the same, and the only question remaining, is as to the armament. The lance has had its advocates from the days of chivalry, and although discontinued for 200 years in the British army, rose again into notice during the Peninsular war, and soon after the battle of Waterloo, was issued to the 16th light dragoons; the 12th, 9th, and 17th light dragoons, were subsequently made lancers, and the battle of Aliwal re-established the reputation of this formidable weapon.

Extreme opinions are nevertheless constantly expressed by cavalry officers on the subject of the lance, which some decry as valueless, while others, adopting the words of Montecuculi, pronounce it to be, "*la reine des armes pour*

* The cuirass is, also, not proof against the Norton, or cylindro-conoidal shot. See Appendix C.

† The average of the 8th and 15th hussars, in marching order, taken by the author in 1827, gave 19 stone 2lb. 1oz., estimating the weight of the men at 12 stone, while the average of the king's dragoon guards, Enniskillens and Greys, was 18 stone 18lb. 11oz., taking the men at 12 stone 6lb. Recent changes in appointments, &c., have reduced the light dragoons to 18 stone 4lb., and the heavy to 18 stone 11lb.—both far too heavy.

la cavalerie." It is very natural that commanding officers of cavalry, and even of lancer regiments, who have never seen the lance tested in actual warfare, and set no weight upon the recorded deeds of the Mamelukes, the Cossacks, and the Poles, should feel doubts as to the efficiency of a weapon comparatively new to the British army; but the glorious battle of ALIWAL ought to settle the question:—On this memorable day, January 28th, 1846, two squadrons of the 16th lancers, under the command of major (now colonel, C.B.) Rowland Smyth, after having been exposed for three hours to the murderous fire of a Sikh battery, armed with seven guns of large calibre, including one 24-pounder, supported by two massive columns of infantry about 1,600 strong,—charged three successive times, captured and spiked the guns, speared the artillery men, and breaking the infantry, drove them into the Sutlej.

The enemy had been formed into two dense columns, having guns in the intervals and on the flanks, against which formidable array, Smyth led his gallant squadrons, whose firmness and constancy had been so severely tried by their long exposure to cannon fire. Fierce was the onset and terrible the result—the artillery men were speared—the unwieldy columns pierced—a desperate hand-to-hand encounter ensued—the lance made fearful havoc amongst the crowded foot soldiers, and a sanguinary *mêlée* mingled the assailants and assailed. But, with admirable discipline and presence of mind, the two squadron leaders, captain (now lieutenant-colonel) Pearson, and captain Jackson, rallied the two squadrons in independent bodies, and when the Sikhs also endeavoured to rally and assume their original formation,—charged with unflinching vigour, and completed their discomfiture. The gallant colonel Smyth received a severe wound, a musquet shot having entered above his knee, on the outside of the thigh, and traversed the limb to the hip, where it was eventually cut out; the regiment had to deplore the loss of lieutenant Swetenam, an estimable young man, who fell in the enemy's ranks shot

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Narrative of
lieutenant
and adjutant
Dyson 16th
lancers, M.S.S.

CHAP. through the heart; 15 men were killed, and two officers and
 VI. 35 men wounded.

Such an exploit could never have been achieved by cavalry, who placed their dependence upon the carbine or the sabre, for with such weapons, the artillery men could not have been so easily reached, and, as has occurred upon other occasions, they would probably have resumed their stations at the guns, and continued their fire.

Narrative of
 an eye-wit-
 ness. MSS.

Amongst the most remarkable achievements of lancer regiments, were the operations of the queen of Portugal's cavalry, under general Bacon, from 1832 to 1834, when some brilliant charges and feats of arms were performed by the regiment under his immediate command, both officers and men of which were armed with lances:—Captain (now colonel) Griffiths, charged a squadron of the enemy's cavalry, with only 17 men, and routed them, killing six of his opponents with his own lance. The same officer subsequently charged a body of the enemy's cavalry which had attempted to pass the bridge at Loures, near Lisbon, dispersed them, and did considerable execution with the same weapon. At Torres Novas, a short fight took place in the square, between a regiment of the enemy's cavalry and some lancers, in which the latter without losing a man, killed or wounded about fifty of their opponents. During the pursuit, general Bacon got entangled with three of the enemy's cavalry; one pointed his carbine, which movement was met, on the part of the general, by a blow of the blade of his lance across the man's face,—and the other two attacked him with their swords, but without effect; they could make no impression and eventually surrendered. On another occasion general Bacon, with an aide-de-camp and two orderlies, got into the midst of a column of the enemy's cavalry, the accompanying squadron having failed to charge home. The aide-de-camp and orderlies were all wounded and unhorsed; the general's own horse first cleared, by violent kicking, a small space, which the round parries of his lance widened, and he got out of the crowd;

an officer then presented himself as if inviting single combat, but found the lance too much for him, and was induced to adopt the advice given him by the general—to ride off. The effects of the lance were very palpable in this affair, seven men having received severe lance wounds and being unhorsed. A Prussian soldier named Berger, serving in the lancer regiment, obtained leave to ride to the front of the enemy's squadron, and offer a challenge, but no one was bold enough to accept it. Lieutenant Skipworth, also, of the same corps, who was an excellent horseman, used his lance, on several occasions, with great success; the enemy entertained a prudent dread of the weapon, and even the lancer recruits had a confidence in it, which carried them forward, and led invariably to their superiority when matched with the sword,

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VI.

Narrative of
an eye-witness.
MSS.

This skill in the use of the lance was not, however obtained without great labour on the part of the gallant commander of the queen of Portugal's cavalry. A field day took place every forenoon, the force being under arms an hour before daybreak, and when nothing more important was on foot, the time was devoted to instruction. *Every officer was obliged to carry a lance.* Many of them resisted at first, and declared they could never make anything of it; but general Bacon took away the swords for two months, impressing upon all that the sword was only to be regarded by a lancer as a weapon to be used in case of the loss or breaking of his lance. This plan succeeded: shut up in Oporto, a lance drill was carried on daily; as much was done there in one month as at home in one year, and at the end of six months, a larger proportion of really good lancers was formed than could be exhibited in any of our home regiments.

It is a mistake to suppose that driving the lance with great force forward is the best mode of doing execution. The point should be delivered to the full extent of the arm, with an instantaneous jerk back, taking care in the first instance, to judge the distance accurately, and thus the command of the weapon is retained. Like other arms issued from English

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VI.

manufactories, the lance blades are often defective, and sometimes double up on striking the belts of an opponent; the best form is considered by general Bacon to be that of the Indian hog spear, the edges cutting as sharp as a sword, and causing in the hands of a good lancer, severe wounds.

Some exaggerated stories have been told to illustrate the difficulty of extracting the lance, as if the object of the lancer should be to *impale* his opponent, but the fact is, that a well instructed and expert lancer always withdraws the point immediately after delivery, or the party assailed, gives way, and the lancer galloping onward, frees his point. An eyewitness of the cavalry charge at Aliwal related to the writer an instance where one of the 16th drove his lance, at a gallop, into the head of a Sikh, who fell dead with a small wound in the forehead, without any halt or difficulty on the part of the lancer in extracting his point: in fact, the effect of *gravity* alone must prevent any such consequences as those unfavourable to the use of the lance appear to apprehend. No doubt exceptional cases have occurred, and one instance is recorded of a lancer of the 16th transfixing his adversary and then being unable to withdraw his point, but such occasions are extremely rare, and, if even more numerous, would not effect the general question, for the loss of a few lances would be amply compensated by the deadly thrusts which had preceded their final application.

Appendix D.

The lance, if properly handled, should be to the light horseman what the bayonet is to the infantry soldier. Confidence is imparted by the knowledge that the thrust is nearly certain death. The lance enables the horseman to reach the gunner or the foot soldier inside his bayonet or his battery—giving a decided advantage over the sword, from the greater length of reach, and the mortal character of the wound inflicted.

But the lance exercise, as taught in our service has little affinity with its practical application. What, for instance, can be more unmeaning than twisting the lance between the fingers over the head as in the "St. George," a difficult but utterly useless operation? Why also is there no drill practice

with blunt weapons for the lance as well as for the sword? Attention has evidently not been paid to this important subject by our authorities, and until the lancer *officer* is required to carry a lance himself, the great value and peculiarities of the weapon will, probably, never be appreciated in the British army.

The long lance applied in close line would again render cavalry capable of attacking infantry with success.

The English infantry under Wellington had no fear of any cavalry but lancers.

The best weapon, therefore, for skirmishers would be the carbine, to fire and hit with which, on horseback, they should be much practiced; and the best weapon for the line, a lance of 11 feet in length such as is used by the Polish cavalry.

The length prescribed by the author would be objectionable for light cavalry in the British service, where Asiatic expertness cannot be expected, and great care should be taken to provide the soldier with a well poised and manageable weapon. A new construction of lance has been recently invented, and is about to be submitted to the authorities, by lieutenant and adjutant Dynon, of the 16th lancers, which promises to be very effective. The centre of gravity lies towards the butt end, which also is shod with a projecting hilt or spike, like the old lance of chivalry, and thus the weapon becomes nearly equally formidable at either end. Adjutant Dynon also suggests detaching the lance bucket from the stirrup, and suspending it from the after part of the saddle, allowing the lance to rest in front of, instead of behind the shoulder. This would obviate the present objection of the rider's legs being forced forward when the lance is slung, and give greater power and steadiness to the lancer.

Appendix D.

The lance proposed by lieutenant Dynon has the following important characteristics:—

1st.—It is balanced at two-thirds of its length, instead of in the centre, and will therefore reach an object at a distance of 18 inches further than the regulation lance.

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2nd.—The butt being one-third of the whole length, the lance can be used without interfering with the rear rank, or the adjoining files.

3rd.—It is easier to work—the action of the point not being interrupted by the long useless butt.

4th.—The butt being shod with iron, forms an effective guard or defense at close quarters, and will resist a sword cut; for the same reason it could be used to strike down an adversary in a *melee*, and thus becomes nearly as formidable as the point.

Appendix, D.

5th.—When the lancer dismounts, the lance can be fixed upright in the ground, instead of being laid down horizontally as at present—exposed to being broken by men and horses treading upon it, particularly when in camp or in bivouac.

6th.—The leather sling is discontinued, being of little use, and very inconvenient, as it frequently becomes entangled with the sword knot, sword hilt, cantle of the saddle or corners of the gauntlets and cap during exercise: it also wears out the chevrons and arm of the jacket by friction, when the lance is slung.

7th.—The lance is carried in a bucket suspended from the side of the saddle-tree behind the right thigh, instead of on the stirrup. This admits of the weapon riding easier, and enables the lancer to have the free use of his right leg and spur, now in a great measure prevented by the bucket being fastened to the stirrup.

8th.—When riding at ease, the lance rests against the hollow of the shoulder, where it is more convenient, if suddenly required, than when slung to the arm behind the shoulder.

9th.—The lance pole is much stronger and less liable to break, being gradually tapered from butt to point; thus one end is more firm and the other more elastic, and the fulcrum has greater power: the regulation lance is weak in consequence of being of an equal thickness throughout, or nearly so.

10th—An iron guard is placed at the balancing point, to protect the hand from a sword cut when delivering the point, or when using the butt on the defensive.

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It has been urged that the lancer is not suited for outpost duty, in consequence of the lance being observable at a considerable distance, but this objection is met by carrying the lance at the "trail," and when on vedette, fixing it upright in the ground, by means of the proposed hilt, close to the horse.

Appendix, D.

The blade of adjutant Dynon's lance being short, and the pole inserted some distance into the socket, makes the weapon much stronger, and less liable to break off than the present regulation lance. The flag is attached by a steel spring, and will free itself from the lance, if seized: this arrangement also admits of the flag being instantaneously removed, if found to attract the observation of the enemy, when on vedette; the width of the flag is also reduced, and presents less resistance to the air when the man is in motion. Altogether the new lance offers some very decided advantages and improvements, which cannot fail to secure for it the support of those authorities who may be entrusted with the future armament of our cavalry.

It would be contrary to the intended design of this work to treat of all the objects connected with the formation of cavalry, such as clothing, horse appointments, &c., as these depend upon the character of the nation, and the taste of the generals: a few words may however, be said, on the subject of recruits and re-mounts.

It is of importance in selecting recruits for cavalry, to choose those only who either volunteer, or have been accustomed to horses from their youth, such as the sons of farmers; just as those only make good sailors who have been accustomed to the sea from their childhood.

What is, for instance, to be expected from a stocking manufacturer or linen weaver, who considers the horse as a wild beast? It is well known that such men never

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have confidence in their horses, but look upon them as their greatest enemies, against whom, for the future, they struggle for their lives ; they never learn to ride—never can preserve their balance ; but hang on the horse like a senseless lump, which, in order to preserve its equilibrium, unnecessarily wastes a great part of its strength, and, on this account, is soon exhausted.

Therefore we find some horses in a squadron, who, at the slowest pace, sweat and tire themselves exceedingly ; the horse becomes at last refractory against the ignorant and heavy hand of his rider ; he hangs upon the bridle overcome by the pain of his mouth, goes crooked, jumps, &c. The rider whose fear and anxiety increases, clings still closer, and tires himself by sticking with his knees and heels, in order to prevent himself from falling. Thus the quietest horse becomes at last passionate, and will endeavour either to get rid of his burthen or to run away.

Such an ignorant rider often brings an entire squadron into disorder, which, in a charge, must be productive of fatal consequences : added to which a man who cannot manage his horse will be unable to do any injury to the enemy.

The British cavalry are protected from any of the evil consequences pointed out in the text by the admirable system of military equitation carried on at the cavalry depot at Maidstone, under the able superintendence of major Meyer, formerly of the Hanoverian hussars, and it is to be regretted that this system should have been made an object of attack in a recent work on cavalry tactics, otherwise distinguished by much ability and originality.* The case is not fairly stated by the gallant author, and his representation of the military seat as taught at Maidstone, or “seat as it should be,” in the

* Cavalry, its History and Tactics, by captain L. E. Nolan, 15th hussars ; a gallant soldier, who since the above was written fell a martyr to his enthusiasm at the combat of Balaklava, October 25, 1854.

frontispiece to his work, is quite a caricature, while his illustration of the ideal seat might pass for the effigy of a drowsy sportsman sitting easy at a cover side. Although it is not likely that our present excellent system of military equitation, founded upon a careful study of the practice of other nations, and long experience, will be at all effected by any disparaging reflections that may be made upon it by ungenerous aspirants, still some of these statements and allegations are so inconsistent with actual practice and instruction, that it is only an act of justice to our riding establishments to expose them: nor could the subject be well passed over here, intimately connected as it is with the formation and efficiency of a cavalry soldier. The following extracts from captain Nolan's work are therefore selected for refutation:—

Page 142. "The man's legs from the knee down are carefully brought away from the horse," &c.

So far from this is the nature of the instruction given at Maidstone, that the man is taught to ride as well by gripe as by balance. The rider's legs are kept close to the horse's side, so as to enable him to support his horse in any movement which he may require of him, or to strengthen his seat by gripping the horse firmly with both legs, when occasion requires, as in leaping.

Page 143. "Of what possible use can a system be which requires trained men and horses to ride daily in the riding school," &c.

It is not merely to ride daily in the riding school that men are sent to the riding establishment at Maidstone, but to give them a thorough knowledge of the management of the horse, both theoretically and practically—to enable them to train young horses, and to make them instructors in riding. There is not an intelligent man who leaves the riding establishment, after having acquired this knowledge, that is not promoted on his return to his regiment, and enquiries from old serjeants and serjeant-majors of cavalry, will generally show that they have been much indebted to such instruction, which has not unfrequently led to their eventually obtaining commissions.

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Page 148. "When nature thus becomes more powerful than teaching," &c.

A horse properly broke will be always obedient, as he is thoroughly under the rider's command ; if such is not the case the horse is not broke.

Page 150. "Surely there can be nothing more distressing to the eye of a horseman than to see men holding on to the reins," &c.

This can only apply to men who cannot ride ; those who can ride will not hold on by the reins,—will accommodate their bodies and limbs to the movements of the horse, and make his work easy to him ; so that a horse would do double the work with them to what he would do with a loose rider. Rising in the stirrups is, no doubt, very convenient along the road, but when a man is required to execute a precise military movement—attend instantly to the orders which he receives—keep his proper distance, and command of his horse, the "jockeying" system is altogether out of place.

The riding seat taught at Maidstone may be considered a combination of the military with the hunting seat, retaining the best parts of both, and the best proof of its excellence is the facility with which men so instructed, handle their arms at a gallop, and leap hurdles in the exercise ground. At the inspections of 1858, made by H.R.H. the duke of Cambridge, then inspector-general of cavalry, major Meyer arranged six leaps (ditch, bank, hurdle, &c.), which the men took by sections of threes *at a gallop*, and a picked squad took the leaps and performed the post-practice between them : sir Joseph Thackwell has since expressed his high approval of the system adopted at the cavalry depot, which indeed only requires to be seen by experienced cavalry officers, to be appreciated.

Page 157. "The continual working at the horse's mouth now practiced in the service, the attempt to throw the horses on their haunches by strength of arm," &c.

This is the most extraordinary assertion amongst captain Nolan's strictures, and one is at a loss to conceive how it

could have found place in the work of an intelligent officer, who had himself received the benefit of instruction at the riding establishment. There is no one principle more particularly inculcated—nay insisted on—at Maidstone, than *gentleness* in the treatment of the horse. Force is strictly prohibited.

With regard to “throwing horses on their haunches,”—no such practice is required for military riding. All that is wanted for this purpose is to teach the horse to carry an equal weight on all four legs. In performing “the higher airs of the *manège*,” no doubt the horse is thrown on his haunches, but this is totally unnecessary for military purposes. A horse that is not properly trained, carries too much weight on his fore legs, which makes him unsafe,—lean on the hand,—wears him out before his time, and prevents the rider from having full command of him. A *manège* horse carries more weight on his hind than fore legs: both extremes are prejudicial in military riding.

Page 158. “The troop horses that go through this rough treatment,” &c.

There is no rough treatment either taught, or practiced—at least by authority, in the British cavalry.

Page 162. “To attain these objects we must have a great deal more of out of door work. The soldiers ought to practice their various exercises in the open field,” &c.

The very thing that is done, and was done before captain Nolan’s book was ever published, and an admirable illustration of which may be now * seen at the head quarters of the 16th lancers at Cahir, under the practical guidance of colonel Rowland Smyth, C.B.

However unjust the gallant and lamented author’s observations may be considered on the subject of the system of military equitation taught at Maidstone, it must be admitted that there is great weight in his objections to the hussar-saddle, the injurious effects of which, as well upon the back of the horse, as on the power of the rider, must be admitted by every experienced and unprejudiced cavalry

* March 1855.

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officer. The hussar-saddle, as is well known, consists of a saddle-tree, placed upon a folded blanket, and covered with a sheepskin, the pommel and cantle rising sharply before and behind, and thus throwing the body of the rider forward and the legs back, while his bridle hand is forced up—destroying, or at least diminishing, the command of his horse. This may be, and is no doubt, in some measure counteracted by the instructions given to the recruit in the riding school, but the inherent defects of this description of saddle still remain, and no cavalry soldier can ever attain the same command of his horse and weapon,—or sit with as great ease to himself, on a hussar saddle, as he would do with the roomy pannelled saddle, with which our heavy dragoons were formerly equipped. To the blanket there are grave objections: it collects dirt and dust in the folds—constantly works out from under the side boards on a march,—requires to be kept folded on service, and in case of a surprise at night, if dropped, cannot be re-folded without assistance. General Bacon gives the following remarkable instance of the superiority of the pannelled over the hussar saddle, on an occasion when both were fairly tested on actual service:—

Appendix A.

“In the year 1834, one hundred lancers, and the same number of light cavalry were ordered upon a special duty to a distance of fifty miles in the rear of the enemy; they performed the service required, and returned within 48 hours. The following day the light cavalry, whose saddles were the same as those used in the British service, reported *thirty* sore backs; the lancers *not one*. The saddles of the latter had all *stuffed pannels* like those of the officers. They cost more money, but there were no sore backs, and the *superiority in the riding of the men* was remarkable.”

The chase is admitted to be the best practical riding school for a cavalry officer, on which account it is so properly encouraged by commanding officers, and so many cavalry regiments are now provided with packs of hounds; but would any military sportsman select a hussar saddle to follow the

hounds? We apprehend not: and if unsuited to a purpose where the greatest activity of body, and command of the horse and arms are required, how can it be suitable to the severer requirements of actual service in war?

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The cavalry bit also requires regulation. At present every bridle is fitted with *the same powerful lever*, which is indiscriminately applied to every horse, without any reference to the unfortunate animal's mouth! Hence the good-mouthed horses become hard-mouthed, and the hard-mouthed altogether insensible. This evil was brought to the notice of the duke of Cambridge by major Meyer, with suggestions as to providing every regiment with bits of various degrees of power, and it is to be hoped that H. R. Highness's recommendation of major Meyer's views, will lead to some rational principles being adopted in this important particular.

The choice of the horse is not a less necessary object of attention. If it were possible, there should be a few military studs in monarchies where the horses could be brought up wild, and never placed in a stall, until they were sent to the regiments. In peace, horses are generally too much cared for, and the greatest anxiety is shewn to prevent their catching cold. Then as soon as regiments take the field, they are treated carelessly; often made to bivouac in the very worst weather and without any necessity. What extremes and what contradiction!

Cavalry, says Marshal Saxe, should be lightly mounted—the horses should be accustomed to fatigue—they should carry little baggage, and we should never aim at having very fat or finely proportioned horses.

The encampment at Chobham in 1853, when the horses were merely hutted, and the weather, for a great part of the time, extremely wet, showed that horses *when well fed*, can bear great changes of temperature and treatment without injury. The casualties among the cavalry horses on that occasion were

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not, as might have been expected, caused by inflammatory attacks, but from accidents—kicks—injury from the picket poles, &c., and when we consider the sufferings of horses in transports—the crowding and fœtid air to which they are exposed, and their rapidly restored efficiency, it must be concluded that the horse is capable of much greater endurance than is commonly supposed. Horses, generally speaking, suffer more from hot stables, high feeding, and want of exercise, than from exposure to weather; and more “roughing it” in summer encampments would render our cavalry better able to bear the real hardships of actual service. At the same time, no preparation could render horses capable of undergoing the exposure, privations, and unreasonable work to which they were subjected in the Crimea, and the mismanagement of our noble squadrons in the ill-fated campaign of 1854, will fill a dark page in the history of British cavalry.

One of the most remarkable instances of endurance on the part of the horses of a cavalry regiment, occurred with the 3d hussars of the king's German legion, during the Peninsular war: This regiment, about 600 strong, sailed from Yarmouth for Gottenburg, on the 10th of May, 1808, and arrived at its destination on the 18th. After remaining six weeks at Gottenburg without debarkation, it was ordered to return to England, and reached Portsmouth on the 21st July. Here the regiment received the route for Portugal, and reached Maçeira bay on the 24th of August. The horses had thus been *seventeen weeks* continuously on ship board, and were now obliged to swim ashore. The weather was tempestuous, and a tremendous surf broke upon the coast; several boats were swamped and the horses lost; 40 had died on ship board, or been shot for glanders; and yet when this regiment marched from Lisbon towards the end of October, under major von Burgwedel, only 125 horses were left in hospital, and the gallant Germans subsequently bore the brunt of the severe cavalry duty on sir John Moore's retreat, at the close of which the 3d hussars alone formed the rear guard of the army.

Hist. K. G.
legion.
i. 143-148.

CHAPTER VII.

POSITION OF CAVALRY.

THERE are positions both in and out of action. To the latter belong the camp and cantonments.

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In camp-positions, cavalry should never have natural obstacles too near their rear, such as defiles, morasses, lakes, woods, rivers, villages, &c. ; for should an unexpected and powerful attack be made upon them, or a nightly surprise, there is danger, among such natural obstructions, of being disgracefully defeated, before time can be found to form.

In cantonments also, for like reasons, the alarm-place should never be on the side of the enemy, but in rear of villages and small towns.

Infantry, on the other hand, defend a town, village, and particularly a defile, better at the entrance, than at the outlet.

Well chosen positions often oblige the enemy to leave his own positions or to give up his intention of making an attack.

General Moore took up such excellent positions, on his celebrated retreat to Corunna, that the French, notwithstanding their superior force, never ventured to attack him.

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Alison. viii.
607.

After several days of harassing and dispiriting retreat which had caused great disorder in the British army, sir John Moore took up a position at Lugo (January, 1808), and offered battle to the enemy. The army was drawn up along a ridge of low hills, flanked on either side by precipitous rocks, from the mountains to the bed of the Minho. Instantly, as if by enchantment, the confusion ceased; the men fell cheerfully into their places; the stragglers came up from the rear; arms were cleaned, faces brightened, confidence was restored, and before the morning of the 8th of January, 19,000 men stood in battle array, impatiently awaiting the attack of the enemy; Soult, however, declined the contest, although he had 17,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 50 guns.

Wellington was impregnable in his position near Lisbon. The camp of Frederick the great at Bunzelwitz; the renowned camp of Gustavus Adolphus at Werben, and at Nuremberg; as well as the camp of Wallenstein, not far from that town, shew the highest imaginable talent in position.

In positions for action, it should be determined whether intervals between squadrons are necessary and advantageous.

They are not absolutely necessary, but the formation of nearly all European cavalry offers evidence in their favour.

The Austrians have intervals between their divisions; the French between squadrons, and so have almost all cavalry.

Facility of movement is increased by intervals, but they should not be so great as to diminish the essential strength of the charge.

The Prussian cavalry, at the period of its greatest fame, was formed without intervals.

Nine paces, the breadth of a subdivision, is sufficient distance between squadrons; and when that crowding arises which generally occurs in a charge, and which lies in the nature of the horse, which is too apt to press inwards, these intervals are, in most cases, found very useful.

In proportion as the horse exerts himself and increases his pace, he requires more room than when halted or at a walk; during the trot, therefore, and still more at the gallop, the intervals close of themselves, so that there can be no openings of which the enemy may take advantage. These intervals increase the power of manœuvring to a high degree.

Without conforming too strictly to this rule, the intervals are better determined by the state of the ground, the line of battle of the enemy, and generally by those circumstances which give to every battle its peculiar character.

Cavalry may take greater intervals when acting on the defensive, but when employed offensively should be more close.

In time of peace, manœuvres may be performed, sometimes with and sometimes without intervals; and generally with intervals at optional distances; for, as engagements are manifold and various, so must the art of position and motion be varied, in order that this art may be practiced in peace.

The manœuvres of all regiments during peace, should, as much as possible, be assimilated to those which are generally found necessary on active service. This truth was acknowledged to the fullest extent by the great Frederick, and since his time has been always acted on by the government of Prussia, and the principal German states. In England, until lately, we have been satisfied with *regulation* manœuvres,

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conveying no idea of any of the duties required of cavalry in war, and hence an officer might be advanced from cornet to colonel without ever obtaining any knowledge of the duties connected with patrolling a country, covering a retreat, leading an advance, taking advantage of ground, reconnoitring, supporting infantry and artillery, &c. Our military authorities seem, however, at length, to have awakened to the necessity of rendering the field drill of the army more instructive, and it is to be hoped that the encampment in 1858, at Chobham, will be followed by periodical training of a similar kind. *

If the general to whom the cavalry is entrusted, receives an order from the commander in chief, on the day of battle, to shew an intention of engaging the enemy on any particular point, in order to divert his attention from other points, on which it is intended to make a decisive attack with another part of the army, the general places his forces in deceitful threatening lines.

The echelon position is here very useful. The intervals may be increased, by which means the lines are lengthened, and yet appear full and multiplied. The head of the echelon is advanced towards the point intended to be threatened. In this position there is great command of manœuvre, and any point may be threatened without attacking it. Since from this position, the attack may be as easily made as avoided, it naturally creates caution on the part of the enemy—renders it necessary for him to take up counter positions, and completely fulfils the intended design of making a demonstration.

Uneven ground may be advantageously employed to give an appearance of greater strength than really exists, and thus increase the deception.

* Since the above was written, active steps have been taken for the formation of encampments at Aldershot heath, in Surrey, and the Curragh of Kildare, in Ireland.

When, for instance, two lines are concealed towards the middle behind rising ground, the enemy will believe that the space behind the ground which lies between the two visible ends of the line, is equally occupied. This mode of taking up a position will, in retreat, often gain half a day.

On the 4th September, 1812, the Russian cavalry manœuvred in this manner, with great ability. It was formed in apparently great lines; the intersected country prevented a complete view, and the lines were everywhere lost behind the heights and small woods.

The French cavalry under Murat, which always marched in great masses at the head of the army, was obliged, in consequence of this position, to halt for several hours, until the first *corps d'armée* of Davoust came up, and a reconnoissance was made.

Meantime the visible parts of the Russian line were lost, and when the French advanced, all had disappeared.

The retreat of the Russians on this occasion, was executed with such skill that neither cannon, equipages, or prisoners fell into the hands of the enemy, and at one time Murat and his horsemen were repulsed by the rear guard. In vain the French toiled onward under a burning sun through clouds of dust; the horses sank under fatigue without reaching the enemy. The following was the order of march:—Murat, with 20,000 cavalry, led the advance; next came the infantry in three great columns, all abreast, the centre, under Davoust, keeping the high road, while the corps of Poniatowski formed the right, and that of Eugene the left. The Imperial guard followed the corps of Davoust, and Ney brought up the rear: the artillery moved along the country roads or open plains parallel to the great *chaussée*.

Alison. xi. 60.

M. de Segur gives a very graphic, but not very credible instance of Murat's daring, and its effect upon the Russian

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Hist. de Na-
poleon. i. 363.

rear guard, on this day : —“ On assure, que ce jour là par un de ces premiers mouvements dignes des temps de la chevalerie, il s'élança seul et tout-à-coup contre leur ligne, s'arêta a quelques pas d'eux, l'épée a la main, il leur fit d'un air et d'un geste si impérieux le signe de se retirer, que ces barbares obéirent et reculèrent étonnés”!

In irregular ground, therefore, the intervals of squadrons may be increased without any disadvantage. In a plain, cavalry should be placed as close as possible, for the science of position varies according to the description of the ground on which it is placed, and according to the positions which the enemy is taking or has taken up: also according as it is intended, either to charge the enemy or parry his attack.

A general who has only a certain number of regular positions and movements in his head, is easily embarrassed, because those which he has practiced on the exercise ground, will not always answer.

True genius develops new manœuvres in every new position according to circumstances. The general principles of positions, movements and engagements, are only guides to talent—instruction for the application of tactics; for this application depends upon the fertility of the mind: the elements of service (*regulations*) are only the *form*, to which talent gives life.

Its gift of combination elevates it above the prescription of regulations. A commander who has once reached this point is, in the fullest sense of the term, *matured*. Peace may certainly circumscribe him, but war re-establishes the true connexion, and shews that the service does not give brilliancy to him, but he to the service. Peace displaces the names that were of importance in war, and puts others in their situations; because, as Lloyd says,

the principal talent in peace consists in the art of pleasing, and the useful is neglected for the agreeable.

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War scours away the ignoble parts, and exhibits individuals according to their personal value.

If cavalry be posted in a plain with the design of maintaining its position, it is well to extend the first line and form it with great intervals; but the second line should be closed up, and interspersed with twelve-pounder batteries, and a third line should be formed, as a reserve, in columns of single regiments, as points of *appui*.

The second line then contains the real force of the charge. If the enemy advances, the first line (skirmishers) can be made to harrass him in various ways, and involve him in partial engagements; but when the enemy's force increases, this line can gradually retire round both flanks of the second line, thus having the second line free, and exposing the enemy to the fire of artillery.

A most favourable position is thus obtained, for while the flanks of the real charge are strengthened, the flanks of the enemy are threatened, and now the attack may be commenced at pleasure.

The first and second line thus united, will form a line of battle in the shape of a stretched bow (*ordre courbe*). Should the enemy continue his movements, and present the appearance of a real attack, his intentions should be anticipated, and he should be attacked with one or both wings, according to circumstances. If the attack is made with one wing only, such a strength should be given to it, as to render it superior to the corresponding wing of the enemy, which should be surrounded.

Should this flank attack succeed, it is now time to move the whole line forward, in order to derive advantage

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from it. If it does not succeed, the defeated wing reforms upon the reserve. Should the enemy now advance with his whole line, he must be boldly attacked with that wing which has not yet been engaged ; in this case the artillery retires at the moment of the charge, but the reserve advances, and forms line on the point where both lines engage.

If a plain has been occupied, the artillery is placed in the first line, and this is made the line of attack, with small intervals. The second line, however, must not be placed at too great a distance, in order that when the first advances to the charge, the second may move up to the artillery. It is of importance that the position should not be so taken up as to endanger the flanks, but that, on the other hand, it may be expected to outflank the enemy.

General Sebastiani manœuvred successfully in this manner with his corps of cavalry, against general Sacken at Schilda, on the 10th October, 1813. While he placed his cavalry in the middle, and his artillery in battery in front, he pushed forward both wings extending them, and obliged general Sacken to leave his position in a very short time.

When the crown prince of Wirtembeg, with the fourth and sixth corps of the grand army, on the march from Vitry to Paris, met with the division of the army of marshal Marmont, at Sondé St. Croix, on the 25th March, 1814, the cuirassier division of general count Nostitz, deployed in the centre ; general count Pahlens on the right ; and the light cavalry division of prince Adam, of Wirtemberg, on the left. The Wirtemberg horse-artillery of twelve guns, was placed on a height, in the centre of this position, and opened a cannonade ; at the

same time, the Russian cavalry on the right, and the Wirtemberg cavalry on the left, advanced in echelon.

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This position of the crown prince obliged marshal Marmont immediately to abandon his position, although he had a numerous corps of all arms. The crown prince, without waiting for his infantry, followed the enemy with his cavalry, which was afterwards joined by the light cavalry of the guard, under the grand duke Constantine. He pursued them to Allemens, a distance of fully twenty-four miles! The French frequently made an attempt to halt, at Sommesons, Conontroi, and Fère Champenoise; the crown prince, however, gave them no time, but instantly attacked them with his known impetuosity. Two large squares were cut to pieces; marshal Marmont lost the greater part of his guns, and the advent of night alone enabled him to reach the heights of Allemens with the remainder of his army. This day will be ever memorable in history, for it determined the whole campaign. Napoleon, though not present, was then conquered.

This was the celebrated combat of Fère Champenoise, an action which, perhaps, more than any other in modern times, goes to support Napoleon's theory of the superiority of cavalry over infantry. The forces of Marmont and Mortier were 22,000, of whom 5,000 were cavalry, and these were supported by 84 guns; the allies were solely cavalry and artillery, including the cuirassiers and chevaliers of the Russian guard, making 22,000 horse, with 128 pieces of cannon. The French cavalry struggled gallantly against this overpowering odds, and the infantry steadily formed square, and retreated, at first, with great regularity; but the pressure of the enemy's squadrons at length caused confusion, and several squares were broken by the Imperial cavalry. The French horse were defeated by the Russian

Alison. viii.
134, et seq.

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and Austrian cuirassiers, who took 24 guns, while Pahlen's horse, under the prince of Wirtemberg, captured 20 more. A violent storm of wind and rain prevented many of the French musquets from going off; a sudden panic now seized the whole, and a charge of Le Clerc's heavy dragoons, and the approach of night, alone saved them from total destruction.

Such was the important success of the advanced guard. Meantime the emperor Alexander and king of Prussia came up with Pacthod's division, and soon 9,000 chosen horse, and 70 guns were opposed to 6,000 infantry, without cavalry, and only 16 pieces of cannon. Pacthod, however, refused to surrender, and forming square, he bravely retreated towards Fère Champenoise, and for some time repelled the Russian horse; but the guns eventually made openings in one of the squares, and the horsemen breaking in, the whole were cut down or made prisoners. Allied reinforcements now came up, and soon 13,000 men were in the field; but still the other squares of the French refused to surrender. Alexander, therefore, directed a general charge, and personally leading the Chevalier guards, the gallant band of Pacthod was penetrated on all sides. Still the French refused to yield, and fired until their last cartridge was exhausted, when Pacthod gave up his sword to the Emperor. The trophies of this battle were 7,000 prisoners, two generals of division, four of brigade, 80 guns, 200 ammunition waggons, and the whole of a convoy of baggage, which was under the protection of Pacthod: The loss of the allies was only 2,500 men.

Allison. viii.
184, et seq.

It will be observed that although this battle may at first sight, appear to give the palm to the Russian and Prussian cavalry, the numbers on both sides being at the commencement, about equal, yet, subsequently the proportion of horse under Alexander and Pacthod, was as three to two in favor of the cavalry, while more than four times the number of guns were brought up by the allies, and eventually 13,000 men were directed against Pacthod's division. Something must also be allowed for the presence of the Russian

emperor, whose life was reported to be in danger, and his troops were consequently roused to a high pitch of enthusiasm, so important in attacks of cavalry. In other respects this action offers strong evidence in favour of simple armament, for neither carbine or pistol was fired on the part of the allies, who by the power of the sword alone, supported by horse artillery, broke all the French squares, though formed of veteran troops. This battle laid open the road to Paris to the allied army.

In a regular battle, the cavalry must be placed in reserve. It should not, at the commencement, be either exposed to cannon fire, or generally speaking, brought into action. This rule seldom admits of exception. The time for cavalry to produce great effects, is when the line of battle wavers—when the fire of artillery has weakened it—when single points have become thinned—when the infantry is tired and exhausted, and the arms, in consequence of a long continued fire, no longer go off with regularity, and therefore the fire begins to become uncertain. This is the moment to attack infantry with advantage, and the cavalry must then suddenly advance and attack in masses. The hearing of the soldier is effected by the thunder of the cannon and the long continued fire of small arms, so that the word of command is heard and understood with difficulty. The smoke favours the unperceived advance of the cavalry,—all which are co-operating circumstances; wherefore, at such a moment, the mere appearance of the cavalry, when unexpected, frequently frightens the infantry and makes the victory easy.

At the battle of Waterloo, a French division of infantry fled before two regiments of English dragoons, without firing a shot, and left behind them thirty guns.

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Siborne. 534.

The author, no doubt, alludes to the splendid charge of the Union brigade, under sir William Ponsonby upon the French division of Alix, when 3,000 prisoners were taken, and 40 guns disabled or captured, as before related. The effective strength of the brigade on going into action was only 1,181 horses, so that the disproportion between the assailants and the assailed was immense, and the result shows how little this should be regarded by leaders of cavalry, when circumstances favor the employment of that force.

Before the invention of gunpowder, cavalry was employed at the commencement of a battle, but in the present day, it cannot be effectively used until the end, to ensure the victory and to profit by it.

French account of the battle of Mont St. Jean.

Napoleon's grand error at Waterloo was that of ordering the cavalry to charge *too soon*, and this he seems to have afterwards admitted in his bulletin of the battle, although the admission is qualified by an attempt at explanation of the cause:—"By a movement of impatience, so common in our military annals, and which has often been so fatal to us, the cavalry of reserve, having perceived a retrograde movement made by the English, to shelter them from our batteries, from which they suffered so much, crowned the heights of Mount St. Jean, and charged the infantry. This movement, which, made in time, and supported by the reserves, must have decided the day, being made in an isolated manner, and before affairs on the right were terminated, became fatal."

Siborne.

Notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the French cavalry, which outnumbered the English and German legion horse by nearly 6,000 at the commencement of the action, it became so reduced, depressed in spirit and worn out by fatigue at the close of the day, that it was unable to oppose any effectual resistance to the British squadrons, then comparatively fresh. On the other hand, it is clear, that the ultimate success of Wellington was mainly owing to his judicious withdrawal of the cavalry, after their

first successes, and his keeping them in reserve, while the enemy's horse were torn for three hours by the grape and musquetry from the English batteries and squares. Had Napoleon reserved his cavalry, the result might have been very different. Both commanders followed their own principles of action. Napoleon, his favorite theory, that cavalry if brave and bravely led could always overcome infantry: Wellington, that the firmness of the British foot soldier was not to be shaken, and that he would repel the assaults of the enemy until the moment had arrived when he could safely be let loose upon the foe.

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Alison. xiv.
66, 67.

The position of cavalry, even in reserve, must always be in several lines. To place cavalry in ground where it could be of no service, would bespeak little talent. Frederick the Great, speaking on this subject says;—"If cavalry is placed behind a morass, no use can be made of it; if it be placed too near a thicket the enemy's infantry can conceal themselves therein, and firing, throw the cavalry into disorder, which is then unable to defend itself."

In positions, where the object is to support other kinds of troops, the cavalry should be placed at a distance, in order that a charge may be executed with force; on this account attention should be always paid to the nature of the ground, for a few hundred paces greater distance is no consequence with cavalry as it moves so quickly.

In retreat, cavalry should never be placed before the debouches, but always at some distance behind them, in order that when the enemy debouches, he may be impetuously attacked, before he has taken up his position.

The cavalry action at Zedenich in 1806, which the French make so much of, was the natural consequence of a faulty position which general Schimmelpennick

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had taken up immediately before a wood. Instead of retreating through this wood, with the greatest possible expedition, after he had ascertained the advance of the enemy, he accepted battle from a superior force, in this most unfavourable position.

The injudicious position of Anson's light cavalry brigade at the battle of Talavera (1809) led to serious consequences: The French divisions of Villatte and Ruffin had advanced to turn the British left, and Anson's brigade was ordered forward to check the movement. The French, seeing that they were threatened by a charge of cavalry, formed squares, and the horsemen advanced upon the bayonets, the 23d light dragoons taking the larger square, which had formed in its front, and the 1st hussars of the king's German legion, the two smaller squares on the left, the brigade being formed in two lines on a front of four squadrons with the usual intervals. But just as the charge had commenced, a hollow cleft, covered by long grass, presented itself in front of the leading squadrons. Too late to pull up, the foremost horsemen rode headlong into the hollow, and a frightful scene ensued. Some tumbled in or over the ravine; some scrambled through it, while others leaped boldly across the chasm, and gained the other side; but great confusion was the consequence. In front of the legion hussars the ravine was from six to eight feet in depth, and twelve to eighteen feet in breadth, while widening in front of the 23d, it was there also more shallow, and the greater part of the regiment managed to get across, but so dispersed, and in such confusion, that they were unable to make any impression on the squares, and the French artillery, sweeping their ranks, they were obliged to give way, leaving nearly half their numbers on the field. The hussars suffered less, in consequence of their flank not being exposed to the fire of artillery, and the rear squadrons crossing the ravine more cautiously, on seeing the fate of the front; but the unlooked for impediment having thrown the first line into disorder,

Hist.
K. G. legion.
i. 214, 215.

few of the horsemen arrived before the bayonets of the enemy, and no impression was made upon the squares. Had the ground in front of the brigade been carefully reconnoitered before the action, this calamity could scarcely have occurred.

The fatal charge of lord Cardigan's brigade at Balaklava, October 25th, 1854, presents some analogy to that which has been here described. At Talavera, a misunderstanding as to the nature of the order given to the cavalry, which were merely directed to "advance," precipitated the whole brigade into a ravine, and entailed upon it a heavy loss; at Balaklava, the same error caused 670 British horsemen to be launched against an *entire wing* of the Russian army, and two-thirds of our noble soldiers were sacrificed. The consequences of the misconception, or misdirection at Balaklava were, however, of a much more serious character than in the Peninsular encounter, and this fatal charge presents matter for both instruction and enquiry.

The subject has been much discussed, and the prevailing opinion appears to be unfavourable to the commander of the cavalry division, but much may be said in extenuation of the part taken by lord Lucan on this lamented occasion, and military men, before pronouncing judgment against a brother soldier, placed in a highly critical and responsible position, should carefully consider all the circumstances connected with the case.

The heavy cavalry brigade, consisting of the Greys, Enniskillens, and 4th and 5th dragoon guards, the whole under the orders of the honorable major general Scarlett, had charged, with great success, in the early part of the day, and driven the Russian horse behind a ridge of low hills, which ran across the valley and intercepted the view of their troops from the British position. Unfortunately this success was not followed up, and the enemy, having driven the Turks from some redoubts which defended the position, seized the guns, and made off to their main body. Captain Nolan of the 15th hussars, aide-de-camp to major general Airey, the quarter master general of the British army,

Special cor-
respondent of
Times, an
eye-witness.

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then brings to the commander of the cavalry division, the following written order :—

“ Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front,—to follow the enemy, and try to prevent them from carrying off the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on the left.”

Immediate.

R. AIREY.

Lord Lucan, struck no doubt, by the ambiguity of this order, and seeing neither enemy nor guns, asks captain Nolan, “ where, and what to do ? ” to which the other, with more enthusiasm than discretion, and, as has been stated, with an air of petulance and disrespect, which must have been extremely irritating to a commanding officer — replies, “ There is the enemy, my lord, and there the guns ” !— implying that a charge was to be made, and practically illustrating this object by placing himself at the head of one of the leading squadrons. Lord Lucan referring to the written instructions, sees that he is ordered to “ *try* and prevent the enemy from carrying off the guns,” which seems to bear out captain Nolan’s interpretation ; for how is a commander of cavalry to *try* and wrest guns from a numerous and resolute enemy without charging ? Thus the fatal order is given—the devoted brigade is launched against three formidable batteries—supported by 5000 cavalry and masses of infantry, and after performing prodigies of valour, returns a mere fragment of its original force, leaving two-thirds of its number on the field !

On the other hand it has been said that the word “ *try* ” gave a discretionary power, or in other words, that it was tantamount to saying “ take the guns, if you think you can,” but this is “ begging the question.” All charges are more or less trials—trials of strength between opposing forces ; and if an officer in command of a body of cavalry, is ordered to *try* and prevent an enemy from taking away guns, it is not likely that he could do so in any other way than by attacking him.

A less hurried consideration of lord Raglan's order would, perhaps, have shewn that at the time when it was given, his lordship was under the impression that the enemy were *in retreat*, as implied by the word "*follow*." This not being the case, called for hesitation; but one can easily understand the difficulties under which a general of cavalry labours, when, anxious to exhibit promptness, he is urged on by the misplaced enthusiasm of the bearer of an order from the commander-in-chief, his own judgment, at the same time, deprecating the step which that order appeared, and was stated by the aide-de-camp, to direct. Lord Lucan may also, not unreasonably, have expected that a general attack was intended to be made, as three infantry divisions—those of the duke of Cambridge, sir George Cathcart, and general Bosquet had debouched into the plain, and would, in that case, have advanced to his support.

As it was, the onset was unparalleled. The heroic light brigade, consisting of the 8th and 11th hussars, 4th and 13th light dragoons, and 17th lancers, led by the Earl of Cardigan, advanced in three lines down a gradual descent of more than three quarters of a mile, the Russian guns vomiting forth upon them shells and shot—one battery bearing upon their right, and another on their left, and all the intermediate ground covered with riflemen. Ascending the hill, the oblique fire of the artillery poured upon their rear, so that when they came within 50 yards of the guns, they were completely surrounded by a circle of fire! Undaunted, however, the intrepid horsemen, following the example of their unflinching leader, dashed into the nearest battery, and cut down the Russians at their guns. In the two leading regiments every officer, with one exception, was either killed or wounded, or had his horse shot under him. The second and third lines followed, all vying with each other in deeds of heroism and carrying destruction into the enemy's artillery and cavalry, but with fearful loss. Upon returning up the hill which they had descended in making the attack, the gallant squadrons had to run the same gauntlet to which they had before been exposed from the flank fire of infantry—

Speech of
lord Cardigan
at lord may-
or's dinner,
Feb. 6, 1855.
Corresp. of
Times, and
Morn. Chron.

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men and horses fell fast upon the plain—and the shattered remnant returned to the position a mere skeleton.

From what has transpired since this calamitous combat, it would appear that lord Raglan was not correctly informed of either the strength, position, or movements of the enemy, at the time when he issued the fatal order committed to writing by general Airey, and that his lordship was under the impression that the Russians were in *retreat*. Hence the apparently rash direction to the commander of the cavalry—the unqualified interpretation given by the bearer of the order—lord Lucan's instructions to his brigadier—the fatal charge, and almost annihilation of one of the finest brigades of cavalry that has ever taken the field.

Another question remains: why was the light cavalry *alone* advanced to the front, when the whole of the cavalry was included in the order of the commander in chief? This has not been explained, and appears to be inconsistent with the interpretation which was given to the order in other respects. If a discretionary power existed as to the number of regiments to be employed in the advance—a matter upon which the success or failure of the charge might depend—why not, as to the advance itself, which to any officer acquainted with the uses and application of cavalry, must have appeared rash and reckless in the extreme? Why, at least, was the heavy brigade not pushed forward as reserve? These regiments had been highly successful in the early part of the day, and had suffered little loss. The Scots' Greys and Enniskillen dragoons, led on by the gallant major general Scarlett, and supported by a flank attack of the 4th and 5th dragoon guards, in which the former regiment, under colonel Hodge,* was much distinguished,—defeated and dispersed a body of the enemy's cavalry, estimated at *three times* their number; and rallying with admirable discipline after the charge, stood ready again for action. Too late to restore the combat they eventually advanced to the relief of their brave

Lord Lucan's
despatch,
Oct. 27, 1861.

Narr. of eye
witness. MSS.

* The worthy successor of the gallant major Hodge of the 7th hussars, who fell gloriously at Genappe, 17th June, 1815.—See *ante*.

comrades of the light brigade, as its shattered remnant returned from the deadly encounter, which had proved fatal to so many a gallant spirit, on that ever-to-be lamented day.*

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* Since the above was printed, Lord Lucan's letter of the 30th November, as well as Lord Raglan's counter statement of the 16th December, 1854, have appeared in the public papers, and will be found in the Appendix (E.) It is to be regretted that a correspondence of so recriminatory a character should have been considered necessary by gallant officers holding such high and responsible positions in our eastern army, but the main question at issue still remains unsatisfied, namely: was the order written by major general Airey, under the direction of Lord Raglan, an order for the cavalry to attack the enemy or not? Lord Raglan says "*there was nothing in the instruction to require an attack,*" and no doubt his lordship's intentions were as stated in the letter which contains this declaration, but nevertheless we apprehend that nine cavalry officers out of ten, taking into account the explanation made by the bearer of the order, who might naturally be supposed to know what was intended—would, under all the circumstances of the case, have given the same interpretation to these instructions, as that which was given to them by Lord Lucan. An order to "advance rapidly to the front," with a view to "prevent an enemy from carrying away guns," would naturally be construed into an order to *charge*, for how is an enemy to be prevented from such a step without *charging*? Would the enemy be prevented from carrying off the guns by a demonstration—a threatening of the flank, or any of the parade movements of the drill ground? We apprehend not, and that the only mode of carrying out the object desired by Lord Raglan—if practicable at all—was by a *rapid* and vigorous *charge*. With regard to the details of execution, there may be ground for animadversion: Lord Lucan had, no doubt, the option of taking with him a battery of horse artillery, and did not avail himself of the permission; no communication appears to have been made by him with the French cavalry on the left, or the infantry by which, according to a previous order, the whole were to be supported; no advance posts appear to have been thrown out in front of the cavalry division to reconnoitre and obtain information of the enemy's position and strength; the order included the *whole* of the cavalry, whereas the light and two regiments of the heavy brigade were alone advanced. If Lord Lucan considered that he was at liberty to deviate from his instructions in the latter particular, he might well have assumed a discretion with regard to the order itself, the imprudence of which, (according to his interpretation of it) was so strongly impressed on the minds of both himself and his brigadier. Finally, would Picton, Anglesea, or Thackwell have complied with an order which *apparently* directed a weak division of cavalry to attack an entire wing of the Russian army, consisting of probably 30,000 men? The following current anecdote may serve as a reply:—General Picton having refused to make a certain movement in a great battle, when the order was repeated, repeated his refusal, and in no very respectful terms, to which the duke of Wellington coolly replied:—"Did he say so? well! I suppose he had good reason, but he might have used civil words," and the generous chief afterwards acknowledged that Picton was right, and that it was well the movement had not been made.

CHAPTER VIII.

MOVEMENT OF CAVALRY.

CHAP. The art of movement or manœuvring consists in two
VIII. parts :—

1st. Movement in March.

2d. Movement in Manœuvre.

When troops leave their positions, whether it be camp or cantonments, and move into other positions, these movements are called *marches*.

When troops form and arrange themselves in order of battle, either in the position which they had taken up, or on the march, the movements by which this is attained, as well as those which follow in consequence, are called *manœuvres*.

Strategy shews the necessity for a change of position : positions should only be taken up upon strategical points.

Strategical points are distinguished from points which are not strategical, by there being no possibility of turning them with impunity.

An army which has taken up a position upon a point not strategical, would be outmanœuvred by a skilful general, or if it remained, would be taken, as in a *cul de sac*.

The movement from one position to another may comprehend many marches. These successive marches become an operation ; the new position that is taken up is the object of this operation.

When strategy points out the necessity, direction, and object of this operation, and has designed the plan, then tactics is occupied with the execution. It breaks up the army, according to circumstances, into columns. These circumstances are the ground over which the army marches, and the number of roads upon which columns can move ; as well as the greater or less probability of being attacked by the enemy during the movement.

Tactics also combine the columns according to the different kinds of troops, and according to the double object of safety of manœuvre, and convenience of the troops in performing it ; these can, for example, be united, when the country is open, and the cavalry is at the head of the column ; if the country be mountainous, and that it is necessary to place the infantry at the head, the convenience is disturbed.

Safety is the first consideration—convenience the second : it is here important, whether the movement be in advance or retreat.

In the tactical arrangement of these different points, great exactness is required : the least forgetfulness has often caused the greatest disorder. To transport, with regularity, the enormous baggage with which modern armies encumber themselves is one of the most difficult tasks. The chief of the staff on whom this duty devolves, sometimes meets with difficulties scarcely to be surmounted.

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The transport of baggage is tolerably organized with but few armies: moreover the officers are allowed too much baggage. The baggage waggons of the officers, which, endeavour to keep up with the regiments, press in between the columns, and stop the defiles.

The wants of great modern armies exceed all calculation.

Quintus Cur-
tius.

Although the wants and appendages of modern armies are much more numerous than they might be, or ought to be, yet those of antient armies, and even those of the last century, far exceeded them. The march of Darius to meet Alexander was more like a theatrical procession than the advance of an army. This monarch had not only an absurd retinue of chariots, pikemen, boys, and *cavalry in robes*, but actually his whole family circle. "On each side of him," says the historian, "marched two hundred of his relatives, then followed a chariot, carrying Sysigambis the mother of Darius, accompanied by his wife; as also fifteen large chariots bearing the king's children, with their governors and eunuchs, and his concubines, to the number of three hundred and sixty. Six hundred mules and three hundred waggons were loaded with money; and the wives of the officers of state were all mounted on chariots. There was a body of cavalry, composed of men of twelve different nations; and another body, called the immortal, amounting to ten thousand, dressed in *robes of cloth of gold*!" The generals of Louis XIV made war with all the comforts and luxuries of peace: immense suites, great trains of kitchen apparatus, toilette appointments, &c. One of the most extensive exposés of French military baggage was made by Seidlitz at Gotha in 1757, when he was so near finding marshal Soubise at his soup. "Il prit," says Jomini, "grand nombre de secrétaires, valets de chambre, officiers de cuisine, comédiens, coiffures, marchands de nouveautés, &c. Les bagages tombèrent également en son pouvoir; on y trouva des caisses entieres d'eau de lavande, de sans-pareille, des

Traité des
grandes
opérations
militaires.
i. 198.

parasols, des manchettes, des singes, et des perroquets." This is only to be equalled by the white satin shoes found in prince Mentschikoff's carriage after the battle of Alma (September 20, 1854). The booty taken at Vitoria also exhibited a strange display of the wants of modern armies: Alison. xi. 493. Wives and concubines, nuns and mistresses, arrayed in the highest luxury and fashion, were taken by hundreds. Rich vestures of all sorts, velvet and silk brocades, gold and silver plate, valuable pictures, jewels, laces, cases of claret and champagne, poodles, parrots, monkeys, and trinkets lay scattered about the field in all directions.

The reserve ammunition waggons are also very burthensome and often impede the movement of an army. But the provision waggons, which drag after an army in immense columns, and at a prodigious expense, often carry nothing but mouldy bread, or meal that has long become useless: they are really only a burthen to the country without serving the army. The flocks of cattle poison the air—perish on the roads—seldom benefit the army, because they go too slow, and produce irreparable injury; while they infect and destroy the stock of cattle at the seat of war, and of all countries through which they pass.

So long as these magazine columns are not limited to four days' consumption (bread, rice, corn, brandy), and that to be transported on *permanent* waggons—so long as all other baggage, both belonging to these and the artillery, is not dismissed, the motions of an army will be ever impeded.

A soldier can carry with him four days provisions; consequently an army is thus provided for eight days. With this supply and a proper use of the assistance which the country affords, in our cultivated land, every rapid operation may be executed.

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War consists in a succession of operations, after each of which some days' rest should be taken, even when no battle has been fought, because the strength of an army is finite. During these halt days, the supplies are completed, and consequently the provisions—in defensive warfare, from the magazines; in offensive warfare, from the places or provinces taken.

If provisions be daily served out during the operation, its success is risked, for the operation is thus deprived of rapidity and strength.

The time is past when the German soldier fought on any side for payment. War has ceased to be a permanent occupation of the citizen, but has returned to what it formerly was with the old Germans, the occasional duty of every inhabitant.

Memoirs of a
Cavalier. ii.
75.

The cavalier candidly confesses that when he went into arms at the beginning of the civil war, he did not trouble himself to examine sides. "I was as glad, he says, to hear the drums beat for soldiers, as if I had been a mere Swiss, who cares not which side gets the better, provided he receives his pay."

"And like the sordid Switzer, he would say,
The best of causes is the best of pay."

Alison. ii.
196, 216.

The fidelity and bravery of the Swiss, however, whether engaged in the defense of their own mountains or in the service of other states, stands conspicuous in history, and their devotion to the ill fated Louis XVI, should never be forgotten, when alluding to their national character. The intrepid aspect of the Swiss guard, alone saved this unfortunate monarch from actual violence on the 14th July, 1792, and the sole reliance of the royal family, for their personal security, was ever on the firmness and bravery of these incomparable troops. "Never," says Alison, describing the massacre of the 10th August, "was seen, in a more striking manner, the superiority of order and discipline against the

greatest numerical amount of physical force. The Swiss, firing from the windows, drove back the foremost of their enemies, and ranging themselves in battle array in the court of the Carousel, completed their defeat Seven guns were taken, and brought back by the Swiss to the foot of the great stair. *Three hundred horse at that critical moment might have saved the monarchy*; but the heroic defenders of the palace, few in number, and *destitute of cavalry*, could not follow up their victory beyond the Carousel, and their leaders, in the absence of the king, did not venture to take any steps for completing their victory Imagination itself can conceive nothing so dreadful as the vengeance which the infuriated and victorious mob took on the remnant of the Swiss guard which survived the action An immense multitude of about 30,000 persons all armed, and in the most vehement state of excitement, broke into the palace, ransacked every room, or pursued with relentless fury the Swiss, who, now broken and dispersed, were seeking refuge singly, or two and three together, in the adjoining houses and streets." The sequel to this bloody tale presents examples of atrocity and human wickedness unequalled in history, as well as the lamentable consequences of want of firmness on the part of a monarch, whose throne, notwithstanding all the previous disasters, was still within his grasp. "With inexpressible fury they threw themselves on the wounded Swiss, cut their throats as they lay bleeding on the ground, tore out their hearts and their entrails, which they carried about in triumph on pikes, with the gory heads, through all the adjacent streets. The Cour des Suisses was entirely covered with the mangled remains of these noble defenders of the monarchy, weltering in a sea of blood, and mutilated by French women in a way which civilized depravity, joined to savage barbarity, could alone have conceived." "Nothing can be more certain than that, if the other half of the Swiss guard which lay at Ruel and Courbevoie had been brought up to the scene of action, the insurgents would have been defeated."

Alison, ii,
220, 224.

Ib. ii, 222.

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A warm feeling of patriotism exists in the soldier, just because he is a citizen. In order to increase this feeling, even the private soldier has been encouraged by honorary rewards—the enticement of promotion, which was previously unknown to him. To this system the French owed their victories, during their struggle against feudal rights : to this system nations owe their liberation from the French monarchy during the last war. That partition wall of absolute power on the part of the officer, and slavish obedience on that of the soldier, has disappeared. The officer can now only excel the soldier by greater bravery, or superior talent ; every other distinction loses its aim : *obedience may be extorted—confidence never !*

The judgment of a private soldier on his officer, is often more correct, and of more value than that of officers of high or equal rank, where jealousy often causes reproach.

The soldier is excited by ambition to imitate the deeds of his officer : boldly he fixes his eyes on his colonel, and hopes to equal him. The general looks down upon the hundreds entrusted to him, as rivals of his fame. What mutual inducements to valour !

But when this spirit, which is founded upon past deeds, produces general respect for the military, it must ensure honorable treatment.

When great exertions are required, plentiful subsistence must be provided. With a regular English army that system of scanty portions is as long possible, as the men are able to purchase provisions by means of their high pay.

It is possible, without always depending upon the uncertain provision transport—which, has been proved,

destroys the country, by the prodigious demands on forage, and the little order and discipline by which it is attended—to form a requisition system, by which an army may support itself, during the execution of an operation, without ruining the country.

But the soldier himself must not dare to supply his own wants. Discipline is a very different thing from what is generally understood under that head. The civilian thinks that it consists in the commanding officer obliging the soldier to be content with his commissariat bread. Whether the army suffers from fatigue, or the want of necessary support, in consequence of the absence of ease and shelter ;—whether, on account of their bivouacing at a bad time of the year, contagious disorders spread amongst them, courage relaxes, and finally, an army dissolves, is only to be found in the hospitals, and consequently the object of the war is defeated and the evil prolonged—this the civilian does not consider. He does not see the consequences, of which he himself will necessarily be one of the victims, but only the pressure of the moment. He does not see and honor in the soldier, that man, who after fatiguing and dangerous labour, tired and exhausted from weather, hunger, and thirst, cheerfully accepts a friendly reception, united with a meal seasoned by hospitality. Content and cheerfulness are always united in the soldier ; but the citizen does not look upon him in this point of view.

In soldiers he sees only a horde of rude rabble, sent upon the earth as a scourge and plague. He receives them cold and sullen—covetous and niggardly giving them what the law prescribes. No friendly word or soothing attendance excuses the want of a better meal. He knows not how to derive advantage from the affability

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of the soldier, by praising the deeds of the army. In a word, it is the fault of the citizen himself, when the soldier is what he, in his prejudice, considers him—*savage*.

Many allowances are to be made for the apparent ferocity of the soldier, and those only who have witnessed the sufferings and privations to which he is exposed, can appreciate the exciting causes by which he is influenced. That a dreadful want of provisions was frequently experienced by the British troops, during the Peninsular war, is a fact well authenticated. Many of their retrograde movements were caused by these privations. The diplomatic correspondence published by order of the House of Commons shewed, that *absolute starvation* obliged the British army to retire across the Tagus in 1809, and famine stared them in the face. "On this retreat," says colonel Jones, "*five days passed without an issue of bread* ; on some days, no food of any kind had been received, and at most one-third, or one-half of a ration. During a month which followed the junction of the two armies on the 22d July, 1809, after the battle of Talavera, they had not received ten days' bread ; on many days, they only got a little meat without salt ; on others nothing at all ; the cavalry and artillery horses during the same time, had not received three deliveries of forage ; 1000 horses had died, and 700 men were in hospital."

Jones's
sieges. i. 251.

Alison. ix.
439.

Then look to the devastation caused by epidemic disease : In the following August came the Guadiana fever, which acting upon bodies weakened by fatigue and want of nourishment, carried off numbers. Soon not less than eight or nine thousand men were computed to be in hospital, and in a little time, 5000 had died there. This is only to be equalled by the Crimean campaign of 1854-1855, the peculiar characteristic of which, as compared with other campaigns attended with great exposure to weather, appears to have been the extreme degree of cold—the sudden transitions of temperature, and, when the air was mild, the miry condition of the ground on which the soldiers were encamped.

Napier.

Hist. K. G.
legion. i. 267.

This, added to overwork in the trenches, caused a mortality which—far more destructive than the enemy's fire—decimated our ranks. But during the greater part of the Peninsular war the British troops had *no protection from the weather whatever*, and, therefore, as sir de Lacy Evans has shewn, this exposure in the Crimea could never *alone* have produced such fatal results.* From 1808 to 1813 our army was *without tents*; and many a night during the four first campaigns—and even the nights following Quatre Bras and before Waterloo—many a British soldier had no bed, but “a reeking puddle under a saturated blanket.”

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Parl. Inquiry,
March 1855.

Sketches of
campaigning
life, 218. note.

The privations to which men under the influence of a strong sense of duty, and a high sentiment of honour will sustain, appear incredible: The soldiers of Charles XII made nothing of following their chivalrous leader through roaring torrents in the most inclement seasons, and the sufferings of the staff officers of Napoleon's army in 1807, exceed the most distressing details received from the seat of war in the east:—“Les officiers d'état-major,” writes Napoleon to king Joseph, from Osterode, March 1, 1807, “ne se sont pas déshabillés depuis *deux mois*, et quelques-uns depuis *quatre*; j'ai moi-même été quinze jours sans ôter mes bottes. Nous sommes au milieu de la neige et de la boue, sans vin, sans eau de vie, sans pain, mangeant des pommes de terres et de la viande, faisant de longues marches et contre-marches, sans aucune espèce de douceurs, et nous battant ordinairement à la baïonnette et sous la mitraille, les blessés obligés de se retirer en traîneau, en plein air, pendant cinquante lieues.”†

Alison. vii.
467. note.

* “Neither the deficiency in the supplies of clothes, food, or fuel, would have produced the sickness and death in the army, had not the troops been overworked in the trenches. It was the fatigue of the men that was so injurious the overwork during the nights was decidedly the main cause of the suffering of the army.”—*Sir de Lacy Evans, Parl. Inquiry, March 1855.*

† Colonel Wilson of the Coldstream guards, states, that when the troops first landed in the Crimea (1854), their clothes were in such a condition that it could scarcely be seen that they were British soldiers—the officers had no change of clothing, and from September 14, until November 26, he had never removed his clothes.—*Ibid.*

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Alison's
Marlborough.
ii. 92.

Voltaire.
Hist. de Chas.
XII. Liv.
4 me.

Alison xi.
139 et seq.

The hero of Sweden stifled every complaint by sharing the fare, enduring the hardships, and facing the dangers of the meanest soldier in his army, and, animated by this example, the troops marched on undaunted. "In the month of December 1709, the thermometer fell to 20° below Zero of Fahrenheit, and 2,000 men almost all destitute of any adequate clothing, perished in a few days."* "Ce fut dans une de ces marches que deux milles hommes tombèrent morts de froid sous ses yeux. Les cavaliers n'avaient plus de bottes; les fantassins étaient sans souliers et presque sans habits; ils étaient réduits à se faire des chaussures de peaux de bêtes—souvent ils manquaient de pain Cette armée, auparavant si florissante, était réduite à 24,000 hommes prêts à mourir de faim." The remarkable parallel between the sufferings of the Swedish army in 1709, and that of Napoleon in 1812, in the same climate, and under the same circumstances, have called forth the observations of the historian:—"Exhausted by fatigue, or pierced by cold, they sank by thousands on the roads clouds of ravens, like the birds which are only seen at sea when a shipwreck is at hand, issued from the forests, and hovered over the dying remains of the soldiers; while troops of dogs, driven to fury by suffering, howled in the rear, and often fell upon their victims before life was extinct Night came, but with it no diminution of the sufferings of the soldiers.

* Query—below the *freezing point* of Fahrenheit? The most severe cold experienced by the writer was in 1829, in Hanover, when the thermometer fell to 19° Reaumur, or 12° below Zero of Fahrenheit, and sir Archibald Alison describes 4° below Zero in Scotland in Feb. 1838, as something intense.—See Alison xi, 141, note. On the occasion referred to in Hanover, the breath froze on the moustache; the writer was frost bitten in the feet while sitting in the theatre, and subsequently the house was closed—an unusual occurrence in that agreeable capital, the fact being thus notified to the public by hand bills:—"Theater Nachricht, Wegen zu grosser kälte, bleibt das Theater Heute geschlossen, Hannover, den, 23d Januar, 1829." In the following year (1830) the thermometer at Hampstead, fell to 10° Fahrenheit, being 22° degrees below the freezing point; and on one particular day, namely, the 19th of January in the present year (1855), the thermometer in the neighbourhood of London indicated 18° or 19° below freezing—in both instances a very unusual degree of cold, in these latitudes.

Amidst the howling wilderness, the wearied men sought in vain for the shelter of a rock, the cover of a friendly habitation, or the warmth of a fire. The stems of the pine, charged with snow and hardened by frost, long resisted the flames lighted by the troops; and when, by great exertions, the fire was kindled, crowds of starving men prepared a miserable meal of rye, mixed with snow-water and horse-flesh. Sleep soon closed their eyelids, and for sixteen long hours the darkness was illumined by the light of the bivouacs. But numbers never awoke from their slumbers; and on the following day the sites of the watch fires were marked by circles of dead bodies, with their feet still resting on the extinguished piles."

With regard to provisions, the French certainly managed much better than the British during the Peninsular war. Living at the expense of the inhabitants of the country, or on food furnished by requisition of the magistrates of the several districts on the inhabitants generally, they found neither difficulty nor deficiency; the burthen was equally shared amongst the cultivators, or, if otherwise, the blame was imputed to their own magistrates; whereas the English, professing to pay for every thing, and employing their own contractors, were dependent on the exertions of individuals, and were frequently defrauded by them, as well as by the avarice of the proprietors. Again in 1810, before the lines of Torres Vedras, Massena maintained 60,000 men, and 20,000 horses for two months, where Wellington could not have maintained an English division, even with all the advantages of payment, and the favourable disposition of the inhabitants. This may, perhaps, be in a great measure attributed to their ignorance of the value of the receipts given in payment of provisions, &c., which they considered a mere imposition, and frequently sold them for one-tenth of the value. A "*Bon*," of the value of 100 dollars was often sold by a Spanish peasant to an English Commissary, for ten dollars!

The "requisition system," however, altogether failed to answer the same end during a campaign carried on in a

Jones's
sieges. i. 251,
252. note.

Allison. ix.
532.

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Alison. xi. 24.

severer climate, and less genial soil : Napoleon's maxim of making " War support War," although successful in his early Italian campaigns, as well as in Germany, the low countries, and Spain, failed completely in Russia, where no human habitations were to be seen for leagues, and no exertions could furnish subsistence. It was, therefore, found necessary to reduce the rations to one-half. Pillage was the consequence, and before a great part of the army had ever seen the enemy, it had already undergone enormous losses.

Discipline is that regulation, by which troops, under the most unfavorable circumstances, continue true to their duties; and their colours, in the execution of the orders given to them. It is that steadfastness, which no idea of near or certain death can shake ; it is that exalted presence of mind, which never loses selfpossession, and by which that solid arrangement, calmness and firmness, is produced, which makes it impossible to disorganize a body of troops.

It is that union of all moral force to a high pitch, to which the physical is subordinate. Yes : it is humane ;—it is fine ;—it is praiseworthy, when the general exerts himself for the happiness of the country whose misfortune it is to have become the theatre of war. It does honour to his heart. But when he attains this blessing only by the ruin, the execration of his army, this good heart is in danger of being called weak, and he neglects one of his first duties.

The general first appears when war has been determined on, and, consequently, is not to be averted. The blame of this war ; the misfortune of the people ; the desolation of the country, does not fall upon him ; he has not to answer for the plunder, disease, and suffering

of all kinds ; the vice and general consequences of war ; he enters on the scene of action as the most extreme means for the object of the state, and forms, with his army, a separate world.

He passes through a country, as cold, circumspect, and tranquil, as if it was as free from suffering as the very maps of the theatre of war. He spares the country merely to effect his object of obtaining assistance from it ; he rejoices, and his heart beats with delight, when he can unite with this high and predominating object, the welfare of the country ; but he destroys it, when a higher object predominates, and silently grieves. *Thus did Wellington in Portugal, and Rostopschin in Moscow.*

When lord Wellington fell back to the lines of Torres Vedras, after the battle of Busaco, followed by the enemy in great force, he adopted a plan for securing his own army and harassing his pursuers, which, however much to be lamented, on the score of humanity, was admirably conceived, as a military proceeding, entirely justified by the usages of war, and inseparable from its calamities. The crowds of men, women, and children, who in obedience to proclamation issued to the Portuguese inhabitants, abandoned their dwellings, and followed the fortunes of the British army, without scarcely a hope of being again restored to their homes, rendered the march most distressing to all who witnessed it. The old and the infirm, as well as the robust and young, carrying with them all their most valuable effects, covered the roads and fields in every direction, and often were the weary fugitives—unable to carry further the articles which they had endeavoured to save—forced to leave them on the way side, and then to struggle onward bereft of all their little property. This apparently harsh measure was adopted to increase the difficulties of the invading army, by depriving them of all the resources in their front ; and although its

*Elliott's life of
Wellington.
333.*

*Hist. K. G.
legion. i. 295,
296.*

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immediate effects were revolting to humanity, its ultimate consequences led to the evacuation of Portugal by the French, and, perhaps, saved that country from subjugation.

Alison. xi.
92, 93.

The sacrifices made by the Russians exceeded any thing in modern history: The governor, count Rostopschin, had already set the example of devotion by preparing the means of destruction for his country palace, to which he had set fire by applying the torch with his own hands, to his nuptial bed; and to the gates of the palace he affixed the following writing—"During eight years I have embellished this country house, and lived happily in it, in the bosom of my family. The inhabitants of this estate, to the number of 7,000, quit at your approach, in order that it may not be sullied by your presence. Frenchmen! at Moscow I have abandoned to you my two houses with their furniture worth half a million of rubles: here you will find nothing but ashes." The nobles determined to imitate the example of the Numantians, and destroy the city which they could no longer defend. The authorities carried with them the fire engines, and every thing capable of arresting a conflagration; and combustibles were disposed in the principal edifices to favour the progress of the flames. Rostopschin was the author of this sublime act of patriotic devotion.

The art of movement of cavalry in manœuvre consists:

- 1st. In the art of forming line from column.
- 2d. Moving the line in all directions.
- 3d. Re-forming the column from line.

FORMATION.

Troops arrive in column of march on the ground where an engagement is to take place, either with an enemy already in position, marching into position, or to be expected there. If, in the first place, the enemy's line of battle is already formed when the troops arrive, it must be reconnoitered under the protection of the

advanced guard, and the assailable points, or keys of the position, sought out. CHAP.
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It is important—nay necessary, that the general of cavalry should be present at these reconnoissances, in order to have a general view of the whole, when the commander-in-chief makes his dispositions for the battle.

In the formation of line, the general of cavalry must carefully distinguish, whether he be ordered to *attack* the opposite line immediately, or only to *paralyze* it.

In the first case, the intervals of the squadrons of the first line, must be but small (nine paces). His object should be to give strength to his line, and he is heedless of cannon fire.

In the second case, the intervals may be greater, his object being to give a deceptive appearance to his lines; and he keeps out of cannon shot.

If the attack is to be made immediately on the formation of the line, an endeavour should be made to surprise the enemy, and to outflank him; by which the victory is prepared, facilitated, and frequently gained, as Frederick the Great often proved.

Here the rapidity of cavalry appears to advantage. General Seidlitz determined the battle of Rosbach by the quick deployment of the cavalry under his orders.

In the second case, where the enemy is in march when we arrive on the field of battle, the commander has generally full power to form his line under favorable circumstances. In this case, the cavalry generally comes into action at the beginning of the battle, and, by rapid deployments, and still more rapid movements, gains the heights and plains lying in front: thus a favourable change is often effected even at the commencement of a battle.

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The commander of the cavalry should take care to deploy his lines in such a manner, as that they should form a curtain in front of the army, in rear of which he can perfect his order of battle undisturbed.

The third case, when the enemy is expected on the field, admits of the formation of the line with every advantage.

MOVEMENT OF THE LINE.

Front lines are divided into straight lines, oblique lines, and curved lines.

When our front line is parallel to that of the enemy, it is called a straight line. If the enemy be attacked with one wing of this straight line, while the other is refused, our visual line will form an angle with that of the enemy, and constitute an oblique line.

Curved lines are those where the enemy is attacked with both wings, while the centre, which is the curve of the bow string, is kept back, or when the centre is advanced, and the flank refused: this is the curve of the bow.

Movements in straight lines are the advance, the charge, and the retreat. The greatest possible simplicity is the principle of all movements.

Essai sur le
système mili-
taire de
Buonaparte.
i. 434.

This principle was acknowledged so far back as the time of Gustavus Adolphus, but has not yet been acted on by modern tacticians. "*Simplicity*," says Grimouard, "in the construction of every military evolution, and rapidity in its execution were justly considered by this consummate general (Gustavus) as constituting the most important principles of tactics;" and if we enquire into the nature of the movements and evolutions which have preceded the actual charge of cavalry, we shall find that they have invariably been of the most simple character.

In the advance in line, equality of pace, closeness, steadiness and silence are indispensable conditions. A line of troops thus marching, still and composed through the midst of death and destruction, frequently beneath a shower of balls, heedless of those falling near and around them;—the moans of their wounded, dying, or mangled comrades; and inspiring awe, contrasts wonderfully with the thunder of the artillery, and the heaps of the slain.

The march in line, thus conducted, is the most requiring result of military steadiness and discipline.

The charge is the most powerful movement of a line of cavalry.

Its success depends upon rapidity, justly calculated, and progressively increased, united with the most perfect dressing.

The longer is the charging line, the less should this movement be hurried. The quicker the pace, the more likelihood is there of solidity and order being lost.

A charging line commences the *trot* about three hundred paces from the enemy, the leader previously giving the word of command—"the line will attack! guard lances, or carry swords!"—which gives force to the charge.

It shews composure, when the weapons of attack are kept quiet until the charge. The artillery, also, does not load, nor the infantry make ready until the attack really begins.

A hundred paces from the enemy, the gallop is sounded; with good cavalry this is increased as they advance. Bravery and cowardice augment in proportion as the moment of attack approaches. The most valiant leader will generally be victorious, as we are to suppose that his example will be a law for the line that follows him.

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The retreat requires circumspection ; it is either made *en échiquier* or *en échelon*, in order that one part may be always opposed to the pursuit of the enemy, while the other retires.

It is important and decisive on a retreat, always to follow the principle of *never* allowing the enemy to charge ; but as soon as he shews a disposition of so doing, to anticipate his intentions, and suddenly and forcibly to surprise and charge him.

This is no easy task, and requires tried regiments and determined colonels. Delay should not be created by following up the enemy after the charge ; but as soon as it has succeeded, the retreat must be recommenced, in an orderly manner and without loss of time. If, on this occasion, the enemy were to be followed up, new lines would be met with, and our army destroyed.

The object of a charge during a retreat, is only to gain time for the execution of it, and to create respect in the enemy.

The following details may serve to illustrate this principle, as well as further practically to shew the advantages of manœuvring in "rank entire :"* On the retreat of sir John Moore's army to Corunna, in 1808, and after the combat of Benavente, December 29, the English cavalry had been withdrawn, and the third hussars of the king's German legion, numbering about 220 horses, formed the rear-guard of the army. On the 30th December they reached Palacios, leaving a picquet of 22 horses at Villabrazura. Lieutenant Heise was entrusted with the command of this picquet, and placing a non-commissioned officer and six men in front of the place,

See ante.
p. 20.

Hist.
K. G. legion.
i. 167, et seq.

* The merits of this system have been admirably laid down in a pamphlet by colonel Kinloch, formerly of the 2d life guards, who organised and commanded the 1st, or "Reyna Isabel," regiment of lancers of the British legion in 1835-36,—see appendix B.

he took post with the remainder behind a small rivulet which ran through it. During the night of the 30th he was not disturbed, but scarce had day broke on the following morning and the picquet were about to fortify themselves with some hot soup which had just been prepared, when the advanced party came galloping over the bridge followed by the enemy in considerable force. The main body of the hussars was this day on the road to Astorga, and a long day's march from the rear guard. Thus out of the reach of immediate assistance lieutenant Heise was placed in a situation of extreme difficulty. Was he to charge, even with success, the weakness of his detachment would be exposed, and to retreat would be to bring upon him the whole force of the enemy; he was, therefore, obliged to proceed with extreme caution, and sending off a man, with an application for a reinforcement, he slowly retired before the approaching squadrons.

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Hist.
K. G. legion.
i. 167, et seq.

Luckily for his small force, a dense fog filled the atmosphere, rendering objects scarcely distinguishable at the distance of twenty paces. The French cavalry continued to advance, and the picquet to give way, and the skirmishers on both sides became engaged, but the enemy made no charge.

The skirmishing was thus kept up throughout the entire day, the enemy seeming to be satisfied with this mode of pursuit; at length towards dusk, they shewed more confidence, and began to press forward; and fortunately, at this moment, an officer and twenty-two men came to the aid of the hussars.

Lieutenant Heise now resolved to try the effect of shewing a bold front, and becoming the assailant. He accordingly spread out his little party *in a single rank*, and led them bravely forward at full gallop. The French drew back. The continued fog, added to the darkness of the night, prevented Heise from being able to distinguish more than the enemy's retiring skirmishers until he had arrived within six yards of their front, when two formidable squadrons broke upon his view! These halted to receive him, and challenged the threatened onset with a tremendous shout.

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It would have been folly for the small German detachment to have really charged the enemy, for those who might have chanced to escape from their superior force, must have taken flight; so, after shewing a bold front for a few seconds, Heise put his line about, and resumed his march at a steady trot. This *ruse* had the desired effect: the enemy did not venture to follow, and the little rear-guard joined the regiment at Tariadenzo, a village near Astorga, about 11 o'clock, having sustained no further injury than the loss of one horse which had fallen on the road.

When the duke of Wellington retreated from Quatre Bras, into the position of Waterloo, on the 17th June, 1815, the English life guards made a brilliant and successful charge on the French advanced guard, by which the foremost squadrons were completely overthrown, and checked in the pursuit.

Siborne. 169.
et seq.

This brilliant encounter took place in the narrow defile of Genappe, of which lord Anglesea availed himself for the purpose of checking the enemy's advance, so as to gain time for the orderly retreat of the allied army. The town of Genappe consists principally of houses lining the high road which ascends a ridge to the distance of six or seven hundred yards on the Brussels side; and here lord Anglesea posted the life guards, blues, and union heavy brigade, so as to cover the retreat of the British light cavalry, consisting of the 7th hussars and 23d dragoons, which formed the rear guard of the army. The household brigade was drawn up in column of half squadrons on the right of the high road, and the union brigade on the left, somewhat to the rear. The 7th hussars were in the rear of Genappe, and the 23d in support, about midway between the former regiment and the household brigade: one squadron of the 7th, under major Hodge, was posted between the main body of that regiment and the town.

Loud shouts now announced that the French had entered the place, and presently a few intoxicated horsemen galloped

out of the street, and dashed at speed into major Hodge's squadron. Soon the enemy's column shewed its head, led by a troop of lancers mounted on small horses. It halted at the outlet of the town, facing the British rear guard, and having its flanks protected by the houses. The street not being straight, and the rear of the column not being aware that the front had halted, continued to press forward until the whole mass became so jammed that it was impossible for the foremost ranks to go about; their apparent hesitation induced Lord Anglesea to order the 7th hussars to charge, and they rushed forward with the greatest intrepidity. The French, as on former occasions, *awaited the attack*, opposing to the hussars' sabres, a close, compact phalanx of lances, which, flanked by the houses, and backed by a solid mass of horsemen, presented a complete *chevaux de frise*; and hence the charge made no impression on the enemy. A spirited contest, however ensued, and the commanders of the leading squadrons on both sides were killed on the spot. By this time the French had brought their horse artillery to bear upon the British support, and several shot struck the main body of the 7th, upsetting men and horses, and causing great confusion. The lancers now advanced and threw the hussars upon their reserve, but here the 7th rallied, renewed the attack, and drove back the lancers. The latter, reinforced, also rallied and continued the combat, driving back the hussars, and thus the contest was prolonged with varying fortune on both sides, without any decisive result, until lord Anglesea, seeing the insufficiency of the hussars to compete with the lancers in their protected position, decided upon withdrawing the 7th, and charging with the 1st life guards. As soon as the hussars went about, the lancers followed them, but in the *mêlée* that ensued, lost quite as many men as the hussars, and when at length the latter disengaged themselves from the contest, the enemy did not attempt to follow them. So elated were the French with the result of this first encounter with the British cavalry, that they abandoned the secure cover to which

Siborne. 109,
et seq.

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VIII.Siborne. 189,
et seq.

they had been indebted for their temporary success, and advanced up the ascent with a confident front, when lord Anglesea seizing the advantage presented to him by their advance, brought up the life guards through the 23rd dragoons, and led by sir John Elley, (who began by cutting down two men, right and left), this powerful regiment rushed upon the foe. The French met the attack with firmness, but were unable to hold their ground, and were ridden down in such a manner, that the road was instantaneously covered with men and horses: the life guards then dashed into Genappe, and carried all before them, to the opposite end of the town.

The retreat requires the greatest intelligence: prudence and bravery must here be united more than in any other movement.

Movements in oblique lines are the *échelon manœuvres*. The *échelon*, in which one flank is refused, while the other is advanced, has been ever considered by the most talented leaders, as particularly advantageous for cavalry. With *échelons*, one can deceive and manœuvre for a long time, without materially changing the position, or losing or gaining ground. With single *échelons*, attacks can be made from line, according to circumstances. The visual line may be easily changed at discretion, consequently the flank of the enemy quickly gained.

Oblique lines or *échelon* movements unite the advantages of making front on all sides;—of quickly profiting by the weakness of the enemy;—of choosing the point and moment of attack, and of surprising the enemy without being exposed to a surprise: in fine, they can be as successfully employed in retreat as in attack.

The manœuvres of the French in the battle of Marengo, June 14th, 1800, are proofs of this, and these manœuvres are worthy of the greatest admiration.

Marshal Lanne's retrograde movement at Marengo was executed in *échelon* of squares, and, at first, conducted with admirable order and discipline; but gradually the retreat became disorderly. In vain Kellermann and Champeaux arrested the Imperial cavalry by repeated charges; they could not check the Hungarian infantry, which advanced steadily in pursuit, halting at every fifty paces, and pouring in destructive volleys, while the intervals between the regiments were filled up by a powerful artillery, which incessantly sent a storm of grape through the retreating masses; and gradually the squares broke. The immense plain of Marengo was covered with fugitives—the alarm spread to the rear of the army, and the fatal cry of "*tout est perdu*," "*saue qui peut*," was heard in the ranks. Kellermann's cuirassiers, however restored the battle. Gourgaud says that Lanne's corps occupied three hours in retiring three quarters of a league, entirely exposed to the grape shot of eighty pieces of cannon.

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Alison. v.
377.

Gourgaud. i.
296.

Curved lines are also united with *échelon* movements. The advance *en échelon*, from both flanks, forms the curve of the bow-string: the advance, *en échelon*, from the centre, forms the curve of the bow. Both are movements of attack.

Further: cavalry has often to change front, or to wheel. These changes of front, and especially those backward, are very important, because they are almost the only means of preservation against the threatened outflanking of the enemy.

The flanks are the weakest points of a line of cavalry, because it cannot, like infantry, be quickly formed *en potence*,* or, if it can, possesses then no security.

* Troops are ranged *en potence* by breaking a straight line, and throwing a certain portion of it forward or backward, for the purpose of securing that line. It may be derived either from *potence* a gibbet, or *potences* crutches.

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When infantry, after having been formed *en potence*, has its fire for protection, cavalry can expect nothing else than to be overthrown by the charge which *it waits to receive*.

The predominating principle of cavalry is *motion*—that of infantry *position*. A reciprocal attempt is therefore made by both sides, to gain the flanks, and to surround them; and he who succeeds in this attempt, generally gains the victory.

A change of front forwards on any division of the line, executed with rapidity, favours a surprise, as one part of the line is thrown upon the enemy's flank, just as a similar movement backwards is a security against any possible movement of the enemy.

In battle, *minutes* are decisive: to know and profit by these minutes is the *talent for commanding*.

MARCHING OFF.

After the favourable termination of an engagement, the march from the field of battle to pursue the enemy, is very simple.

Such a march is, however, difficult for a beaten army. There is no warlike operation so difficult as a retreat before a victorious enemy; and no operation offers a better opportunity for displaying the fertility of genius.

The retreat of Moreau before the archduke Charles in 1796, although severely censured by Napoleon, has been generally considered as an exhibition of great military talent, and it cannot be fairly denied that his passage through the Black Forest, and the dangerous defiles of the "valley of Hell" (Höllenthal) were enterprises of the most hazardous nature, eminently successful, and conducted with consummate ability. Not only did he pass these dangerous defiles without confusion or loss, but he

Montholon.
i. 40.

Alison. iv.
191.

debouched into the valley of the Rhine, more like the victor than the vanquished. Sir John Moore's retreat from Saldanha to Villa-franca in 1808, shewed great firmness, decision, and knowledge of tactics. Marshal Soult's, also, from Oporto in 1809, would have been highly creditable to his military abilities, if he had not suffered it to be disgraced by the most barbarous cruelties. His soldiers plundered, and murdered the inhabitants at their pleasure; many persons were found hanging from the trees by the way side, who had been put to death for no other reason than that they were not favourable to the invaders, and the line of his retreat might be traced by the smoke of villages burnt by his soldiers. It was in his retreats that Wellington so greatly surpassed Napoleon. "For my part," said the marquis Wellesley, "were I called upon to give my impartial testimony of the merits of your great general, I confess before heaven, I would not select his victories, brilliant as they were; I would go to the moments when difficulties pressed on him;—when he had but the choice of extremities;—when he was overhung by superior strength. It is to his retreats that I would go, for the proudest and most undoubted evidence of his ability."

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Southey. ii.
817.

Speech of
Marquis
Wellesley.
Dec. 1812.

One of the most remarkable retreats in modern times was that of the unfortunate duke of Brunswick-Oels, who fell in the battle of Quatre Bras, June 16, 1815. By an ungenerous exception in the armistice of Wagram, the auxiliary corps of the Austrian army were abandoned to their fate, and the duke of Brunswick found himself under the desperate alternative of contending with the armies of France, or submitting to the oppressor of his country, and the destroyer of his family. He was then in Bohemia, and without hesitation, took the noble resolve of marching his little force of about 1,500 men from the heart of that kingdom to the shores of the North sea; a distance of *five hundred miles*. He had 800 cavalry and 700 infantry; and first advanced upon Leipsic. After a slight skirmish with the weak garrison there, he proceeded to Halle, where

Hist. K. G.
legion. ii. 532.
Gesch. des
Braunsch-
weigischen
armée corps.

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VIII.Hist. K. G.
legion, ii. 339.

he arrived on the 27th July, 1813, and on the 30th reached Halberstadt. This place had been entered on the morning of the same day by a battalion of Westphalian infantry, which made a bold resistance, but eventually gave way, their colonel (Wellingrode) being taken prisoner. The duke now pressed on for Brunswick, where arriving on the 31st, the corps bivouaced outside the town, the gallant duke lying in his cloak, upon some straw on the ramparts of his own city! Little time, however, was afforded him for repose. His enemies were closing round him, on all sides. The Westphalian general Reubel was at Olof, with 4,000 men; general Gratien had put a division in march against him from Erfurth, and the Danish general Ewaldt had crossed the Elbe at Glückstadt, to prevent his passage of that river. The Duke engaged Reubel, at the village of Oelper, near Brunswick, on the 1st August, when a remarkable, and, perhaps, unparalleled action took place, the Westphalian corps of nearly 4,000 men, being defeated by the duke's little band of 1,500! This opened the only road by which these devoted soldiers could escape. Their chief, having given the enemy reason to suppose that he intended marching upon Celle, turned short towards Hanover, where he arrived on the 2d, and the same day went on to Nienburg. Here he crossed the Weser, breaking the bridge after him, and pressed on, down the left bank of the river, to Hoya, which he reached on the 4th. Meantime part of his corps made a demonstration upon Bremen, into which place the hussars entered on the 5th, and seized the gates, but left it on the following morning. The duke continued his march with the main body, through Oldenburg, and made a movement as if he intended to embark on the coast of east Friesland, but contrary to this expectation, he suddenly crossed the Hunte—seized all the merchant ships and river craft that he could find at Bremen,—impressed the necessary number of seamen, and, with the exception of the horses, embarked the whole of his corps, on the night of the 6th. In the morning he put to sea, under an English flag;—landed on the 8th at Heligoland,

and on the 11th sailed from thence for England, where all arrived in safety.

The sea alone had saved these devoted soldiers from capture or destruction; for Reubel reached Bremen the very day on which the duke left the river; and the enemy's advanced guard was engaged with the hussars that were left to cover the embarkation.

In 1815, the duke of Brunswick-Oels brought into the field eight battalions of infantry; one regiment of hussars; a squadron of lancers, and two batteries of artillery,—making together a corps of 7,000 men, with 16 pieces of cannon. The hussars were clothed in black uniforms, with light blue facings, and hence were sometimes called the “black hussars”: also the “death's head hussars,” from the ominous ornaments on their appointments—a skull and cross bones!

If *concentric* lines are favourable to an attack, *eccentric* lines are favourable to a retreat. The more *column*-roads that are found in rear of a line of battle, the more favourable is it for retreat. Divisions of pioneers, led by officers of the staff, march in front, to mark out and level the different lines of retreat. The baggage follows them, and that gang of modern times, which is in connection with it. Then follows the reserve ammunition, and the heavy artillery: a few squadrons of cavalry are required, to preserve the order of this immense train.

The pernicious effects of too numerous a baggage train, on a retreat, is always felt. Strict orders, and strict officers to execute these orders, are necessary in order to prevent dangerous stoppages. If, even in advances against the enemy, obstructions of defiles by the carriages are of common occurrence, how must it be on retreats, where, in general, a panic terror unnerves the spiritless gang in which poltroonery is found embodied. What cannot proceed, must be abandoned

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without mercy. If the field of battle be open, the cavalry covers the retreat of the army. Great warlike abilities on the part of the commander, and facility in manœuvring of regiments appear brilliant on such occasions—meet with reward, and are favourable to the acquirement of fame.

The nearer the time approaches for cavalry to commence its retreat, the more important is firmness: troops which, at that critical moment, lose their firmness, not only destroy others, but also themselves.

It has been already stated by what movements cavalry retreat over plains. If defiles are to be left behind, the line is broken quickly into regiments, as soon as the rest of the army has moved a certain distance, in order that it may retreat in column. This movement must be concealed from the enemy as much as possible, by doubtful manœuvres.

If we are placed with parallel lines—the worst of all—before a defile, the regiment should retire from both flanks; the breadth of the defile determines the breadth of the divisions, of which the column is to be formed. If, at this moment, the enemy presses on, as is to be expected, and it is believed that there is not sufficient time for the retreat of the whole, a charge is made with one part, in order to force the enemy back, while the other continues to gain the defile, and to pass through it: nay there are cases where one part is sacrificed, in order to save the other. Without cavalry a retreat is very difficult.

The intrepidity and steadiness of the British cavalry under lord Paget, on sir John Moore's retreat was conspicuous. The 18th dragoons were successful in six different attacks. Captain Jones ventured to charge 100 French dragoons, with

only 30 British, when fourteen of the enemy were killed, and six made prisoners. Colonel Leigh with two squadrons of the 10th hussars, attacked a strong detachment of the French advanced guard, on the 26th December, 1808, and routed them in a skilful and complete manner. He led one squadron up the hill, on the summit of which the enemy had halted, at a brisk pace, keeping the other in reserve, and on approaching the top, where the ground was rugged, reined in to relieve the horses, although exposed to the enemy's fire. He then charged with impetuosity and overthrew the opposing body, many of whom were killed and wounded, and more than 100 surrendered. Upon the retreat of lord Wellington after the battle of Busaco, (September 1810), the cavalry of the king's German legion gave renewed instances of their efficiency in the duties of rear guard. On the 1st October the outposts under captain Krauchenberg, of the 1st hussars, were attacked near Fornos, and had to sustain a long skirmish, in order to admit of the rest of the cavalry getting through a defile, which led from the place into a wide plain that opened on the Mondego. Several men fell and Krauchenberg was wounded. Arrived in the plain, the German hussars were taken up by three regiments of English cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery, which were there drawn out, but without any intention of making a stand; and after a few effective cannon shots were fired into the enemy's advance, as it defiled from the village, the British cavalry and guns resumed their retreat, and for some hours during the day were suffered to proceed unmolested. They retired, however, much too leisurely, and the rear guard became, consequently, engaged in a serious skirmish at the passage of the Mondego. This river was to be crossed by a ford below Coimbra, from whence the road led through a defile of nearly three miles in length; and the head of the British column had scarcely entered this defile, when the French cavalry rushed towards the ford, in considerable force, and swarmed in front and flank of the German hussars, who brought up the rear of the column. Infantry were also seen running up in their rear.

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James
Moore's nar-
rative.

Hist. K. G.
legion. i. 293,
294.

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Seeing that the safety of the column depended upon a stand being made here, colonel von Arentsschildt, who commanded the hussars, sent two squadrons across the river, and posted them in front of the defile, keeping the remaining two squadrons of the regiment on the right bank, to check the enemy's advance, and these had now to sustain the whole weight of the French cavalry, who rushed forward and endeavoured to cut them off from the ford. But the little rear guard maintained a bold front, and when the enemy's advanced horsemen plunged after them into the stream, they wheeled about, and stoutly opposed their pursuers. Several horses fell and the riders were drowned; but some of the hussars, dismounting on the opposite bank, poured in a sharp carbine fire upon the French, and covered the passage of the rear files. To meet these, the enemy also dismounted some men, and their fire proved most destructive, captain Krauchenberg and lieutenant Schauman, having been both wounded, the former severely, while twenty men and eighteen horses were killed, wounded, and taken. The hussars, however, held their ground until the French infantry came up, and then followed the column, whose safe retreat through the defile had been thus secured.

The details of this skirmish afford strong evidence in favor of the carbine in the hands of rear and advanced guards. How much more effective would it have been in the form of a short rifled revolver, or constructed on the principle of the Prussian breech-loading needle-gun? On the 16th September, captain Aly and lieutenant von der Decken, with one squadron of the same regiment attacked the enemy's rear guard, which attempted to debouch, in great force, from the village of Cortua, and notwithstanding immense superiority of numbers on the part of the French, the legion hussars drove them back, with great loss, and eventually prevented their advance.

Xenophon was greatly inconvenienced from the want of cavalry, on the retreat of the ten thousand Greeks. In consequence of the enemy being enabled to annoy

him with impunity, and tiring his troops, thereby rendering his march difficult; and as, according to his own words, nothing was to be gained by a victory, while every thing might be lost by a defeat—he formed a troop of horse, by selecting the best of the officers' horses and bat-horses, placing on these the bravest men of his army.

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The last French bulletins of the war in Russia admit that the loss in cavalry, during the retreat from Moscow, prevented intelligence being obtained of the enemy's movements.

The Russians were, on the other hand, well provided with light horse, and to this circumstance, more than to their severe climate are the losses of the invading army to be mainly ascribed. "The more the memorable campaign of 1812 is studied," says Alison, "the more clearly it will appear, that this was the real cause of the destruction of the French army, and that it must have proved equally fatal to them, even though Moscow had not been burned, or the frosts of winter had never set in." The same want was experienced by Napoleon in 1813, when the movements of the allies were so admirably screened from the French, by their light cavalry, that although they bivouaced within two leagues of the French right, on the night before the battle of Lützen, their vicinity was not even suspected!

Alison. xi.
359.

Ibid.

CHAPTER IX.

ENGAGEMENT OF CAVALRY.

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The engagement is divided into two principal parts.

1st. The engagement in open line or attack of skirmishers.

2d. The engagement in close line, or the charge.

The formation of skirmishers is very important. Firing and hitting with the carbine on horseback, are most essential.

Firing, while the horse is in motion, is without effect, and should not be encouraged. The skirmisher should rather ride up to a certain distance, halt, and turn his horse to the right; then seizing his carbine at the butt-end, and bringing the sight and breech into line with the object, he should fire. Habit must bring him to a facility in skirmishing, so that holding his horse, taking aim, and firing, should be all, as it were, one movement.

In most armies too little attention is paid to the formation of skirmishers, which is, nevertheless, of great importance.

Instances are known, where skirmishers, in rough ground, have stolen upon the enemy on foot, leading their horses, and caused whole detachments to surrender.

In Alsace in 1815, the skirmishers of the Wirtemberg cavalry, by their effective fire at Nieder-Otterbach, near Weissenburg, caused six French squadrons to give way ; and a few days after, the crown prince of Wirtemberg took the town of Brumpt by dismounted skirmishers, who were opposed to infantry.

The mode of fighting of skirmishers does not allow of the line being very regularly preserved. They are formed in two ranks. In an open country we may allow fifteen paces between the ranks, and the same distance between files.

The skirmishers in the front rank are numbered 1, and those in the second rank 2. Numbers one and two conduct themselves as inseparable friends—as principal and second.

Skirmishers should not remain long in one position ; they should circle to the right after firing.

The word of command named “recall”—(*Appel*), is particularly intended for the skirmishers.

Battles creates passion—particularly fortunate battles. This passion increases according to the previous resistance.

Unintentionally, and without perceiving it, every man pursues his opponent when the enemy gives way ; he loses in this manner, the connexion with his regiment, and often atones for the imprudence by captivity or death.

If the enemy has any where prepared an ambush, all those who have thus dashed on, are lost.

The utility of skirmishers is principally to commence and support engagements—to cover advances and retreats—to fall upon the enemy during an attack, in flank and rear—to disperse on a march, in order to search the country right and left of the front of the

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army — to observe the enemy — pursue him — form advanced guards—rear guards—partisan corps, &c., &c., services which require bravery, presence of mind, understanding, cunning, activity, expertness in the use of the sword, and good horsemanship on the part of the men; together with durability, lightness, pliability, docility, and such like qualities, on the part of the horse.

If that attention were paid to skirmishers, which might be done;—if it were sought to bring them up with a truly warlike character, they would shine forth a model for the rest of the cavalry, and immortalize the fame of their arms.

Skirmishers should be the favorite men of a regiment—nursed up and tutored by ambition; and with them the boldest and most daring deeds might be executed.

The charge is the principal movement of cavalry.

In the middle ages, the cavalry, on both sides, approached each other to within thirty paces distance, and then fired with long pistols: At length one side wheeled about, and the other stood fast.

Even in the first Silesian war, the Imperial cavalry were accustomed to trot up to within about thirty paces of the enemy,—fire off pistols, and then seize their swords.

This tame recourse to the pistol is still exhibited by the modern Turkish cavalry, as the following detail of a skirmish near Bucharest in August last, will illustrate:—Nine squadrons of Turkish cavalry left Bucharest on the 16th August, 1854, under the orders of Sir Stephen Lakeman (Mazar Pacha) so distinguished as a partisan leader during the Caffre war;—and under him were colonel Symmons, major O'Reilly, lieutenant Gardino, of the Sardinian army, and captain Dymock of the 20th regiment. They made a forced march of 40 miles during the night of the 16th, and early on the following

morning reached Benzeo, a small town 24 leagues from Bucharest. Here they met with the Russian outposts, drove them in, and, in a few minutes, found themselves in front of about 600 Cossacks, thrown out in skirmishing order, in an immense line across the plain. O'Reilly advanced with one squadron, and a section commanded by Gardino; colonel Symmons led two squadrons in support, and sir Stephen Lakeman followed with a reserve of six squadrons. On closing up to the enemy, O'Reilly wheeled sharply off to the left, and on arriving at the extremity of the line, faced round, so as to take them in flank, intending to charge along the line, and sweep them off individually. However, they perceived his intention, and immediately the whole of their left wing came galloping over, at full speed, to the point of danger. Here they formed and halted to the number of three or four hundred. Major O'Reilly now called up Gardino with his section, and found he had 98 men, his supports being 1000 yards in the rear. Up to this period the Turkish cavalry had never charged during the whole course of the war, not from want of courage in the men, but from backwardness and inefficiency on the part of the officers. When a reconnoissance was made at Kalafat or elsewhere, it was usual to halt on coming within 500 yards of the enemy, and commence a harmless fire of carbines. The consequence was that neither men nor officers believed they would ever charge, and the privates always got their pistols ready, the moment they spied the Russian vedettes. Major O'Reilly now rode along his line, and found every man *with his lance slung, his sabre in the scabbard, and his pistol cocked!* an arrangement which the gallant major quickly reversed by making them return their pistols to the holsters and seize their lances. Still the Turks did not believe that their leader was really going to charge, and followed him steadily at a trot. In this manner O'Reilly advanced within twenty yards of the enemy, who remained perfectly motionless. He then gave the word "charge!" the Turks plied their spurs,—shouted Allah! Allah! and dashed manfully forward.

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At the same moment the Cossacks received a similar order, gave a shout, and six or seven charged. The rest fired their carbines, turned right about, and fled. It was now no longer a fight, but a race who should get first to the village. For 400 yards across the plain, each party used their spurs with unsparing activity, the Cossacks firing their carbines over their shoulders, and the Turks straining every nerve to get a thrust or a cut at the fugitives. But the Cossack horses were fresh, while the Turks were jaded by a long march and long fast. At the first moment Gardino, a fiery little Piedmontese—who carried off an Austrian standard at Novara—rode straight in amongst the Cossacks, their lances tearing his clothes right and left, and in the twinkling of an eye, he knocked three or four of them out of their saddles, two being killed on the spot. Both sides now entered the village where the Cossacks found themselves caught in a trap, for they became jammed together like sheep in a pen. Horses fell every moment, stopping all that were behind them, and the Turks coming close up, plied lance and sabre with unsparing vigour. Those who fell, were transfixed on the spot; and a Turkish lieutenant snatching a lance from the hands of a Cossack, ran it into the back of another!

The Turkish cavalry of the present day are evidently far inferior to their ancestors. The "irregular horse," says Mr. Layard, "is daily degenerating throughout the empire. The Turkish government have universally neglected a branch of their national armies, to which they owed most of their great victories, and, at one time, their superiority over all their neighbours. The abolition of the spahiliks and other military tenures, has of course contributed much to this result, and has led to the deterioration of that excellent breed of horses, which once distinguished the Ottoman light cavalry. No effort is now made by the government to keep up the race, and the scanty pay of the irregular troops is not sufficient to enable them to obtain even second rate animals. Everything has been sacrificed to the regular army, undoubtedly an essential element of

Layard, in
Morell,
Neighb. of
Russia. 278.

national defense ; but in a future war, the Turks will, probably, find reason to regret that they have altogether sacrificed to it the antient irregular horse."

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Frederick the Great, however, ordered his cavalry to attack the enemy impetuously, sword in hand, which was generally crowned with success, so that these horsemen, who, in his first war, were very middling, acquired, by this mode of attack, a superiority so great, that no cavalry of antient or modern times has ever equalled it.

Frederick was the creator of his *cavalry*, and not of his infantry, as has been generally supposed. He brought the cavalry to greater perfection than any other general. Before his time they never went out of a *trot*, and used fire arms more than their sabres.

Bulow. 240.

Seidlitz taught the cavalry of the king to perform infantry manœuvres. The battle of Rosbach affords an incontestible proof of the advantage of facility of manœuvring and bravery, united with the greatest possible rapidity, in an attack of cavalry.

The king not venturing, apparently, to engage so superior a force as the united French and Austrian armies, retreated with every symptom of precipitation, and took up a position behind heights, which concealed the greater part of his army. About noon on the 3d September, 1757, the enemy advanced against the Prussians, and endeavoured to turn their left flank. The enemy's column, at the head of which marched the cavalry, approached carelessly ; Seidlitz rushed suddenly forward with his cavalry, which had been concealed behind heights, and fell upon the enemy with such valour and rapidity, and with such success, that one of the most brilliant victories was then gained, and the name of *Rosbach* became proverbial.

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Tempelhoff.

The Prussians were certainly indebted for the victory at Rosbach to their gallant cavalry, and the able general who commanded it. The vigilance and decision of Seidlitz were admirable. When he had reached the bottom of the Janus hill, he perceived the enemy's cavalry, in column, between Reichertswerben and Lundstadt, and that he had already gained their flank. Without a moment's hesitation or delay he formed his troopers in two lines, and advanced, although the infantry had not yet come up. The enemy on discovering the Prussian cavalry, endeavoured to deploy, but before this could be accomplished, Seidlitz charged the columns in front and flank, and completely routed them. No battle during the war caused such a sensation as that of Rosbach. Friends and foes laughed at the generals of the combined armies ; and the Prince of Soubise was particularly an object of derision, as he had promised the king of France to send him Frederick as a prisoner.

There are four modes of attack :—

1. The charge in a straight line.
2. The charge in an oblique line.
3. The charge in echelon.
4. The charge in column.

The charge in line is peculiarly the mode of attack against cavalry : that in echelon and column against infantry.

The charge in a line parallel to the enemy's front, is always the safest with cavalry, animated with a good spirit, and vigorous mind. Cavalry can then exercise its whole force—*impetuosity*—unshackled by art.

The charge in an oblique line is particularly applicable when our line is smaller than that of the enemy, whose flank may be thus turned ; but an oblique line, which is not formed *en échelon*, requires great exertion to support it, and a separation is easily caused.

The charge *en échelon* possesses the important advantage of always keeping one part of the line in safety : the enemy can be thus harassed, while our own strength is preserved. This mode of attack, also, employed against infantry, disturbs the soldier by the frequency of the charge, and induces him to expend his ammunition.

The celebrated charge of Vivian's brigade at Waterloo, although intended to have been in *line*, became virtually a charge *en échelon* of squadrons, in consequence of the too rapid pace of the head of the column. See Siborne 359 ; also at the combat of Garcia Hernandez, see ante. p. 75.

The charge in column is to be employed against infantry formed in masses.

The charge in column, although sometimes, as at Moodkee, (1845) productive of brilliant results, is scarcely applicable to cavalry at all ; and the most successful charges, even against infantry, have always been made in line. In whatever manner the charge be executed, whether in line or echelon,—two ranks, or “rank entire,”—too much attention cannot be paid to rendering that movement perfect. Much of the time that is now spent in changing front, throwing back flanks, and other manœuvres, would be better applied to making regiments advance steadily in line. The advance of a regiment of cavalry in a line perpendicular to its front, with correct intervals, dressing, distance, and sufficient velocity, has ever been justly considered the most difficult movement it can be called upon to perform ; it is also the least practiced, and hence a perfect charge is so seldom seen. “This manœuvre,” says Marshal Saxe, “is to be performed with the utmost celerity ; cavalry must, therefore, be familiarized to it by constant exercise ; but it is above all things necessary that they should practice galloping large distances. A squadron that cannot charge 2,000 paces at full speed, without breaking, is unfit for service (?) It is the fundamental point, for after they have once been brought to that degree

Reveries on
the Art of
War. 56.

CHAP.
IX.Comm. sur
Montecuculi.
iii. 319.Lord de
Ros's In-
structions for
Squadron
Drill.

of perfection, they will be capable of any thing, and every other part of their duty will appear easy to them." Count Turpin gives an instance of the extraordinary degree of perfection to which the Prussian cavalry had arrived in performing this moment:—"J'ai vu," he relates, "en 1750, à Velau, en Prusse, cinquante escadrons, dont trente de dragons, et vingt de hussards, en bataille sur une seule ligne, et sans aucune intervalle; au premier commandement, cette ligne se met en mouvement au pas, ensuite au trot, de là au galop et à toutes jambes, sans aucun flottement; et au second commandement pour faire alte, cette ligne s'arrêta *sans que la tête d'un cheval passa l'autre!*" Such precision seems scarcely credible, and is certainly incompatible with the long charging distance insisted on by marshal Saxe. The system of instruction laid down by lord de Ros in his little work on the drill of the squadron, is, perhaps, the best that could be adopted to ensure a regular and effective charge. This practical and enlightened officer proposes that recruits should be first taught to make the advance in line *individually*; he places markers at certain distances to denote the change of pace, and the recruit puts his horse into the trot, canter, gallop, &c., as he arrives successively at these markers. Each man thus goes through, *singly*, and in turn, the whole operation of attack, after which the same movements are performed by files, threes, divisions, and half-squadrons; and lastly, the whole squadron advances to the charge. No better mode could be devised for ensuring the co-operation of every individual recruit; the errors in riding, dressing, distance, &c., are at once detected, and the faults usually committed by careless riders in the charge, are thus exposed.

The emperor Leo was of opinion that our formation should correspond with that of the enemy, whether deep or extended, but in general, the formations of a good military nation are extended, while those of a bad one are deep.

The diminution of depth in the formation of armies was the natural consequence of the invention of gunpowder, and the destructive effects of cannon fire. Amongst antient nations, battles were generally decided by bodily strength ; and there being then no concentric fire to apprehend, as in the present day, armies could assume with safety, that deep formation which overwhelmed the enemy with its tremendous impetus and weight. When Gustavus Adolphus departed from the dense formation, and drew up his men six deep, it was considered an innovation which nothing but his success could justify : Tilly and Wallenstein, his opponents, formed their infantry in solid masses, thirty deep. " At present," as Bulow says, " the whole affair is over when one army has turned the flank of the other." Deep formations are not, however, even now, so inappropriate as may be imagined—at least for infantry ; and absurd as the column of Folard may appear, it must be admitted that it was by the employment of analogous masses that Napoleon was so often successful. In the order of battle laid down by Jomini, as that possessing at the same time, the greatest degree of mobility and solidity, the corps destined for the attack is composed of two lines of battalions, each battalion being formed in column of grand divisions. " La troupe d'attaque, aussi bien que la réserve ne sauraient être mieux disposées qu' en *colonnes* d'attaque par le centre ; car la réserve, devant être prête à tomber sur l'ennemi au moment décisif, doit le faire avec force et vivacité, *c'est à dire, en colonnes.*" The duke of Wellington almost invariably attacked with deployed lines, but these were sometimes of deep formation. The body of British guards which routed the columns of the Imperial guard at Waterloo, was formed *four deep* ; and the final attack of the British infantry on that day was also in a line of the same depth.

Traité des
grandes
opérations
militaires.
iii. 357.

Infantry will never await the attack of cavalry in extended lines, but will either form in column or square.

A remarkable exception to this rule occurred at the

CHAP.
IX.Correspon-
dent of Times
Nov. 1854.Sketches of
campaigning
life, 88.

battle of Balaklava, in the Crimea, October, 25, 1854, where the 93rd highlanders, under colonel Ainslie and Sir Colin Campbell, received and repulsed two regiments of Russian hussars in line, and that in their ordinary formation of *two deep*. "I did not think it worth while," says Sir Colin Campbell "to form them even four deep," and how were these formidable horsemen received? "The Russians draw breath for a moment, and then in one grand line dash at the highlanders. The ground flies beneath their horses feet;—gathering speed at every stride they dash on towards that thin red streak capped with a line of steel. As the Russians come within 600 yards, down goes that line of steel in front, and out rings a rolling volley of Minié musquetry. The distance is too great—the Russians are not checked, but still sweep onwards with the whole force of horse and man, through the smoke, here and there knocked over by the shot of the batteries above. With breathless suspense every one awaits the bursting of the wave upon the line of Gaelic rock; but ere they come within 150 yards, another deadly volley flashes from the levelled rifle, and carries death and terror into the Russian squadrons. They wheel about—open files right and left, and fly back faster than they came." The deadly efficacy of the cylindro-conoidal-shot was here again strikingly exhibited. Another instance of infantry *in line* repulsing a charge of cavalry occurred in the Peninsula, when the *Chasseurs Britanniques* under lieutenant colonel (now general sir William) Eustace, received the charge in that formation. When the French horsemen had arrived within fifty yards of the bayonets, the chasseurs poured in a murderous volley, which swept their opponents ranks, and those left in their saddles, sought safety in flight.

When cavalry has occasion to attack infantry, formed in masses, it should be placed in open column of squadrons, with double intervals, and attack progressively. The leading squadron receives the whole and first fire. If it remains steady, and penetrates the line,

the second and third follow quickly after, in order to perfect the defeat! Should, on the other hand, the squadron give way, which commences the attack, as is generally to be expected, it must retire from both flanks, in order to leave the front of the second squadron clear: it should, however, re-form in rear of the column.

The second squadron should execute its charge with such rapidity, that the infantry cannot have sufficient time to re-load.

It may be presumed that infantry which believes the cavalry to be retiring from its fire, will be shaken when, while re-loading, it suddenly sees a new line of cavalry advancing through the smoke.

If it be intended to attack artillery, the attack should be first made against those troops which serve to cover the guns.

Guns that are separately posted must be attacked in open lines:—Skirmishers advance in a curve, the extremities of which move forward. They fire little, but advance, apparently without any design, until arrived under the fire of the guns, when they charge the battery with the rapidity of lightning,—cut down the artillery men, and make the drivers bring the guns to our side.

At the battle of Strasburg, 28th June, 1815, five guns were taken in this manner, by the skirmishers of the Wirtemberg cavalry.

Artillery is not nearly so formidable as is generally believed, and does not deserve the respect which troops often shew for it.

Napoleon and his enthusiastic admirer Jomini, who has founded his principles of tactics on the ex-emperor's successes, are at issue on this point. "Une longue experience," says the former "a prouvé que le feu de l'artillerie est beaucoup moins meurtrier dans un bataille qu' on ne le pense communément; les canonnades sont des complimens

Jomini. ii.
326.

CHAP.
IX.

Memoirs
dictated to
Moutholom.
i. 287, 288.

auxquels on répond sans peine," &c.* Napoleon, on the other hand, supports the character of the artillery with all the zeal of an old member of the corps. "As to pretending to rush upon the guns, and carry them with the bayonet, or pick off the gunners by musquetry, these are chimerical ideas.—In a general way, there is no infantry, however intrepid, that can, without artillery, march, with impunity, 500 or 600 toises, against 16 well-placed pieces of cannon, served by good gunners.—We know not a single instance in which 20 pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, were ever carried by the bayonet."

Napoleon's assertion, it will be observed, applies exclusively to the *bayonet*, which has not, perhaps, been so conspicuous in the capture of guns as the sabre or the lance. Assaye, Maharajpore and the Alma, however, furnish instances among many, of batteries taken exclusively by the bayonet, while Borodino, Eakmühl, Waterloo, Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, &c., shew the more numerous successes of *cavalry* over artillery. At Assaye, the Scindiahn artillery-men were bayoneted at their guns, the gallant assailants lying in files upon the ground, as they stood in their ranks; 97 pieces of cannon, and almost all the ammunition and stores of the enemy fell into the hands of the British; 2,000 Mahrattas were killed, and 6000 wounded, but with a loss to the British of more than a third of their whole force. "Never," says Southey, "was victory gained under so many disadvantages. Superior arms and discipline have often prevailed against as great a numerical difference, but it would be describing the least part of this day's glory, to say that the number of the enemy was five to one; they had disciplined troops in the field, under European officers, who more than doubled the British force; they had 100 pieces of cannon, which were served with fearful skill, and which the British, without the aid of artillery, *twice won with the bayonet*."

Alison. viii.
68, 69.

Lett. of private
Scully,
88th regt.

At Inkermann the "Connaught Rangers" took nine guns with the same incomparable weapon.

* Jomini qualifies these observations in the third edition of his work by admitting that cannonades have become "*plus sérieuses*."

At Moodkee and Ferozeshah, as subsequently at Aliwal, the triumph over artillery was obtained by cavalry. The brilliant conduct of the 3d dragoons on the two former occasions, has been related to the writer by an eye-witness, and the following is perhaps, the only correct statement that has yet appeared in print of the remarkable cavalry charges which then took place :—

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At mid-day, on the 10th December, 1845, the troops at Umballah, under the command of lord Gough, received orders to march to the frontier, in accordance with which the 3d light dragoons numbering 518 sabres, broke up from their cantonments at seven a.m. on the following morning, and proceeding along the Loodiana road, diverged to the left at Kunha-ke-Serai, taking the direction of Moodkee. Lieutenant-colonel White having been appointed to the command of the 1st brigade of cavalry, the command of the regiment devolved upon major Balders,* who was thus placed in the position so eagerly desired by a zealous cavalry officer—that of commanding a fine regiment in the important operations of actual war. The distance from Umballah to the fort and village of Moodkee is 151 miles, which was accomplished by forced marches† on the 18th, when the regiment proceeded to take up the ground which had been marked out for it on the right of the village; but scarce had the horses been cleaned and fed, when about three p.m., it was notified that the Sikhs were advancing in force.

Narrative of
an eye-wit-
ness, MSS.
Lord Gough's
despatch.

* Now Colonel and C.B.

1845.	Miles.
† December 11. Pombu river.....	12
„ 12. Petarsee.....	18
„ 13. Kunha-ke-Serai.....	20
„ 14. Isru	10
„ 15. Latalla	26
„ 16. Wudnee.....	30
„ 17. Patalla	14
„ 18. Moodkee	21
Total.....	151

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Narrative of
an eye-wit-
ness. MSS.
Lord Gough's
despatch.

The 1st squadron, under captain Hale was immediately mounted and accompanied the commander-in-chief to the front. The remainder of the regiment followed, and having advanced about two miles, was halted in close column opposite to a thick jungle, which covered the enemy's position. The Sikh artillery, numbering 40 guns, immediately opened upon the British dragoons. The first shot fell short, but quickly obtaining an accurate range, they sent the second right through the column, breaking a horse's leg. A staff officer now came up with the statement that the enemy were moving in force in the direction of the British camp, and the 3d dragoons were ordered to take ground to the right in open column of half-squadrons. Trotting on for about half a mile, the regiment came suddenly upon large masses of the enemy's cavalry and infantry, estimated at 15,000 of each arm, which were immediately attacked by the leading half-squadrons headed by brigadier White, and the regiment was ordered to form line to the front. But the ground was studded with clumps of jungle trees, rendering any connected movement impracticable, and notwithstanding the strenuous exertions of major Balders, a deployment could not be effected; yet pouring through and around the clumps, wherever openings presented themselves, the impetuous troopers struck terror into the opposing horse, which fled with precipitation, pursued by their brave assailants. One part of the regiment now followed up the attack on the Sikh cavalry, while the other charged the infantry. Captain Tritton, cutting down a standard bearer, wrested the banner from his grasp, and bore it off in triumph. The Sikh infantry sheltering themselves behind the clumps of jungle, poured a destructive fire upon the British horsemen, and a series of hand to hand encounters ensued, terminating in the total route of the enemy, who were followed up by their assailants until darkness put an end to the pursuit. At one moment several of the enemy's guns were in the possession of the British cavalry, and cornet Worley was killed in this daring attack on the artillery; but having no means of either spiking

the guns or carrying them off, the captors were unable to reap the fruits of their achievement.* About six p.m. the regiment was re-formed in rear of the right of the infantry, and returned to the camp about nine o'clock—remaining saddled during the whole of the night.

The loss of the 3d light dragoons in this brilliant action was three officers (captain Herries, lieutenant Newton, and cornet Worley), and 58 men killed; lieutenants Swinton, Cureton, and Fisher, and 32 men wounded.

On the 21st the army resumed its march, leaving all the tents standing, and having effected a junction with the force from Ferozapore, proceeded to attack the enemy's entrenched camp at Ferozeshah. This was a parallelogram of about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah, and armed with 100 guns, more than 40 of which were of battering calibre. The action commenced about 3. 30' p.m. The 3d light dragoons, now reduced to 428 sabres, were in line, in rear of the infantry, which advanced to the attack in echelon of regiments from the right, followed by the dragoons, and exposed to a heavy fire of artillery. About 4 p.m., the infantry having made no impression on the enemy, and a murderous fire having been kept up continuously from the Sikh guns, major Balders received an order to charge the batteries in his front. At this point the greatest resistance was presented: the leading British infantry had been directed to lie flat upon the ground, and masses of fire and smoke indicated the deadly encounter for which the cavalry were now destined; but mindful of Moodkee, the undaunted squadrons, having taken ground to the right, to clear the infantry in their front, advanced to the charge, in line, with all the regularity of a field day movement, and dashing onward with tremendous shouts—White and Balders boldly leading the way—the batteries were in a moment cleared and every gun was silenced! But the exploit did not end

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*Narrative of
an eye-wit-
ness. MSS.
Lord Gough's
despatch.*

* The guns were removed by the Commissariat on the following day, having been left on the field by the enemy.

CHAP. here : although three officers and 53 men had been killed, and
 IX. brigadier White, major Balders, with five other officers and
 67 men were wounded, some squadrons charged completely
 through the enemy's camp, and rallying in front of the 16th
 native grenadiers, rode back in triumph—a brilliant sunset
 illuminating their return from the glorious scene of encounter.*

Lord Gough's
 despatch. Lord Gough describes this action as "one of the most
 memorable in the page of Indian history," and the results
 of the two engagements were the dislodgment from the left
 bank of the Sutlej, of 60,000 Sikhs, supported by 150 pieces
 of cannon, 91 of which remained in possession of the British.

Artillery can only be successfully applied against
 stationary bodies, for moving ones are difficult to hit.

Six-pounders take effect at from five to nine hundred
 paces. Cavalry in trot, moves six hundred paces in two
 minutes ; how uncertain, therefore, must these lines of fire
 become, in consequence of the continual motion ! A quick
 charging line of cavalry will suffer little from cannon fire.

"Vous m'avez donné un très beau spectacle," said
 Napoleon at the battle of Eckmühl, to the Bavarian
 general, who had taken a battery of thirty guns with his
 brigade of cavalry.

Cavalry should never begin a charge with *half inten-
 tion*, as if to try first whether the enemy will stand ;—
 that must be settled beforehand : to yield in open action
 never dishonours, but to advance with apparent bravery,
 and then to retire, faint hearted, when the enemy shews
 resolution, dishonours and disgraces for ever.

* Officers killed at Ferozeshah—lieutenants Codd, Ellis, and Knight-Bruce.
 Wounded—brigadier White, major Balders, and lieutenants Morgan, Archer-Burton,
 White, Rothwell, and Orme.

	Officers.	Men.
Total killed and wounded at Moodkee.....	6	90
Do. do. at Ferozeshah.....	10	120
Total.....	16	210

If a charge prove successful, no time for recollection should be given to the enemy. "Nothing is done so long as anything remains to be done," said Frederick.* The impression which a successful charge of cavalry makes on the enemy, must be quickly supported, in order to give a decisive turn to the battle.

If cavalry could observe the impression which its imposing appearance created on the enemy, and knew how to take advantage of it, at the right time, the instances of that arm determining battles would be more numerous.

It is the talent of conducting which here determines; for often enough regiments burn with the desire of attacking the enemy, but leaders destitute of military character, are at their head, and lose the valuable—the irrevocable moment—with empty considerations of *pro* and *con*.

The prince of Condé, at the age of twenty-two, beat the Spaniards at Rocroi, 19th of May, 1643, by the impetuosity with which he led the attack, at the head of his cavalry.

He commenced the battle, so that a corps of musketeers which was placed in ambuscade on his right flank, by don Francisco de Melos, the Spanish general, was cut down; upon which he attacked the cavalry of the left wing of the enemy, drove it upon the second line, and cut both to pieces.

While the prince sent a part of his victorious cavalry in pursuit of the flying enemy, and after he had collected

* This was an axiom long before the time of Frederick. "Nil actum reputans, si quid superasset agendum."—LUCAN.

"He reckoned not the past whilst aught remained,
Great to be done, or mighty to be gained."—ROWE.

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the squadrons of the second line, and wheeled them to the left, he attacked the enemy's infantry in its uncovered left flank. Several battalions had been already ridden down, when he heard that his left wing had been unfortunate, and was retiring in disorder ; with the rapidity of lightning he led his cavalry there, and in the most favourable moment, attacked the Spanish cavalry of the right wing, which had been thrown into disorder by a successful charge, liberated the prisoners, and put all to flight who escaped the sword. The Spanish infantry, deserted by their cavalry, formed into a deep column and retired. Several attacks of the French cavalry were received with the whole camp artillery and small arms, and beaten off. Finally, however, this old steady infantry yielded to the repeated attacks of the prince's cavalry, and twenty thousand men of the best infantry of that day, which, under Charles V., and Philip II., had made Europe tremble, was almost entirely destroyed by a body of cavalry exasperated by the heavy losses which it had sustained.

Histoire de
Condé. i. 145.

The circumstances which exasperated the French are thus related in the "*Histoire de Condé*:" The Spaniards being surrounded, several officers, convinced that there was no longer any hope of escaping, quitted their ranks, and expressed, by signs, their readiness to surrender. No sooner was the duke d' Enghien aware of their intention than he galloped towards them. Erroneously supposing that he was about to renew the attack, the Spaniards fired, but fortunately he escaped unhurt ; but this mistake, which they naturally attributed to premeditated treachery, so exasperated the French, that they spontaneously rushed upon the enemy, and slaughtered numbers before it was possible to restrain them. The loss must have been excessive, for a Spanish officer is stated to have said in reply to the enquiry

of a Frenchman as to the number of their infantry before the battle, "You have only to reckon the slain and the prisoners."

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The rapidity of cavalry often changes the fortune of a battle, if the commander of any of the divisions of troops that have not yet been engaged, preserves his presence of mind. At such moments everything depends upon falling *à tempo* on the enemy, while pursuing our squadrons in the intoxication of success.

These moments cannot be pointed out—they must be felt. A single squadron may, at critical moments, perform miracles.

At the battle of Medellin, on the Guadiana, which marshal Victor gained over the Spanish general Cuesta in 1809, the French were already retiring on all sides, when a captain, at the head of a squadron of hussars, attacked six Spanish squadrons, which were advancing rapidly in pursuit, and overthrew them; and general Lasalle, who commanded the cavalry of marshal Victor, took such advantage of this circumstance, that the most complete victory was gained by the French.

This was a remarkable instance of unaccountable panic on the part of troops, up to that moment triumphant. Cuesta had taken post at Medellin with 20,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 20 guns, drawn up in the form of a half moon, in a line about a league in breadth, a little to the south of the Guadiana. Victor advanced to the attack with 15,000 foot, and 3,000 horse. The right wing of the Spaniards made a brave resistance, and for two hours not only held the enemy in check, but sensibly gained ground. Encouraged by these appearances, Cuesta advanced his centre, which, also repulsed the enemy, and considering the victory secure, he ordered the cavalry to charge. But no sooner had they come into fire, than the whole body

Alison. ix.
402, 408.

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Jones's war
in Spain.
i. 196.

of horsemen, instead of charging, wheeled about, and fled, trampling their own victorious infantry under foot, and spreading disorder throughout the rear. The consequences were fatal. A great part of the troops, being new levies, took to flight. Still, however, the centre stood firm, and by a point blank discharge, repelled the first efforts of the French dragoons; but Victor, bringing up cannon, made such gaps in their ranks by volleys of grape, that the horsemen broke through, and the whole Spanish army fled, and were pursued with great slaughter—the total loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners being little short of 10,000 men, besides their whole artillery, while that of the French did not exceed one thousand. The most extraordinary feature in this reverse was, that the cavalry regiments, which thus disgraced themselves, had displayed both skill and courage during the retreat from the Tagus, and had been much distinguished in the affair near Miajadas.

Colonel Jones gives a somewhat different account of the Spanish cavalry in this unfortunate action, stating that, in the first instance, they distinguished themselves by boldness in the pursuit; but when the French, having arrived at a favorable point, faced about, the Spanish horsemen turned, and galloping past the infantry, infected them with a similar panic—one of the many illustrations of the value of a “bold front.”

When St. Louis saw his brother, the earl of Anjou, in danger, at the battle of Massara, which began to wear an unfavourable appearance for him, he placed himself at the head of a squadron, rushed upon the Turks—overthrew all that were opposed to him—rescued his brother from the surrounding enemy—instilled new courage into his troops by this act of heroism, and restored the battle.

The valorous Henry IV. attacked the cavalry of the enemy at Contras, with two squadrons, before which thirty noblemen volunteers, armed with lances, had placed

themselves as a vanguard—overthrew his adversary, and afterwards, in order to derive advantage from the impression which this heroism had made upon the enemy, attacked the infantry with success.

There is an essential advantage—an endless strength in the attack. “In the soul of man,” says Cæsar, when he blames Pompey for having waited for him at the battle of Pharsalia, “exists a certain natural fire and impetuosity which kindles and increases by motion : of this the general must avail himself.”

Cæsar was so convinced of the advantage of attack, that he boldly left his entrenchments, and as soon as he was pressed, passed from the defensive to the attack, which always had a favourable result.

The most renowned generals of all ages have acted on the same principles. Frederick expresses himself clearly on this subject, in his instructions to the generals of his army. “I allow,” he says, “’tis true, that the Prussian troops as well as others, should occupy advantageous positions, in order to benefit by the artillery ; but they must quickly leave these positions, and advance boldly towards the enemy, as soon as he really attacks ; thus, instead of attacking, the enemy is himself attacked, and his entire project defeated. The strength of our troops consists in the attack, and we should act unwisely not to employ this circumstance to our advantage.”

History shews us that battles are much more frequently gained by the party attacking than by those attacked.

The advantages of being the first to attack are well expressed by Jomini. After laying down as an axiom that the fundamental principle of all military combinations consists in making a combined effort, with the greatest force, upon the decisive point, he states that the first means of applying

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this maxim is to commence the attack. "Le general," says this author, "qui réussit à mettre cet avantage de son côté, est maître d'employer ses forces ou il juge convenable de les porter ; celui, au contraire, qui attend l'ennemi ne peut être maître d'aucune combinaison, puisqu'il subordonne ses mouvemens à ceux de son adversaire, et qu'il n'est plus à tems d'arrêter ceux-ci, lors qu'ils sont en pleine exécution. Le general qui prend l'initiative sait ce qu'il va faire ; il cache sa marche, surprend et accable une extrémité—une partie faible. Celui qui attend est battu sur une de ses parties, avant même qu'il soit informé de l'attaque."

By the attack, strength is elevated to power. Fortune smiles upon and favours the bold and courageous, and even when one is weaker than the enemy, the weakness is best concealed by bravery and confidence.

The advantages of the attack consist : 1st. In choosing the point and time of attack. 2d. In being able to form the column of attack, so as to ensure success ; or, 3d. To diminish the disadvantages of failure. The advantages of the party attacked consist : 1st. In choosing favourable positions. 2d. Strengthening those positions by art. 3d. In being able to draw the enemy into ambuscades.

The two first will not bear criticism.

A position is seldom found which nature and art render unassailable.

The famous Weissenburg lines were quickly and easily stormed. The entrenchments at Essling on the Danube, in 1809, were surrounded. The entrenchments at Borodino on the Moskwa, were taken and maintained. The famous Mont-martre has lost its importance.

And it may be added that the more modern Russian lines on the Alma, September 20, 1854, armed with field guns of unusually large calibre (24 and 32 pounders) proved no impediment to the impetuosity of British infantry, unaided

by cavalry, and having no artillery to compare, in weight of metal, power, and mobility, with that of the enemy.

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Gustavus Adolphus found two positions ; Wallenstein, Frederick, and Wellington, only one each, in which they could either not be attacked at all, or attacked without success, as for example, Wallenstein by Gustavus Adolphus at Nuremberg.

“ Lines and entrenchments,” says marshal Saxe, “ are works to which I am altogether averse, from a persuasion that the only good lines are those which nature has made ; and that the best retrenchments are, in other words, the best dispositions, and the best disciplined troops.” The battle of Malplaquet shewed the inefficiency of entrenchments even when well defended. The French were here secured by three successive lines ; and so hazardous an operation was the attack considered by the Dutch deputies, that the allied generals found much difficulty in overcoming their objections to a battle being risked. The resistance of the French troops, on this occasion, was the most determined that can be conceived. At one time both parties were obliged to give way, and retire under cover of their respective cavalry ; but the allies at length prevailed, and obtained possession of the enemy’s camp.

Reveries. vii.
137.

The third advantage of the attacked, namely, that of drawing the enemy into an ambuscade, is very uncertain.

Although Hannibal succeeded on a few occasions, in decoying his enemies into an ambuscade ; Sempronius on the Trebia, and Flaminius on the lake of Trasimenus, it was merely because those generals were destitute of military talent and experience. Such a feint can only succeed when we are assured of the indiscretion and incapacity of our adversary.

A general of ability is not to be enticed into an ambuscade ; and should he fall into an embarrassing

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situation, his fertile genius furnishes him with the means of extricating himself. Hannibal escaped the stratagem of Fabius, in the defile of Casilinum, by counter stratagem : nothing remained for him but to return the way which he had come, and which Fabius had blocked up ; the guide who had led him through this valley, instead of Casinum in Campania, he caused to be nailed on a cross.

Tit. Liv. Lib.
xxii. cap. xiii.

The infliction of death on the unfortunate guide was most unwarrantable ; for, according to Livy, the true cause of Hannibal being directed wrong, was his not pronouncing properly the name of the place to which he wished the guide should conduct him. This occasioned him to be led across the countries of Allifa, Callatia, and Cales ; and finally, the Carthaginian general found himself, to his astonishment, in the plains of Stella, where he soon discovered his error.

“Sed Punicum abhorrens os, ab Latinorum nominum prolatione, pro Casino Casilinum dux ut acciperet, fecit ; aversusque ab suo itinere, per Allifanum, Calatinumque, et Calenum agrum, in campum Stellatam descendit.”

During the night he had two thousand oxen driven to the top of a mountain ; between their horns bundles of dry wood were placed smeared with tar and ignited ; while the Romans, as Hannibal expected, hurried to this point, where they thought to find the whole Carthaginian army in march, and deserted the post which defended the entrance to the valley, Hannibal reached it undisturbed, and got through in safety.

In 1760, Frederick was shut up in his camp at Liegnitz by four corps of the enemy, who intended to attack him on the 15th of August. In the night of the 14th he left his camp ; surprised general Laudon, whom he defeated, and opened for his army the road to Breslau.

The situation of Frederick was here very critical: Daun, Laudon, and Lascy lined the right bank of the Katsbach and intercepted his communications with Breslau and Schweidnitz. He at first manœuvred to open them with the latter place, but failing in that, attempted to open them with Landshut, in which he was also unsuccessful. The king's army was without bread, and surrounded by forces three times their number; and in fact, when Frederick marched from Liegnitz, on the night of the 14th, it was more for the purpose of collecting provisions, and supporting himself on the fortress of Glogau, than to attack the Austrians. Napoleon finds great fault with Frederick's manœuvres about Liegnitz: "He had no base," says the Emperor, "no *point d'appui*; he was surrounded by forces of thrice his numbers: chance alone saved him; he was indebted to fortune alone, for his victory over Laudon, which extricated him from the perilous position in which he had placed himself; and in this instance was much more fortunate than prudent."

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Hist. Misc.

Napoleon to
Count Mont-
tholon.

Marshal Luxembourg being lulled into security by false intelligence, was surprised at Steinkirch by the prince of Orange; but, although his right wing had given way, his personal qualities, and the capability of manœuvring which his troops possessed, procured him the victory.

The surprise at Hochkirch also shews the effect of the personal qualities of the general, and the moral force of the troops.

"Zieten saved Frederick and his army at Hochkirch. The king had relied upon the information of an Austrian officer, with whom he was in league; but this traitor, having been discovered by Daun, was made, under the pain of death, to furnish Frederick with false intelligence. He accordingly wrote to say that the Austrian army would remain inactive for at least a week. Frederick was, therefore, completely lulled into security; and although a deserter informed him that the Austrians were marching to the attack, yet he

Thiebault.
Orig. Anec.
of Frederick
the Great.

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depended so much upon the first intelligence, that he went confidently to bed, and recommended all his generals to follow the example. Zieten, however, was not so easily satisfied: "Do you intend going to bed," said he to the other generals? "We were thinking of doing so," they replied; "the king seems certain that we have no danger to apprehend." "Well," said Zieten, "for my part, I shall instantly order all the horses of my regiment to be saddled, and all the men to hold themselves in readiness." This resolve influenced two of the other generals to imitate his conduct, and these three regiments saved the king and his army.

The actions at Krasnoi and the Beresina, November 1812, had trifling results.

Alison. xi.
163, 164.

The battle of Krasnoi, can scarcely be considered an action with trifling results (*geringe erfolge*). The corps of Davoust was almost totally destroyed; the Russians took about 6,000 prisoners, 45 pieces of cannon, 2 standards, and an immense quantity of baggage, including the baton of marshal Davoust, and part of the archives of Napoleon; and the general results of the battles on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, besides 112 pieces of cannon abandoned near Smolensko, were the capture of 26,000 prisoners, 300 officers, and 116 pieces of cannon taken on the field, and 10,000 killed or drowned, with the loss to the Russians of only 2,000 men. The grand army became thus reduced to 10,000 combatants, and 20,000 stragglers.

Ibid.
175, 176.

With regard to the passage of the Beresina, 28th Nov., 1812, it simply completed the ruin of the French army: 25 pieces of cannon, 16,000 prisoners, and above 12,000 dead were the result of this dreadful operation; the grand army no longer preserved the appearance of military order, but a confused mass of 45,000 men marched in detached groups along the road to Wilna. On the 30th, the frost set in with increased severity; the general disorder now reached its height; the artillery was gradually abandoned; the cavalry

melted away; and marshal Ney could, with difficulty, collect 3,000 men on foot, to form a rear guard, and protect the helpless multitude from the attacks of the Cossacks.

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Vandamme was a victim to his indiscretion at Culm.

The indiscretion at Culm was altogether on the side of Napoleon, who had charged Vandamme with the perilous mission of cutting off, or stopping the retreat of, an army of 100,000 men, with the small force of 30,000. The support of the young guard, 28,000 strong, which were stationed at Pirna within a few hours march, had been promised by the Emperor, and Vandammé naturally concluded that he would not be left unsupported in the perilous duty which had been allotted to him. But no re-inforcements arrived; the young guard were kept inactive at Pirna, and the fatal result to Napoleon of the two days' contest at Culm—August 29th and 30th, 1813—was not less than the loss of 18,000 men, while that of the allies did not exceed 5,000. Napoleon had evidently over-rated the effect of sending 30,000 men in rear of the enemy, which he thought, would paralyze the allies; and he was unwilling to bring the young guard into action, thinking that it might be required for his own projected march upon Berlin.

Alison. xii.
129. et seq.

The battle is that great act, where force, elevated to its greatest possible height, often produces effects, for which the most sanguine imagination could not have ventured to hope. These effects not unfrequently astonish as much him who has produced them, as him whom the preponderance of this power has crushed and annihilated.

The battle of Jena is such an action, but has been greatly exceeded by that of Waterloo!

The battles of Jena and Auerstadt prostrated, in a single day, the strength of the Prussian monarchy, and did that, in a few hours, which the combined force of Russia, Austria,

Alison. vii.
231. et seq.

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and France, had been unable to accomplish in the seven years' war. The loss of the Prussians in the two actions was nearly 20,000 killed and wounded, besides a nearly equal number of prisoners; 200 pieces of cannon, and 25 standards. The total loss of the French was 14,000. The disasters consequent on the retreat of the Prussians were only exceeded by those which followed the flight from Waterloo. Four generals had been killed or disabled by wounds, and the confused mass of fugitives was left without a leader. Thus, when morning dawned upon the scene of ruin, the soldiers from the three armies of Ruchel, Hohenloe, and the duke of Brunswick fled in different directions as accident or intelligence guided their steps.

The battle is a situation where man freed from humanity, excited by revenge, or the love of glory, according as the motives for war are well or ill founded—breathing only death and destruction—destroys every thing that is opposed to his blood-thirsty rage.

Often does the importance of the moment rise to such a height and consequence, that it shakes thrones—overturns kingdoms—renders millions of men unhappy, and disturbs and destroys the arts and sciences for many years.

CHAPTER X.

OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY IN COVERING THE POSITIONS
AND MOVEMENTS OF AN ARMY.

Cavalry has two different objects to attain. At one time, when the army is collected into a small space, to perform one of those great developments of power, which form epochs in war, the cavalry, united in masses, is to make these explosions the more terrific and destructive, by rushing on the enemy's line, at a moment when it has been already weakened and thinned by fire. At another time, when the army, collecting its forces, either in preparation for a great battle, or for recovery after a battle, finds itself dispersed in an extended space—the cavalry has to provide for the safety of the army.

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This has led to the distinction of heavy and light cavalry. The form of cavalry to which reference has been made in Chapter V, abolishes this difference, for each regiment—each squadron has *line* and *light* dragoons.

The author's plan of establishing one description of cavalry only, would give a most desirable simplicity to its organization, and is peculiarly applicable to the British service. We have now, including the household troops, 26 regiments of cavalry in the English army; suppose the whole of these completed to a war establishment of ten troops, containing

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80 horses per troop, and that from each troop, as has been before suggested,* 12 active, gallant, and intelligent men were selected as skirmishers, and armed with needle-carbines, the remainder being considered *cavalry of the line*, armed and accoutered as lancers, and carrying also repeating pistols. Each troop would then consist of 68 line cavalry, consequently each squadron of 68 files, or allowing for casualties 64 files. This number would admit of the squadrons being "told off" in 4 divisions of 16 files each, and 8 sub-divisions of 8 files each. The united force of the skirmishers to each regiment would thus be 120, and the whole number of that force about 3,000, the line cavalry of the army amounting to about 20,000. This would give a proportion of carbineers to *line* or lancer cavalry of about one seventh, a force of skirmishers, which, considering that England is never likely to be engaged in a continental war without the aid of foreign hussars or other light horse, would be amply sufficient for our army; and the mass of our powerful cavalry might be *reserved* for such occasions as are suited to the peculiar characteristics of British horse—daring, vigour, bodily strength, order, and above all, *velocity*.

Each forms an entire solid body, supported by its light horsemen, who hover about it, according to circumstances, and sometimes have to protect their own march, sometimes to reconnoitre that of the enemy.

Thus the commander of the cavalry of an army is not restricted but can freely employ the talent of his generals and colonels.

He appoints those to the command of the outposts, who possess that strength of constitution, and activity necessary thereto; as well as that cunning, prudence, fertility of resource, and clearness of comprehension, without which, no one is fitted for the command of an advanced guard.

* See ante, p. 133.

He keeps those with the reserve who distinguish themselves by that obstinate bravery, which leads them to consider reflection as a burthen.

The general-in-chief has an easy choice, as he has only to look to the intellectual power—the mind—for the form is the same in all regiments.

It has already been discussed in what manner cavalry in masses (reserve) united as a great whole, should be placed, move and fight, in order to maintain its place honorably in the order of battle ; and how re-animate its fame, on the day of battle itself, by great exploits and glorious deeds.

Cavalry must, therefore, be now exhibited in those operations where, at one time, it is called upon to protect the positions and movements of the army ; at another time, to observe the movements of the enemy.

If the army has taken up a position, the cavalry requires the assistance of the infantry. In the movements of the army, however, the cavalry acts alone.

Light divisions, as they are called, composed of infantry and cavalry, impede the march, without being able to assist each other, as, in such combinations, each arm is too weak in itself to operate powerfully ; for the same reason, also, neither can rely on being supported by the other : thus whole campaigns frequently pass over, without these *combined light divisions* acquiring any reputation.

If the different arms are too much and too anxiously intermixed, the confidence of each arm upon itself is undermined. Self-confidence is, however, in entire armies as in individuals, the moral force which leads to action, and ensures success.

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Officers of Peninsular experience will not be found to coincide with the author in depreciating the employment of divisions consisting of mixed arms of the service. Craufurd's celebrated light division, was ably supported by the 1st hussars of the king's German legion and a British battery of horse artillery, which often covered its movements under the most critical circumstances, and bore a conspicuous part in some of the most brilliant affairs of outposts which marked the operations of that distinguished corps.

Hist. K. G.
legion. i. 270,
et seq.

The light division, originally consisted of the 43d and 52d light infantry, and 95th riflemen, but was augmented in the month of March 1810, by the addition of two Portuguese light battalions, a battery of British horse artillery, and the 1st hussars of the king's German legion, and subsequently by a corps of Spaniards. The hussars were spread along the left bank of the Agueda, occupying a chain of posts which extended from Barba de Puerco to Fuente Guinaldo; the infantry were distributed in small parties, in the villages between Almeida and the lower Agueda, and the guns were stationed at Fort Conception.

In the beginning of June, marshal Ney, at the head of 15,000 men invested Ciudad Rodrigo, throwing two bridges over the Agueda. On the 8th, 4,000 French cavalry crossed the river, and general Craufurd's situation became critical. He, however, maintained his posts on the exposed plain, concentrating his troops at Gallegos and Espeja, and drawing in the hussar posts to Azava, thus encouraging the garrison of Rodrigo, and protecting the villages between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy's foraging parties.

In proportion as the siege of Rodrigo advanced, the enemy increased their pressure on the British outposts, and the hussars were engaged in constant skirmishing. They were also employed in escorting convoys to the fortress, and in consequence of the enormous mass of cavalry (at least 6,000 sabres) which was opposed to them, experienced little rest.

On the 21st, the French proceeded to forage, with a few squadrons, in front of the British picquets, but general Craufurd causing a gun to be fired, they withdrew. In about an hour afterwards, however, they returned with 15 squadrons and several regiments of infantry, and captain Bergmann of the hussars, with about 30 horses, was engaged for upwards of four hours, with double his own force. On the following day the batteries were opened against the fortress, and four regiments of cavalry, as many of infantry, and some guns advanced upon the picquets, and after a skirmish of several hours, drove them across the Azava. A general attack was now expected, but the enemy contented themselves with keeping possession of the Azava, and placing strong outposts along the left bank of the stream. On the 26th, two squadrons of the 16th light dragoons came to the relief of the German hussars, not one of whom, however, was general Craufurd willing to part with; but lord Wellington, who visited Gallegos on the same day, and saw how much the hussars wanted rest, expressly ordered that the relief should take place. One squadron, therefore, marched the same day to Minneal, and another the day following to Mazal de Chao. The 14th light dragoons were also brought up to Val de la Mula. The cavalry outposts were now doubled and the duty became very severe. Within the last few days the enemy had occupied the stream with strong detachments of infantry, and to a corporal's picquet of hussars, consisting of five or six horses, a hundred of the enemy were often opposed; but the vigilance of the small allied posts amply made up for their deficiency in number, and so much was the jealousy of the enemy excited by the alertness of the German cavalry, that a hundred doubloons were offered by the general who commanded their outposts, to any party that would cut down one of the small British picquets.

An attempt was soon made: on the night of the 29th, all the infantry of the light division, except two companies of the 95th riflemen, fell back to about four miles from

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Hist. K. G.
legion. I. 270.

Gallegos, leaving two squadrons of the 16th dragoons, one squadron of the 1st hussars of the legion, and two guns in that place, under the command of lieutenant colonel von Arentsschildt. The outlying picquet of the 16th was posted at the village of Marialva, about two miles in front of Gallegos, and this party the French attempted to surprise on the morning of the 4th July, when, nearly an hour before daybreak, it was attacked by so superior a force of the enemy's cavalry, that it was obliged to retire with precipitation upon Gallegos—the retiring picquet and pursuing squadrons appearing in front of the troops in that village at the same moment.

Here the high state of efficiency and alertness in which the veteran Arentsschildt ever kept his distinguished regiment was conspicuous. The reserve was found drawn out ready to take up the picquet; one squadron of the hussars under captain Krauchenberg was in front, having the 16th in line in its rear, and the guns were planted in the churchyard of the village.

Krauchenberg, seeing the importance of immediately checking the enemy's progress, led his squadron forward at a gallop to within fifteen paces of the French line, and then spreading it out into a chain of skirmishers, engaged in a sharp carbine fire with the advanced horsemen, upon whom the two guns also opened. This unexpected reception had the desired effect; the intended surprise was completely foiled, and daylight shewed nearly three regiments of French cavalry hesitating before the carbines of a little squadron of hussars!

Strict orders having been given by general Craufurd that no engagement should be entered into with a superior force of the enemy, the 16th dragoons retired, covered by Krauchenberg's hussars, and two guns of British horse artillery under lieutenant Alexander Macdonald. The village of Gallegos was defended by this little force for a considerable time. A party of dismounted men under Cordemann maintained a small bridge in front, while two other parties observed

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two fords on the flanks. One of these was at length passed by the enemy in considerable force, while the hussars were, at the same time, pressed hard in the village. Krauchenberg, therefore, ordered the guns to the rear, with directions to unlimber on the other side of the town, at a bridge which led from Gallegos to Alameda, and from whence the retreat of his squadron could be protected. This movement was well executed by Macdonald; and Krauchenberg, as soon as he saw that the guns were in position, led his squadron off at a gallop to gain the bridge. The enemy followed rapidly in column; but the English horses had the speed of the French, and Krauchenberg was enabled to draw up his squadron at the other side of the bridge before they reached it. The head of the enemy's column, however, came close after the rear skirmishers of the hussars, and the leading divisions had passed the bridge, when Krauchenberg, taking advantage of a little disorder which the hasty pursuit had caused in the enemy's ranks, suddenly charged the leading divisions. Fully three times the number of the hussars were at this moment, opposed to them; but the well timed attack was completely successful, and the column was driven back in disorder. Again the enemy advanced, and again the Germans charged and dispersed them, cutting down three officers and about fifteen men, while the loss to the hussars was only one horse killed and four men and two horses wounded: The Germans were eventually directed to retire on the infantry support, which had been posted by general Craufurd in a corn field in the rear; and this, opening a fire upon the French cavalry as they cautiously followed the hussars, caused them to give up the pursuit, leaving the squadron to continue its retreat unmolested.

Here we have one of many instances of the successful operation of part of a light division, composed of three arms of the service, cavalry, infantry, and artillery—a combination which seems only natural, and so far from weakening the confidence of each arm in its particular branch, is rather calculated to create a generous rivalry in the execution of

Hist. K. G.
legion. I. 270.
et seq.

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the part that may be allotted to each detachment by the commander of the division. The utility of the carbine was also here again exemplified ; but it should be stated that the carbine then, (as well as now), used by the Hanoverian hussars, was extremely light and handy, being formed of an independent carbine-butt attachable to the pistol (*Kolben-Pistole*), this small stock hanging by the swivel when not required for use.

Motion is the element of cavalry. It is therefore to be employed upon every description of ground so long as the army is in movement.

In 1692, the French court gave the command of an army of one hundred battalions and forty squadrons to de Catinat, with which he invaded Piedmont. To oppose this army Victor Amadeus had only eighteen battalions ; but sixty-four strong squadrons. After this prince had seen through the plan of operations of the French, he threw himself into the Alps, passed over the mountains, crossed the Durance, took Gap, Ambrun, &c., and by these means obliged his opponent to give up offensive operations.

The brilliant expedition of general Seidlitz, so graphically described by Archenholtz, against Gotha, strongly occupied with infantry and artillery, which he took with fifteen hundred men, is a proof that a brave leader may, even with cavalry, attempt the most hazardous enterprizes, when he knows how to regard circumstances, and take advantage of opportunities. The subsequent fame of Seidlitz was founded upon this exploit, which covered Soubise with derision.

The disposition which Seidlitz made of his little force at Gotha, evinced great ability. Having withdrawn to a short distance from the town, he placed the principal body of his cavalry in order of battle, and sent one regiment of dragoons

to a defile half a mile in his rear, *with orders to form an extended front in rank entire*. Meantime the allied troops entered the town, and the court being present, the French had an opportunity of displaying their wit and gallantry, in complimenting the ladies on their liberation from the "unpolished Prussians, who never quitted their pipes, and suffocated them with the smoke of tobacco." Seidlitz, having now received reinforcements, resolved to advance, and attempt to dislodge the enemy. He sent forward the hussars to attack the advanced posts, and followed with the regiment of dragoons in *rank entire*.

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The generals were about to sit down to table when news was brought that the enemy were in sight. The prince of Hildburghausen seeing this apparently grand line of cavalry, which Seidlitz had so skilfully arranged, imagined that the whole Prussian army was on its march to support him. Soubise was a commander of too much experience not to be convinced that hussars dare not attack infantry without support; and, therefore, having expressed his regret that the unmannerly conduct of the Prussians should deprive him of the agreeable society which he enjoyed, took a hasty leave, mounted his horse, and having made no dispositions for his army, gave the word "*sauve qui peut*," and galloped out of the town followed by his suite.

Post. works
of Frederick
the Great.
Tempelhoff's
7 years' war.

In the year 1793, the duke of York had, for a moment, the idea of marching to Paris with 150 squadrons.

Perhaps such a force, at one moment of that remarkable campaign, might have been able to effect this object, but the duke of York's authority had only reference to the British contingent, and was subordinate to that of prince Cobourg, who acted as generalissimo of the allied army. After the storming of the camp at Famars (May 1793), and the abandonment of Valenciennes by the republicans, it seems highly probable that by a little timely vigour, their army might have been destroyed—the war brought to a close, and all its fearful consequences averted; for Cobourg had 80,000 men in

Alison. iii.
43, 44.

CHAP.
X.

Alison. iii.
64, 65.

the field, while the French had only 50,000 ; but the period of such enterprises had not arrived, and the ordinary cautious routine was followed by the generalissimo. The subsequent division of their forces was the ruin of the allied army. After defeating the republicans in a pitched battle, within fifteen days march of Paris, and with a splendid army of 130,000 men, they separated their forces,—the British with 35,000 moving to besiege Dunkirk ; 45,000 Austrians sitting down before Quesnoy, and the rest scattered in detachments to preserve the communications.

General Czernitscheff, at the end of September 1813, executed a bold, and, in its results, brilliant operation against Cassel, with about two thousand horse and four light guns. Arrived before this residence, he attacked the infantry, (posted with six guns at Bettenhausen) with Cossacks and Izam's hussars, when they were either dispersed or made prisoners, and the guns taken.

The king of Westphalia took advantage of this moment to escape with two battalions of the guard, and one thousand horse. Czernitscheff, having taken the Leipsic gate by storm, allowed a free retreat to general Alix, but caused him to be accompanied by Cossacks for two miles.

The war of 1813 has exhibited brilliant and numerous deeds of partisan corps. The operations of a Scheitter, Thielmann, Mensdorf, Platow, Wallmoden, Tettenborn, Dörnberg, Lützow, &c., deserve to be studied by young officers.

The operations of Lützow's corps have a peculiar interest for the young officer, in consequence of their connexion with one of the most enthusiastic volunteers which the "war of freedom" produced—the poet and soldier, THEODORE KÖRNER. This corps, called also the "black chasseurs," and "*Lützow's Wilde Jagd*," was raised in Silesia by major Lützow, under the authority of the king of Prussia, and

young men of the most respectable families flocked eagerly to his standard, entering readily as private soldiers. The force consisted of a corps of riflemen, one-fourth of whom were mounted, four squadrons of cavalry, three battalions of infantry, and a few guns, and it was particularly intended to act as a partisan force in rear of the French army. Kœrner served in the mounted riflemen and became aide-de-camp to the commandant. He had been originally intended for a scientific profession, but a love of poetry and dramatic literature proved inseparable obstacles to that career, and, abandoning his studies, he rushed to the liberation of his fatherland with all the enthusiasm and patriotic feeling of an ardent poetical temperament. After describing the solemn administration of an oath by the pastor of Rogau, pledging the volunteers to conquer or die, and beseeching the blessing of God upon their labours, he says :—"It was a moment when the present thought of death kindled a flame in every eye, and awoke heroism in every heart. The oath, solemnly repeated by all, and sworn on the swords of the officers, and Luther's hymn '*Ein fester burg ist unser Gott,*' concluded the ceremony, upon which a thundering *vivat* burst from the congregation of champions for German freedom, while every blade leaped from its scabbard, and gleams of warlike light shone through the sanctuary. The hour was so much the more impressive, that most of us went out with the conviction that it was the last time we should ever meet." A most perfidious attack was made by the French upon Lützow's corps after the conclusion of the armistice between Napoleon and the allies in 1813, when, on the 14th June, under the pretence that the suspension of arms applied exclusively to the *regular* troops, this gallant band of volunteers, 500 strong, was attacked, when on their return to Silesia, by 3,000 men under Fournier, and nearly all destroyed or made prisoners. Kœrner, who with Lützow, had advanced to parley with the French general before the attack commenced, was cut down before he had time to draw his sword; the poet's friends instantly rushed in and rescued their beloved

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X.

Deutsche
Pandora, in
Alison, xi. 341.

Alison. xi.
409, 410.

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comrade, and Kœrner—owing to the kind aid of Doctor Windler of Leipsic, who sheltered him at the risk of his own life, eventually recovered; but on the 26th of the following August, he was struck down by a musquet-ball, in a skirmish between Gadebusch and Schwerin, and almost instantly expired.

Kœrner's glowing verses were repeated by thousands and tens of thousands of volunteers, as they marched to the place of assembly. His celebrated "Sword Song," was written and read to his companions on the morning of his death, and is admitted to be one of the most spirit stirring lyrics in any language, baffling the power of the most expert translator:—

SCHWERTLIED.

Du schwert an meiner Linken,
Was soll dein heit'res Blinken?
Schaust mich so freundlich an,
Hab' meine Freude dran
Hurrah!

"Mich trägt ein wackrer Reiter,
Drum blink' ich auch so heiter,
Bin freien Mannes Wehr;
Das freut dem Schwerte sehr."
Hurrah!

Ja gutes Schwert, frei bin ich,
Und liebe dich herzinnig,
Als wärest du mir getraut,
Als eine liebe Braut.
Hurrah!

"Dir hab' ich's ja ergeben
Mein liches Eisenleben.
Ach wären wir getraut!
Wann holst du deine Braut?"
Hurrah!

Zur Brautnacht's-Morgenröthe
Ruft festlich die Trompete;
Wenn die Kanonen schrei'n,
Hol' ich das Liebchen ein.
Hurrah!

"O seliges Umfängen!
Ich harre mit Verlangen.
Du Braut'gam hole mich,
Mein Kränzchen bleibt für dich."
Hurrah!

Was Klirrst du in der Scheide,
Du helle Eisenfreude,
So wild, so schlachtenfroh?
Mein Schwert, was Klirrst du so?
Hurrah!

"Wohl klirr ich in der Scheide:
Ich sehne mich zum Streite,
Recht wild and schlachtenfroh,
Drum Reiter klirr' ich so."
Hurrah!

Bleib' doch im engen Stübchen.
Was willst du hier' mein Liebchen?
Bleib' still im Kämmerlein,
Bleib', bald hol' ich dich ein.
Hurrah!

"Lass mich nicht lange warten!
O schöner Liebesgarten,
Voll Röselein blutigroth,
Und aufgeblühtem Tod."
Hurrah!

So komm denn aus der Scheide,
Du Reiters Augenweide,
Heraus, mein Schwert, heraus!
Führ' dich in's Vaterhaus.

Hurrah!

"Ach, herrlich ist's im Freien,
Im rüst'gen Hochzeitreihen,
Wie glänzt im Sonnenstrahl,
So bräutlich hell der stahl!"

Hurrah!

Wohlauf, ihr kecken Streiter,
Wohlauf, ihr deutschen Reiter!
Wird euch das Hertz nicht warm?
Nehmt's liebechen in den Arm,

Hurrah!

Erst that es an der Linken
Nur ganz verstohlen blinken;
Doch an die Rechte traut
Gott sichtbarlich die Braut.

Hurrah!

Drum drück't den liebeheissen
Bräutlichen Mund von Eisen
An eure Lippen fest.
Fluch! wer die Braut verlässt!

Hurrah!

Nun laßt das Liebechen singen,
Das helle Funken springen!
Der Hochzeitmorgen graut.—
Hurrah, du Eisenbraut!

Hurrah!

M. Saint-Marc Girardin has thus eloquently drawn the character of Kœrner:—

"It was his patriotism and enthusiasm that formed the genius of Kœrner. He was not a Tyrtæus of the closet, who composed warlike songs by his fire side; he was a soldier—a volunteer of the *black chasseurs*; the sword by his side—the rifle at his back, he enrolled himself to save his country—to punish her tyrants. Poet and soldier, his genius and his courage warmed with the fire of war, for all was poetry to him: the flash of the musquet was the spark of liberty; the blood which reddened the plains was the purple of Aurora—the Aurora of freedom!"

In England the memory of Kœrner will ever be associated with the beautiful elegiack lines of Felicia Hemans:—

ON THE DEATH DAY OF THEODORE KÖRNER.

A song for the death day of the brave,
A song of pride!
For him that went to a hero's grave
With the sword—his bride!

He went with his noble heart unworn,
And pure and high;
An eagle stooping from clouds of morn,
Only to die!

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He went with the lyre, whose lofty tone,
Beneath his hand,
Had thrill'd to the name of his God alone,
And his Fatherland.

And with all his glorious feelings yet
In their day-springs glow,
Like a southern stream that no frost hath met
To chain its flow !

A song for the death day of the brave,
A song of pride !
For him that went to a hero's grave
With the sword—his bride !

He hath left a voice in his trumpet lays,
To turn the flight,
And a spirit to shine thro' the after days,
As a watch-fire's light :

And a grief in his father's soul to rest
Midst all high thought,
And a memory unto his mother's breast
With healing fraught.

And a name and fame above the blight
Of earthly breath
Beautiful—beautiful and bright
In life and death !

A song for the death day of the brave,
A song of pride !
For him that went to a hero's grave
With the sword—his bride !

In order to secure an army in its position and movements, the advanced guard must also take up positions, move, and fight. We shall here refer only to the principal points, and in the following order :—

POSITION.

1. Camp.
2. Cantoning.
3. Field-Guard.

MOVEMENT.

1. Van-Guard.
2. Rear-Guard.
3. Patroles.

ACTION.*

1. By day.
2. By night.

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POSITION.

1. *Camp.*

The regiments composing the Van-guard, are encamped in a semi-circle before the visual line of the army—as much as possible behind natural obstacles, rivers, &c., beyond which the field-guards only are placed.

With these tactical conditions it should be sought to unite those which facilitate the supply of provisions: water for the horses must not be wanting.

In summer, corn fields or firm meadow ground, in the vicinity of a clear running stream, and high trees, which give shade, are the most agreeable and advantageous places for encampment, as they permit the quick formation of troops. In winter the vicinity of villages, mills, farm houses, &c., is to be preferred.

It is a bad practice to take up positions as the night is coming on, and when persevered in for an entire week, has the most destructive effects upon both men and horses.

You can no longer discern where you are, and often scarcely know where the enemy is. Wood, water, straw, forage, is frequently sought after in vain: the greatest disorders and excesses are, however, committed, when discontented troops like these find single houses or a village.

* *Gefecht*. This term is applied to the most unimportant description of engagement, and may be considered to express what we call *Combat* or *Affair*. The Germans have *Schlacht*, *Treffen*, and *Gefecht*. *Schlacht* is applied to a general action, *Treffen* to a particular action, or where a part of the army only is engaged, and *Gefecht* to a combat or affair of posts.

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If a general wishes to have order and discipline maintained also with regard to the inhabitants, he must bind himself to a regular time, and take up his camp at such an hour of the day as will admit of the provisions being cooked before dark. This was the custom in former times ; but, on the other hand, armies began their march at day-break.

Wellington is the only general of modern times who has never departed from the maintenance of his army, and support of their reputation for well-ordered regularity.

The retreat from Burgos in 1812, is the only exception that can be made to this well-merited eulogium, and the disorders and excesses which were then committed by the troops, met with the severe admonition of the commander-in-chief. "The army," said the duke, "has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented; it has suffered no hardships excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather, at a time when they were most severe. The necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops made such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. Yet from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Madrid, on the one hand, and Burgos on the other, the officers lost all command over the men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained, which ought never to have been incurred."

Wellington
to Officers
commanding
divisions and
brigades—in
Alison, x. 404,
note.

Engagements and battles naturally make exceptions.

2. CANTONMENTS.

Before a regiment or squadron has taken up its quarters in a place, the country must be reconnoitered; measures of safety, by the placing of picquets, sending

out patrols, &c., must be adopted—the alarm post appointed—the place divided into as many districts as there are squadrons—these districts numbered; and measures concerted with the local authorities for the support of the troops.

In 1809, on the evening of the battle of Eckmühl, two squadrons of dragoons were cut down because those precautions had been neglected.

Count Wittingerode was surprised by the duke of Brunswick, at Halberstadt, in consequence of the same neglect. The grand marshal had orders to march from Magdeburg to Hamburg, with a body of Westphalian infantry, to cut off the retreat of the duke; but was so little alarmed at the rumours of his Highness's vicinity, that he marched without the usual precaution of patrols and vedettes. His corps arrived at Halberstadt at the end of the second day's march, and immediately took up its quarters, very comfortably, in apparent security. Unluckily for the grand marshal he had to deal with no ordinary foe; the duke was well-informed of the force and situation of the enemy, and covering his march by the woods which ran along the Hartz mountains, he appeared in full force before Halberstadt, at about six o'clock of a fine summer's morning. The Westphalians were at roll call in foraging caps, and unarmed; the Brunswickers thundered on them in a moment; hundreds were sabred, and the whole arms and stores of the best appointed corps of the Westphalian army were taken. The grand marshal woke as from a dream, and found himself the prisoner of the sovereign whose retreat he came to cut off!

If there are guns, a certain suitable division should encamp with them.

Whether or not the saddles should be taken off during the day, depends on the vicinity of the enemy, and such circumstances as can only be judged of in war itself.

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3. FIELD-GUARDS.*

When troops occupy positions, guards are placed in advance for their safety. They are correctly placed, when, unseen by the enemy, they can observe every thing.

The field-guards plant picquets in their front; and finally vedettes (double mounted sentries) form a chain which must be so constructed that the cavalry shall be fully commanded by it, and that nothing can pass through unobserved.

It is self-evident that the principles which prevail at night are entirely different from those which prevail by day.

The first care of an officer commanding a field-guard consists in the precaution of not being surprised, which at night, and in stormy weather, requires the greatest activity.

Authentic reports are required of him; consequently a correct eye and judgment are indispensable to him.

It often happens, but it is a great fault, that the outposts see double, and take five hundred men for a thousand. A small brigade of cavalry, with a few field-pieces, observed at a distance by an unpracticed eye, often swells to a column of ten thousand men in march.

The officer who can be convicted a few times of such an error is not to be depended on. Danger must not appear greater than it is: courage should increase in proportion to the danger.

* There are three lines of outposts in continental armies:—Field-guard (*Feld-wache*) picquet, and outpost detachment (*Vorposten detachment*.) The first is the guard nearest to the enemy, and furnishes the vedettes and patrols; the second supports the first, and the third corresponds with our "in-lying picquet." The "field-guard" of the Germans is the "*grande garde*" of the French.

Such was the courage of David Gam, the celebrated Welsh captain, who, when sent by Henry V., to reconnoitre the French army before the battle of Agincourt, where their force was more than four times that of the English, reported only that, "there were enough to be killed, enough to be taken prisoners, and enough to run away."

A too vivid imagination on the part of an officer placed in charge of an outpost, not only leads him to "see double," but sometimes to metamorphose inanimate into animate substances, turning rocks or other features of the country, into armed men, and otherwise creating optical illusions. The agreeable author and experienced soldier who has lately added to our military works the lively volume entitled "Sketches of Campaigning Life," thus describes an amusing incident of this kind, of which he appears to have been an eye-witness:—

"One dark, windy night I was on advanced picquet, not far from the large central fort; the French sentries after dusk were pushed to within some fifty yards of ours; the orders were not to fire unless the enemy made a movement in advance; we habitually found them equally civil, and a tacit understanding seemed to exist, that we should not shoot one another unless absolutely necessary. An hour before daylight the general of the brigade visited my picquet; it was a hazy morning, and day-light broke slowly; a fog hung in the dells, and over the undulating ground in our front; there was an upright rock at some little distance in advance of the picquet, which looked in the uncertain light, like a French vedette with his long drab cloak; the general fell into the mistake, and thinking the presumed vedette had advanced too near, ordered me to fire. Knowing thoroughly the ground in my front, I ventured to assure him of his error, at which insinuation he was pleased to be angry, and peremptorily ordered me to obey. Of course my compliance was immediate; but the echo of my sentry's shot came back as flat a denial of the presence of an enemy as the sound of a bullet against a rock could well venture to

*Leaves from
the diary of
an officer of
the Guards.
27, 28.*

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express in contradiction to a brigadier. At this moment lord Wellington rode up ; he asked what had occasioned the firing ; the brigadier had an awkward excuse to make, and to avow his incorrectness of vision. Lord Wellington turning sharply round, asked him how old he was ; the brigadier replied "forty-four." "Ah !" said lord Wellington, "you will be a great soldier by the time you are as old as I am." The future duke at that time, was only forty-one.

To alarm the army unnecessarily is a crime that cannot be expiated. The true mean between precaution and confidence is more difficult to describe than to feel. To him who cannot *feel* this mean, it cannot be shewn.

The old customary instruction for vedettes, to fire, even by day, upon every one that approaches and does not give the parole, appears to require some explanation : at least it should be added thereto that when a vedette *clearly* recognises in the person approaching, *one of his own officers who is perfectly well known to him*, he is not to fire even should the officer be unfortunate enough to have forgotten the parole. In general, firing upon every single man by day must not be permitted, and it is absurd for a vedette to ride up to every poor peasant with an air as if his last hour was come.

MOVEMENT.

1. *Advanced-Guard.*

The advanced or van-guards, as well as the rear-guards, are for an army in march, the same as the picquets are for an army in position. The van-guard must move cautiously.

In Spain, in 1809, the tenth French regiment of *Chasseurs à Cheval*, which incautiously followed the enemy too precipitately, as advanced-guard, was destroyed by the Spanish cavalry, which had been placed behind a

village. The proud *Chasseurs à Cheval* of the imperial guard, under the command of Lefebvre Desnouettes, were, on account of a similar indiscretion, and to the delight of the French soldiers—who gladly wished these haughty fellows any misfortune—partly cut down, and partly driven back into the river which they had swam across.*

The advanced-guard must extend itself and form a line of skirmishers, in order to clear the country through which the line of march passes: Attention is to be paid to the time of the day, the nature of the country, and the weather during the movement.

By day, in clear weather, and in an open country, movements are made with greater security and rapidity than by night, in rainy or foggy weather, or in broken ground, through mountains, woods, &c.

The advanced-guard should leave nothing unattended to: in villages information must be demanded from gentlemen, priests, wood-rangers, magistrates, inn-keepers, &c.; and in the country, from shepherds, peasants, and every person that is met: from many answers a correct conclusion may be drawn.

If the advanced-guard has occasion to send in a report, the man must be sent with it, who has himself seen what is to be reported. This must particularly be observed in *verbal* reports, in order that the person who takes the report, may be questioned as to the smallest circumstances.

No part of the cavalry of the allied army in the Peninsular war was so effective both as advanced and rear-guard as the hussars of the king's German legion, and the history of that period is replete with incidents of their vigilance, enterprize, intelligence and gallantry. On the 20th March, 1811,

* See ante page 20 et seq.

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Hist. K. G.
Legion. i.
323, 324.

during the pursuit of Massena by lord Wellington, captain Aly's squadron of the 1st hussars formed the advanced-guard, and under the protection of a fog, made the extraordinary capture of 520 infantry, 1,200 sheep, 12 bullocks and 10 horses, losing only two men and one horse killed, and three horses wounded. On the 28th upwards of 100 prisoners were captured by the allied cavalry, to which were added, on the following day, 300 more; and after the battle of Sabugal, (April 3rd, 1811), the German hussars, principally under the same enterprising leader, captured four officers, ninety men and horses, and twenty-five mules, besides the entire baggage of marshal Soult, losing only two men and three horses in killed, wounded and missing.

Colonel
Grant's des-
patch. June
2, 1813.

The affair at Morales in 1813, under colonel (afterwards general sir Colquhoun) Grant, was also a brilliant operation of an advanced-guard, and is thus described by that gallant officer:—"The French cavalry appearing in considerable force near Morales, the 10th royal hussars were immediately brought forward, under the orders of major Roberts, who attacked the advanced squadrons of the enemy in the most gallant manner: their front line made a determined resistance, but was overpowered by the irresistible impetuosity of the 10th hussars, which being now supported by the 18th (the 15th being in reserve) reached their second line, and drove it with loss, to the heights, two miles in front of Morales."

General
Lumley to
lord Beres-
ford. May 26,
1811.

An important operation on the part of an advanced-guard occurred with the allied cavalry under general Lumley after the battle of Albuera, (May, 1811);—The French rear-guard had been driven by that officer from Usagre, which town he occupied on the night of the 24th, by placing the Spanish troops in front, with their *Tiradores*, or light infantry, well in advance towards the enemy, while the Portuguese and British cavalry, with four six pounders, stood in rear of the place—a small brook, hollow and deep ravine, and narrow defile being on the same side. About six o'clock on the morning of the 25th, it was reported that the enemy's cavalry were advancing in force, accompanied by

artillery and infantry; upon this general Lumley, ordered the 13th light dragoons, and colonel Otway's Portuguese brigade of cavalry, to cross the ravine to the left of the town, through the narrow fords and passes that had been previously reconnoitered; and general Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, in like manner, to the right, with orders to retire by the same passes if necessary: a heavy brigade of British cavalry (4th dragoons and 3d dragoon guards) was held in reserve behind the town.

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General
Lumley
to lord
Beresford.

Upon the nearer approach of the enemy, it became evident that they were advancing with the whole of their cavalry, and five or six eight pounders. This being ascertained, the allied troops were ordered to retire, which they did slowly and in excellent order, the Spaniards filing on the main road through the town. A smart cannonade now commenced, from the opposite heights, the superiority of numbers and weight of metal being decidedly in favour of the enemy; but the superior skill and aim of the British battery of only four six pounders under captain Lefebure was manifest. The enemy, however, shewed great confidence, and notwithstanding the fire from two British guns, which bore directly on the road, three of their chosen regiments (4th, 20th, and 26th,) dashed through the town, and formed rapidly on the flank of the 3d dragoon guards, and in front of the 4th dragoons, thus presenting two fronts. A simultaneous charge was now made by both the British regiments, which rushing forward with irresistible impetuosity, completely annihilated the opposing squadrons. General Lumley having forbidden the allied cavalry to enter the town, no pursuit took place, and several of the wounded escaped, but so great was the consternation produced by the British charge, that many of the enemy threw themselves off their horses, and fled across the brook and gardens. 29 horsemen were found dead upon the spot, and besides 78 prisoners, from 30 to 50 wounded were hurried off to the rear. On this occasion the French are supposed to have had in the field, 13 regiments of cavalry

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I.

numbering from 200 to 300 sabres each, which gave them an immense superiority over the allied force, and it is yet remarkable that the latter experienced little loss.

The rapidity with which sir Stapleton Cotton followed Soult, on his retreat after the fall of Badajos in 1812, precipitated the evacuation of Estremadura, by the French army. The brigades of generals le Marchant and Anson formed the advance of the British army on this occasion, and defeated the French rear-guard at Llerena, on the 11th April, with considerable loss. On the night of the 10th, a party of the 12th light dragoons under lieutenant (now major-general) Chatterton, drove before them the enemy's advanced picquet, which had endeavoured to secure itself in Villa Garcia by barricading the bridge, and on the following day, the whole French cavalry were defeated, and obliged to retire through Llerena: nearly 250 prisoners, including several officers, were taken in this combat.

2. REAR-GUARD.

To conduct the rear-guard well is one of the most difficult tasks; the force of cavalry consists in the charge, the results of which, in this moment, are very uncertain.

In defiles, the enemy pressing hard upon us, can only be kept back by bold and rapid attacks.

Such occasions often lead to the most brilliant exploits, in which officers and soldiers earn great fame by bravery and presence of mind.

In order to animate the courage of the troops and give the pursuing enemy a lesson, an army in retreat should, from time to time engage in small affairs.

On the 26th May, 1813, on the retreat from Görlitz to Schweidnitz, prince Blücher attacked the advanced-guard of the French army. While colonel Mutins retired, with the real rear-guard, over the plain behind Haynau,

to Steuditz, colonel Dolfs remained, with twenty squadrons, covered by Schellendorf.

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The burning of a windmill, at three o'clock in the afternoon, was the signal that the enemy was advancing, led by the division of Maison.

Colonel Dolfs rushed out so quickly from his ambuscade and took the enemy so much by surprise, that they had no time to form masses: all who did not gain Michelsdorf, by a rapid flight, were cut down or made prisoners, and eleven guns were taken. All this was the work of a quarter of an hour; colonel Dolfs,—who, according to Gneisenau, shewed, on this occasion, talent that rendered him worthy of being placed beside a Seidlitz,—was left dead in the midst of the enemy.

“This affair,” says Alison, “would have been still more decisive, but for the uncontrollable impatience of the Prussian dragoons, whose ardour made them break into a charge before the proper moment had arrived. As it was, however, it was one of the most brilliant cavalry actions which occurred during the war, and may justly be placed beside the splendid charge of the heavy German dragoons on the French infantry, on the 23d of July, in the preceding year, the day after the battle of Salamanca.” On this occasion the French dragoons, as at Garcia Hernandez, left the infantry to their fate, and these being in column, were not prepared to receive cavalry: the trophies were 400 killed and wounded, 400 prisoners, and 18 pieces of cannon; but from the want of horses only 12 guns could be brought off. Altogether, however, this combat cannot be placed on a par with that of Garcia Hernandez, where three *squadrons* only of the king's German legion dragoons, produced a greater discomfiture than the three Prussian *regiments* under Dolfs—breaking three squares, and capturing three battalions, amounting on the most moderate computation to 1,200 men.

Alison. xi.
397, 398.

See ante p. 75.

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On the 25th February, 1814, on the retreat of the grand allied army, from Troyes to Bar-sur-Aube, the crown-prince of Wirtemberg unexpectedly attacked the enemy, advancing from Vendœuvres, with two squadrons, by which they were driven back three miles.

Alison. xii.
576, 577, 578.

This was probably at the combat of Bar-sur-Aube, given by Alison as having taken place upon the 27th, when the corps of Wrede and Wittgenstein, numbering about 35,000 sabres and bayonets, were drawn up opposite to Bar-sur-Aube, on the road leading to Chaumont. Oudinot commanded the French, who did not exceed 17,000 men, yet made a gallant defence. They were skilfully posted across several ravines, extending from Bar towards the Aube, where the superiority of the attacking force could not be so severely felt, as the position was only accessible along the plateaus between the ravines. The allied general's (Wittgenstein's) plan was to attack the enemy in front, while the crown-prince of Wirtemberg, supported by Pahlen's cuirassiers, threatened their flank. The French, however, anticipated the attack by storming the heights in front of Ailleville, upon which Wittgenstein ordered up the corps of Gortschakoff, together with the cuirassiers. The latter were repulsed, but the Russian infantry regained the height. Upon this a general attack was made along the whole allied line; meantime Pahlen's horse were detached to threaten the enemy's communications, and Gortschakoff's troops became exposed to the furious charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers. These veterans, just returned from Spain, soon routed the Russian hussars, and threw the allied centre into such disorder, that Wittgenstein could only avert defeat by the concentration of his artillery: he then, ordered Pahlen to retrace his steps, and bring up his cavalry in support. Kellermann's squadrons now threw themselves on the Russian batteries with all the confidence inspired by their Peninsular achievements, but 400 horsemen were soon stretched upon the plain, and the rest drew back in disorder. At the

same time, Schwartzberg ordered two brigades of cavalry and one of infantry to support the centre; ordering Pahlen to resume his march. Shortly after, Wrede commenced a vigorous attack on Bar-sur-Aube, so that both of the enemy's flanks were menaced, and these movements compelled Oudinot to retire; but his troops made the most vigorous resistance, and the French effected their retreat without the loss of either guns or standards, their casualties, however, including 500 prisoners, amounting to 3,000 men. The loss of the allies was about 2,400, but they gained their object, and arrested a retreat, which might possibly have extended to the Rhine.

3. PATROLES.

The advanced-guard, whether stationary or in motion, covers the country of which it is in possession,—the horizon limiting its sphere of action.

But this is not sufficient for the security of an army. Therefore the advanced-guard sends out patrols, which search the country in different directions, in order to increase the security of the army by collecting intelligence beyond the limits of the horizon.

Hence it follows that fighting is no part of the business of these patrols. A patrol must move quickly, accustom himself to see quickly and to ask intelligibly, in order to be able to make a correct report.

Whenever practicable, a patrol should not return by the road he has taken in going out; he should avoid all inhabited places—follow the direction of the high roads, but at a distance, yet so as to have them within view.

Patrols must not be strong: from three to five fulfil every previous design. It is the object of the enemy not to be observed; this must, however, be done without his remarking it, and is only to be accomplished by a few

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men. Lloyd's observation on this subject is well founded when he assures us that the whole reconnoitering service of an army, may be performed by fifteen hundred men for an entire campaign.

A large party cannot march unobserved ; it runs the risk of being cut off : a few men can conceal themselves—can observe without being observed, and moreover, get off along by-ways.

Whoever can patrol well is master of a country, and superior to his adversary. The enemy has equal claim to the country that lies between both armies : each side has its patroles and spies.

The first hussars of the king's German legion were conspicuous for their efficiency in the important duty of patrolling, of which the following incidents, selected from numerous details of a similar kind, which stand attested by the officers of the regiment, in the archives of the Guelphic order, may be considered illustrative :—

Guelph.
Archiv. 117
1818,

In the month of October, 1812, serjeant LICHTS of the 1st hussars of the legion, formed one of a detachment, which under captain Cordemann, was directed to observe the army of marshal Soult, then advancing from Andalusia towards Madrid. This army marched in three columns, and captain Cordemann, placing himself in rear of the right column, gave Lichte orders to march cautiously with three hussars, between this and the centre column, until he was able to discover at what point the enemy crossed the Tagus. Being broad day, this duty was attended with great difficulty and risk. Lichte detached two of the men to his right, retaining the third ; but the former were soon discovered and driven off by the enemy's flank patroles. Lichte, however, succeeded in his object, and ascertained the route of the enemy, whose columns he followed for a considerable distance, but was eventually

discovered and surrounded by five chasseurs. Through these he cut his way, alone, receiving a wound in the hand, and brought back the required information. So gratified was lord Wellington with the intelligence and intrepidity of the gallant serjeant, that he proposed to make him an officer, which honor, however, Lichte declined, upon which his lordship presented him with a gratuity of 50 piasters.

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In July, 1810, a patrol of the 1st hussars was sent out in the neighbourhood of Pinhel to obtain information of the enemy. Some peasants who met the patrol, stated that the place was strongly occupied by the French. In order to ascertain their strength with as little loss as possible, the officer commanding the patrol called for two volunteers; hussar Bock offered to undertake the duty *alone*, and riding rapidly forward, drove in the French vedette, following close at his heels into the place. Both arrived at the same moment, in an open square, where a picquet of cavalry stood dismounted, and the neighbouring houses were occupied by infantry. Bock halted—fired both pistols at the two first men who attempted to mount—turned his horse round—received a volley from the infantry, and galloped off, thus effecting the object of ascertaining their strength. He reached his detachment without any injury than that sustained by his clothes from several balls by which they had been pierced.

Guelph.
Archiv. 303
1830.

In the year 1813, corporal HEUER of the 1st hussars was one of a flank patrol of eight men, who captured two French infantry soldiers, caught plundering in a village in front of their line. From these they learned that 12 more were about half a league in advance; six hussars immediately set off after them, and fell in with nine men, who were carrying away a quantity of plundered articles on mules. After a short resistance these were all taken. The remaining three (all non-commissioned officers) had already crossed a hill in front of the valley where the French army stood. Heuer pursued them *alone*,—cut off their retreat, and made all three

Guelph.
Archiv. 126
1819.

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prisoners. Four days afterwards he was again on patrol, under the command of an English officer. He took a French infantry soldier prisoner, and learned from him that five men were in the neighbourhood. Giving the prisoner up to the rest of the patrol, he sent three men to the right—rode himself to the left, and soon fell in with the five infantry whom he attacked before they had time to fire, and made prisoners. From these again he learned that twelve men more of the same party were about a quarter of a mile distant. He delivered his prisoners to the commander of the patrol, and requested a few men to support him. Without waiting for these, he rode forward, and came in sight of the twelve men, from whom however, he kept himself concealed. As they were all armed with musquets, he considered that it would have been an act of fool-hardiness, to make a direct attack, so suddenly shewing himself, he shouted out, and made a signal with his sword, as if calling to his comrades in the rear. The enemy immediately took flight, and Heuer, availing himself of the panic, dashed in amongst them, upon which they laid down their arms; and with the help of four men, who soon after joined him, he brought the whole back prisoners.

Guelph.
Archiv. 189
1819.

On the 4th April, 1814, hussar REUSCH formed one of a patrol, which had been detached from the squadron in the neighbourhood of Laverdac. The road lay through a wood, which was occupied by a French corps, and Reusch was sent forward, with another hussar to reconnoitre. He had ridden about a mile when suddenly a loud shout met his ear, and moving towards the sound, he found the baggage of the squadron surrounded by a strong force of the enemy, with whom the weak escort of only four men were vainly contending. Reusch instantly hurried to their assistance—cut one of the assailants from his horse, and made two prisoners; and the charge having been sounded in the enemy's rear at the same moment, they took to flight. It afterwards appeared that a serjeant and trumpeter of the hussars had accidentally arrived near the spot, and had hit upon this

expedient, by means of which 50 of the enemy were put to flight. Reusch was wounded by a sword cut in the arm.

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On the 13th March, 1811, during the pursuit of the French army under Massena, captain von dem Wisch of the 1st hussars was sent with 18 men on patrol towards Coimbra; corporal LANGE and two hussars were in advance, between Condeixa and Coimbra, when they perceived several fires, and Lange, having reported the circumstance to his officer, received directions to approach the spot with caution and ascertain the cause. As they approached, the enemy's vedette fired, but Lange pursued him to the picquet, making a shouting and gesticulation as if the whole squadron followed. Captain Wisch had, in the meantime, formed up the rest of his men, and, rapidly following his gallant corporal, attacked and overthrew the picquet, making the whole prisoners.

Guelph.
Archiv. 154.
1880.

One must be careful with spies, particularly in an enemy's country, lest they should be more faithful to the enemy than to us, and we should thus give our gold to traitors.

Mistrust—otherwise an odious feeling—is a virtue towards the inhabitants during war.

Young officers must early acquire a facility in *finding their station*. Whoever has not learned how to find his station in a country, will feel himself awkwardly situated when separated from the army: clear day is a fog to him—every wood a labyrinth. Perplexed and irresolute he always judges and calculates falsely. Incessantly applying to guides, by whom his march is exposed, and who often, unfriendly enough, deliver him over to the enemy, he blunders on in uncertainty.

He judges incorrectly of the directions which he receives; what is right, he considers left: his reports are generally incorrect and incomprehensible to his superiors.

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The mode of acquiring expertness in the art of finding our station, is to abstract a country, by means of the imagination, and from single parts, to bring the whole to remembrance.

The art of military drawing developes the art of finding our station. The draughtsman accustoms himself to recall entire situations to his mind by the skeleton of chosen fixed points, as is done in the military sketch book.

Facility in "finding our station" is only to be acquired by a knowledge of military drawing. This art as taught at the senior department of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, is perhaps, one of the most useful acquirements that an officer in the army can possess. It not only enables him to construct a military plan, but, from the continued and varied observation of ground, distant objects, roads, rivers, &c., which the practice necessarily involves, enables him, at once to fix upon the principal points and leading features of a country, and thus to form, as it were, a *mental map* of the whole. This acquirement, united with the short but practical course of mathematics, fortification, construction of field works, and other branches of military science taught at Sandhurst, are eminently calculated to form well educated officers, and the staff of our army in the Crimea would have presented a more favorable contrast to that of the French, had graduation at Sandhurst been made a necessary condition of those appointments. But patronage and nepotism are the bane of our army. *Distinction at the senior department has scarcely ever led to appointments on the staff.* A return has just been made to Parliament of officers who have received certificates in the senior department of the Royal Military College, and have been subsequently employed on the staff of the army during the last twenty years, and what is the result? Alas! but *one solitary name* figures in the list—Major EWART of the 93rd, and he was not appointed until

1854, probably *after* the agitation on the subject had sprung up, for the date of his certificate is 1845! It also appears, that out of 30 or 40 officers and cadets, who were induced, by the promises of the commander-in-chief, to leave the artillery and engineers and enter the line in 1826, *one only* has ever been employed on the staff—a single appointment in 20 years! One would almost imagine that scientific education and acquirements were considered by our authorities rather a bar to professional advancement than otherwise; and hence are the British army driven on the outbreak of such a contest as is now raging, to oppose scientific and well educated officers, with youths not only unacquainted with actual war, but having often to learn the rudiments of the most necessary field operations in presence of the enemy. Some of our general officers, when they embarked for the Peninsula, were ignorant of the nature of a ravelin and a counterscarp, and even the redoubted Picton is stated to have passed some days with an engineer officer, for the purpose of learning the rudiments of fortification! The defects of this family system are so palpable that it is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the subject. If purchase and patronage be the main elements of advancement in the British service—if the branches of military education taught at the senior department are of no value to an officer in the eyes of his superiors—if merit be an empty name and staff appointments are given to sons, cousins, and nephews without any reference to their professional attainments—and a Sandhurst certificate thus becomes mere waste parchment—why keep up the establishment at all? The senior department of the Royal Military College is supposed to have been founded for the formation of *staff officers*; but 40 years' experience has proved this expectation to be “a mockery, a delusion, and a snare,” and unless some practical consequences are made to result from its operations, it would be better to close the department altogether and save the students from the waste of time and money now caused by labours, which long experience has shewn them will terminate in mortification and disappointment.

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Lond. Exam.
Ap. 7, 1855.

Alison's
Mariborough.
ii. 427, 432,
438.

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ACTION.

1. *By day.*

Cavalry prevails in a free open country. The skirmisher on horseback has here so important an advantage over the skirmisher on foot, that the latter can make no stand against him. In broken ground the skirmishers must be dismounted and opposed to the enemy on foot, by which the equality of the fight is restored. Cavalry skirmishers will even continue to have the advantage on foot, so long as the combat is carried on with extended files. Less fatigued than the infantry skirmisher; unincumbered by a knapsack, he looks forward to joining the reserve after the engagement, and mounting his horse; and although the carbine does not carry quite so far as the musquet, it is only necessary to advance within range of the enemy, in order to be certain of doing him as much injury as he can do to us.*

The cavalry skirmisher has his sabre to oppose to the bayonet. On the 28th September, 1813, general Thielmann attacked Albrecht's large manufactory at Zeitz, (which was occupied by infantry,) with dismounted volunteer cavalry, at whose head was prince Biron de Courland. With the Cossacks were united Hungarians, Bohemians, and Prussians. After a short carbine fire, the building was stormed, sword in hand; many were cut down, and one colonel, fifty-five officers, and one thousand men made prisoners.

The Scotch infantry generally and confidently employ their long basket-handled sword instead of the bayonet. On the plains of Maida in Calabria, in the summer of 1806, when sir John Stuart with four thousand

* Even close proximity would be unnecessary if the cavalry were armed, as suggested, with needle-rifles, loaded at the breech, and having a range of 300 yards.

English, beat seven thousand French under Regnier, a Scotch infantry regiment successfully attacked the 4th regiment of *chasseurs à cheval* with swords in the right hand and musquets in the left.

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Although unable to substantiate by contemporary authority the remarkable statement made in the text of the mode of attack adopted by the highland infantry at the battle of Maida, it must be admitted that this battle, although now thrown into the shade, was yet one of the most brilliant victories that ever graced the British standard, and first made fully known to Napoleon the power of our infantry. On the memorable 4th July, 1806, 4,800 British foot-soldiers, supported by six pieces of light artillery, and eight mountain guns, but without a single squadron of cavalry, defeated 7,000 French infantry and 400 cavalry with a battery of horse artillery—the latter having the advantage of commanding ground, and being in possession of all the lines of communication. Regnier had been repulsed with loss, but being able to show a greater front than the British, he endeavoured to outflank their left with his cavalry, while his infantry threatened the front. To meet this disposition general Stuart threw back the British line on its left, and then firmly awaited the attack. At this critical moment, the two lines opened their fire, and the day was about to be decided by a general charge, when the 28th regiment, having been disembarked during the action, was brought up by colonel Ross to oppose the cavalry, and under the protection of some rough ground and broken trees opened so destructive a fire that the enemy turned and fled. The British line immediately advanced, and after a few ineffectual discharges from the French, their whole army fell into confusion and hurried from the field, leaving 700 dead, many wounded, and a general officer with about 1,000 men prisoners: The loss on the side of the British was only one officer and 44 men killed; 11 officers and 271 men wounded.

Hist. Mem.
of Battle of
Maida.*

* Attributed to the pen of the late general sir John Jones, Royal Engineers.

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The battle of Maida is said to be one of the few occasions on which *bayonets literally crossed*, but no very conclusive details have been published on this "vexed question," and there is reason to believe that such a conflict was confined to one particular part of the line, where the 1st French light infantry made a brave resistance.

If the advanced-guard, when prepared, meets with the enemy, it disposes itself according as the country is open or interrupted, and according as it has obtained information of the strength and intention of the enemy, or can ascertain anything by observation of his movements.

On such occasions it must not omit to take possession of the commanding heights.

If the advanced-guard unexpectedly meets with the enemy, perhaps in ambush, the leading divisions should rush upon him with resolution and impetuosity. By this, the surprise which the enemy had prepared for us, recoils upon himself: This plan more frequently succeeds than miscarries. It can be explained:—

An enemy remaining concealed, generally does not see the advance of his adversary, and consequently has no certain knowledge of his strength.

If then, the ambuscade be impetuously attacked, at the same moment that it intended attacking, amazement will take possession of the enemy. Besides, in retreat, the soldier easily loses his presence of mind—thinks more of his safety than his fame, and believes *his own* destruction more probable than that of the enemy.

2. BY NIGHT.

If an outlying picquet (field-guard) in position, or a van-guard in march, is attacked, the enemy must be impetuously rushed upon, without the least time been given him for consideration. The darkness of the night

will crown this operation with success: even the most resolute enemy will be surprised to find himself attacked when he intended attacking.

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Thirty horses would throw an entire column of attack into confusion: the head of the enemy's columns being mixed with our's, would increase and extend the disorder; the enemy astounded, would believe that his intended operation had failed and give up all as lost. Such conduct may, with perfect reason, be expected from every officer commanding an advanced-guard, on such occasions.

If it be thought that the enemy will be found equally brave, cool, circumspect, and resolute as we are;—is superior in force; and that the charge should fail, which is scarcely to be expected, and but rarely occurs, it is still always honorable to have exhibited the strength of our intentions by making the attempt.

The characteristic of bravery consists in never hesitating when honour and duty are at stake. The honour of an officer, in the situation mentioned, is truly at stake; and his duty commands him to attack the enemy with all the means in his power;—to beat him back, or at least to check his advance, in order that time may be gained to prepare for action.

The surprise which count Reille attempted upon the advanced guard of the allied army, at Las Rosas in Spain, on the 11th of August, 1812, was completely defeated by the prompt and gallant conduct of general d'Urban, and the heavy cavalry brigade of the king's German legion:—

General d'Urban's brigade consisted of three regiments of Portuguese cavalry, which, with the first light battalion of the king's German legion, and a British battery of horse-artillery, passed the Guadarama on the 9th of August, and on the following day, bivouacked at the Puente de Batamar. On the 11th they were joined by the heavy cavalry brigade

Hist. K. G.
legion. ii. 89,
et seq.

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Hist. K. G.
legion. ii. 90.

of the legion under colonel de Jonquières and the whole advanced on the road to Madrid. The cavalry soon fell in with the enemy's rear-guard, and a distant skirmish was kept up to the village of Las Rosas, from whence the enemy retired through Mahalajonda, towards Navel Carnero, on the right of the road to Madrid. They were followed by the allied cavalry and artillery to Mahalajonda, where the Portuguese brigade and four of the guns were halted, while the German dragoons were ordered back to Las Rosas, where also the light battalion had been halted.

The heavy cavalry brigade of the legion had not been unsaddled for several days, and were much in need of rest ; general d'Urban therefore, directed that they should take the present opportunity of obtaining some relief. The strong brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and the British guns in front, formed an advanced post fully sufficient to secure them from any sudden attack, and to provide still more effectually against a surprise, colonel de Jonquières obtained permission to place a picquet of 40 dragoons, under lieutenant Kuhls, in front of the Portuguese : the remaining two guns were posted on the road to Madrid.

Kuhls tracked the enemy for four miles on the road to Toledo, and charging boldly in front of a defile, killed and wounded several of their rear-guard, but about three o'clock in the afternoon, the French horsemen returned, re-inforced by a battalion of infantry and some guns, and the German picquet fell back upon that of the Portuguese, which stood in front of MAHALAJONDA. The enemy's leading squadrons came confidently forward, leaving the main body at a considerable distance, and d'Urban, seeing the favourable opportunity, which was thus afforded for attack, directed the Portuguese to charge. Led on boldly by their officers, they advanced in good order, and with every appearance of being determined to make a resolute assault ; but just at the moment when contact was to be expected, and before they had actually reached the opposing squadrons, they suddenly wheeled about, and abandoning their gallant officers, and leaving the British guns to their fate, fled in disorder

through Mahalajonda, and continuing their disgraceful flight, galloped back the whole way to Las Rosas.

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Kuhls vainly endeavoured to check the pursuing squadrons, and was twice wounded in the attempt, but the numbers were too unequal, and after the most intrepid conduct on the part of his detachment, he also fell back upon Las Rosas, cutting his way through the enemy's scattered horse. Meantime the rest of the German legion cavalry, little anticipating any demand upon their services, were quietly occupied with their stable duties in various parts of the village, many of them in their shirt sleeves. Kuhls had sent in several reports of the enemy's movements, but colonel de Jonquières, relying upon d'Urban's cavalry, and the orders which he had received, made no preparations to meet an attack, and the brigade was completely surprised. But the alarm was now sounded;—two companies of the light battalion, which stood in the lower part of the village, soon turned out;—the dragoons hastened to saddle, and every effort was made to receive the threatened onset. But the German troops were too dispersed to admit of any effective number being soon assembled, and although captains von Reitzenstein and Marschalck, with wonderful activity and presence of mind, brought together a few men of their squadrons, and bravely meeting the French horsemen, attempted to check their progress at the entrance of the village, they were overpowered by numbers; and the elated enemy, following up his successes at a rapid rate, crowded into the place, and appeared suddenly in an open square, which divided the upper from the lower part of the village. Here the main body of the first light battalion of the legion, together with the baggage of the whole detachment, was stationed, and the French riding wildly about, caused great confusion, took some prisoners and wounded seven men; but the companies quickly forming up, drove back the assailants. By this time the dragoons were all mounted, and quickly assembling in bodies of tens and twenties, according as they could be collected, rode boldly against the intruders, and drove them out of the village: the brigade was then formed,

Hist. K. G.
legion. ii. 90.

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and soon the two regiments appeared in their full strength on the road in front of Las Rosas.

Hist. K. G.
Legion. ii. 90.

The Portuguese cavalry now took courage, and came up on the left of the Germans, forming with them an oblique line, having the left thrown forward. Scarce was this effected when the enemy advanced on a front of two squadrons, at a slow pace, bringing up their right against the Portuguese, and opening a fire from the captured guns. The united brigades rode out bravely to meet the threatened attack, but just as the pace had been increased to charging speed, and the Portuguese brigade had arrived within twenty paces of the enemy, the men again deserted their officers—wheeled about, and fled back to the village !

The left flank of the Germans now became completely exposed to the French, by whom they were nearly surrounded, and no alternative remained but a rapid retreat, which was immediately commenced in column of squadrons. The enemy pressed on, and falling upon the rear, took some prisoners, amongst whom was colonel de Jonquières, commanding the brigade. Arrived near the village, the Germans made front, and the leading squadron of the 2d regiment, under captain Friesland, joined by the picquet under Kuhls, charging with impetuosity, killed and wounded several of their opponents. The second squadron, under captain von Lenthe, together with the same gallant picquet, now advanced to the charge ; the French squadron leader rode confidently forward, and called on Lenthe to surrender, but Wolbers, a bold soldier, rushing from the ranks, cut the haughty captain from his horse, and the French squadron gave way. Thus the pursuit was checked ; and the heavy cavalry brigade of general Ponsonby appearing, at the same time, in sight, the enemy's horsemen withdrew to Mahalajonda, but not without having inflicted severe losses on the German brigade.

War consists in deeds ;—the question is not of *right*, but *action*. The most productive in deeds is victorious : bravery and resolution lead to vigorous actions : nothing is, therefore, worse than irresolution.

CHAPTER XI.

OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY IN RECONNOITERING THE
POSITIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY.*A. Reconnoitering.*

Reconnoitering is either open and forcible, or secret.

1. Open reconnoitering has for its object the enemy's army and position, taken as a whole: it is undertaken with divisions of such strength that the enemy cannot prevent the attainment of the intended object.

The commander-in-chief is generally present himself; but the commander of the cavalry of the army, is *always* present on such occasions.

As soon as we come up with the enemy, his advanced posts should be quickly and impetuously attacked—overthrown on the first onset, and a commanding height gained, from whence the commander, or his representative, can freely observe.

The retreat must be quickly performed, and secured by regiments and squadrons advantageously placed.

Count Turpin has arranged a general plan for reconnoitering:—He takes six squadrons: When arrived within four miles and half of the enemy, he places squadrons close to the road, at intervals of a mile and half from each other. As soon as he has actually reached the enemy, the leading squadron drives back his

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advanced posts—then extends itself into a line of skirmishers, while two other squadrons take up positions, and the commanding officer reconnoiters the enemy.

Open reconnoitering is generally undertaken.

a. Before a battle, in order to observe the position of the enemy, whether we intend waiting for his attack, or attacking him.

b. When the enemy retires without coming to action, in order to ascertain the direction of his march ; or if we wish to retreat, to conceal the retiring movement.

2. Secret reconnoitering has only single parts of the enemy's army or his position, as its object. Intelligent officers should be employed on this service. From the fourth part of a squadron to two or three squadrons, according to existing circumstances, are to be employed. Secrecy of march is the first principle. This is generally performed at night, by cross roads, in order to arrive at the object of the reconnoissance before daybreak.

Inhabited places are to be avoided on the march, which should be conducted round the enemy's posts ; the horses are to be fed in woods, and care must be taken not to meet the enemy's patrols.

Safe guides are necessary—faithful spies can be of great service.

Strada, Turenne, and Vauban strongly recommend spies, for the purpose of gaining secret intelligence of the enemy's army. M. de Feuquières observes that spies are of many sorts :—" They are to be found in the cabinets of princes, in the closets of ministers ; amongst officers of the army, and in the councils of generals—in towns belonging to the enemy, and in monasteries. Some offer themselves—others are found by the generals or ministers ; but the desire of gain is what chiefly encourages and tempts them to undertake the

business." They are generally found amongst the following classes :—

Inferior shopkeepers,
Discontented clerks,
Men eager for money,
Men who have families,
and landed property.

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Selinger.
mil. guide.

Jews are the worst people that can be employed, because their religion forbids them to follow business on a Saturday, and as they scruple to take the oath of fidelity, they are not to be depended upon, or their statements always credited. Postmasters may be advantageously employed, and intelligent women often afford most useful information.

If it be necessary to obtain intelligence from the inhabitants we must be enigmatical in our questions, in order that the real object should not be known : so long as the march can be observed by them, it should be conducted in a direction deviating from the one intended to be taken.

Should a secret reconnoitering party, in spite of all precaution, fall in with the enemy, without being covered, or being able to retire in good order, the enemy must be resolutely attacked by it. If we are stronger than the enemy, he loses the advantage of wheeling about, flying off, and betraying us. If weaker, it is too late to wheel about, and no longer of use : the enemy is upon us before we can turn our horses.

Presence of mind leads on to the attack, by which time is gained ; and time gained, decides : This is particularly advantageous by night.

If it be day, and that we must leave the field, a wood should be sought ; a halt made, with confidence, before it, and an appearance assumed as if infantry were concealed there.

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The *alarm* should be sounded ;—the horses allowed to recover their wind ;—the detachment regulated, and the whole moved slowly away.

A prudent and cautious enemy does not go blindly into woods. In the worst case, the party disperse, taking chance in flight, and calculating that the enemy cannot move faster than they. It is, therefore necessary to make the detachment acquainted with the entire country, and on each hill, to repeat an examination of the bearings.

Strictly speaking, every officer should carry a compass with him. In this kind of highly interesting operations, many artifices and stratagems, as they are called, have been, at all times, exhibited. The old military histories are filled with them. General Luckner, in the seven years' war, often reconnoitered in the garb of a peasant, or dressed as one of the enemy's hussars.

Such metamorphoses require precaution, and much cunning.

Optical illusions must be avoided. A mass of troops, viewed in front, conceals all the divisions that are in rear of it.

Echelon positions, and positions *en échiquier* deceive, and are difficult to judge of. We should count the standards—the intervals.

To make correct observations, we must be acquainted with the form of the regiments, battalions, and squadrons, and manner of encampment of the enemy. By the reflection of the arms, clouds of dust, &c., the direction of the movement of the columns is ascertained. If the reflection from the arms continues to strike the eye, the columns are moving towards us : if the glittering is interrupted, and only visible above, the columns are moving from us.

Persons reconnoitering must endeavour to learn, whether the enemy's army is well provided ;—whether a good spirit prevails ;—whether it desires a battle, and so forth. Whether the discipline is strict ;—the service zealously or inertly performed, and what is said by the enemy.

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This intelligence is obtained by means of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c. Although individual reports may deserve little credit, yet from the many we may combine and extract the truth :—we should never be tired of asking questions.

If the object of the *reconnaissance* be to make a military survey of the country,—to mark out roads for columns, &c., officers of the staff should be appointed for that purpose, and the officer of the cavalry escort then merely acts in command of the troops.

One of the most important results of a reconnaissance on record, was that which took place at Villers-en-Couchée in 1794, where the 15th hussars were so much distinguished. On the 23d of April, the duke of York sent a detachment of cavalry, from his post at Cateau, to reconnoitre the enemy, who were reported to have assembled at the camp de Cæsar, near Cambray. This detachment found the enemy in great force, and so strongly posted at the village of Villers-en-Couchée, that general Otto, who accompanied it, sent back for a reinforcement, which the duke immediately despatched, but not arriving in time, Otto felt himself called upon to attack the enemy on the morning of the 24th April, with his advanced guard only, consisting of two squadrons of Austrian hussars, and two squadrons of the British 15th light dragoons. The former were part of the Imperial corps Leopold Toscano, consisting of 86 men ; the 15th amounted to about 186 ; to which were opposed 10,000 French (cavalry and infantry) a disproportion nearly equal to that at Poitiers. These

Despatch of
H. R. H. Duke
of York.
Attest. of
general Otto.

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XI.Hist. Sketch
of 16th light
dragoons.

squadrons charged the enemy's cavalry with such success, that, finding a line of infantry in rear of the horse, they continued the charge, and completely overthrew their opponents, who were obliged to retreat to Cambray with the loss of 1,200 men killed, and three pieces of cannon. The gallantry displayed by the 15th on this day has never been exceeded: colonel Aylett, in charging at the head of the regiment, was pierced through the body with a bayonet, and his horse was wounded in two places; captain Ryan's horse was severely wounded: captain Calcraft's horse was shot; and the horses of major Butler, captains Blount and Wilson, were all wounded under them. In acknowledgment of the distinguished bravery of the 15th hussars on this occasion, the emperor of Austria presented to each of the officers engaged, medals of the Order of merit, and the name of *Villers-en-Couchée* became one of the badges of the regiment. The 15th hussars were also opposed to a great superiority of numbers at Emsdorf in 1760, when, having just completed their establishment of 600 men, they routed a French force of upwards of 4,000, and took 2,000 prisoners. At Egmont-op-Zee, the 15th were equally distinguished, three troops of the regiment putting 500 French horsemen to flight.

B. Surprises.

When armies remain, for some time, inactive, opposite each other, and the commander-in-chief can obtain no certain intelligence as to the designs of the enemy, surprises (*coups de main*) are ordered to be undertaken, for the purpose of making prisoners, as much as possible, of officers.

To execute a surprise with success requires a knowledge of the enemy's posts which it is intended to surprise, as well in position as in connection with other posts. This information is obtained by means of men sent out in disguise—by spies—deserters. If the post can be surrounded, there is a probability of the enterprise

succeeding; and in this case, the fright caused by appearing in the rear, is of the greatest assistance.

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Having many difficulties to overcome is favourable to the success of a surprise: the stronger the position is, the less do the troops who occupy it, anticipate danger.

Bad weather is favourable to a surprise, because it relaxes the watchfulness of the troops. Added to this is the psychological remark, that a man, frightened out of his sleep, has seldom his senses about him in the first moment;—disorder and confusion are then unavoidable;—ordering and obeying are equally difficult; for neither officers or men have their eyes half open, and clearness of vision is wanting to both; it is therefore, easily to be understood why more surprises succeed than fail. Whoever has experienced such fearful moments, is provided with matter for many interesting remarks.

The campaign of 1813, furnishes many instances of successful surprises. The sudden attack of the Austrians, on the 18th of September, upon Freiberg, under Scheitter, was a brilliant operation.

In the autumn of this year a serious partisan warfare sprung up in rear of the French army. Secure in the mountains of Bohemia, the allied sovereigns took advantage of their superiority in light horse, to threaten the enemy's communications, and seize their convoys on the roads to the Rhine. With this view Schwartzberg advanced to Freiberg, where he made 400 prisoners; from thence Kielmann, with 3,000 horse, was detached to scour the country towards Leipsic, while Mensdorf with 2,000, beset the roads from Dresden and Torgan. The former attacked and destroyed, near Weissenfels, a large convoy of ammunition destined for the use of the grand army, made 500 men prisoners in Merseburg, and spread alarm throughout the whole of western Saxony. Lefebvre Desnouettes now took the field

Alison. xii.
178, 179.

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with 8,000 *chasseurs à cheval* and the cavalry of the guard, and coming up with the Saxon general near Merseburg, defeated him with considerable loss, and obliged him to retire towards Zwickau, after abandoning his prisoners. This called forth Platoff, who issued from Bohemia with 7000 Cossacks and Austrian horse, two days after, and directing his march to Altenburg, where Lefebvre lay unconscious of his danger, attacked him with such vigour that he was driven back to Zeitz. The French general, however, was effecting his retreat *en échelon*, in good order—although still pressed by Platoff in his rear, when he was attacked by Thielmann, and totally defeated, with the loss of five guns and 1,500 prisoners.

The Italian general of division, Pery, suffered himself to be surprised, in an unaccountable manner, in the afternoon of the 19th May, at Königswarthe, by Barclay de Tolly; the division was broken, a great part made prisoners, and eleven guns captured.

Alison. xi.
 376.

The Italians were leisurely reposing, in loose order, after dinner, without any proper look-out; 2,000 prisoners were taken; the rest dispersed; and it was only by taking refuge in the neighbouring neutral territory of Bohemia, that the great bulk of the division, about 20,000, escaped.

The campaign of 1814 is also not deficient in successful surprises on the part of the allies:—The affair at Epinal, on the 11th of January, was a regular surprise by day, from which the crown-prince, to his mortification, could not derive advantage with his accustomed quickness, because the ground on this side of the town did not allow of the movement of cavalry.

The seven years' war is rich in bold operations of this kind. The successful surprise of the hereditary prince of Brunswick, in the little town of Zierenberg, and that of

the French corps of general Glaubitz, encamped near Emsdorf, in Hessa—which the prince captured in broad day—were brilliant operations.

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No surprise was ever better concerted than that of the prince of Brunswick upon Zierenberg:—Having been informed of all the enemy's posts, and the careless position of their troops, he assembled that part of his forces which he had selected for the surprise, at eight o'clock, on the night of the 5th September, 1760, at the stone bridge near the Dymel. The cavalry consisted of two squadrons of the Greys, two of the Enniskillens, two of Busch, two of Melakousky, and four of Bock, the whole being under the orders of major general Bock. The infantry, under the command of major general Griffin, was composed of Maxwell's grenadiers, 150 Highlanders, Kingsley's regiment, and three other battalions, which last were posted with the cavalry, to cover a retreat. The British infantry were entrusted with the attack. Major Maxwell was ordered to force the Durenberg gate with his grenadiers; captain Grey, with the right wing of Kingsley's regiment, to enter at the Warburg side;—captain Carlton with the left wing, to pass through a breach in the wall, to facilitate the entrance of these two corps; and captain Maclean, who commanded the Highlanders, was also ordered to enter at the breach, and endeavour to seize the person of the commanding officer. Such was the general disposition; but the activity and spirit of Kingsley's division, made the entrance at the breach unnecessary, for, driving all before them, they came so close on the heels of the fugitives, that the enemy had not time to shut the gates, and captain Grey, who was the first man in the town, advanced to let in Maxwell at the Durenberg gate, where he had been equally successful, and was just coming in when Grey arrived. The French posts, which had been driven in by Maxwell, became thus between two fires, and were all bayoneted. Maclean and Carlton followed Grey in at the gate, and the latter, pushing for the church-yard, found

Field of
Mars.

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the commander, general Norrmann at the head of 100 men, whom he made prisoners. Altogether, 428 prisoners were taken, and three pieces of cannon.

It is remarkable that, with such complete success, and a night attack, so few men should have been left behind or wounded ; amongst the latter was general Griffin, who received a bayonet wound in the chest : the other British officers who shared the honors of the day, were, colonels Boyd and Beckwith, and lord George Lennox, whose horse was shot under him.

Lukner well understood how to take advantage of the favourable moment, and many surprises succeeded with him during the day : he thus describes that which took place at Butzbach, in the plain of the Wetter, in 1760 :—

“ I gave orders to enter the gate at full charge ; and if this was not possible, to gallop round to the Friedberg side and try there. It was a fatality, that out of a patrol of one cornet and twelve men, we only took eleven ; the cornet and one man escaped us. It was noon. I gave orders to pursue the cornet, and force into the town with him, cost what it would. This was done. At the first onset, nothing was seen but guards and infantry. My hussars cut them all down, crying out ; ‘ where is the enemy ? ’ ‘ Outside the Friedberg gate ’ was the reply. We rushed thither and made more prisoners.”

Bulow, in his “ Gustavous Adolphus in Germany,” relates a very interesting *coup de main*, as well with regard to the rapidity of the previous march, as to the superior execution in general :—

The king was at Würzburg : Tilly before Ochsenfurth. Hanau was of importance to the king. He despatched colonel Haubold with six troops of horse and a few

hundred dragoons, to surprise this place, which was strong and occupied by an imperial garrison. Hanau is ten German miles from Würzburg.

Haubold marched at five o'clock in the morning from Würzburg—soon left the great roads—crossed the Maine near Lengfeld ;—directed his march through Spessart, and, the next day, between five and six o'clock in the morning, he surprised and took Hanau.

At a bad season of the year, in the month of November, he had marched ten German miles in twenty-four hours, without reckoning the circuitous roads, and taken a fortress, with all the warlike stores which it contained : the commandant, Brandeis, was the only one of the garrison who remained in the Imperial service ; all the rest entered into the service of the enemy, according to the custom of that time. The king rewarded Haubold with the situation of colonel of his body-guard ; he must, however, as often happens, very soon have forgotten this exploit, for Haubold became discontented, and afterwards entered the Imperial service.

Benningsen relates an instructive example of a successful surprise :—In the summer of 1794, he was at Trabe in Lithuania ; five miles from him, near the little town of Oschmen, lay a Polish corps, which Benningsen determined to surprise. He marched at three o'clock in the afternoon ; at seven in the evening, after having gone two miles, he stopped for an hour at the little town of Olschau, to feed. After resuming his march, he placed fifty Cossacks at some distance from the advanced guard, preceded by three men, placed fifty paces in front. The greatest silence was enjoined ; no firing was to be allowed : the fifty Cossacks that were at the head,

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were ordered, as soon as attacked, or if they fell in with any thing, to gallop off to the distance of a werst, on the road, and there wait for the advanced guard. By this disposition, the first cavalry picquet was cut off, as well as the second, and the march was continued through a wood.

When the general had reached the edge of the wood, he saw the enemy's corps, about eight hundred yards in advance; the river Oschmenka ran in front of their position; the left flank rested on the town of Oschmen: two new broad bridges led across the river.

All was in motion in the camp; the cavalry had bridled up;—the Russians could observe every thing.

Day broke: the general formed two columns, and advanced from the wood towards the bridge.

At last the sentries fired, upon which the Russian cavalry crossed the bridges at full gallop, and rushed into the camp. The disorder was unbounded; six hundred men were cut down; the rest made prisoners, and all the cannon, baggage, &c., were taken.

Life of Lord
Uxbridge.

Lord Anglesea's surprise of the French at Sahagun, December 1808, was a bold and well-planned operation: His lordship's division of cavalry was stationed 12 miles from Sahagun, where a body of the enemy's horse, amounting to 700, had been posted; and this body lord Anglesea proposed to cut off, by a rapid movement, from the rest of the French army. He accordingly sent major general Slade, with the 10th light dragoons by one road, while his lordship, with the 15th, moving with great rapidity, in another direction, reached Sahagun, and surprised one of the enemy's picquets. Unfortunately some men escaped and gave the alarm, which afforded the French an opportunity of forming in an advantageous position outside the town. This position was parti-

gularly favourable to the enemy in consequence of a hollow way, which ran along the front, and thus prevented a regular charge on the part of the British cavalry, and it became, therefore, necessary to manœuvre, in order to gain the advantage of ground. Here the abilities of Lord Anglesea were strikingly exhibited, and having succeeded in improving his position, he led his squadrons against the enemy in an impetuous charge. The onset was irresistible ;—the French line broke, and their whole force sought safety in flight. Two lieutenant-colonels and 190 men were made prisoners on this occasion, while the loss of the British did not exceed eight men killed and twenty wounded.

The design for a surprise, like all others, is dependent upon the object of operation, and the lines which lead to it. Secrecy of march is an important condition: the safety of retreat must be secured.

Small surprises are best executed soon after midnight; but great ones a little before daybreak. A general place of rendezvous after the operation—a signal of recognition;—a word—white handkerchief, or the like must be previously determined on. Firing must be forbidden—the enemy should be attacked rapidly with the lance or sword. Success depends upon rapidity.

The smallest part of the troops destined for the surprise—at most one half—should be sent into the place to be surprised; the larger part should remain outside, regularly formed up for action, in order to be able to act according to circumstances.

Surprises in several columns generally fail, because all the columns seldom arrive at the same time, even when watches are duly regulated. In order never to be surprised, all *possibilities* must be previously brought to mind.

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In warlike operations luck is essential ; but fortune is a female, and often changes without reason : our own firmness is not sufficient to fetter this mutable goddess

“ Uncertain, coy, and hard to please,
And variable as the shade
By the light quivering aspen made.”

Such is fortune, without even the redeeming quality which the poet allows to the lady :—

“ When pain and anguish wring the brow,
A ministering angel thou.”

SCOTT.

The cavalier Kniphausen said that “an ounce of good fortune was worth a pound weight of wit,” and doubtless surprises, like other operations in war, have failed or succeeded in consequence of some trifling occurrence not previously anticipated, and which is attributed to good or bad luck. A surprise attempted by sir Thomas Graham, in imitation of the remarkably successful operation of general Hill, at Aroya Molinos in October 1811, met with signal misfortune, and seems to furnish an additional argument against the employment of large bodies of troops on such occasions.

Hist. K. G.
legion. ii. 41.
et seq.

The troops employed in this expedition were the sixth and seventh divisions of the allied army, a brigade of cavalry, and two batteries of horse artillery, the whole of which, having been assembled at Usagre, on the 25th March, 1812, moved from thence at ten o'clock p.m. for Villa Garcia, where they arrived at one a.m. on the following morning. Here general Graham made his dispositions, and at two o'clock the whole set out for Llerena, distant about four English miles.

The main body of the infantry marched in one column on the high road ; the cavalry were on the left, together with the first light battalion of the king's German legion, with orders to enter the town from the Andalusian side ; while the second light battalion, which, it was intended, should enter the town on the opposite side, marched on the right. In

front of the main column was an advanced guard of 25 men of the first light battalion of the legion with a few English dragoons; and some distance in rear of this detachment rode sir Thomas Graham, sir Stapleton Cotton, general Bernewitz of the Brunswickers, and several officers of the staff.

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Hist. K. G.
legion. ii. 41.
et seq.

The night which, at starting from Villa Garcia, was illumined by a fine moon, soon became obscure, and before the troops had marched more than a mile, they were completely in the dark.

Just at this moment—when the whole corps became suddenly shrouded in obscurity—a patrol of the enemy's cavalry, which had been lying in ambush near the line of march, availing themselves of the darkness, rushed impetuously upon the advanced guard, and drove it, together with the staff, in full speed, back upon the column—upsetting the cavalry chief (sir S. Cotton), general Bernewitz, and other officers of the suite. The latter general, on rising astounded from the dust, saw as he imagined, that his overcoat was pierced in many places, by musquet balls, however; on careful examination, the injury proved to have been inflicted by horse-shoes? and his personal safety was unaffected by the overthrow. Owing to the darkness of the night, the cause of this sudden irruption was not discernible to the troops in the rear, but lieutenant (afterwards major) Rautenberg, who commanded the leading section of the first light battalion of the legion, seeing drawn swords, horse hair plumes, and long tailed horses approaching him at a rapid rate, did not hesitate to draw up his men and order them to fire. The French horsemen immediately wheeled off towards the 51st regiment, which marched at the head of the column, and they also fired. Upon this, the regiments in rear, concluding that the whole force had been attacked, commenced defending themselves in various ways, according to their respective notions of the nature of the assault:—Some sent forth a desultory fire in the direction of their front,—many of the balls of which, falling amongst the flanking battalions and squadrons, brought down several

CHAP. XI. men, and caused the horses to break their ranks; others formed square and prepared to receive cavalry, while a crowd of starved dogs which had been wandering about the road in search of their masters, setting up a doleful whine, added to the confusion. Nor was this otherwise ludicrous affair unattended with serious casualties; for the assistant surgeon, and two soldiers of the 51st were killed; a serjeant of the 1st light battalion of the legion was shot through the chest, and others were wounded.

Hist. K. G.
Legion. li. 41.
et seq.

Order being restored, the march was resumed, and the troops arrived before Llerena without further molestation. It was now daybreak, and the main column halting in front of the town, the artillery opened a fire upon what appeared to the commanding officer to be a strong line of infantry; but the obscurity of the air had created an optical illusion, for after a few shots, the formidable opponent proved to be a dark stone wall!

Meantime the cavalry scouts had ascertained that the enemy were in full march for Azugal, and the troops being now too fatigued to attempt a pursuit, the expedition returned without success.

Ibid.
318, 319.

The operations undertaken by cornet Strenuwitz of the 1st German hussars in 1811, were of a very different character, and furnish happy illustrations of successful enterprise.—On the night of the 9th February, 1811, this gallant officer, with not more than ten hussars, cut down the greater part of a cavalry picquet, about ten of an infantry support which was formed in its rear, and caused a reserve of infantry, said to be 50 in number, to take to their heels. One officer and eleven men became his prisoners without the Germans losing a man! On the night of the 20th, the same enterprising officer dexterously led an enemy's picquet, consisting of one officer and 20 chasseurs, and the same number of infantry, into an ambuscade formed of 30 of the 16th light dragoons and 1st hussars, near Ferragoas. The enemy were vigorously charged, under the able guidance of the cornet, and the whole of the infantry, including the

officer, and several of the chasseurs were either taken or cut down. The officer proved to be an aide-de-camp of general Clausel, and it was afterwards ascertained that he had been for several days waiting with parties of cavalry in ambuscade, hoping to surprise the British patrols; but the fortune of war now brought him and 17 of his followers prisoners to the gallant cornet. These dashing affairs drew forth the marked commendation of lord Wellington, who recognized in Strenuwitz all the qualifications of an effective partisan officer.

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PETTY WARFARE.

The strategical object of war is the defeat of the enemy. War is divided into great and petty. The object of the former is the enemy's army—that of the latter his lines of communication.

Great war consists in the operations of contending armies; petty war is conducted by partisans, and its object is the *matériel*—the military stores and provisions.

Petty war is the war of posts, carried on by a body of light troops, commanded by a person who is dexterous in the command of a *party*, and hence called a *partisan*. "This corps," says major James, "should consist of 1,000 to 2,000 men separated from the army, to secure the camp or cover a march;—to reconnoiter the enemy or the country—to seize their posts, convoys or escorts;—to plant ambuscades, and to put in practice every stratagem for surprising or disturbing the enemy." The Lusitanian legion, which was so conspicuous in the Peninsula for its effective operations under the gallant sir Robert Wilson, may be considered as coming under the denomination of a partisan corps: also the troops of Lützow, Tettenborn, &c., in 1813.

Mil. Dic. voca.
"Petty War."

The military stores and provisions are either collected in magazines, or follow the army; and are, therefore, to be found on the great roads. A bold partisan—what Theobald calls a land pirate (*land-kaper*)—does not

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content himself with attacking, taking and destroying these endless trains of military stores, or even with retarding their march and seizing them by partial surprises; he ventures, also, to attack the troops which follow the army as reinforcements — the depôts of cavalry, artillery, hospitals, &c.

One or more bold and able partisan corps may thus cause incalculable injury to the enemy;—may even arrest the operations of an army—render them ineffective, and induce movements of retreat.

The duty of partisan corps is to weaken the enemy in every possible way, and all means are allowed to effect this object. Petty war is carried on with light troops. In general these troops are volunteers, whose service is only binding during the war.

Discipline is seldom a qualification which distinguishes partisan corps. The choice of the commander is the most important point; for, as in all other cases, so also with light or volunteer corps, every thing depends upon the personal qualities of the leader.

To discern and select talent is a great art, but once put into action, it should be left unshackled. The greatest possible freedom of action should be given to a partisan. Upon this it generally depends, whether the operations of partisan troops assist to fulfil the real object of the war, or are only confined to causing alarm amongst the defenceless inhabitants. *Honour* is the principal product of the former: *money* of the latter.

Man yields much too easily to the seduction of wealth. The less liberality is to be expected from princes, the quicker and more certainly will the opportunities of becoming rich be taken advantage of. On this point the English show a knowledge of human nature,

for they unite *honour* and *money*. All conquerors, and all usurpers have known how to connect their interests with these two talismans. They are the two open approaches, to defend which a man seldom possesses sufficient strength of mind, for nothing in this world is so thoroughly real as self-interest!

Partisan troops, along with the before mentioned operations, must direct their attention to reconnoitering. Seizing on couriers—diplomatic persons—intercepting dispatches, &c.—all are included in the operations of partisans.

The line of conduct to be observed on such occasions may be found in many military works, for much has been written on the subject of petty war.

CHAPTER XII.

PRINCIPAL EPOCHS IN THE HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

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XII.

The Scolothians, a Scythian nation, are said to have been the first people who had the hardihood to tame the horse, which gave rise to the fable of the Centaurs amongst poets and mythologists.

Virgil gives the Lapithæ, a people of Thessaly, who inhabited the environs of Larissa and Mount Olympus, and carried on war with the Centaurs—credit for this daring act :—

" The Lapithæ, to chariots add the state
Of bits and bridles ; taught the steed to bound,
To run the ring, and trace the mazy round ;
To stop, to fly, the rules of war to know ;
T' obey the rider, and to dare the foe."

DRYDEN.

This is, however, taking too much credit for the descendants of the fair daughter of Apollo. The employment of horses, both for riding and driving, is frequently alluded to in the Old Testament. The Canaanites, to whom Joshua gave battle at the waters of Merom, had horsemen as well as chariots, and the Arabs may certainly claim a better right than the Scythians to the honour of having been the first horse-breakers. As to the Centaurs their history appears to be involved in great uncertainty. "The most inquisitive and judicious of the antient antiquarians," says Mitford, "appear to have been at a loss what to think of the Centaurs." Strabo calls them *ἀγρίον τι φῦλον* (savage) a

Mitford's
Greece. i. 39.
Note.

mode of expression implying his uncertainty about them. Hesiod and Homer, on the other hand, never speak of them as a savage race. The scholiast on Homer indeed, says that where Nestor is speaking of mountain beasts destroyed by Theseus, he means the Centaurs, but this interpretation is not warranted. In the *Odyssey* we find the Centaur Eurytion mentioned with the honourable name of *αγαλότης* (illustrious) which is not likely to have been given to one of a tribe of mountain beasts or hairy savages. He got drunk, certainly, but it was in good company, and such indulgences have characterised some of the most eminent moderns. Pindar describes the Centaur Chiron as a most paradoxical being, which yet, in the fourth Pythian, has been described in two words—*φῆρ δειός* (a godlike wild beast). But even in Xenophon's time, it appears the term Centaur did not of itself describe the imaginary animal, half man and half horse; for that author, wishing to particularize, never calls them simply Centaurs, but Hippo-centaurs (Horse-centaurs). Heyne derives the word Centaur from *κεντεῖν τὴν αὔραν* (spurring or lashing the air), and supposes it to have been given to one of the Thessalian tribes, in consequence of the great velocity of their movements.

Since then, according to Buffon, pompous palaces have been assigned to it for habitations.

When and where horses were first used in battle, is not pointed out.

Horses were, no doubt, first used in battle upon the wide open plains where civilization began, such as Assyria or the Tartarian steppes. Assyria was a powerful empire when the Greeks fed upon acorns; and it is impossible to fix any period for events which are so completely lost in the obscurity of early history.

It appears merely probable that cavalry fought at the famed siege of Troy, although Homer does not speak clearly on the subject.

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Homer appears to be quite explicit on this point: all his heroes either fight in chariots, or leap from them to engage the enemy on foot, as did Paris, Agamemnon, Teucer, Ajax, &c. Nestor, forming the army for action, composes the first line of chariots; in the second he places that part of the infantry, in which he had the least confidence; and forms a third line of the most approved troops, which were heavy armed infantry, formed in close order, many ranks deep, and called a *Phalanx*. No person of Agamemnon's time is mentioned by Homer, as riding on horse-back except Diomed; when, with Ulysses, he captured the horses of Rhæsus:—

“Καρπαλίμω δ' ἵππων ἐπεβήσεντο κόπτε δ' Ὀδυσσεύς
τόξ' αὖ τοί δ' ἐπέγοντο θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν.”

ΙΛΙΑΔΟΣ, x. l. 513.

“At once he mounted—with his bow the steeds
Ulysses plied, and to the ships they flew.”

COWPER.

It seems certain that Homer was well acquainted with riding, for a feat of horsemanship is mentioned in a simile B. xv. l. 679. Riding on horseback was, however, little practiced, and some centuries passed over before it was applied in Greece to military purposes, the mountainous ruggedness of the country preventing any extensive use of cavalry, except amongst the Thessalians, whose territory was a large plain.

Thus much is certain—that the brave Scythians descended from the renowned Amazons, and from the women conquered by Hercules at Thermodon, who existed before the Trojan war, were accustomed to ride; and fought partly on horseback.

The existence of the *Amazons* is very doubtful. Mont-faucon, after relating the many wonderful stories which Herodotus and others have told of their achievements, thus concludes:—“Nous ne nous arrêterons point à ces faits trop connus, et que plusieurs regardent comme fabuleux: il y en

a même qui vont jusqu'à douter si les Amazones ont jamais existé." It is highly probable that the word Amazon is not Greek at all, but, like many other words, pressed into the language, from an eastern origin, and a fable devised, as usual, to account for the punning derivation which they gave it—*Ἀλφα*, without, and *μαφα*, a breast. Spain has, however, produced a real Amazon, and the well authenticated heroism of Augustina Zaragossa may vie with any of the female exploits recorded by Herodotus or Diodorus Siculus. At the first siege of Saragossa in 1808, this intrepid woman,—when the soldiers hesitated to re-man the guns—rushed forward over the wounded and the slain, snatched a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, and fired off a 26 pounder; then jumping upon the gun, she made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege; and her fellow-citizens, stimulated to fresh exertions by this daring act of intrepidity, instantly rushed into the battery, and re-opened a tremendous fire upon the enemy. At the second siege (1809) she again took her station at the gun, saying to the governor Palafox, "See general, I am again with my old friend." Her husband being struck by a cannon-ball as he served the battery, she calmly stepped into his place, and pointed the gun as he lay bleeding by her side. Frequently she was to be seen at the head of an assaulting party, wrapped in her cloak, sword in hand, cheering on the soldiers. Augustina was at length taken prisoner; but contrived to escape. A female corps was formed during this remarkable siege under the countess Benita for the purpose of carrying provisions and water to the combatants, and to remove the wounded; and this young, delicate, and beautiful woman, was frequently seen attending to the duties which she had prescribed to herself, in the midst of the most tremendous fire of shot and shells: several hundred women and children perished in actual combat.

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Elliott's life
of Wellington.

Alison. ix.
354, 355.

Elliott.

Alison. ix.
355.

The Greeks had little cavalry: the defeat of the Macedonians at Messene and Ithome is entirely to be attributed to their deficiency in that force.

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Pausanias.
b. iv., c. xi.

The battles referred to in the text were probably those fought between the Lacedæmonians (not Macedonians) and Messenians, as related by Pausanias. One of these took place in the plains of Messenia, and the other near the mountain Ithome. In the latter the Lacedæmonians are stated to have sustained a complete defeat, but no mention is made of cavalry having been employed on either side. The Messenian archers appear to have gained the victory. "The light armed troops of the Messenians," says Pausanias, "beat and transfixed with their darts, those of the Lacedæmonians who kept their ranks, suddenly overturned those who pursued them, and assaulted them from behind as they were returning to their own troops; at last the Lacedæmonians, being wearied with the length of the battle, and disordered by the unusual manner of fighting of the Messenian light armed troops, broke their ranks and fled."

The wars with the Persians first made them attentive to this subject,—just as the Romans perceived the advantages of cavalry when taught by Hannibal.

Agesilaus, king of Sparta, was the first who, in the wars with the Persians, increased his cavalry.

The Asiatic nations have always had a numerous cavalry; and even at the present day, it is not uncommon for the Mahrattas, whose united force of cavalry is considered two hundred thousand, to appear in the field with from sixty to eighty thousand horses.

Alison. vii.
631.

If united, the Mahratta chieftains can bring 200,000 horsemen into the field; but their constant feuds with each other render it improbable that this vast force could ever be concentrated against an external enemy. The most distinguished chieftains are the Rajahs of Berar, Scindiah and Holkar, each of whom can muster 60,000 men, almost entirely cavalry, round his standards.

Asia appears to be the real father-land of the horse; for it is there only where it arrives at the most perfect and regular beauty.

With regard to tactics, the Thessalians and other Grecian nations, according to Elian, formed their cavalry in the shape of lozenges and wedges. The invention of the wedge-shaped position is attributed to Philip, father of Alexander the Great.

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Alexander, however, departed from this formation, and with his shallow lines of cavalry, conquered the deep-formed lines of Darius.

Afterwards, the cavalry of all the other Greek nations was also formed more shallow: never, however, under four, or above eight ranks.

The squadrons of Hannibal were sixty-four strong, which, formed in four ranks, made sixteen files. The *turma* of the Romans had, according to Vegetius, eight files and four ranks; ten *turmæ* formed a legion: the distances between the *turmæ* were equal to their front.

There is some misconception here. The Roman legion contained both infantry and cavalry, and according to Vegetius, the number of the latter far exceeded that stated in the text. Gibbon gives the following clear detail of the number of cavalry attached to an Imperial legion:—

“The cavalry, without which the force of the legion would have remained imperfect, was divided into ten troops or squadrons. The first, as the companion of the first cohort, consisted of 132 men, whilst each of the other nine amounted only to 66. The entire establishment formed a regiment—if we may use the modern expression—of 726 horses, naturally connected with its respective legion, but occasionally separated to act in the line, and to compose a part of the wings of an army.”

Decline and
fall. i. cap. iii.
13, 14.

Vegetius expressly says:—“His decem cohortibus legio plena fundatur, quæ habet pedites sex millia centum, *equites septingenta viginti sex*. The *turma* consisted of thirty-two men, and reckoning the decurion or officer, thirty-three; the

Veg. de re
milit. lib. ii.
c. vi.

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cavalry of the first cohort must therefore have contained four *turmæ*, and the cavalry of the remaining nine cohorts, two *turmæ* each: thus 22 *turmæ* formed the cavalry of an imperial legion.

In the battle of Pharsalia, the unfortunate Pompey united four *turmæ*, in order to form broader and stronger masses; but Pompey did not attack; therefore his cavalry, which was superior in number to that of Cæsar, was of no service to him.

The employment of gunpowder produced a great reform in tactics. Berthold Schwartz, a Franciscan monk of Cologne, is generally named as the inventor of gunpowder.

Long before his time, however, inflammable materials had been used for the purpose of projecting stones and iron bullets; as for instance in 1342, when the Moors were besieged by the Castilians in Algesiras, and of which Villasas says, "that the iron bullets had such force as to cut away the men's limbs, as if they had been cut off with a knife; and the powder with which they fired, was of such a nature, that the wounded died immediately."

The Greek fire had, together with an addition of pitch, rosin, and naphtha, all the component parts of the present gunpowder. It is therefore wrong to fix the first use of gunpowder to the year 1380, for it has been shewn that the Arabians had a much earlier knowledge of it than the Europeans.

At the siege of Ptolemais in Syria (1290), the Egyptians threw Greek fire out of three hundred machines. The Moors made the Spaniards acquainted with the use of Greek fire; from the latter it went to the French and English, and from these to the Germans.

According to the chronicle of Lübeck, the town-house of that place was blown up in 1360, in consequence of the carelessness of the powder maker. CHAP.
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So early as 1372, the Augsburgers fired out of twenty metal cannons, on the Bavarians who besieged them.

From all these circumstances it is evident, in the first place, that those writers err, who fix the first employment of gunpowder in the year 1380, and, secondly, that the pious Berthold Schwartz—a great naturalist and chemist—was not the inventor, but that it is probable he only improved it. We can therefore, absolve him from the sin of having invented this destructive compound.

We may not only give the pious monk absolution for his reputed discovery or improvement, but return him and others thanks for the signal service which the invention of gunpowder has rendered to mankind and the cause of humanity, by diminishing the destruction of human life in battle, and rendering warfare less brutal by curtailing its operations. Our own countryman, Roger Bacon has, however, a much stronger claim to the invention of gunpowder than Berthold Schwartz; for the composition was distinctly mentioned by him in 1267, and even then he speaks of it as a substance well known and employed for the purposes of pyrotechnical display. Dutens supposes that Bacon derived his knowledge from Marcus Græcus, who lived about *the end of the 8th century*; and in a work entitled *Liber Ignium*, he not only mentions the ingredients of gunpowder, but gives better proportions of them than many works of later date. Numerous documents can be adduced to prove that gunpowder was known in the East at periods of great antiquity, and the count Rzevuski gives the following receipt for making it, taken from an Arabian MS., written in the time of the Crusades of St. Louis (Louis IX.) * :—

Bacon's opus
majus.
Schoffer's
weapons of
war. p. 56.

Rzevnski to
von Hammer
in Mines de l'
Orient. t. i.

* Louis returned from his first crusade in 1254.

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"Description de la composition qu' on met dans les canons :—Savoir :—Salpêtre, 10 ; Charbon, 2 drachmes ; Soufre une drachme et demie. Pilez-le bien et remplissez-en précisément le tiers du canon. Faites faire un refouloir de bois chez le tourneur, suivant le calibre de l'embouchure du canon, et introduisez-le avec force. Vous y mettrez ensuite le boulet ou la flèche (incendiaire) et vous mettrez le feu a la poudre contenue dans la chambre du canon. Il doit etre perforé a la profondeur de la lumière, car s'il etoit perforé plus bas, ce seroit un defaut et malheur alors à celui qui tire !"

Scoffern's
weapons of
war. p. 58.

But some writers trace the use of gunpowder to far more distant periods. Citizen Langles, in a paper read before the National Institute of France, contends that the Arabs employed this compound at the siege of Mecca, in 690 ; and hence the knowledge of it might have been transmitted to Europe, either through the Greeks of Constantinople, or the Saracens of Spain : indeed there is a treatise on gunpowder in the Escorial collection, written in 1249, and Sanscrit documents shew that it was known in China and Hindostan far beyond all periods of investigation. Professor Scoffern inclines to the opinion "that it has been known in Asia from time immemorial, and that its discovery might have originated in accident." Its application to artillery, however, did not take place until the beginning of the 14th century.

Ibid. 64, 65.

With regard to the "Greek Fire" which long preceded the discovery of gunpowder, and respecting which such marvellous accounts have been given, all knowledge of its nature or ingredients, as well as the period of its discovery, has been completely lost, and we can only conclude that *Naphtha* was its basis, and that the composition was of a *liquid* character. According to Beckmann it was invented A.D. 678, by Collinicus an architect of Heliopolis (Baalbeck) in the reign of the emperor Constantine Pogonatus, and its use was continued in the East until the end of the 13th century. The writer of the "*Esprit des Croissades*" asserts that it was known in China A.D. 917, and was called the

Ibid. p. 47.

"oil of cruel fire," and that it was carried there by the Kitan Tartars, who obtained it from the king of Ou. "We know," says Professor Scoffern, "that in Persia, as also in the island of Zante, and many other parts of the world, there are naphtha springs, which continually pour out this inflammable liquid. We also know that the Parsees, or fire-worshippers, employed naphtha in supporting their religious flames. All they found necessary to do for this purpose was to insert one end of a cane a little way under the earth so impregnated with naphtha, which ascended by capillary attraction, and was easily ignited. Now it is well known that large districts are furnished with these naphtha springs, and a substance of properties so obvious, could hardly escape being applied to the uses of war. Probably then naphtha was the basis of the Greek fire."

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Scoffern's
weapons of
war. p. 48.

Joinville says that this remarkable liquid "was thrown from the bottom of a machine called the petrery, and that it came forward as large as a barrel of verjuice, with a tail of fire issuing from it, as big as a great sword, making a noise like a dragon flying through the air; and from the great quantity of fire it threw out, giving such a light, that one might see in the camp as if it had been day."

The following lines shew the general opinion that was entertained of its marvellous properties:—

"Pereat ô utinam ignis hujus vena,
Non enim extinguitur aquâ, sed arenâ,
Vixque vinum acidum arctat ejus fræna.
Et urina stringitur ejus vix habena:
Ignis hic conficitur tantum per paganos,
Ignis hic exterminat tantum Christianos,
Incantatus namque est per illos prophanos,
Ab hoc perpetuo Christe, libera nos."

Monachus Florentinus de expugnat acconensi.

Since the use of gunpowder, seven principal periods are denoted in tactics.

The first begins with the employment of cannon, and extends to the campaigns of Charles VIII. in Italy,

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or from the beginning of the fourteenth until towards the end of the fifteenth century.

During this period, when the art of war began to revive from that state of barbarism into which it had sunk since the fall of the Roman empire, occur the wars of the Spaniards against the Moors—the English against the French, and the Italian Republics against each other.

The cavalry, consisting of the nobility, constituted, at that period, the flower of the army, and was the support of princes and their kingdoms. At the storming of fortresses, however, or when important posts were to be occupied and defended—as well as upon all such occasions generally where a bold and resolute soldiery was required, the knights dismounted and fought on foot.

The count of Normandy would not venture to besiege Quesnoy, in 1340, because the garrison consisted of knights.

Besides knights and squires, there were also archers, who were, in fact, the vassals of the knights, and who, being lighter armed, and riding lighter horses, served as light horsemen.

Pére Daniel.
Hist. mil.
Française.

The splendour and extent of victories was always denoted by the number of knights, squires and other gentlemen who had been killed or taken. The strength of a garrison was also expressed by the number of knights or other gentlemen which it contained. “On jetta dans telle place qui étoit menacée de siège, 20 chevaliers, 100 sergens,” &c. The circumstance of the knights dismounting is a strong argument in favor of what has been already advanced on the comparative merits of cavalry and infantry.* “En certain occasions où la cavalerie ne pouvoit agir, et où l’on manquoit en ce tems là, les chevaliers, les ecuyers et d’autres gendarmes mirent pié à terre et s’acquirent de l’honneur—on reconnoit la nécessité

Ibid. i. 223.

* See ante p. 96

d'une bonne infanterie dans les batailles, et que n'y en ayant point de telle, la gendarmerie voulut bien y supplier."

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At the beginning of the 14th century, the cavalry of the European armies was divided into heavy and light horse; the men composing the former were called *men-at-arms*, those of the latter *hobilers*; the men at arms were so called from being fully armed *de cap a pied*; they were composed of the tenants *in capite*, holding by military service, or their substitutes (*servientes*). The hobilers were so called from their riding little horses termed "hobbies;" they consisted of yeomen, and formed the light cavalry of the army. At the beginning of the 15th century, the men-at-arms were called "lancers," and the hobilers "demi-lancers." At the close of the reign of James I., the heavy cavalry received the denomination of "cavaliers," from the intercourse with Spain; and soon after, that of "Pistoliers" from the weapon with which they were armed.

Meyrick's
Crit. Inq.
Ancient Ar-
mour. i. 174.
Skelton's
Illustrations
of Arms and
Armour.

The knights were completely armed, and rode what were called "war horses," which were also covered with an armour of iron plates.

This tactical arrangement of centuries generalizes facts to too great an extent: *entire* plate armour did not make its appearance until the beginning of the 15th century; and chain armour first became covered with plates, at the beginning of the 14th century.

Meyrick's
Crit. Inq.

The head coverings of the horse were often very splendidly ornamented with gold and silver. At the siege of Harfleur, count St. Pol had a horse's head covering (called *chanfron* or *champ frein*) that cost thirty thousand dollars, and the count St. Foix had another valued at fifteen thousand dollars: both were inlaid with precious stones.

These men-at-arms carried a long strong lance, armed with an iron head; a sword, dagger, and pistol; a battle

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sword five feet long, which hung at the saddle bow, and a mace (battle axe, hammer or hatchet.)

Meyrick's
Cris. Ing.
Skelton's
Illustr.
Montfaucon's
Monarc.
Franc.

There is some confusion and incorrectness here, resulting from an attempt to generalize, and, at the same time, retain due precision as to dates. The men at arms did not carry pistols before the middle of the 16th century: the long sword called *wyn-brot*, (bread earner) as well as "arming sword" by the English, was worn at the side—the shorter one, called *estoc*, hung at the saddle-bow: the greatest length of the former was $3\frac{3}{4}$ feet. In addition to these, either the mace, battle-axe, or hammer (*martel de fer*) was also carried.

The formation for battle was very simple—they fought hand to hand. Every armed knight sought out his opponent and rode against him with couched lance, in order to throw him out of the saddle, or make him prisoner.

The esquires or armour bearers followed as a kind of second rank—as seconds to their knights, whom they assisted in battle, and brought them fresh arms, and other horses, when the former became unserviceable, or the latter were killed—without directly fighting themselves.

I have been unable to find any authority for this statement; and the description of all battles which took place during the period mentioned, would lead to a different conclusion:—

The line of battle at Cressy is thus described by Meyrick:—

"The archers were drawn up in the form of a herse,* about 200 in front, and 40 deep. The prince of Wales

* That is to say, with their spears projecting in every direction, like the modern hollow square. The word is derived from the French *herise*, and signifies a bristled portcuse or gate cover, which was let down over the inner gates after the enemy had forced the portcullis: it was formed of transverse pieces of wood, with spikes projecting from the points of intersection.—See Meyrick,

stood at the bottom of the herse on foot, among his men-at-arms, as a solid square, having on his left the earls of Arundel and Northampton, with a force of 7,000 troops, consisting of men-at-arms, billmen, and archers." Now the men-at-arms were composed of both knights and esquires, as the different ordinances of that period shew; consequently in the order of battle which has been described, they must have been intermixed, and that the esquires so placed, should have been only inactive spectators of the battle, cannot be credited. But further enquiry will clearly shew that the esquires bore an equal share with the knights in the engagement. Mills, in describing the battle of Otterbourn, which was fought on the 21st July, 1388, states, on the authority of Froissart and Buchanan, that "there was neither knight nor squire but that did his devoir, and fought hand to hand." Again:—"They wished to take alive Thomas Felton, an English squire, whose valour excited their admiration," and sir John Chandos is mentioned in page 62, on the authority of Froissart, as having been killed by a French squire. Sir Harris Nicholas in his minute and valuable description of the battle of Agincourt, gives a full detail of the order of battle of both armies, from a number of corresponding and indisputable authorities. Amongst others he quotes St. Remy, an eye witness, who states that it was ordered the army should be formed into three lines, that is to say, the advanced-guard, the main body, and the rear-guard. In the advanced-guard were placed about 8,000 basinets, knights and esquires, and a few archers; and in the main body were placed a number of knights and esquires. The same authority furnishes us with another at least *presumptive* proof that the esquires were something more than the providers of arms and horses:—"Eighteen esquires of the French army led by Brunelet de Masinguehem and Ganiot de Bournaville, bound themselves by oath that when the two armies met, they would, with their united strength, force themselves sufficiently near to the king of England to strike the crown off his head."

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Meyrick's
Crit. Ing.
ii. 15, 16.

Mills Hist.
Chiv. ii.
80, 81.

Sir H. Nicholas' acc. of
battle of
Agincourt.
clxxxix.

Ibid. clxxxvi.

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The mistake of always considering esquires in their original capacity of *armigeri* or armour bearers, is common to many writers, and arises from a confounding of historical periods, which they will not take the trouble to arrange. Père Daniel himself has fallen into this error, and most of the writers who uphold him as an authority, have blindly followed his statement on the subject, without caring to make further enquiry. At the commencement of chivalry every man who could afford to keep a horse was a knight; as society advanced, that rank became of importance, and those who aspired to the distinction were obliged to attend on those who had actually acquired it. They carried the shield or armour of the knight until he arrived on the field of battle, and hence they were called *Scutiferi*, *Escuyers*, or *Armigeri*. Such was the state of things in the 11th and 12th centuries. In the 13th century, however, the duties of a more menial kind, previously performed by the esquire, fell upon the page, and an inferior servant called a *coustrel*, from the long knife with which he was armed; and the services of carrying the shield, &c., of the knight were performed by esquires only on occasions of state, and at tournaments, which continued to be the practice until the beginning of the 17th century. Esquires were, no doubt, disposed in battle, according to the orders of the commander of the army, or the marshal who acted under him; and although they, as well as the archers, *coustreliers*, &c., attended those knights to the muster, whose quota they formed, it is evident, that, once enrolled, they must have acted in that part of the army to which they were attached, and under the orders of that particular officer who happened to be appointed to command them.

This clearly appears in an ordinance of Henry VIII, "for a retinue of speres or men at arms," preserved in the Cottonian library, the very first statute of which says—"Every of the said gentlemen shall have his harneys complete, and all other habiliments mete and necessary for him, with two double horses at the leeste for himself and his page, convenient and necessary for a man of arms; also his

coustrell, with a javelin or demye-launce well armed and horsed as it appertayneth. And theye shall obeye, in every condicion, the captain that shall be ordeyned and deputed by the king's highness, or his deputie-lieutenant, to have the rule, conduite, and gov'nance of the men, in all things that they shall be commanded to doo in the king's behalf."

An esquire might accidentally find himself posted near his own knight, but there is no authority whatever for assuming that the esquires were invariably placed in rear of their respective knights, or that they bore no part in the battle.

However these esquires, animated by a noble desire for glory, sought opportunities of distinguishing themselves, in order to obtain the honorable order of knight-hood by some exceedingly gallant action.

Thus, if the enemy escaped the knights in the first rank, or was the conqueror, he fell into the hands of these brave youths.

So emulous a desire of glory led to the most brilliant actions.

Nothing was known of scientific movements until Charles the Bold, the warlike duke of Burgundy, compiled an exercise-book, in 1473. He taught the cavalry to attack in close and extended order, or to link horses and fight on foot.

An engagement was generally commenced by single brave knights going forward and challenging their opponents from the enemy's army, in order to raise the courage of their own side. The staff was, at that time, very simple: the commander-in-chief was the prince himself; under him was a field-marshal for the cavalry, a general for the infantry, and a master of the ordnance for the artillery.

Princes had, also, a marshal at the head of their households.

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There were no military writers at this period—nothing but the regulations of Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy—of Louis VII. of France, and the well known Zisca, general of the Hussites, have been transmitted to posterity.

The second period—from the campaigns of Charles VIII. in Italy, to the beginning of the wars of the Netherlands, or from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century, comprises the wars of the French, Spanish and Germans in Italy.

Chivalry gradually declined: the entire education of the nobility was directed to the formation of a warlike character. The sons of the knights served first as pages, and afterwards as esquires, in the courts of princes and celebrated knights. Their whole occupation consisted in making themselves acquainted with the use of arms, and the manners of a knight.

The transition from page to esquire was accompanied by certain solemnities, at which the new esquire was girded with a consecrated sword. The conferring of knighthood was still more ceremonious: the most important appendage was a pair of gold spurs.

Fauchet says that the knights' spurs were *gilt*, and that they alone were permitted to wear such spurs, "*mais aujou-d'huy*," he adds, "*ils sont aussi communs à tous ceux qui en peuvent acheter que la soye (jadis parement des Roys et Dames illustres) à toutes sortes de gens.*"

Origines des
Chevaliers,
&c.

Du Cange gives a long account of the ceremony attendant upon the making of a knight *hors de l'armée* which, it appears, was considerably modified when the army took the field, or a battle was expected. Froissart relates an amusing instance of a wholesale manufacture of knights, which took place at

Vironfosse :—The armies of Philip de Valois and Edward, king of England, were drawn up in order of battle, when a hare jumping up in the middle of the French army, caused such shouting amongst the soldiers, that those in the rear imagined the battle had commenced, and immediately several knights were made on the spot. The count de Haynault, says the historian, on his part, made fourteen ; however no battle took place, and these knights were ever after called "*les Chevaliers du Lièvre*."

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Knights had the power of conferring the honor of knight-hood, even upon those of the enemy's army. Père Daniel relates that when the earl of Suffolk was taken prisoner at the siege of Jargeau by William Renaud, he asked the victor before surrendering himself, "Are you a gentleman?" to which William replied that he was. "But are you a knight added the earl?" He answered "No." "I should like you to be a knight before I surrendered myself said the proud Chevalier, who accordingly dubbed his adversary on the spot, and then gave himself up as his prisoner."

Hist. Mil.
Franc.

During peace, the tournaments served the knights for practice ; here they fought with blunted weapons, for prizes which were given by ladies : other knights were placed ready to rush in between the combatants, if the sham-fight threatened to change into a real one.

The practice of converting the tournament into a deadly combat, occasioned an oath to be imposed upon all knights, that they would frequent tournaments solely to learn military exercises. This did not, however, prevent the occasional death of a knight on such occasions, which the priests, who were violently opposed to jousts and tournaments, always took care to record. Serious and fatal accidents also occurred :—The accidental death of Henry II. of France in 1559, at a tournament is supposed to have hastened considerably the decline of chivalry ; and when, in the following year, prince Henry de Bourbon-Montpensier was killed by his horse falling under him, while careering round the lists,

Du Cange on
Joinville.

Meyrick.

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Jeffry of
Monmouth.
lib. ix. c. 13.

Life of lord
Herbert of
Cherbury.
p. 70.

tournaments ceased altogether in France. The nature and effect of tournaments is thus described by a contemporary writer:—"Many knights famous for feats of chivalry were there, with apparel and arms of the same colour and fashion. They formed a species of diversion, in imitation of a fight on horseback; and the ladies being placed upon the walls of the castles, darted amorous glances on the combatants. None of these ladies esteemed any knight worthy of her love, but such as had given proof of his gallantry in three several encounters. Thus the valour of the men encouraged chastity in the women, and the attention of the women proved an incentive to the soldier's bravery." The French ladies were more unreasonable in their demands upon knightly valour than the fair dames described by Jeffry of Monmouth: In the life of lord Herbert of Cherbury, it is stated that his lordship was very much annoyed at Paris by a monsieur Balagny, who received more attention from the ladies than his lordship. They used, one after another, to invite him to sit near them, and when one lady had his company awhile, another would say:—"You have enjoyed him long enough; I must have him now;" and the reason of all this favour was that he had killed eight or nine men in single combat!

Thus was that courage formed, which never calculated the number of the enemy, but only the desire of fighting; and hence arose that equanimity in the greatest and most appalling dangers—that insensibility to bodily pain—those warlike virtues which after ages can only gaze at and admire, without possessing the strength of will to exercise in their own persons.

George Withers thus describes, in the person of Britannia, the feelings of the English nation on the decline of chivalry:

"Alas! who now shall grace my tournaments,
Or honor me with deeds of chivalry?
What shall become of all my merriments,
My ceremonies—shows of heraldry,
And other rites?"

Prince Henry's obsequies, El. 31.

England had not, however, so much reason for bewailing the departure of "mailed knight and trusty squire;" her armies possessed a far more effective force in the gallant archers. To them are we mainly indebted for the victories of Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. Here their unerring arrows, aimed at the horses of the French cavalry, threw the enemy's army into such confusion that the utmost efforts of the knights were unavailing. The Scotch men-at-arms also sustained a complete defeat from the English archers at the battle of Halidown hill in 1333.

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"Nor paused on the devoted Scot
The ceaseless fury of their shot;
As fiercely and as fast,
Forth whistling came the grey-goose wing,
As the wild hail stones pelt and ring
Adown December's blast."

SCOTT.

It is to be regretted that with the errors, the virtues also of those times have departed.

After Charles VII. in 1445, had established the first standing cavalry, consisting of fifteen *compagnies d'ordonnance*, and that other powers had followed this example, the practice of calling out the knights ceased of itself.

Charles VII. was very apprehensive as to the result of this experiment, in consequence of his inability to pay the troops, thus organized. He also feared that the officers and soldiers, with whose services he found it advisable to dispense, would form independent corps, as in the time of Charles V, and that he would therefore be compelled to employ force to disperse them. Both difficulties were fortunately overcome. The towns and provinces consented to bear the expenses of the establishment, and the remainder of the troops were prevented from organizing any systematic resistance to the government, by the provosts and marshals of the provinces posting themselves, with their archers, on the great roads, and preventing

Père Daniel.
i. 155.

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Père Daniel,
i. 155.

any union amongst the disbanded troops. These "*compagnies d'ordonnance*" consisted each of 100 lancers or men-at-arms; to each lance were attached three archers, one *coutillier* and a page; these formed the "*lance garnie*" and were all mounted; thus each company was composed of 600 men, and, consequently, the 15 companies amounted to 9,000 men, exclusive of volunteers, who often increased the company to 1,200. Each man-at-arms had four horses; one for his valet, another for its baggage; his war-horse, which, as well as his armour, always remained with the regiment, and a hack or pony for his journeys. Each archer had two horses; all the men-at-arms and some of the archers were gentlemen; the companies were commanded by captains, under whom was a lieutenant, and a guidon, or enseigne—situations which were always filled by persons of the highest birth.

The cavalry now consisted of hired soldiers, who were commanded by knights (officers). The heavy cavalry—the lancers or spearmen were still fully armed; they wore close helmets, with plumes and golden decorations, and still rode war-horses covered with iron plates.

The light cavalry appeared under various names and forms:—arquebusiers (*schützen*), light horse, *chevaux legers*, &c. These were lighter armed, and instead of lances, carried fire-arms.

Souldier's
accidence.

The light cavalry was known in England by the name of Hargobusiers or Arquebusiers, so called from the arquebus, with which they were armed. Markham, in his "*Souldiers Accidence*," says:—"the second sort of horsemen, of which many troops are compounded, are called hargobusiers or carbines; these men ought to be the best of the first inferior degree, &c.—For offensive armes they shall have an hargobus, of three feet three inches long, and the bore of 20 bullets to the pound," &c.

About this time the Venetians established a kind of light horsemen, who gave much trouble to the French;

these were the Albanians : they rode light Turkish horses, were dressed as Turks, and well knew how to use a sort of pike, of eleven feet in length. Their fame increased rapidly, and Louis XII. took two thousand of them into his service, when he marched against the Genoese.

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XII.

These light troops went by the name of *Estradiots* or *Stradiots* in France and Italy, and are thus described by Philip de Comines :—" *Estradiots sont gens comme Genetaires, vêtus a pied et à cheval comme Turcs, sauf la tête où ils ne portent cette toile qu' ils appellent turban ; et sont dures gens, et couchent dehors tout l'an et leurs chevaux. In a military work, attributed to M. de Langey, the pike used by these troops is called an "arzegaye, ou bâton ferré par les deux bouts."* With this, he states, they were enabled, when dismounted, " *de faire la fonction de piquiers contre la cavalerie.*" Père Daniel derives the name from the Greek word *σπαρῖον*, a soldier.

Philip de
Comines.

In Hungary appeared the hussars, who soon made themselves formidable. According to an ordinance issued about the middle of the fifteenth century, every *twentieth* man was obliged to take the field ; and these horsemen were called hussars from the Hungarian word *husz*, which signifies *twenty* : they have suffered little change since their first institution.

The designation "hussar" is derived from the Hungarian word "*husz*," the twentieth, and "*ar*" pay, because each twentieth house in Hungary found one trooper.

Nav. and Mil.
Gaz. May 27,
1854.

When the cavalry became a fixed standing corps its position for battle was changed. The Germans were the first to alter the mode of formation from one rank to masses, which long obtained, until it was evident that deep formations were of no advantage to cavalry.

The cavalry was not yet formed into regiments, but

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XII.

was divided into cornets, troops, or companies, commanded by a captain.

In forming up a body of troops for battle, they were placed as broad as long. The lancers occupied the first ranks and the flanks of the masses, behind which were placed the arquebusiers.

Père Daniel.
i. 233.

Père Daniel states, on the authority of the cavalier Melzo, that, whenever the ground permitted, the arquebusiers were always placed *before* the lancers, who did not advance until the former had fired, and given sufficient space by opening out. The lancers were then supported by the cuirassiers, behind whom another body of arquebusiers was placed.

To commence an engagement, or to reconnoiter the enemy, patroles were sent out, for which service every tenth arquebusier was taken. The infantry had also its patroles, which, uniting with those of the cavalry, formed a line in front of the army, under the protection of which the masses were placed in order of battle, and prepared for action.

As soon as the battle had actually commenced, these patroles, called by the French "*enfants perdus*," retired on both flanks, in order to cover them.

The "*enfants perdus*" were probably an imitation of the Roman *velites*, which were sent out in front of an army to skirmish before the battle commenced: They were not however, like the *velites*, a separate body of troops, but merely volunteers from the different corps of the army. Père Daniel tells us that it often happened that more offered their services than were required, in which case they drew lots "*pour ne point causer de jalousie, et ne point offenser ceux qu' on n'auroit point agréer.*"

Ibid. i. 234.

In modern warfare the "*enfants perdus*" of the French are the "forlorn hope" of the English, being volunteers selected to lead the assault upon a fortress or out-work.

The term cornet appears to have been formerly applied to any body of cavalry that was furnished with a cornet or standard. The word is evidently derived from the Italian *cornio*, which, in the *Vocabulario della crusca*, is stated to be "*una insegna di compagnia di cavalleria, ed è piccola e di forma quadra.*" Hence the application of the term to the officer who carried the standard. The strength of a "cornet of horse" appears to have varied from 100 to 300 men. In prince Maurice's "Instructions for the encampment of a regiment of horse," it is prescribed that "a cornet, containing 100 horsemen, must have a place of 300 feet deep and 70 broad," and that "a greater cornet, consisting of 140 heads (or it may be 150), must have a row of huts more," &c.

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Vocab. del.
crusc. voce
cornio.

Princip. of
art. military
practiced in
warres of
United Ne-
therlands.
p. 37.

Davila, speaking of the battle of Ivry (1590) says—"The duke of Mayenne, with his cornet and 400 gentlemen, which, in all made 700 horses," &c. The cavalry, at this time, seems to have been always enumerated by cornets:—"The king, having appointed 20 cornets of horse, and four regiments of foot for the duke, reserving all the rest of the army, which he was to lead himself," &c. The white cornet was the peculiar appendage of royalty: "The Sienr de Rodes, a youth of great expectation, who carried the royal white cornet." Markham again says, "the cornet shall carry, charged on his right thigh, his capitaine's cornet, which, (being a private captain), should be compounded of colour and metal impailed: the substance of the cornet should be of damaske," &c.—"If the cornet belong to a great officer, it shall then bee of one entire colour," &c.

Davila. B.
viii. 635.

n. 303.

Souldier's
accidence.

Such a squadron consisted of from two hundred to two hundred and fifty horses; from four to five squadrons were commanded by a colonel of horse; the colonels were under the orders of the field-marshal; the latter chose a substitute from among the colonels, called the lieutenant field-marshal; the pay was considerable, and sufficient to live upon:—

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The Colonel of 1000 horse received monthly.....	400	guldens.*
Lieutenant-colonel	100	„
Commissary	40	„
Colonel's Secretary.....	24	„
The Captain had half a guilder for each horse of his } squadron, hence for 250 horses.....	125	„
Lieutenant	40	„
Cornet.....	30	„
Chaplain and quarter-master each.....	16	„
Serjeant	40	„
Corporal	25	„
Private	12	„
Farrier, armourer, saddler, each	12	„
Trumpeter or kettle drummer	16	„

Harleian
MSS. No.
6844.

The pay of the British cavalry about this period, was much higher in proportion to the price of provisions than it is at present. The following list, taken from the Harleian MSS., shews the pay of both the heavy and light cavalry in the year 1557, reign of Philip and Mary :—

	Per diem.
General of the horsemen.....	£3 6 8
Captain of armed horsemen.....	0 10 0
Lieutenant	0 5 0
Standard bearer	0 3 4
Surgeon	0 2 0
Trumpeter and private, each	0 1 6
Captain of light horsemen	0 6 0
Lieutenant	0 3 0
Standard bearer	0 2 0
Surgeon and Trumpeter, each.....	0 1 6
Light horseman	0 1 0

At this time the average price of wheat, per quarter, was about ten shillings of our present money; and now (April 1855) the average price of wheat is from 71s. to 84s. per quarter.

Every colonel was also allowed eight halbardiers (*trabanten*) and every captain two, for each of whom they were further paid eight guldens. These halbardiers, or body-guards were very necessary at a time when the mercenaries were so disposed to mutiny.

* A guilder is about the value of two francs or one shilling and eight pence British.

In the reign of Elizabeth, the captain-general or commander-in-chief of the English army, was allowed 30 halbardiers for his body-guard; the general of cavalry, 15; and the captain-general of lances, 10. The halbardiers were paid eight pence per diem, and appear to have been most gaily attired.*

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XII.

Grose.

The third period of the art of war comprises the great war of independence of the Netherlands, from 1568 to the general suspension of arms in 1609.

Here fought on one side, art, and an army formed by the experience of more than fifty years' war, under the command of Charles V, and Philip II; and, on the other side, the Netherlanders, living only by trade and the arts of peace. These appeared a contemptible foe to the haughty Spaniards; but this very circumstance, and the continual arrear of pay on the Spanish side, was favourable to the Netherlanders. The war was protracted. In the same proportion as the Dutch were formed by the war, the discipline and bravery of the Spaniards were relaxed: this war was followed by great changes in tactics.

"Never," says Watson, "was there a more unequal contest, and never was the issue of any dispute more contrary to what the parties had reason to expect. On the one side, a people, consisting chiefly of manufacturers and merchants, inhabiting a country of small extent, and already much exhausted by a long continued exercise of tyranny and oppression: on the other, the richest monarch of the age, who was master of the most numerous and best disciplined forces, commanded by generals distinguished above their contemporaries by consummate skill in the art of war."

Watson's
hist. Philip
II. 428.

* "The duchess appointed him a guard of thirty halbardiers, in a livery of murrey and blue, to attend his person."—BACON.

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In this war the Netherlanders could not furnish the necessary number of lancers and spearmen, because, if no other reason existed, of the difficulty of procuring horses suitable to that service.

Pére Daniel adds another reason for lancers not being employed by prince Maurice :—" The attack of lancers," he says, " requires open and firm ground, whereas the country where the Netherlanders carried on war, was, for the most part, broken, and enclosed:" the extreme poverty of the Dutch, perhaps, also added to the difficulty.

Prince Maurice, therefore, did not give any lances to the horsemen who were at that time raised in Germany ; and endeavoured to counteract this disadvantage by making them more moveable ; he, therefore gave them long-stocked pistols. When the Spanish lancers charged, the German horsemen fired a volley :—then opened out quickly from the centre, and fell upon the attacking enemy with the sword from both flanks, which manœuvre was generally successful.

Davila. civ.
warres of
France. B. xi.
p. 901.

It was at the battle of Turnhout, 1597, that Maurice first introduced this practice, to which Grotius ascribes the great facility with which the Spaniards were overpowered ; for the victory was gained entirely by the horse, and the infantry only arrived in time to divide the spoil. It appears, however, that the general mode of attack practiced by the *Reiters*, was, after firing, to retire behind the army to which they were attached, and not, as stated in the text, to attack the enemy in flank with the sword. The principal cause of Henry's success at the battle of Ivry (1590) proceeded from the *Reiters* not being able to perform this manœuvre. " As soon," says Davila, " as they had discharged their pistols, they fell off, according to the custom of their discipline, turning to get behind the body of the army ; but, not having found the passage open, as by directions it should have been,—by

reason of the narrowness of the intervals between the squadrons—they rushed upon and disordered that great body of lances wherewith the duke of Mayenne followed them to charge the battell.” Their mode of attack is again alluded to by the same author, in describing the order of battle of the army of the League :—“ And before all were two squadrons of *Reiters*, led by the duke of Brunswick and Bassompier, who were to charge and wheel off after their wonted manner ; and so, passing between the two wings, should fall as a reserve, and rally themselves, in order that they might return more fresh unto the battell.”

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Davila. B. xi.
p. 897.

The prince called this cavalry, which contributed so much to his victories, *cuirassiers*, after the cuirass which the men wore as defensive armour : they had a “ cut and thrust ” sword.

The lance disappeared by degrees, but more from necessity—no war-horses being procurable—than from any acknowledged disadvantages of that weapon : on the contrary, the lance was called “ the queen of weapons,” * but it was considered only useful in the charge.

Fifty light horsemen were added to the cuirassier-squadrons, and called, after the weapon with which they were armed, *carabiniers*. The fire arm—carbine—which they used, was about four feet in length, and their principal weapon.

Père Daniel states, on the authority of M. de Montgomeri, that the carbineers, in the reign of Henry IV. of France, were attached to the *light-cavalry* : “ Un certain nombre étoit comme incorporé dans un compagnie de *chevaux legers* ou plutôt joint sans être du corps.” Again “ Ces carbins attachez à une companie de chevaux *legers* quelque fois

Hist. mil.
Franc. i. liv.
iv.

* “ La lance est la reine des armes pour la cavallerie.”

Mem. de Montecuculi, liv. i, c. ii.

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jusqu 'au nombre de cinquante," &c. They were placed, according to the same authority, on the left of a light-cavalry squadron, and advanced, on a signal from the captain, to within 200 paces of the enemy's squadron, if the latter was composed of lancers—if of cuirassiers, they moved a hundred paces further; they then fired by successive ranks, and retired in rear of the squadron to which they were attached.

They were drilled to load at full speed, and were required to hit their mark on horseback; the pistol was only to be used in case of necessity, and the sword only in close contact: their destination was to annoy the enemy at a distance.

These carbineers were placed on the flanks of the squadrons, and prepared the way for the charge by their effective fire, or endeavoured to avert the consequences of an unsuccessful charge.

The employment of carbineers led, at a later period, to the establishment of dragoons; for the carbineers, on rapid enterprises, were often obliged to take infantry behind them on their horses.

An example of this kind occurred in the operations of king Louis of Nassau on Bergen in Hennegau, when five hundred horsemen took an equal number of infantry behind them.

Prince Alexander of Parma, to obviate the inconvenience which attended placing two men upon the same horse, when, in 1552, he wished to surprise the duke of Alençon—mounted several companies of infantry upon pack horses, and thus hastened towards the enemy.

It being found advantageous to bring infantry quickly to any desired spot, in order thereby to effect a surprise, several divisions of the army were mounted. These

mounted foot soldiers were called *dragoons*, probably from a comparison with the imaginary monster, the *dragon*, when with burning match, and fire-arms slung obliquely across the shoulder, they rushed along with the rapidity of lightning.

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Père Daniel, who wrote in the time of Louis XV, says that dragoons are of French origin, and were first raised by the mareschal de Brisac in 1600. He supposes that they were called "*dragons*" from the velocity of their movements, and the rapidity with which they ravaged a country, thereby resembling the fabulous monster of that denomination. Sir James Turner, who published a book called "*Pallas Armata*" at the end of the reign of Charles II, says:—"For what they got the nomination of dragoons is not so easy to be told, but because, in all languages, they are called so, we may suppose they may borrow their name from dragon, because, a musqueteer on horseback, with his burning match, riding a gallop, as many times he doth, may something resemble that beast which naturalists call a fiery dragon."

"Dragoon," says Johnson, "n. s. (from the Roman *draconarii*), a kind of soldier that serves indifferently either on foot or horseback."

Todd's Johnson, voce dragoon.

Menage was the doctor's authority for this derivation, which he did not give himself the trouble to investigate, for Vegetius would have told him that the *draconarii* were standard bearers of the Roman cohorts:—"Dracones etiam per singulas cohortes a draconarii feruntur ad prælium." Furetière, by way of correcting Menage, says—the word dragoon is probably derived from the German *tragen* or *draghen*, which signifies infantry carried; to which Menage justly replies—*draghen* has no signification in German, and *tragen* does not mean infantry carried, but simply to carry.

Vegetius de re Mil. lib. ii. c. xiii.

Dict. Etymol.

"Le nom de dragon," says M. de Schauenburg, "paraît avoir été donné à cette arme, parce que les premières dragons, au plutot les premières fantassins qu'on a mis à cheval, portaient sur leurs casques l'effigie d'un dragon."

Tactique de la cavalerie. p. 225 Note.

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Communica-
tion of Sir
S. R. Meyrick,
bart. MSS.

The writer desirous of obtaining the true etymology of the word *dragoon*, which it appeared impossible to establish from so many conflicting authorities, consulted the late eminent antiquary, sir Samuel Rush Meyrick, LL.D. author of an elaborate and valuable work on Ancient Armour, to whose research he is indebted for the following apposite remarks and satisfactory derivation :—" It appears to me," says sir Samuel Meyrick, " that count von Bismark has adopted the *suppositions* of Père Daniel, and sir James Turner. This is not an uncommon mode of proceeding with historians, and often tends to mislead; for we frequently find that the progressive increase of a conjecture terminates at length in the assumption of a fact. Among many instances of the kind may be adduced an amusing one which originated in the reign of Henry IV :—Walsingham, a contemporary, states, that on the accession of that king, it was intended there should be a tournament at Windsor Castle, and that the friends of Richard II, meant, on that occasion, to destroy him; a later writer, improving upon this, says that the tournament absolutely took place; and Hall, in the reign of Henry VIII, to complete the story, actually describes the costume and equipment of the combatants!"

" Let us, however, seek for earlier authority than Père Daniel, and sir James Turner, on the subject of *dragoons*." Markham, who published his "Souldier's Accidence" in 1645, speaking of dragoons, says, " And for offensive armes, they have a fayre *dragon*, fitted with an iron work, to be carried in a belt of leather, which is buckled over the right shoulder, and under the left arm, having a turnell of iron with a ring, through which the piece runneth up and downe, and these dragons are short pieces of sixteen inches the barrell, and full musquet bore, with fire locks or snap-haunces." " Grose illogical says :—' this piece derived its name from the species of soldiers by whom it was carried,' whereas the converse of this is the truth. The *carbineers* were so called from the carbine; the *lanciers* from the lance; the *bombadiers* from the bombard; the *engineers* from the engines, &c.;

and so the *dragoniers*, as they were sometimes called, or dragoons, from the *dragon*."

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A dragon nearly similar to the weapon described by Markham, forms part of sir Samuel Meyrick's valuable collection of ancient armour, now collected at the beautiful castellated residence of Goderich-Court. Except in the length of the barrel, which is only eleven instead of sixteen inches, it entirely corresponds with the above details, having a wheel-lock (often called a firelock before the invention of modern fire-arms) and the muzzle being formed by a monster's head. Markham speaks of the year 1645, and from the costume upon the dragon, in the Meyrick collection, it appears to have belonged to about the year 1600, which will account for the difference of size. Sir Samuel Meyrick infers that it was called *dragon* from the formation of the muzzle, because the culverine (*colubrina*) serpentine, falcon, falconet, &c., were so denominated from the heads of those animals being the respective ornaments at the mouth. These were taken from the tubes for ejecting the Greek fire, which were similarly embellished; and from the annoyance which they gave the crusaders, gave rise to the stories about knights, and what sir James Turner says "*naturalists* (!) call a fiery dragon."

Personal
Observation.

Sir S. R. Mey-
rick, MSS.

A full description of the dragon in the Meyrick collection, accompanied by a beautiful engraving, will be found in "Skelton's Illustrations of Arms and Armour," a publication which does infinite credit to the artist; and as it contains correct delineations of, perhaps, the most perfect collection of antient armour in existence, is of inestimable value to the historian and antiquary.

They always fought on foot, and only left with their linked horses a certain guard. We find them first under this name at a reconnoissance which Henry IV. as king of Navarre, made, with four hundred light cavalry and five hundred dragoons.

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The German cavalry of the prince of Orange was the model; it was imitated on all sides. The northern nations were the last to adopt the change, and remained long fighting man to man. Nay the Swedes, Danes, and Norwegians, trained their horses to take part in the fight by biting and kicking. Horse fights were kept up as bull fights in Spain, and the knight of the victorious horse obtained the prize.

The pay during the Netherlands' war of more than forty years, was very liberal. With the Spaniards the field-marshal had, monthly, five hundred crowns or French dollars; and, as commander of a squadron, eighty-six crowns in addition.

The fourth period comprises the thirty years' war, the *pretext* for which, according to Bulow, was the "happiness of heaven," but the *motive* the goods of the earth—from 1618 to 1648.

Principle and political attachment appear to have been utterly disregarded by the gallant cavaliers of the 30 years' war. The country, which afforded the best prospect of plunder, was readily adopted as the fatherland, and patriotism, with a most accommodating versatility of sentiment, immediately transferred its exertions to the new cause. "A cavalier of honour," says captain Dalgetty, "is free to take any part which he may find most convenient for his own peculiar;" and the party chosen by these honorable cavaliers, was always that which afforded the best pay and the most plunder.

"For pleas of right let statesmen vex their head,
Battle's my business, and my guerdon bread;
And with the sworded Switzer I can say,
The best of causes is the best of pay."

DONNE.

Such was the principle of the times, and the difficulty sometimes of supplying this only security for adherence, led to the most frightful excesses, which the commanders were obliged to tolerate, as the only means of appeasing their mutinous troops. Banner was frequently unable either to pay or feed his army, and was thus reduced to the painful necessity of conniving at the commission of every crime which lust or rapacity could inspire.

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Galetti.

When peace had been restored to the exhausted nations, by a cessation of hostilities for only nine years—which arose after the great war of the Netherlands had devastated the banks of the Rhine for above half a century—a new war broke out, which can only be considered a continuation of the former war.

As in the one, Maurice of Orange, so in the other, Gustavus Adolphus was the creator of new tactics.

Gustavus Adolphus made a greater progress in tactics and the art of war in general, than any commander before or since his time: He first introduced that order and regularity in military operations, which insured a unity of action, and prevented the confusion which previously frequently arose from the failure or disorder of particular divisions of an army. With him did the idea originate of clothing soldiers well and regularly. Tilly's doctrine, on the other hand, was "a ragged soldier and a bright musquet," following the maxim of the antients—"Horridum militam esse decet." Gustavus exceeded all his contemporaries in the science of an engineer; he reduced the enormous regiments of 2,000 and 3,000 men, to 1,200, and afterwards as in later times, to 1,000; the invention of the column is attributed to him—also the system of firing by platoons; the use of leathern portable artillery, and the substitution of pouches for bandoliers. He first thinned the enormous depth of ranks—established regular pay—founded a manu-

Harte's
Gustavus
Adolphus.

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factory of arms—improved the field-service of the cavalry—reduced the musquet to the carbine—changed the armour into head and breast pieces—reformed the matchlock, and abolished the pike.

It is remarkable, that although each of the generals of Gustavus was brought up by him—and although those who were opposed to him were constant witnesses of his military skill, yet, after his death, the art of war declined ; nor was it until the days of Montecuculi and Turenne, that it exhibited any sign of re-animation.

The lance had entirely disappeared. When Gustavus entered Germany, the Swedish cavalry consisted of cuirassiers and dragoons.

The Imperial cavalry consisted of cuirassiers, carbineers, dragoons and hussars. The hussars were magnificently dressed. Not only the head-gear of the horse—the pistols, sabre, and tasche, but also the buttons on the pelisses and jackets, were of solid silver, besides being otherwise richly decorated : they wore herons' feathers in their caps.

The Polish hussars in the reign of Charles XII, appear to have even exceeded the above description :—" They march," says Voltaire, " attended by several valets who lead their horses, which are adorned with bridles plaited with silver and silver nails, embroidered saddles ; saddle-bows and stirrups gilt, and sometimes made of massive silver, with large housings trailing after the Turkish manner." These soldiers are only to be equalled, in modern times, by the emperor of Austria's body-guard, whose splendid equipment, and purely parade duty, has obtained for them the *soubriquet* of Silk hussars (*Seiden husaren*.) This theatrical costume may have the effect of ensuring recruits amongst the idle lovers of tinsel and pageantry, but like much modern cavalry finery, is altogether inconsistent with practical soldier-

ing, and too much of mere show—unconnected with any useful purpose, is still retained in the equipment of our cavalry.

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"That puny fop trimmed *cap-à-pied*
Who loves in the saloon to shew
The arms that never knew a foe,
Whose sabre trails along the ground,
Whose legs in shapeless boots are drown'd,
A new Achilles—sure the steel
Fled from his heart to fence his heel.

* * * * *
Who comes in foreign trashery
Of tinkling chain and spur,
A walking haberdashery
Of feathers, lace, and fur."

SCOTT.

There are many articles of equipment in our cavalry, which are not only useless but positively detrimental, and appear for the most part to have had their origin in the notion that a gaudy appearance is indispensable to the mounted soldier. The shabraque, for instance—sheep-skin—heavy helmet, bear-skin cap, or tschako—heavy shoulder ornaments—hussar pelisse—originally of use as an over-garment, but now reduced to so small a size that the wearer acts in the capacity of a clothes peg—all these might be discontinued with great advantage both to the dragoon and his horse. The shabraque is positively injurious; it keeps the horses' loins and flanks in a state of constant perspiration when moving rapidly in warm weather, and collects dirt; the sheep-skin keeps up perpetual irritation; the heavy helmet of the dragoons—bear-skin cap of the Greys and hussars, as well as the tschakos of the so-called light dragoons, are all top-heavy, weighty and inconvenient, and the heavy shoulder ornaments render the wearing of the cloak so oppressive and painful, that men would rather get wet through than submit to the pressure. The hussar pelisse, we are told, protects the left arm; but the left arm would be able to protect itself if disencumbered of this extra clothing—more particularly when the dragoon is called upon to use his carbine—a moment when the greatest freedom of the arm is required.

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An imitation of this cavalry was commenced ; and the division into regiments, originating in Germany, became general. About this time mounted musqueteers and fusileers were established in France, where they received arms furnished with the then invented flint-lock.

In consequence of this lock having been first used in the army, by the French, it received the name of *French-lock*.

Meyrick's
Crit. Inq.

The lock mentioned in the text is, no doubt, that known in England as fire-lock, and supposed to have been invented in France, about the year 1630 ; but of this invention there is no satisfactory account : indeed it is difficult to fix the exact periods at which any of the improvements in fire arms have taken place, for we constantly find both the old lock and its successor in use at the same time. Although the fusil, for example, was introduced into the French army in the reign of Louis XIII, there are yet plates of Louis XIVth's soldiers armed with match-locks. It is, therefore clear, that the fire-lock was at that period, by no means in general use in the French army, and the observations of the duke of Albemarle on military affairs, compiled in 1646, shew that the English were almost as slow in its adoption ; yet the original portrait of a republican officer, said to be cornet Joyce, in the Meyrick collection, represents him carrying a fire-lock pistol. It is, however evident, that the duke of Albemarle was aware of the discovery of the fire-lock, although he does not appear to have considered it any great improvement upon the *snaphance*, for in page 34, of his " observations," he says, " the lieutenant of the ordnance and others should have companies of fire-locks or *snaphances*," &c.

The *snaphance* is supposed to have originated with some Dutch poachers, who could not afford to purchase the wheel-lock, and were apprehensive that the match-lock would expose their nightly maraudings ; they called it *snaphaens*, from the low Dutch word *snap*, to steal, and *han* a fowl. Exact delineations of these several locks will be found in " Skelton's Illustrations of Arms and Armour."

Until the middle of the thirty years' war, it was still the practice to form cavalry in from four to eight ranks; but Gustavus Adolphus departed from this rule, and fixed it, once for all, in three ranks.

According to Harte, who is celebrated for correctness of detail, the last change which Gustavus made in the formation of his cavalry for action, was that of placing it in *four ranks*. Speaking of the battle of Lützen, he says:—"It was the king's custom, at this period, to make his battle lines only *four deep* in cavalry, and six in infantry."

Harte Hist.
Gust. Adolph.

In the intervals, platoons of infantry, fifty and upwards strong, were placed, as well as light guns.

The author appears to have generally inferred, that the practice of placing bodies of infantry between those of cavalry, originated with Gustavus Adolphus, but there are many authorities to shew that it is of much older date. The Greeks employed this disposition of their troops; the Alemanni, who fought chiefly on horseback, rendered their cavalry more formidable, by the introduction of light infantry amongst the horsemen, selecting from the bravest and most active of the youth, "whose frequent exercise," says Gibbon, "had inured them to accompany the horsemen on the longest march, the most rapid charge, or the most precipitate retreat." The mixture of infantry with cavalry was constantly practiced by Hannibal; Xantippus thus opposed Regulus at the battle of Tunis, and the Romans, after the battle of Cannæ, followed the same system. At the battle of Pavia, in 1525, 1,500 Spanish arquebusiers, placed amongst the squadrons, were the sole cause of the defeat of the famous French *gens d'armes*. At the battle of Ivry (1590), Davila states that "the king knowing the enemy's army abounded with a number of lancers, &c., divided his cavalry into many squadrons to render the encounter of the lancers less effectual; to every body of horse he joined squadrons of foot, to the end that the hail of small shot

Gibbon. i.
806.

Folard.

Davila. B. xi.
p. 893.

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might not only favour his own men in the encounter, but that, falling among the enemy's it might make them weaker" &c., "which remedy," the historian adds, "did that day give proof how considerable it was in effect." Gustavus Adolphus, therefore, acted on the encouragement of all these examples, and he was thus enabled to withstand the formidable Austrian cuirassiers, at the battle of Leipsic. The duke of Weimar, and all the pupils of Gustavus, followed the same plan; Montrose imitated these; Turenne made the same disposition at Sintsheim, in 1674, and afterwards at Ensheim; and lastly, Frederick the Great, in imitation of his predecessors,—but with less success,—placed platoons of infantry between his squadrons of cavalry, at the battle of Mollwitz.

When the advancing enemy was thrown into disorder by the effective fire of the musqueteers and guns, the cavalry rushed upon the enemy, sword in hand, and generally overthrew him. This disposition was well calculated to oppose the Imperial cavalry, which, being heavily armed, could move but slowly. In order to be still more superior to this cavalry, the king ordered his troopers, as soon as the Austrians were in motion, to charge them quickly, sword in hand. He did not allow of those half-wheels, half-halts and caracoles, on which, according to Wallenhausen, the cavalry of that time prided themselves over much, and the design of which was to draw on them the first fire of the enemy; but was justly of opinion, that the quicker a line of cavalry falls on the enemy the less it will suffer from his fire.

Monro, his expedition with the worthy Scots' regiment, called Mac-Kaye's regiment.

Caracoling was, however, still adopted for particular purposes, as shewn by Monro, who relates that "His Majestie commanded out the most part of his cavalerie, to make a *caracolle* betwixt us and Berleine, fearing general Tillie, with his armie, might come behind whiles we were engaged with the towne."

The Imperial cavalry profited by dear-bought experience, and at Pfaffenhofen, in 1633, the Lorraine cuirassiers defeated the cavalry of the Elector Palatine at the very first charge.

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On particular occasions they returned to the charge, in deep formations. In the engagement at Jankowitz, in 1645, the Swedish general Douglas formed a column of attack of three squadrons, placed one behind the other, in order to overthrow an Imperial regiment of infantry, which had long withstood the attacks of the Swedes; and his object was accomplished.

There does not appear to be any certain information as to the pay of the troops at this period; thus much only we know, that a higher rate of payment existed for the cavalry than for the other arms of the service.

Harte gives some account of the pay during the 30 years' war, which, taking into account the price of the necessaries of life at the two periods, was comparatively much higher than at present. The colonel of a Swedish regiment of infantry received about £380 per annum; a lieutenant-colonel half that sum; a captain £128 per annum; a private something under six pence a day. The Imperial pay was higher: a colonel of cavalry had nearly £800 a year; a lieutenant-colonel £200; a private cuirassier 11d. per diem; a private of infantry 5½d. per diem. The pay of the Imperial army, however, was subject to constant stoppages, and generally, very irregular, which rendered, perhaps, the service of Gustavus equally lucrative. "Howbeit," as captain Dalgetty says, "a cavalier of fortune might thrive indifferently well in the Imperial service, in respect his private casualties are nothing so closely looked to as by the Swede; and so that an officer did his duty in the field, neither Wallenstein, Pappenheim, nor old Tilly before them, would likely listen to the objections of boors or burghers, against any com-

Harte Hist.
Gust. Adolph.

De Foe, Mem.
Cav.

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mander or soldado by whom they chanced to be somewhat closely shorn." In fact the Austrian commanders endeavoured to compensate the soldiers for their want of pay, by permitting them to ravage the country, and rob the inhabitants.

The fifth period in the history of Cavalry comprises the wars of the French in Italy, Germany, and the low countries; as well as the northern and Turkish wars—a period of ninety years, namely, from 1648 to 1738.

The thirty years' war and that of the Netherlands had lasted nearly one hundred years, when they were finally terminated by the peace of Westphalia. Germany, inexhaustible in her resources, had been devastated in all directions.

The results of this conflict were:—For the princes—secularization of ecclesiastical property; for religion—wavering faith; for the priesthood—entrance into civil life by marriage; for the people—greater mental freedom.

Standing armies were the immediate consequence of a war of such long continuance.

During these five periods, two hereditary enemies became conspicuous in Germany—the Turks and the French.

The former by their attacks on the Imperial house of Austria;—the latter by their attacks on Germany itself, and their inflexible intention to make the Rhine their boundary.

The French now made a greater advance in tactics than any other nation. The aggressive wars of Louis XIV, quickly developed the art of carrying on war. Generals were formed, who shine in military history. Opposed to a French Turenne, Luxembourg, and Condé, stand Montecuculi, Marlborough, and Eugene of Savoy.

A remarkable similarity of circumstances was attendant upon the lives of Turenne and Montecuculi:—They were nearly of the same age; they had the same sort of education; both served as private soldiers before they obtained commissions; and they were alike gifted with extraordinary genius, judgment, presence of mind and coolness of temper. Having become captains by study, they fought by rule, and seldom left anything to fortune; they were both adored by their respective troops, who always appeared to be more inspired by love for the general than duty to the sovereign. These two commanders esteemed and feared each other; neither could hope to derive advantage from the errors of his opponent; and both alone depended for victory upon their personal genius and military skill. When Montecuculi heard of Turenne's death he is reported to have said—"A man has died who was an honour to mankind."

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Hist. of mar-
shal Turenne.

"Turenne," says Alison, "first applied to the military art the resources of prudent foresight, deep thought, and profound combination. His methodical and far-seeing campaigns in Flanders, Franche-Comté, Alsace and Lorraine, added these valuable provinces of France, which have never since been lost. His conquests have proved more durable than those of the great Emperor, all of which were lost during the lifetime of their author."

Alison's life
of Marlbo-
rough. ii. 379.

Condé, on the other hand, was the personification of chivalry. Like Clive or Alexander, he burned for fame; and in the promotion of this object, no difficulties or dangers could deter him. Cavalry was, therefore, the arm which suited his genius, and in the employment of which he took the greatest delight. He destroyed the Spanish infantry at Rocroy and Lens by charges of the French horse as skilfully directed as those by which Hannibal overthrew the Roman legions at Cannæ and Trasimenus.

Ibid. 280, 381.

"Marlborough united the combinations of Turenne to the daring of Condé." To his combined intrepidity and

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Alison's life
of Marlbo-
rough. ii. 382.

quickness in bringing up the reserves at the decisive moment, all his wonderful victories may be ascribed. Combination was his forte; and in this he was not exceeded by Napoleon. Like Wellington he united prudence and boldness to a high degree. His campaigns bear a closer resemblance to those of Hannibal than to those of any modern general, while his winning manners retained unwilling multitudes around his standard—held in subjection by nothing but the strong bond of admiration for their general, and a desire to share in his triumphs.

Ibid. i. 77,
79.

Eugene differed from the other three commanders. He was neither methodical nor scientific; his genius had more analogy with that of the Tartar chiefs and Oriental daring. He was as prodigal of the blood of his soldiers as Napoleon, but never hesitated to expose his own person to the same dangers. Column after column, often headed by himself, was hurried on to the attack, and it was by the unsparing use of that formidable system, that he achieved his astounding successes. At the great battle of Zenta, before mentioned, he surprised and totally defeated Kara Mustapha, at the head of 120,000 Turks—killed or wounded 20,000 of the enemy—drove 10,000 into the river—took their whole artillery and standards, and entirely dispersed the remainder. Eugene shared with Marlborough the glorious victory of Blenheim; and on the 7th of September 1706, with only 30,000 men stormed the intrenchments around Turin, defended by 50,000 French, totally defeating marshal Marsin and the duke of Orleans, and driving the French armies across the Alps.

Louis of Baden, fortunate against the Turks, was less so against the French; however he was equal to a Vendome, Catinat, &c. Louis XIV, who, for a hero, dedicated too much time to the ladies, luckily for Germany, committed monstrous errors. The choice of his generals, influenced by a Maintenon, proves very

clearly that he did not possess the qualification of discerning military talent, and placing it in an appropriate sphere. CHAP.
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This observation does not appear very logical, as the power of discriminating talent is quite consistent with the weakness which yields to female influence. Turenne, Condé, and Vauban did honor to the judgment of Louis XIV, and there never was a man who possessed to a higher degree the quality of discerning and selecting merit in the public service. "His discriminating eye," says the eloquent biographer of Marlborough, "selected the genius of Vauban which invented, as it were, the modern system of fortification, and well nigh brought it to its greatest elevation, and raised to the highest command that of Turenne which carried the military art to the most consummate perfection." Alison's life
of Marlbo-
rough. i. 55.

Feuquières gives an interesting description of these ill-chosen generals of Louis XIV :—Rochefort and Humière held the chief command, because the minister of war, Louvois, was their friend ; Sourdis, Villeroi and others were obliged to be recalled ; La Troussé only escaped this fate by death ; Feuillade cost the king of Spain the Italian provinces, and the king of France monstrous sums of money, his heavy artillery, and more than twenty-five thousand men ; Bouffleurs lost Cologne, Liege, the Meuse, Guelderland and Limburg, and retired ; Tallard lost Bavaria by the battle of Höchstedt, and luckily for France, was taken prisoner ; Tessé, who was sent to the assistance of Spain, brought that kingdom to the brink of destruction.

The cavalry underwent little change during this period. Louis XIV established mounted-grenadiers, his brilliant guards can only be considered remarkable on account of the immense sums of money which they cost.

CHAP.
XII.Grose. Mil.
Antiq. vol. i.
Mil. Lib. v. 2.

A corps similar to that of the French *grenadiers à cheval* existed in the British service, in the reign of James II. They were called "horse-grenadiers," and acted as a company of grenadiers did to a regiment of infantry, being armed with musquets and hand-grenades. When brought into action, they dismounted, linked their horses, fired and then threw their grenades by ranks—the centre and rear ranks advancing through the intervals of their file leaders.

After the revolution and disbanding of the army in 1698, the English cavalry consisted of life-guards, horse-grenadier-guards, horse and dragoons, until 1746, when a regiment of light dragoons was raised. In the same year the third and fourth troops of horse guards were disbanded, and three regiments of horse reduced to the pay and service of dragoons. The latter, as some compensation for their loss of pay, received the title of *dragoon-guards*, and were given precedence over all dragoons. In the year 1788 four regiments of Irish horse were similarly reduced and placed on the same establishment. The first regiment of Irish horse consequently became the 4th regiment of dragoon-guards, and the 4th regiment of Irish horse the 7th dragoon-guards: thus were formed the four regiments of dragoon-guards now in the British service.

These regiments of Irish horse were also known by the distinctions of blue, black, green, &c., according to the colour of their *facings*.

A captain of the *Garde du corps* had twenty-four thousand livres per annum: * these guards consisted of troops of all arms, and appeared very brilliant on parade.

The rest of the cavalry selected out of the squadrons the best shots, who acting as riflemen, with rifled-arms, and were destined by individual effective fire, to annoy the enemy *even when still distant*.

* About £1000 sterling.

The strength of regiments varied in the different armies; the Austrians had the strongest, varying from twelve to eighteen hundred horses: amongst other nations the establishment fluctuated between four and nine hundred horses: the Swedish regiments under Charles XII, amounted throughout to one thousand horses.

During this period, the torch of war blazed in the north of Europe, at various intervals. Swedes, Poles, Brandenburgians, Muscovites—fought alternately on the plains of Poland and the steppes of the Ukraine. Charles XII, that chivalrous monarch, rejected all defensive arms, so that his cavalry, with which he produced such great results, consisted almost entirely of dragoons. He, whose restless warlike character always pressed forward, was not contented with making his cavalry—without any connexion or dependence upon other arms; but solely from confidence in itself and without firing—charge the enemy's cavalry at full speed; he led it equally against intrenchments and batteries and always with success.

This intrepid monarch knew that by rapidity of motion, the natural vivacity of the majority of mankind is increased; and often mounting to a blind fury, and fool-hardy enthusiasm, leaves no time for consideration or calculation of danger—that, at such a moment, death loses its terrors, and *Victory*—but with living colours, presents itself to the soul of the wildly rushing warrior.

Charles XII king of Sweden was the most remarkable sovereign and soldier in modern times, and rivalled in his short but brilliant career, the great conquerors of antiquity.

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He dictated peace to Denmark at Copenhagen, dethroned the king of Poland, and nearly overturned the vast empire of Russia by the unparalleled victory of Narva, where 9,000 Swedes routed 60,000 Muscovites.*

Alison's Life
of Marlbo-
rough. i. 294.

The character of Charles is thus admirably epitomized by the eminent biographer to whose labours and genius the present work is so much indebted:—"More nearly than Napoleon, he realized the heroes of Plutarch. A stoic in pacific he was a Cæsar in military life. He had all the virtues, and a considerable share of the barbarism of antiquity. Achilles did not surpass him in the thirst for warlike renown, nor Hannibal in the perseverance of his character, and the fruitfulness of his resources: like Alexander, he could have wept because a world did not remain to conquer. Almost unconquerable by fatigue, resolute in determination, and a lion in heart, he knew no fear but that of his glory being tarnished. Endowed by nature with a dauntless soul—a constitution of iron, he was capable of undergoing a greater amount of exertion than any of his soldiers. At one time he rode across Germany almost alone, in an incredibly short space of time; at another, he defended himself for days together, at the head of a handful of attendants, in a barricaded house, against 20,000 Turks. Wrapt up in the passion for fame, he was insensible to the inferior desires which usually rouse or mislead mankind. Wine had no attractions—woman no seductions for him; he was indifferent to personal comforts or accommodations; his fare was as simple—his dress as plain—his lodging as rude, as those of the meanest of his followers. To one end only his attention was exclusively directed—on one acquisition alone his heart was bent. Glory, military glory was the ceaseless object of his ambition: all lesser desires were concentrated in this ruling passion; for this he lived, for this he died.

* The Russians were in about equal force at Inkermann, (Nov. 5, 1854), when they were successfully resisted by 8,000 British; and the arrival of 5,000 French, under Bosquet, determined the action in favour of the allies.

"No joys to him pacific sceptres yield,
 War sounds the trump, he rushes to the field.
 Behold surrounding kings their power combine,
 And some capitulate and some resign.
 Peace courts his hand, but spreads her charms in vain:
 'Think nothing gained,' he cries, 'till nought remain,
 On Moscow's walls till Gothic standards fly,
 And all be mine beneath the Polar sky!'

* * * *

His fall was destined to a barren strand,
 A petty fortress and a dubious hand:
 He left a name at which the world grew pale,
 To paint a moral, or adorn a tale."

Johnson's Vanity of Human Wishes.

The Turks, who by their invasion of Hungary produced a sensation, had a numerous cavalry, which never made an attack, but in swarms of from five to six thousand.

Dexterity in the use of their crooked sabre, united with the highest degree of activity and rapidity on their horses, gave them a determining superiority, and generally the victory. However, the power of withstanding them was acquired, and, at present, they do not enjoy much consideration.

The sixth period includes the three Silesian wars, namely, from the beginning of the first Silesian war, to the first campaign of the French revolutionary war, or from 1740 to 1790. The other wars which happened at this time are unimportant in the history of cavalry.

Prussia appears, for a century, to have been only employed in preparing herself for the brilliant part which she acted under Frederick II.

To the great elector, Frederick William, the Prussian military power is indebted for its origin. The count von Schwartzenberg sent him away from the court under the pretext of making a general of him; but in reality,

CHAP. for the purpose of getting rid of a dangerous rival. He
 XII. grew up, as it were, in a camp, and even in his boyish days, was present at the sieges of Breda and the Schenkenschantze.

Arrived at the government, the Elector endeavoured to infuse a new spirit into the army:—was enabled, in 1672, to promise the republic of Holland, an auxiliary force of twenty thousand men, and left behind him, at his death, a well-organized army of nearly thirty thousand.

When Frederick the Great ascended the throne he found the army about eighty thousand strong. With this army, which, under Leopold of Dessau, had become drilled to a degree of precision in movement until then unknown, and to an unusual facility in the loading and firing of musquets—he entered upon the theatre of his deeds in 1740.

Alison's life
 of Marlbo-
 rough. ii. 406.

Frederick found the army 60,000 men, but augmented it to 80,000; he also found the equally important element of a large accumulation of money in the exchequer, and was thus placed in a position most favourable to his ambition and enterprise. But the prince of Dessau, has the merit of all the previous organization of the army, and to his exertions Frederick was mainly indebted for the means which enabled him to figure with so much brilliancy on the theatre of war. The prince of Dessau invented the iron ramrod and the equal step, both of which improvements so materially contributed to his success at Mollwitz; he also reduced the formation of the infantry from four to three ranks, and thus increased the effect of musquet fire.

Ibid. ii. 406. It is remarkable that Frederick, like Wellington, was unfortunate in his personal bearing on the first occasion he was under fire:—"he fled," says the historian, "from the field of Mollwitz at the very first repulse of his cavalry;" and

was already seven miles off, ensconced in a mill, when he received intelligence that his troops had regained the day; and at the entreaties of general Schwerin, he returned to the field.

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XII.

The two first wars passed quickly by: Frederick had also powerful allies; but when the third Silesian war had broken out, in 1756, the king, forsaken by almost all his allies, stood alone, unmoved as the oak braving the storm.

On one side, his natural *coup d'œil*—the unity and power of his will—the habit of his troops to remain firm in all situations—to execute every movement, even in the tumult of battle, with an admirable precision—the never-shaken confidence in their kingly leader—the enthusiasm produced by having such a king at their head, whose brilliant genius regarded all—and, on the other side, the division, weakness, and unconnectedness of the enemy's plans of operation—their partial and lukewarm mode of execution—enabled Frederick II, to retire from this bloody seven years' conflict, crowned with fame, and without loss of territory.

This would be saying little for the result of Frederick's campaigns. Silesia, the most valuable part of the Prussian territory, was wholly regained by him; and the peace of Hubertsburg, in February 1763, besides confirming the conquest of that important province, left entire the whole dominions of Prussia. "No words," says Alison, "can paint the enthusiasm of the spectators at the entrance of Frederick into Berlin, after six years' absence His like had never been seen since the fall of the Roman empire. He had founded and saved a kingdom. He had conquered Europe in arms. With six millions of subjects he had vanquished powers possessing 90 millions. He had created

Alison's life
of Marlbo-
rough, ii. 421.

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Alison's life
of Marlbo-
rough. ii. 432,
434.

a new era in the art of war. His people had come victorious out of a struggle unparalleled in modern times Before his death his subjects had been doubled—the national wealth made triple of what it had been at the beginning of his reign ; and Prussia now boasts of 16,000,000 of inhabitants, and a population increasing faster in numbers than that of any other state in Europe.”

Ibid. ii. 423.

Napoleon's celebrated campaign of 1814, when he sustained the attacks of 250,000 enemies with the comparatively small force of 70,000, can alone be compared with those of Frederick ; but this was a solitary instance : The Prussian monarch did continuously for six campaigns what the French emperor did only in one. The troops of Frederick in five years fought seventeen pitched battles ! At one time four huge armies, each stronger than his own, advanced to crush him, but with 25,000 of his shattered battalions, he marched against 60,000 of the French and Austrian forces under Soubise, and gained the famous battle of Rosbach. With a nearly similar inequality of forces he fought the memorable battle of Leuthen, (Dec. 5, 1757,) defeating Daun and the prince of Lorraine, with the loss of 30,000 men, 18,000 of whom were prisoners. “ No man ever made more skilful use of an interior line of communication, or flew with greater rapidity from one threatened part of his dominions to another. None ever, by the force of skill in tactics and sagacity in strategy, gained such astonishing successes with forces so inferior His deeds as a general were more extraordinary than those of Napoleon, because he bore up longer against greater odds.”

These remarkable events form a peculiar ever-memorable period in the history of war. Frederick rose above all prejudice—became the creator of new tactics, and made his army a model for all others.

He began with formation : the infantry was placed in three, the cavalry in two ranks ; between the squadrons were intervals of from nine to eighteen feet : in formations

on perfect plains the king would allow no intervals, and the charges were then made *en muraille*.

At the commencement of the seven years' war, the regiments of heavy cavalry amounted to eight hundred and eighty-one effective horses: those of hussars to sixteen hundred and fifty-three horses: the former were divided into five—the latter into ten squadrons.

With regard to the formation and arming of the cavalry, every nation followed different principles; the hussars alone remained everywhere alike, according to their original Hungarian model.

Generally, however, all cavalry carried carbines and pistols; the straight sword was the usual side arm. That worn by the Prussian cuirassiers and dragoons weighed two pounds three quarters without the scabbard; the blade was thirty-eight inches and a quarter long: the side arm of the Imperial cavalry weighed two pounds and three-eighths: the straight blade was thirty-six inches long.

Much has been said by cavalry reformers about the length and form of the sword, and the present "regulation" sword is unquestionably very defective; but we apprehend that the main point for attention—whether with a crooked sabre or a "cut and thrust" sword is the *sharpness of the edge*. The heavy dragoons of the German legion did good service with the old straight sword at Garcia Hernandez and the Venta del Poço, as did the Household and Union brigades at Waterloo; while the 3d, 10th, 15th, 19th, and the 1st and 3d hussars of the legion, as well as other British light dragoon regiments, both in India and the Peninsula, did equal execution with the sabre.* But no form can compen-

* The Journal of an officer of the 3d hussars of the king's German legion describing the wounds inflicted by the British sabre, (with which that regiment was armed,) at Benavente, in 1808, says, that "arms were cut off—heads split to the neck, and

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Siborne. 171,
260.

Cavalry, its
history and
tactics. p. 106.

sate for the *bluntness of the edge*, and until our cavalry swords are either carried in leather scabbards, or the scabbard be provided with a wooden protection for the edge, they will always be blunt and ineffective—to say nothing of the clatter of the steel scabbard, and the warning thus given to the enemy. The curved sabre is said to be more effective in the *melée*, while the “cut and thrust” is better suited to the charge; but when we read of sir John Elley, of the Blues, cutting down two opponents, right and left, at Genappe; and corporal Shaw, of the 2nd life guards, prostrating nine cuirassiers at Waterloo, it cannot be maintained that even the old straight sword, when properly sharpened, is an inefficient weapon.* That the sword and sabre used by our cavalry in the Peninsula were good and trusty weapons, is best proved by the respect now entertained for these ancient blades by the Sikhs. Captain Nolan says:—“The sword blades they had were chiefly *old dragoon blades cast from our service*. The men had mounted them after their own fashion. The hilt and handle, both of metal, small in the grip, rather flat, not round like ours where the edge seldom falls true. They all had an edge like a razor from heel to point—were worn in wooden scabbards, held by a short single sling to the waist-belt, from which a strap passed through the hilt to a button in front, to keep the sword steady, and prevent it flying out of the scabbard.” A gallant friend, to whom the writer is much indebted for various communications and

one French horseman had his face cut from ear to ear right through the mouth.”—*Hist. K. G. legion* i, 164, *note*. Again at the combat of the Venta del Poço, where Anson's brigade of light, and Bock's brigade of heavy cavalry, were engaged with double the number of French horse, their commanding officer of cavalry reports:—“Votre Excellence jugera de l'acharnement avec lequel on s'est battu, lorsqu'elle apprendra, que le brave colonel Belleille et six officiers de la legion de gens d'armes ont été blessés; que dans le 15^e Regt. de chasseurs, le colonel et tous les officiers, excepté deux, ont reçu des coups de sabre ou des contusions, et que les lanciers de Berg ont eu dans leurs escadrons plusieurs officiers blessés.” *General Caffarelli's despatch to the Minister of War*.

* The gallant corporal was eventually killed by a *carbine* shot, which thus effected, in one operation, what repeated sword-cuts had failed to accomplish. See Siborne, 260.

valuable professional information,—possessed himself of the sword of a dead Sikh artilleryman after the battle of Aliwal, and found it a very superior weapon, with an edge like a razor; but what was his surprise at discovering on the blade *English letters*, evidently part of the maker's name, as they corresponded with the marks on the old swords formerly used in our service: the Sikh had, however, wisely substituted a *wooden* for the steel scabbard.

The same intelligent officer thus illustrates the excellence of the Asiatic sabre:—"At Buddiwal my baggage was taken by the enemy, and amongst the articles was a portable library which I was in the habit of taking with me campaigning. Three days afterwards we fought the battle of Aliwal, and in capturing the enemy's camp, several of the articles we had lost fell into the hands of our infantry. A volume of 'Napier's Peninsular War,' having my name on the fly-leaf, was brought to me, and it was evident that a Sikh had been trying his sabre upon it before the battle, for one cut on the side of the book had penetrated through 60 pages, besides a strong cover of Russian-leather and pasteboard. The book is still preserved, shewing the cut as clean as if made with a razor, not a single page being jagged or torn."*

The armour of the cuirassiers having progressively become lighter, was finally reduced to a simple breast-plate.

In the seven years war the Hungarians established mounted riflemen, armed with rifles having conical touch-holes, invented by Godfrey Hantsch of Nuremberg, and rendered important service in the army of the duke of Brunswick.

Marshal Saxe, in the first half of the eighteenth century, re-introduced the lance, which had long disappeared, and called the cavalry which were thus armed, *Hulans*.

* Some excellent observations upon the comparative merits of curved and regulation sword-blades, from the practical pen of adjutant Dynon, 16th lancers—as well as on the best mode of carrying the proposed needle-rifle, will be found in Appendix H.

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The king of Prussia, for the special purpose of opposing a similar description of cavalry to the cossacks of Russia, established in 1745, spearmen or lancers, and called them *Bosniaks*.

It is true that the Hulans had for a long time, constituted the only cavalry of Poland, but the middle of the eighteenth century is the period when the lance, which had for a long time lost its importance—but only because it was imagined that a full-armed horseman could alone carry a lance, and on which subject so much difference of opinion yet exists—was re-established in its good old rights. Since this period it has always been more general, and justly, provided it be used only in the *close charge*.

Comm. sur
Montecuculi.

Montecuculi gives the same reason for the discontinuance of the lance, the armed horseman, as he states, requiring a horse of great strength, a servant, and other conveniences. Count Turpin, on the other hand, does not consider these sufficient reasons for giving up the use of so important a weapon, and shews that instead of there being any necessity for a lancer being armed *de pied en cap*, an actual advantage results from his not being so armed. “Plus il sera libre dans ses mouvemens, moins le cheval qui le porte aura de poids sur lui et plus le coup de lance sera vif et ajusté.” He then suggests a flexible breast plate, &c. Armour, however, of any kind, must be a decided inconvenience and disadvantage to a lancer, from the position which he is obliged to assume when charging, and the inflexibility of the plates. It also adds considerably to the weight which the horse has to carry, and is, on this account alone, objectionable for any cavalry. It is remarkable that armour should have been given to the British household-troops, immediately after their discomfiture of the French cuirassiers at Waterloo had proved its inefficiency! The splendid attire of the life-guards and royal horse-guards is all well for purposes of parade, but totally unsuited for actual warfare. The

enormous weight of the cuirass*—the constant cleaning required—the pain which its inflexibility must cause upon a long march—are all circumstances which go far to neutralize its advantages in action. These advantages also have been much overrated, and perhaps it will one day be shewn that the British life-guardsmen is more to be feared when his natural strength, courage, and dexterity are allowed freedom of action, than when these qualities are hampered by the incumbrance of a cuirass. The Russian cossacks and Polish lancers have repeatedly defeated cuirassiers, and Alten's five small squadrons of hussars at El-Bodon drove back the mailed thousands of Montbrun. But if our gallant life-guards, whether for purposes of war or state, are destined to be secured in steel, at least let their defences be of a more convenient, if not of a more graceful construction. With the present ill-shaped back-plate, they all appear *hump-backed*. Compare the modern armour with that of ancient times, and it will be seen what care was then taken to preserve the graceful form of the human figure; but it is to the breast-plate that attention should be particularly directed, as those worn by the household troops are particularly defective. Their want of saliency renders them per-
 vious to the cylindro-conoidal shot, as was clearly proved by captain Norton, in the experiments carried on by him in 1832 at Windsor and Taplow in presence of lord Orkney and the officers of the 1st life-guards; † the armholes being enlarged for freedom of action, exposes that part of the shoulder where a sabre-cut would prove most serious; the front-plate not lapping over the back-plate leaves another space which is open to the attack of the enemy; and, in short, there is nothing to prevent a good swordsman or lancer from quickly putting a cuirassier *hors de combat* either by cutting at the upper part of the arm, or giving point between the aperture of the

Appendix C.

* The largest sized cuirass worn by the household-cavalry weighs 15lb.; the smallest 12lb. 6oz., giving to the horse, in marching order, the enormous load of 25 stone, supposing the life-guardsmen to weigh personally 18 stone.

† See Appendix C, "Norton's Projectiles."

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plates in the side. These several defects could have been readily obviated at the period of construction: no difficulty presented itself to increasing the saliency; a moveable gusset of steel, similar to that used in the time of Henry VIII, might easily have been added to the arm-holes; and the uncovered space in the side could as easily have been obviated, by making the front-plate lap over the back-plate, according to the antient method. It is very doubtful whether a cuirass increases the courage of the wearer. The confidence which its supposed protection affords would naturally diminish, when it happened to get injured or loosened in action; he would feel like a soldier without his arms, and more readily give way to panic and alarm: the best sort of armour, as marshal Saxe said of intrenchments, is "personal courage and discipline."

During the sixth period, great importance began to be placed on the formation of cavalry. Since the disappearance of knights, horsemanship had become quite neglected: count Melfort in France, and Seidlitz in Prussia, directed their attention to this error.

After the peace of Hubertsburg and Dresden, the establishment of riding-houses was commenced with every regiment, and rough-riders and riding-masters were appointed: it was evident that horsemanship could alone lead to facility of manœuvre.

Seidlitz, who was yet only major in the Natzmer hussars, after the second Silesian war in 1747, occupied himself particularly with the officers. He got over the prejudice that education would injure their authority, and soon convinced them that they would gain respect by it. Seidlitz, observed by his great king, rose quickly from step to step, notwithstanding the prejudice of seniority; and in spite of the rising envy, which, from old habit, hangs like a dead weight upon talent, in order to retard its ascent.

Seidlitz soon beheld himself removed to a sphere of action, where his great talents could enable him to move without impediment;—where the Prussian cavalry, raised by him to a height until then unknown in history, was enabled so essentially to contribute to the successful result of a severe contest of seven years—to fortify the crown of the king, and help to elevate his high military fame.

Seidlitz taught the cavalry not only the use of arms, but also to perform the movements of infantry. Since that time—a period in the history of cavalry which has never been equalled—he remains the highest model to which an officer of cavalry can aspire.

At the autumn manœuvres, which Frederick held annually after the peace of Dresden, that which was newly learned was practiced and discussed. Here the talents of the officers had opportunities of being displayed, and the king became acquainted with them. The praise of their admired sovereign encouraged those who distinguished themselves to redouble their zeal: the indolent were strictly and justly reprimanded.

The king laboured with Seidlitz, Saldern, Gaudi, &c., after the autumn manœuvres were ended, in order to point out the defects which had been discovered; and these generals were then obliged to perfect the new plans of the king.

In the order of battle, Frederick departed from the general prejudice of placing the cavalry on the flanks. Whether, in the two first Silesian wars, he either did not quite understand the strength of cavalry, or had not generally employed it in great operations—owing to the little power of movement which it possessed—the king acted on entirely different principles in the third Silesian, or seven years' war, when Seidlitz was at its head.

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In 1756, at Lowositz, Frederick placed his cavalry in two lines, behind the infantry, and from this time, laid it down as a principle, that, on the day of battle, the cavalry should be united in a large mass, upon one point.

Amongst the other armies during these wars, actions of single cavalry detachments and regiments, worthy of being handed down to military posterity, occurred ; but there was nothing done upon a large scale : *there was but one Seidlitz !*

The battle of Mollwitz is an exception ; and proves still further, the assertion which has been so often repeated in these pages—that the secret of producing great effects by cavalry, lies in the *personal qualities of the leader*. The brave and talented Austrian general von Römer fell too early for the fame of a cavalry, which had always been distinguished by an excellent *matériel*.

Striking instances are recorded of the opposite effects produced by different commanders upon the same troops :—When Murat upbraided Junot for his inaction, after crossing the Prudiszi, Junot alleged in excuse that he had no orders to attack—that his Wirtemberg cavalry were shy—their efforts feigned, and that they could never be brought to charge the enemy's battalions. These words Murat answered by deeds. He rushed on at the head of the troops, who, with a different leader were quite different men ; he urged them on—launched them against the Russians—overthrew their skirmishers, and then returning to Junot, said : “ Now finish the business ; your glory and your marshal's staff are still before you.” A similar anecdote is told of colonel Rousset, an officer of Louis XIV, and captain Churchill, afterwards duke of Marlborough, at the siege of Nimeguen, (1672). On this occasion the French colonel had been obliged to abandon a post. Turenne, who witnessed the retreat, betted that Churchill, with half the

Segur. Hist.
Nap. i. 253.

Alison's life
of Marlbo-
rough. i. 6.

force, would regain it. He gave him the command, and after a desperate struggle, the future duke, in presence of the whole army, recovered the position.

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At the battle of Minden in Westphalia, which was gained by the duke of Brunswick, lord Sackville neglected a fine opportunity. He had the power of driving the French into the Weser with the Anglo-Hanoverian cavalry; but was prevented by his pride and jealousy of the duke. Lord Sackville renounced his own glory, rather than assist in increasing that of his commander.

Lord George Sackville's conduct at Minden was most reprehensible; but there appears to have been great confusion, misunderstanding, and want of arrangement amongst all the chief officers on both sides. Duke Ferdinand never formed the allied army in line, and left the flanks of eight regiments of infantry uncovered. Marshal Contades placed his infantry on the flanks and his cavalry in the centre;—the allied artillery never received orders to advance until late in the day, and long after the action had commenced; and the cavalry under lord George Sackville, owing to an apparent unwillingness on the part of that officer to understand the orders brought to him by the duke of Brunswick's aide-de-camp, Winzingerode,—were never brought into action at all—leaving the French to retire unmolested. Lord George was deprived of all his military employments in consequence of his unwarrantable proceeding in this battle, and the Marquis of Granby appointed his successor; a court martial was afterwards granted him, at his own request, and the charge of "disobedience of orders," having been fully proved, he was deprived of his commission: this did not, however, prevent him from serving his sovereign in another department of government, where his conduct was more successful to his country and honorable to himself.

Macdonald's
land battles.
ii. 265. et seq.

The custom of firing a volley before the charge was discontinued by the cavalry during the seven years' war.

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This example of the Prussians carried other nations with it: the endeavour was to excel in rapidity.

The French had two modes of attack—close and in a trot, which they called *en muraille*; or at speed, and dispersed, which they termed *en fourageur*.

It is remarkable that in proportion as the European cavalry confined itself exclusively to the sword, the Turkish cavalry adopted fire-arms, as if each mistrusted their own manner of fighting; and indeed it bespeaks great respect for an enemy, when we adopt his forms or tactics.

The Turkish cavalry in their wars against the Russians, and afterwards against the Austrians, formed a close line of skirmishers before their Pulks. The most part of these skirmishers carried rifles, and being well mounted, displayed remarkable activity. The Pulks remained behind the line of skirmishers, as it were, in ambush, and rushed with incredible rapidity on the enemy as soon as they saw him thrown into disorder by the carbine fire: an excellent manner of fighting which deserves due credit; and indeed, the advantage was almost always on the side of the Turks.

The seventh or last period in the art of war, from 1790 to the present time, comprehends the war which lasted a quarter of a century, devastating Europe from east to west, and from north to south, and terminating by changing the relation of every state, without leaving any of them secure.

The old hereditary enemies of Germany of the fifth period, are no longer dangerous: the prayer against the Turks has fallen into disuse. Every power is finite and

subject to established laws ; so that after the maximum of exertion comes that of exhaustion. The south of Europe has lost its *physical force* by a too long use of it : the great north, sensible of its most high power, stands strategically formed ! *

An old, but very important observation has acquired during this war, mathematical certainty, namely, that a war against the French must be carried on *offensively*. The Frenchman bold, impetuous, nay terrible in attack, does not, on the contrary, possess that cold-blooded, quiet circumspection and endurance which is so indispensable in a defensive war. A cautious, but not the less uninterrupted offensive, must be the ruling principle of all projects of operation against the French.

* O'Meara in the "Voice from St. Helena," thus announces Napoleon's views on the aggression to be expected from the north, a prophecy which the Crimean campaign, up to the present moment, is not calculated to negative :

"In the course of a few years Russia will have Constantinople, part of Turkey, and all Greece. This I hold to be as certain as if it had already taken place. Almost all the cajoling and flattering which Alexander practised towards me, was to gain my consent to effect this object. I would not consent, foreseeing that the equilibrium of Europe would be destroyed. In the natural course of things, in a few years, Turkey must fall to Russia. The powers it would injure, and who could oppose it, are England, France, Prussia and Austria. Now as to Austria, it will be very easy for Russia to engage her assistance by giving her Servia, and other provinces bordering upon the Austrian dominions reaching near to Constantinople. *The only hypothesis that France and England may ever be allied with sincerity will be in order to prevent this.* But even this alliance would not avail. France, England, and Prussia united, cannot prevent it. Once mistress of Constantinople Russia gets all the commerce of the Mediterranean—becomes a great naval power, and God knows what may happen. Above all the other powers, Russia is the most to be feared, especially by you. All this I foresaw, and I wanted to establish a barrier against those barbarians by re-establishing the kingdom of Poland, and putting Poniatowskig at the head of it as king, but your *imbeciles* of ministers would not consent. A hundred years hence, I shall be praised, and Europe, especially England, will lament I did not succeed. When they see the finest countries in Europe overrun, and a prey to those northern barbarians, they will say—'Napoleon was right.'"

"A Voice from St. Helena," being conversations with Napoleon at St. Helena, in May, 1817.

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The French have generally endeavoured to be the attacking party. They thus not only derived the usual advantage obtained by taking the initiative, but adopted the mode of warfare, which was best suited to their national character. It is remarkable, however, that in many encounters with the British and German cavalry, their horsemen *awaited the charge*. *

At the end of this long conflict, which, during its continuance, had assumed such various forms and names;—in which all the nations of Europe had been engaged, and which in South America, continued in its original form of *war of freedom*, as it began in North America—opinions are more than ever divided as to the preference which should be given to line or column-positions in attack.

Had Folard yet lived, he would have felt the pleasure of seeing that the French, in the first years of the revolution, following the natural instinct of men, to crowd together into deep positions, on visible dangers, generally attacked in deep masses. These masses, got the name of columns; but were, however, often nothing but heaps of men crowded together in disorder: on the retreat from Moscow, the French army marched in such masses.

When Marshal Ney was pressed before Torgau, after the battle of Dennewitz, the troops formed masses without orders. General Morand, who endeavoured to escape the danger of being crushed in the crowd, remained hanging by his clothes on a palisade.

Rogniat, and after him Decker, have published their opinions on columns in admirable works.

The second lines, according to circumstances,—but

* See ante pp. 20, 48, 208.

always the reserves, may be most advantageously placed in columns for order of battle: columns are easily moved, and may be quickly disposed of.

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Opinions diametrically opposite have been given by the most distinguished military writers, upon the subject of attacks in *column*, and both parties have founded their arguments upon examples furnished by the revolutionary war. Napoleon, following a system from which Jomini has since deduced his theory of military operations, generally concentrated a body of troops upon one point, and attacked in *column*; the duke of Wellington, on the other hand, always deployed previous to the attack; and the battle of Waterloo is, perhaps, the only instance where his lines exceeded the usual formation of *two deep*. Wellington was never beaten. Napoleon lost the battle of Aspern by attacking the centre of the Austrian line in *column*. Massena's columns shared the same fate at Busaco—Victor's at Barrosa—even the Spaniards broke two *columns* of the French army at St. Marcial; the repeated advances of Napoleon's *columns* at Waterloo failed in their object; and although, at the close of that memorable day, the chosen *columns* of the Imperial guard advanced with a bravery and resolution, which would have done honour to the troops of any nation; the first volley from the British guards knocked them back with its shock; confusion ensued, and the *column* was broken. "The British guards," says Siborne, "springing up suddenly, in a compact four-deep line, appeared to the French as if starting out of the ground; the latter with their high bonnets, as they crowned the summit of the ridge, appeared to the British through the smoky haze, like a corps of giants bearing down upon them." The British guards then opened their fire; an oblique volley was, at the same time, poured in by part of Halkett's brigade;—the head of the column became convulsed by the shock;—nearly the entire mass staggered under the effect, and in less than a single minute, more than 300 veterans fell to rise no more. A deployment was now attempted, but in

Siborne. 340.
341.

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vain; the head of the column was continually shattered and driven back;—men turned round and disappeared by the flanks; others in rear began firing over the heads of their front files;—Maitland's brigade now charged; numbers of the enemy threw down their arms and fled;—the flanks spread out rapidly in disorder; and the column appeared as if rent asunder by some invisible hand.

Alison. ix. 64.
et seq.
Rogniat. 333.

The battle of Aspern also clearly shewed that the method of attack in column, when directed against well-disciplined and resolute troops, is essentially defective. "The battle of Essling was lost," says Rogniat, "in consequence of our having attacked in *column* the centre of the Austrian line. That centre skilfully gave ground as the French columns of Lannes and Oudinot advanced, while their wings insensibly approached our flanks. By means of that skilful manœuvre we soon found ourselves in the centre of a semi-circle of artillery and musquetry, the whole fire of which converged on our unhappy *columns* our leading *columns* were literally destroyed," &c. The Austrians did not, however, attempt to meet the French attack in four-deep lines as did the British at Waterloo, but resisted in battalions formed *en échiquier* from the centre. These facts naturally shake our faith in the *column* theories of Bulow and Jomini. It is also remarkable, that although Napoleon's attacks in column were frequently successful against the Austrians and Prussians, yet they seldom prevailed against the steady valour of the Russians, and *never against the English*.

Jomini. iv.
638. ap
Alison. vi. 84.

An undisciplined mob, or an army possessing little moral force, may be appalled by the formidable appearance of a column advancing to the attack, and give way from mere apprehension, but numerous instances can be adduced to shew, that no such effect is produced, where courage and discipline are found united. Rogniat justly says:—"Tout ordre est bon contre des troupes qui ne se défendent pas; il suffit de marcher. Si vos adversaires sont tellement lâches, que votre aspect seul leur fasse prendre la fuite, il ne s'agit que de marcher et non pas de combattre; et l'ordre le plus

Rogniat.
chap. vi.
p. 216.

favorable à la marche est celui que vous devez préférer sans perdre de temps à vous déployer ; mais ce-ci ne s' appelle plus faire la guerre, c' est poursuivre de la canaille."

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At the battle of Foksan, in 1789, the Austrian army was formed in squares of battalions : the Turks sustained a complete defeat. In Egypt, Napoleon formed his infantry six deep, in order to withstand the Mamelukes, and at the battle of Lützen, formed oblong squares, to oppose the numerous cavalry of his adversaries.

Generals of superior talent, do not blindly follow forms, but make the whole empire of tactics tributary to them.

Since Louis XIV. commenced to increase the number of officers, the example has been generally followed. A natural consequence of this augmentation was the diminution of the pay. It is true that the senior officers, the real leaders, received high payment ; but the subalterns scarcely received enough to support themselves miserably : of late years the pay of the higher ranks also has much diminished.

Before the age of Louis XIV, when, under the name of officer, a leader was always understood, the following only existed :—Commander-in-chief, field-m Marshals, colonels, captains, and their substitutes—lieutenants.

As assistants to these officers there were under-officers—sergeant-majors, sergeants, corporals, &c.

Louis XIV. was a conqueror, and endeavoured, by the enticement of promotion, to give new wings to ambition. A conqueror requires and excites ambition : a defender requires and excites patriotism.

Napoleon superseded every officer who was either taken prisoner or fell sick. Whoever was not present with the army was not counted, and lost his promotion :

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thus the number of officers increased without end. Napoleon could do this, because he did not think with Montecuculi, that "to carry on war, one must have money,"* but with Cato, "war maintains war." He must have done so because the conscripts could only be led against the enemy, and, as it were re-formed for "cannon-food," as Bulow says,—by many experienced officers and non-commissioned officers.

Young soldiers, and old officers, who are experienced, ambitious, blindly devoted to their generals—intimately acquainted with all the casualties of war,—form the best regiments for a conqueror.

In this seventh period the cavalry remained almost entirely in the same form which it had assumed in the preceding period.

The French *chasseurs-à-cheval* are nothing but light cavalry, and only differ from hussars in their dress. It is the same with other nations, whatever name may have been given to their light cavalry. The Hungarian hussars, Polish hulans, and Russian cossacks can alone be considered as national troops.

The cossacks have acquired some reputation, and attempts to employ them even in a charge, have sometimes been successful. The cossack regiment of the Imperial Russian guard, made a fine steady attack in line, at the battle of Leipsic.

The red cossacks of the guard were much distinguished at Leipsic, and proved in a conspicuous and irrefragable manner,

* "L'argent est cet esprit universel qui, se répandant partout, anime et remue tout; il est virtuellement toutes choses: c'est l'instrument des instrumens; il sait enchanter l'esprit des plus sages, et calmer la fureur des plus féroces." *Mém. de Montecuculi*, vol. I, lib. I, chap. ii.

Another experienced commander, on being asked how many things were required for war, is stated to have replied—"But three—Money; money again; and thirdly money."

the superiority of the lance over the sword—even when the latter was handled by Napoleon's chivalrous cuirassiers : Latour-Maubourg and Murat, at the head of 4,000 cuirassiers of the guard, had borne down on the flank of the allied right, while Victor and Lauriston assailed their front. This double charge broke prince Eugene of Wirtemberg's infantry—routed 10 squadrons of the Russian guard, and captured 26 guns. So violent was the onset, that the emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia narrowly escaped capture ; but at this critical moment, Alexander advancing boldly to the front, ordered the Don-cossacks, under Orloff Denizoff, to charge the enemy's flank, while the heavy cavalry of Barclay and the reserve batteries of artillery were also brought up ; and the effect was decisive. With resistless impetuosity the red cossacks bore down on the flank of the French cuirassiers, just after they had captured the guns, and before the horses had recovered their wind ; “ their *long lances were more than a match for the cuirassiers' sabres* : instantly the whole hostile squadrons were pierced through and routed ; 24 of the guns re-taken, and the French cavalry driven back, with immense loss, to their own lines.”

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Alison. xii.
220, 222.

The cossacks of the present day seem to be far inferior to their ancestors, and to be particularly deficient in that essential qualification of light cavalry—*dash*. Accounts from the Crimea state that British stragglers pass unmolested before their eyes, even when in the act of driving horses and mules, laden with provisions and luxuries from Balaklava to the camp !

Spec. corresp.
of Times.
Feb. 10, 1855.

The dragoons have lost their original distinction of fighting on foot as well as on horseback. In the English and French service only are instances known of this description of force being sent on foot, in order to be mounted on their arrival at the theatre of war.

The French restored to their heavy cavalry entire cuirasses of polished iron. This cavalry, which only charged at a trot, has made a figure in the world.

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Napoleon employed it frequently in taking batteries and entrenchments; nay even strong redoubts. The fame of these troops rose to such a height in the French army, that "*brave comme nos cuirassiers*," became a proverb.

One of the most remarkable cavalry-exploits on record was that performed by the cuirassiers of Montbrun, at the battle of Borodino, Sept. 7, 1812, when they captured the great redoubt in the middle of the enemy's position, defended by the flower of the Russian infantry. The details of this brilliant achievement are full of interest, and shew what may be effected by resolute cavalry, bravely led, and confident of success:—

Alison. xi.
77, 78.

Augustus Caulincourt, just separated from his young and beautiful bride, only a few days after their marriage, fell into the command of Montbrun's cuirassiers by the death of that general in the early part of the day, and was directed to penetrate through the Russian line, and wheeling round, enter the redoubt by its gorge. "You will see me immediately," he replied, "dead or alive," and setting off at a gallop, at the head of his followers, the glittering mass was soon lost in a volume of smoke, as he approached the entrenchment. "The Russians hastened to support the point of attack; Caulincourt, advancing with the utmost rapidity, overthrew the regiments of horse which Kutusoff opposed to him, while the great redoubt continued to vomit forth an incessant fire upon its assailants. Eugene, with his infantry, was advancing to the attack; the bayonets of his troops were already gleaming on its slopes, when the columns of the cuirassiers were seen ascending through the clouds of smoke which enveloped the entrenchment. Its sides seemed clothed in glittering steel; and the fire from its summit, after redoubling in fury for a few seconds, suddenly ceased. The flames of the volcano were extinguished in blood; and the resplendent casques of the French cuirassiers appeared, when the smoke cleared away, above the highest embrasures of the entrenchment." Young Caulincourt met a glorious death at the entrance of the redoubt.

The only parallel in military history to this daring capture was the charge of d'Auvergne's cavalry under Marlborough at Malplaquet, Sept. 11, 1709, when that gallant body of horsemen, 3,000 strong, dashing forward, entered the formidable entrenchments before mentioned ; * but these were, at the same time, turned and surrounded by some of Lottum's battalions—thus facilitating the operation of the cavalry ; whereas at Borodino, the cuirassiers had the sole merit of the achievement.

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XII.

Alison's life
of Marlbo-
rough. ii. 62.

The French dragoons, which for some time, had degenerated, regained moral force in Spain, and in 1813-1814 acquired respect.

The Austrian cavalry, whenever it was led with talent, always renewed that fame which it had obtained by the sanguinary engagements of many centuries.

At the battle of Würzburg, September 3d, 1796, Wartensleben passed the Maine with twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers—attacked the French cavalry under Bonneau, and decided the victory.

At the battle of Leipsic, the Austrian cuirassiers, under Nostiz, covered themselves with glory. On the 16th of October, at one o'clock in the afternoon, Nostiz, having scarcely passed the Pleisse at Gröbern, attacked the lancers and dragoons of the French guard, overthrew them, and then broke several squares of infantry of that guard.

At a critical period of this memorable battle, when three regiments of Russian cuirassiers under Lewachoff, were overwhelmed by Kellermann's 6,000 horse, and the consequences might have been fatal, Schwartzenberg hurried forward the Austrian cuirassiers of the guard, to the point of danger. " This superb corps, consisting of six regiments cased in steel, the very flower of the Imperial army, under

Alison. xii.
220.

* See page 87.

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XII.

count Nostiz, after crossing the Pleisse at Gröbern, arrived at the menaced point at the critical moment, and instantly bore down, with loud cheers and irresistible force, on the flank of Kellermann's dragoons, when somewhat disordered by the route of Lewachoff's men. The effect was instantaneous; the French horse were routed and driven back in great disorder to the heights behind Wachau, where, however, they re-formed under cover of the powerful batteries which there protected the French centre."

The English cavalry, with respect to its *matériel*, excels all other cavalry with which we are acquainted; and with utility, unites also beauty. The duke of Wellington endeavoured to give this cavalry what it yet requires—facility of manœuvring in great lines. Colonel Ponsonby, who displayed talent in the Peninsular war, would have made a good general of cavalry: he commanded a lancer regiment with the army in France, and accompanied the duke of Wellington in his inspections.

Hist. K. G.
legion. i. 313.

Colonel Ponsonby exhibited a true knowledge of the use and application of cavalry at the battle of Barrosa, (March, 1811,) when he endeavoured to make up for the inertness of general Whittingham and the Spaniards, by hurrying round the right flank of the allies, with a squadron of the 2nd hussars of the king's German legion, just as the enemy's rear-guard of cavalry were about to charge the exhausted British battalions. The German squadron, led by captain von dem Bussche, charged the French dragoons,—which much exceeded them in number,—with such impetuosity, that, breaking through the cavalry, they captured the commandant and two guns; and coming suddenly on the column in rear, many of the enemy laid down their arms. Colonel Ponsonby was much distinguished at Waterloo, where, in command of the 12th light dragoons, (now lancers) he charged and penetrated a column of Marcognet's division, carrying everything before him. When endeavouring to with-

Siborne. 269.

draw his regiment, this intrepid officer was disabled in both arms, and carried, by his horse, up to the crest of the French position, where, receiving another sabre-cut, he was struck senseless to the ground. Upon recovering, he was observed by a French lancer, who, in a savage and cowardly manner, struck his lance into the gallant colonel's back; not long afterwards he was plundered by a *tirailleur*; but the latter was no sooner gone, than he experienced great kindness from a French officer, who held a brandy-bottle to his lips, and directed one of his men to lay him straight on his side, and place a knapsack under his head. Later in the day, he was passed over by two squadrons of Prussian cavalry, in full trot, by which his sufferings were much aggravated. On the following morning he was discovered by some English soldiers and removed to the village of Waterloo. To the inexpressible delight of his friends, colonel Ponsonby recovered from these dreadful wounds, notwithstanding their great number and hopeless character. His evidence in favour of the lance, resulting from this encounter, has been already quoted.*

Siborne. 271.
Note.

By such dispositions, the consequences of which will appear in the future, a great general shows himself. It was thus that Frederick formed his generals of cavalry for the seven years' war, during the peace between the second and third Silesian war.

The Russian cavalry will be able to lay just claims to being the first in the world, when, at a future time, intellectual power shall be united with the physical and moral force which it possesses at present.

This time does not appear to have yet arrived. The Russian cavalry, as well regulars, as irregulars, shewed themselves far inferior to the British and French upon all occasions of fair collision during the Crimean campaigns: even the cossacks exhibited no symptoms of that enterprise, for which they have been lauded, and bear no comparison

* See ante, page 147.

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XII.Morell.
Neighbours
of Russia.
227.Morell. 276.
Note.

in activity and physical qualities to the *Chasseurs d'Afrique*. The advantages gained by the Russian regular cavalry over the Turks has also been much exaggerated; for although the battle of Kurukdere in Armenia, (5th August, 1854), was determined by the overpowering effect of 3,000 Muscovite horse, almost the whole of these were afterwards destroyed by the Turkish artillery, and the whole force were obliged to retire, abandoning their camp and 3,000 tents. In fact, the victory was really on the side of the Turks until the Mushir, through bewilderment, turned it into a defeat. Beboutoff had ordered two regiments of dragoons to charge the Turkish batteries, but they were received with three discharges of grape,—the last volley at the distance of 250 yards—besides the fire of two infantry regiments, which repulsed them. Twice the Russians renewed the charge, but were each time repulsed, losing 2,000 men. Upon this Beboutoff began to retreat, and to cover his flight, ordered a false attack on the Mushir, who became quite bewildered, and turned the victory into a defeat. Russian officers acknowledge that out of 3,000 dragoons, only 609 were living after the battle, and estimated their entire loss at 8,000; a grenadier battalion of 1,000 men could only muster 160 on the following day. The Turks had only 1,600 killed and 1,200 missing; but 200 of the worst description deserted.

The Polish cavalry stands out prominently as a model. Prussia feels the importance of good cavalry, and, at present expends vast sums of money and much care on its *matériel*. The Bavarian cavalry, owing to Polish remounts which it has received for many years, is in excellent condition. The king of Wirtemberg, perceiving the spirit of the times, has given a new form, and new regulations to his cavalry.*

* The Wirtemberg cavalry are armed with lances 11 feet in length, with the exception of the skirmishers, (5th division), who have long carbines. Both skirmishers and lancers are furnished with a "cut and thrust" sword, and one pistol—all according to the armament advocated in chapters V and VI.

The Baden cavalry consists of fourteen squadrons, the detail and individual instruction of which are excellent. The cavalry of the kingdom of Saxony has been destroyed by the political convulsions to which that country has been exposed. The long established fame of the Hanoverian cavalry has been brilliantly supported by the achievements of the "KING'S GERMAN LEGION." *

The Belgian cavalry has not yet had an opportunity of making itself known. The Swedes and Danes, have seldom, in modern times, been engaged on a theatre of war, favourable to the operations of cavalry.

The Swedish light cavalry are the most practical-looking mounted soldiers that a dragoon officer could wish to see. Small, active, intelligent men—short-legged, wiry, high-spirited horses—they are the very *ideal* of skirmishers and light troops. I allude particularly to the king's or Scanian regiment of hussars stationed at Gottenburg, and the hussar—or horse-guards† quartered at Stockholm. To see these troops go through a field-day is one of the most gratifying spectacles that can be presented to a zealous cavalry officer. Their evolutions are thus graphically described by the late lamented captain Nolan :—

"At Stockholm, on the 29th June, 1852, I saw the regiment of Swedish horse-guards, under count Stedingk—a fine body of men, but rather under-mounted.

Cavalry, its
History and
Tactics. 275
et seq.

"They had four squadrons, each of about 75 horses, divided into three divisions, which they call troops. The squadron leader alone was in front, an officer on each

* For full details connected with the origin, formation, and achievements of this corps, the reader is referred to the "History of the King's German Legion," 2 vols. 8vo: Boone, London, 1832—1837; as also to a summary of the services of the corps, which will be found in Appendix G.

† Since my residence in Stockholm the hussar-guards have, I understand, been made *lancers*, a strong evidence of the favourable opinion entertained by the Swedish military authorities of the *lance*. This brilliant regiment, clothed in sky-blue and silver, forms the household cavalry of Sweden.

CHAP. flank, and one in the rear: they had no markers, and no
XII. one out of the ranks.

“They skirmished by squadrons against each other, frequently sounding a charge, when the men, seizing their swords, galloped towards each other, each man riding round his opponent at a gallop, and crossing swords, the reserves advancing to the support.

“On a signal to advance at a gallop, the skirmishers drew together towards the centre of their divisions, and, after the charge, resumed their line They change front on the move in open column of squadrons they advance in open column from any named squadron, and, when forming line, the squadron which has lost its place in line, resumes it on re-forming, and takes the shortest road to get there.

“I was much struck with the deep silence which reigned throughout. The colonel’s word of command was followed by a caution from the squadron leader only; the trumpet sounded, and the movement was executed. There was no noise, no shouting, no hurrying. If a halt was sounded they stood motionless; all hung on the word of command; not a move was perceptible; no dressing up—no reining back—no closing in—not a word was spoken!

“Their working in the field was as fast as the power of their horses would admit. On coming into line, they halt the squadrons in rear of the line of dressing. The squadron leader and the officers on the flanks of the squadron, move up to the alignment, and then the squadron dresses up between the officers.

“Their charges were excellent, and made at their utmost speed; (I rode with them to try it); the flanks were always well closed up; no flying out was perceptible; and if they opened in the least during the advance, they closed up gradually again. There were no breaks in the line at any time, and they halted at once and altogether at the signal. For parade purposes they have a slow canter. When marching past by squadrons and the reviewing

officer is on the right, they lead with the right leg : when on the left, then the horses lead off with the left leg."

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" *This is one of the best regiments of foreign cavalry I have ever seen.*"

The Swedish cavalry have also an admirable system of "skeleton-drill" in which light ropes are used to represent distances and intervals. This practice is carried on by independent squadrons in *rank-entire*, and gives the non-commissioned officers great facility in taking up points—determining the extent of front required for their divisions, half-squadrons, &c., and generally creating that correctness of eye so essential to a marker and under-officer.

Personal
Observation.

The Italian nations have no pretensions to good cavalry.

The Spanish and Portuguese cavalry partake of the fate of the nations to which they belong—relaxation.

This is rather too sweeping a verdict. A material difference exists between the Spanish and Portuguese cavalry, the former being very superior in every respect. The Spaniards, from possessing a fine breed of horses, have always had a better mounted cavalry than the Portuguese, and often shewed much spirit in their operations during the peninsular war; the Portuguese, on the other hand, are indifferently mounted—their country is altogether unsuited to the operations of cavalry, and from these circumstances, the cavalry service is not looked upon with that degree of respect in Portugal which it is in other countries.* The *personnel*, however, of both nations is the same. Both possess the very best materials for making good troops, and general Bacon has shewn what the Portuguese cavalry can do, when well drilled, well officered, and well led. Their infantry, as is well known, owing to their wise admission of British discipline and officers, shewed a very decided superiority to

* The late general Sir Loftus Otway, K.C.B., who commanded a brigade of Portuguese cavalry in the Peninsula, observed to me how much he was struck, on returning home, by the superiority which the English hackney-coach horses presented to those of his brigade!

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the Spanish, during the Peninsular war, but this was more owing to the foolish pride of the latter, than to any deficiency in personal bravery. These haughty patriots preferred being beaten as Spaniards to being indebted for victory to British tactics and organization.

The Turks have given up the part of conquerors, and since that time, their empire has been declining.

The Mamelukes, a peculiar sort of cavalry, gave the French a good deal of trouble in Egypt, but it is a question whether they will fight any more for the sublime Porte.

A tendency to disparage and undervalue the courage and discipline of the Turkish troops has been exhibited by many modern writers, and notwithstanding their acknowledged valour at Citate, Silistria and Olteniza, it cannot be denied that the general impression is unfavourable to the Osmanlis. The author of "Neighbours of Russia," has, however, put before us an array of facts and authorities upon this subject which places the gallantry of the Turks, whether behind walls or in the field, beyond all question, and shews that even their cavalry, when properly led, still retain that reckless daring, which formed the basis of their antient reputation. General Valentini, a Russian author, states, in his history of the last war, that, in the affair at Basardjik, (June, 1828), the Ottoman cavalry charged the Russian artillery between the squares of chasseurs, like madmen, and generally, that the Ottoman defends himself with greater obstinacy than other nations—fighting with the fury of despair rather than surrender. An English writer, unfavourable to the Turks, speaking of the battle of Koulevscha, admits, that although the Russians gained the victory, yet the honour of the day was due to the Turkish cavalry, who, the second time within the month, broke through the enemy's squares. According to the government lists, the present Turkish army, including the reserve, (*redifs*), presents a

Morell.
Neigh. of
Russia, 87, 88.

grand total of 400,000, and can be increased by an addition of 150,000, to 170,000 men from the tributary provinces. Of these 22,416 are cavalry, each regiment containing about 950 horses.

With regard to the grand operations of cavalry, since the sixth period, they seem to have rather retrograded than advanced : little genius—little intellectual force has been displayed.

Napoleon formed his cavalry into independent corps, amongst the commanders of which were some very talented generals, who have performed individual exploits of brilliancy ; but that *high all-surpassing talent of a general-in-chief of cavalry, has been always wanting.* They never understood in the French armies, that cavalry can only produce results by manœuvre ; thus, neither the physical force of this cavalry—its united masses—nor the high elevation of its moral force—was of avail. In consequence of the want of talent to manœuvre, it was placed in the battle as food for cannon ; and after it had shewn the greatest proofs of steadiness and intrepidity, single cuirassier regiments were sent to charge batteries at a slow trot, as if it was glorious to gain every victory with the greatest possible loss.

These faults were repeated in every battle ; and the failure of the French cavalry at Waterloo, is solely to be attributed to the bad position in which it was placed, being exposed from the beginning of the action to the effect of cannon fire.

The failure of the French cavalry at Waterloo, as has been before shewn,* was caused by its having been *prematurely brought into action.* Napoleon, after his advantages at the commencement of the battle, when he was so confident of

* See ante, page 174.

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XII.Siborne. 348,
349.

victory as to dispatch a courier to Paris with intelligence that the day was won, ordered his immense cavalry to charge the centre of the allied line, which, judging by the general effect of Murat's masses in the German campaigns, he believed could not resist so powerful a shock ; and although he soon saw his error, yet the inflexibility of his character would not allow him to recall the gallant troops, thus uselessly sacrificed. "Il aime mieux," says Rogniat, "faire detruire assez inutilement sa cavalerie, sous le feu des Anglais que de la faire replier." Thus he deprived himself of the power of supporting the attacks of the Imperial guard with strong bodies of cavalry on the wings or rear, and was unable to secure the columns from those flank attacks, which arrested their progress, and eventually effected their destruction.

The deficiency of talent to manœuvre large masses of cavalry, in such a manner as to ensure success, has been felt by all European armies in the last wars : therefore so few decisive actions have taken place ; and hence it is so truly stated in the second chapter of this work :—"Seidlitz was a perfect general of cavalry ; but many a century may pass away before a second will be formed in the same army."*

This is a *truth*, and one like it never ceases to be a truth, be it ever so much opposed.

The deficiency of good cavalry officers in the British service—now that the veterans of the Peninsula have passed away—cannot be denied ; and this want will continue to exist so long as the system of promotion by purchase and without qualification is sanctioned by authority. The majority of those who hold commissions in cavalry regiments are the sons or relatives of persons in the middle classes of society, who never dream of making the army their profession, and generally retire on obtaining the rank of captain. A wealthy merchant or manufacturer, laudably desirous of pushing on

* See ante, page 42.

his family in the world, makes a bargain for the purchase for his son of a commission in a dragoon regiment, without any reference to the youth's possession of any peculiar qualification for that service, and—if not plucked at Sandhurst for bad spelling—the aspirant is in due time gazetted to a cornetcy. The recruit shuffles through the adjutant's and riding master's drill—becomes thoroughly initiated in all the mysteries of the mess—never opens a book on professional subjects, and finds perhaps no encouragement to improve himself either theoretically or practically in the duties of the service which he has entered. A handsome sum above the regulated price of the commission, soon secures him a lieutenancy,—perhaps over the heads of old and meritorious officers—and the same means, a troop, having attained which, and thus established a “handle to his name,” he retires from the service, receiving back his original investment, and perhaps sometimes more; and making room for another worthy of the same calibre, who, in his turn, gives place to a third, and thus the series is continued. Or if the amateur has been gifted with a financial turn of mind, he finds that exchanging first into infantry is a more profitable mode of retreat than the direct method, and—no prohibition existing to such an exchange—although the infantry officer, may be totally unsuited to cavalry,—he accordingly “finds his man,” and thus resumes his place as a civilian. The whole proceeding is a commercial transaction from beginning to end: a certain rank is purchased, like the uniform by which it is distinguished, for a certain sum of money, and when the wearer is tired of the finery and the rank, the latter is sold, perhaps at a considerable profit. This is the ordinary career of cavalry officers. Others again, with more money and more ambition, persevere until they attain the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and then sell out, or retire on half-pay, realizing, or receiving back, sums ranging from £10,000 to £15,000.

There are, of course, exceptions—brilliant exceptions to this course—instances of men who join the cavalry with all the chivalrous feeling which that noble service ought to

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inspire in the minds of British youth—who take a pleasure in their duties, and a pride in professional excellence, and thus become distinguished officers *in spite of the system*; but these instances are “few and far between.”

Let us, however, follow the career of the infantry captain, who in an evil hour has been rash enough to exchange into the cavalry at a heavy cost, without knowing anything of the duties or requirements of his new calling. No examination or official enquiry, be it remembered, either physically or morally, is made as to the fitness of an officer so exchanging. The arrangement, if sanctioned by the respective colonels, is ratified by the commander-in-chief, and straightway, the former foot-soldier screws on the spurs and is introduced to the riding-school. But alas! after a little preliminary jolting in this probationary department, it is, perhaps, discovered, that nature has disqualified him for an equestrian! Here is a predicament for all parties concerned, the solution of which we will not prosecute. It is remarkable how poor vain human nature will sometimes undertake duties for which it is physically disqualified. An amusing instance of this kind is related as having occurred in a distinguished regiment, where the riding master, in the course of his instruction, directed the recruit, in the technical language of the school, to “press the *flat part* of his thigh against the flaps of the saddle.” The *ci-devant* foot soldier, as the story goes, expressed his perfect readiness to comply with the direction, “if the riding-master would only be good enough to point out where the *flat part* of his thigh was situated!”—An *ingenuous* reply, which, of course, protected the round-legged-rider from further reproof.

Competent cavalry officers can never be secured for the British army while such anomalies and abuses are permitted to exist. Stars like Anglesea, Ponsonby, Vivian, Thackwell, &c., will, of course, always shine forth at intervals, but where is the security in the time of need like the present? To form good cavalry officers a separate school of instruction should be established, where horsemanship, the use of the sword—

lance—carbine—a knowledge of the horse—of the veterinary art, and every thing relating to the cavalry service, should be combined with mathematics, military drawing, and fortification, and a certificate from this CAVALRY COLLEGE should be declared indispensable to an appointment in any regiment of dragoons, not excepting the household troops.

If a young man chooses the cavalry, obtains a certificate of qualification from the proposed college, and joins a dragoon regiment, he should not afterwards be allowed to exchange into the infantry, and thus expose his corps to the introduction of an officer having had no previous suitable education or knowledge of anything connected with the duties of a mounted soldier. Neither should cavalry generals, as too often occurs, be permitted to place infantry officers on their personal staff, however otherwise eligible. This mixing up of the services is injurious to both. Why should exchanges be permitted between officers of cavalry and infantry more than from either of these services into artillery or engineers? Each is a distinct branch, and should be kept so. There is too great a running after promotion in our service, wherever it is to be found, which destroys all *esprit de corps* and attachment to a particular branch or regiment. Hence, also, is talent for commanding cavalry so rarely exhibited; and the purchase system, prohibiting any one but a man of fortune from arriving at the command of a cavalry regiment, completes the barrier to efficiency in the higher grades.

Another serious evil resulting from this loose mode of dealing with the cavalry service, is the practical mistakes into which commanding officers of regiments constantly fall by never having studied the rudiments of their profession. Witness the passion for gaudy and superfluous equipment and *large men*. The rage for the latter had at one time risen to such a height, that the 9th lancers and 10th hussars rivalled the life-guards in size and height!—an absurdity which never could have occurred had the commanding officers of those regiments studied their profession, and made themselves acquainted with the first principles of cavalry organization. Such authorities

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will tell you of the great value of *weight*, forgetting, or not knowing, that *the effect of a charge of cavalry depends more upon the SWIFTESS of the horse than on his weight*—that velocity makes weight; and that such power is of a far more effective and telling character than weight derived from the dead load now borne by our dragoon horses. These truths are not apparent at a review, when almost any weight may be borne by the horse for the few hundred yards that he is required to gallop; but set the same men and horses on a forced march in an enemy's country—even without the frequently recurring drawbacks of bad food and shelter, and sore backs and reduced condition will be the consequences of the load. A standard of five feet eight inches for the man, (recruits of five feet six inches), and fifteen hands for the horse, the latter being short-legged, wiry, swift and of high courage—the abandonment of cuirass, shabraque, sheepskin, sabretasche, heavy head-gear, pelisse, and inflexible shoulder ornaments; and all straps and et ceteras not absolutely necessary, would render our cavalry—not, perhaps, so shewy a spectacle for a review or gala-day in Hyde park, but far more effective for the real purposes of war, and all the practical uses of the service.

England has the command of the bravest men, the boldest riders, and the swiftest and most powerful horses in the world, and ought, therefore, to have the finest cavalry; but we destroy the speed and endurance of the horses by placing giants upon them, while the degrading system of conferring rank by purchase, instead of awarding it to *merit* and *seniority*, checks all professional exertion—prohibits the advancement of eligible men, and deprives the service of able leaders.

But the purchase system can no longer stand the unequivocal expression of public opinion with which it is now assailed. Whether seniority or merit, or both combined, shall take its place—whether the road to the higher ranks shall be equally open to the deserving sergeant as to the wealthy noble—at least let us cast off and repudiate the jobbing, haggling, degrading system of purchasing rank. What would

be thought of purchasing the office of a judge—an eminent physician, or a dignitary of the church? Would the artillery, engineers, marines, or the East India company's army willingly adopt the purchase system? and if not eligible for these services, why should it be retained in other corps? Patronage and nepotism are equally to be deprecated, and we would point to the career of the most distinguished French marshals for brilliant instances of the success of an opposite system. What policy or expediency can justify the notorious fact, that, unless by casualties in action, no officer has any chance of obtaining the command of a cavalry regiment in the British service without the expenditure of from £10,000 to £15,000? Contrast this with the case of colonel Fleury, with whose history the recent visit of the French emperor has made us acquainted:—This officer, now commanding the French regiment of Guides, has risen in 16 years to his present position, from the rank of a private dragoon in the 3rd regiment of *Chasseurs d'Afrique*!

The injustice, inexpediency, and positive evils resulting from our system of military advancement, have been lately so much discussed, and this stain upon our national institutions has been so generally admitted, that it is scarcely necessary to call in the aid of individual instances to illustrate the subject;* but the case of the senior lieutenant of the 6th dragoon guards, (carbineers), which does not appear to have been yet noticed, is too glaring to be passed over. This officer—the oldest subaltern in the British army—being unable to purchase, has been THIRTY years a subaltern, during which time he has had the mortification to see wealthy commoners, noblemen, and connexions of noble and aristocratic families, with services of two and three years, rewarded with companies—in many cases *without purchase*!

* “It has been clearly shewn during the last few weeks, that while noblemen's sons of two and three years' standing in the army, have received promotion, subalterns of 12, 13, and 14 years' service, without interest, have been left in their former positions.”—*Daily News*, May 10, 1855.

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The main objection to promoting sergeants appears to be their supposed deficiency in education, and the awkwardness of placing them in a social position foreign to their tastes and habits. This may, perhaps, sometimes be productive of inconvenience, but it should be recollected, on the other hand, that sergeants, being generally married men, would not be expected to join the mess, upon promotion, and even if they were, the literary information now secured to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the British army by the establishment of regimental adult-schools, and the excellent soldiers' libraries which many garrisons possess, would always give a becoming tone to their manners and deportment.

The meanest soldier should feel that the upper ranks of the service are open to him, and this feeling will operate, not only as a stimulant to gallant actions, but to the acquisition of that knowledge which ought to characterize the position to which he aspires : a short theoretical examination might also precede and be a condition of promotion. *Merit*, combined with *seniority* appears to be the most rational ground of advancement—that is to say, *seniority*, if accompanied by *merit*. Neither officer or soldier should be promoted merely because he happens to have been so many years in a junior rank, for those years may have only exposed his incapacity, but if two men of *equal* merit present themselves for promotion, *seniority* should turn the scale.

If the purchase system be so good as its advocates assert, how comes it that England alone, of all the military nations in Europe upholds this traffic? Are the officers of the continental armies less brave, less scientific, or less practical than our own? We apprehend not. Are the East India company's officers—the artillery, engineers, marines, less effective than the corresponding troops of other armies? But it is said, "You cannot break up the purchase system without compensation." Be it so. This, surely, should be no argument in the eyes of the generous British nation. England could afford to pay 20 millions for the ill-fated Walcheren

expedition ; the same sum for the emancipation of the blacks, and the first year of the Crimean campaign has proved still more costly ; let us not, therefore, be told that the finances of the country will not admit of some £800,000 for the compensation of those who have attained rank by purchase, and thus removing from our military system the existing opprobrium.*

It is vain to say that purchase and patronage make room for the officer of small means, and are, therefore, no injury to him. When we hear of scions of aristocratic families, with services varying from one to two-and-a-half years, being promoted to companies—*without purchase*—over the heads of subalterns of 15 years' standing, as has recently taken place, it cannot be believed that the latter are insensible to the injustice. What claims have these favored youths over the many veteran soldiers who figure in the army list, with war services and honorary distinctions ? Can the latter feel otherwise than insulted at a slight which no merit—no exertion—no gallantry on their parts can avert ? and what man will seriously maintain that such a system is not in the highest degree humiliating and mortifying to the sufferer from its partiality ? But—

" 'Tis the curse of service
Preferment goes by letter and affection,
Not by the old gradation, where each second
Stood heir to the first."

OTHELLO.

"What," said Frederick the Great, "Title and birth ! Everything depends upon personal merit." In the army of

* A Treasury Abstract, dated May 5, 1855, gives the following estimate for the year ending March 31st, 1856.

Army	£16,214,000
Navy	16,653,000
Ordnance.....	7,808,000
Extraordinary.....	3,000,000
Total.....	£43,675,000

Two years since the estimates for the same object amounted to £16,487,000 ; the increase therefore in *one year*, caused by the eastern war, is not less than £27,188,000 !

CHAP.
XII.

Gustávus Adolphus there were but two means of advancement—*seniority* and *merit* ; the former was always superseded when found undeserving of promotion, but the latter never failed to meet its reward. Birth, rank, patronage—

“Et genus, et proavos, et quæ non fecimus ipsi”

were all alike unavailing.

“Oh ! that estates, degrees, and offices
Were not derived corruptly ! and that clear honour
Were purchased by the merit of the wearer !
How many then should cover that stand bare ?
How many be commanded that command.

MERCHANT OF VENICE.

THE END.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

A.

GENERAL BACON ON THE LANCE AND RANK ENTIRE.

I.

To the Editor of the United Service Gazette.

"SIR,—As you have already advocated the plan of the formation of cavalry in rank-entire, you may, perhaps, be induced to revert to the subject, now that our cavalry is upon the scene of action; and with the aid of your powerful pen, I am in hopes that it may receive the attention of the officers in command in the East, and that a fair trial may be given to a system which I firmly believe gives the greatest efficiency to the action of cavalry. It was adopted by myself when I had the honour to be placed in command of the Portuguese cavalry, and carried out with most signal success. Some trifling change will be found necessary in the organization, but not more than can be done at once upon the regimental parade; it is simply to form each troop as a squadron in one line, and the regiment in two lines instead of two ranks. A great advantage is thus gained, as all the men are under the immediate command of their own officers, which is not always the case at present—the right troop or half-squadron, being frequently commanded by the officer whose own troop is on the left, depending upon seniority, and it will be admitted that all soldiers act better under the orders of their own than strange officers; and even if a rear rank be insisted upon, this mode of formation will be found better under all circumstances, because the second line can always be closed up when deemed requisite,—can at any time act independently, and the coverings, (always a source of confusion in rallying) are

done away with. In the House of Commons, an honourable member has complained of the undue proportion of officers to soldiers in our cavalry regiments. Had that gentleman served in the yeomanry, he would have known that each troop must, of necessity, have a complement of three officers, whatever its strength, viz : a captain and two subalterns, and even that is not sufficient, for cavalry officers have much detached duty to perform, and it occasionally happens with the present establishment, that there are not sufficient officers present to occupy the required posts on parade.

“ Many years since my attention was drawn to what I considered to be great evils attached to the formation of cavalry in two ranks, as exposing men and horses unnecessarily. I will confine myself to three instances on that head to which I was an eye-witness. On the 28th of July, 1813, a squadron of Spanish cavalry, whilst covering skirmishers under the walls of Pamplona, had four horses disabled by a round shot, two of them in the rear rank. On the 10th of December following, near to the mayor of Bayonne’s house, a squadron of the 16th, in which I then served, was employed in covering the late colonel Ramsay’s guns ; a round shot knocked over three horses, two of them being in the rear rank ; and at the last charge made by a part of the 10th hussars, at Waterloo, under the command of the late major the Hon. Frederick Howard, of whom so much has been said, and in which he fell, the rear rank lost as many men and horses as the front rank from the fire of musketry ; and what was done on that occasion would have been equally well done had the rear rank been left behind, and at a far less cost of life : the loss was very great, and has left me one of the few survivors.

“ Some years afterwards I had several conversations with the late lord William Russell, then lieutenant-colonel commanding the 8th hussars, as to the rank-entire system, having in the interim, whilst a major in the 17th lancers, had many opportunities of trying the experiment, and I invariably found that cavalry could work more steadily, quickly and compactly in one rank than in two. His lordship was quite of this way of thinking, and took up the subject very earnestly. How it would answer before the enemy had to be proved ; nor was an occasion long wanting, for I was shortly afterwards appointed to the command of the cavalry of the late queen of Portugal, and as I had been the first to propose, so was I the first to put the system in practice. The late lord William Russell was then our minister at Lisbon, and the interest which he took in the matter was

confirmed by a very long correspondence, and by his making known all my views and reports to the late duke of Wellington, which gave rise to a long letter from his grace upon the subject. This letter was confided to me as a most valuable document by his lordship, and I supplied colonel Kinloch with some extracts from it upon his appointment to the command of the lancers in the Spanish Legion; they have already appeared in your columns, and have been quoted by captain Nolan, but the entire letter, of which I now send you a copy, has never yet been given to the public, a copy having been given by me to his royal highness the duke of Cambridge alone.* It was my intention some years since to have written a pamphlet on the subject, and to have introduced the duke of Wellington's letter; but, in reply to my application so to do, his grace refused his permission, saying that the letter was not written with a view to publication. Not having the power to make use of such high authority in support of my views, I abandoned the idea of the pamphlet, notwithstanding that I had full authority to state the highly favorable opinions of the late marquis of Anglesey and lord Vivian, the two most distinguished cavalry commanders of the day.

"It has been objected that in one rank the movements must be loose, and much daylight visible, (*i.e.*, openings in the rank), but this I most emphatically deny. All movements in one rank, as I have stated before, I have found to be more connected, more perfect, and far more rapid than those in two, and if constantly practised I do not believe that there is a cavalry officer of intelligence who will not acknowledge the fact. The observations of the duke, which must have great weight, will shew the attention he gave to the subject, the decided opinions he formed, and the importance he attached to the proposed change. I know of no instance where this mode of formation was tried before I put it in practice, unless what captain Nolan states with regard to the Cossacks may be accepted, and which he adduces as an argument against the rank-entire system, viz: that as soon as they were incorporated with the Russian cavalry, they abandoned their original formation. This would naturally follow; they would, of course, conform to the rules and regulations of the army of which they formed a part, and their organization would be assimilated to the rest of the Russian cavalry. But there are many instances of great advantages gained by very few cavalry soldiers. Sir William Napier, in his history

* Owing to the kindness of general Bacon, I am enabled to give this important letter at full length.—See Appendix B.

of the Peninsular war, brings forward colonel Ferrier, who commanded a regiment of French hussars, as a bright example of what can be done by a few men under the orders of an able and enterprising leader. That gallant officer, he says, was always in his place at the moment wanted, whether, with a few men, a single squadron, or his whole regiment. The charge of the 23rd light dragoons at Talavera de la Reyna may be cited as an instance, for very few men passed the ravine with the late sir Frederick Ponsonby, yet they were not to be resisted; had that regiment advanced in single rank many more would, doubtless have got over, as they would have been less crowded. The German dragoons owed their success at Salamanca to some half-dozen daring spirits who made the first impression, and in major Howard's charge at Waterloo there were not 20 men left in their saddles who rode through the square. This was seen by the duke, who was close by at the time, and was a convincing proof of what can be done by a few. Many more cases might be brought forward if necessary, and they would all tend to show that for an attack great numbers are not wanted, but where they *are* wanted is in reserve. The usual formation in an open country for cavalry is in two or three lines, thus holding one or two lines in reserve; by the rank-entire system you obtain three reserves in the one case, five in the other. These powerful reserves enable a commander to hold a large portion of his force in columns ready to act upon the flanks or rear of an enemy, or in any manner he may think fit, and it is rare that opportunities do not present themselves that may be taken advantage of, if the reserves are held well in hand. In all charges of cavalry the greatest order and steadiness should be observed till within 50 or at most 100 yards from the body of troops to be attacked—then with the inspiring hurrah! let every man put spurs to his horse; the horse will not turn when so roused and where the rider is determined, but will dash madly on with a blind fury even at a precipice. As the speed of horses varies much, even in the respect of fifty yards, some will be much in advance of others, and there will consequently be quite as much crowding and confusion with a single rank, as is convenient, without the addition of a rear rank to cripple the action of both man and horse. Should the attack fail, a rank-entire squadron can more easily make way for a second line to advance than can one composed of two ranks, and can, moreover, more speedily form again, and in turn act in reserve. A charge in rank-entire is more rapid from being disencumbered of the rear rank, than one in two ranks, and with

cavalry it is not numbers riding one close after another that constitutes weight, *it is speed that is weight*; this may be instanced by a runaway horse who has got rid of his rider,—most of us have seen how quickly he disperses a crowd, and how difficult it is to stop him. A rear rank man cannot use his weapon, nor can he add to the force or speed of the horse before him; he is, therefore, a useless appendage—room is what a horse requires, and room he cannot have when pressed upon by a rear rank; if he have not liberty of action, his force is wasted, and he is weakened by strong efforts to get out of a crowd, whereas all his strength should be husbanded to get *into* one.

“ I will now give you some instances as proofs of the advantages of the rank-entire formation, premising that had I thought the rear ranks of Squadrons added to their strength I should have retained them, because the enemy with whom I had to deal were (numerically) vastly superior, highly disciplined, and mounted on good and well-fed horses, and I was cautioned on all sides to beware how I meddled with them. One regiment in particular (the Chaves) was the terror of the Portuguese soldiers; we at last met, and without the loss of a man on our side, this celebrated corps was annihilated, notwithstanding that before the attack an officer of high rank said to me, ‘for God’s sake take care, they are the Chaves people.’ They had 400, we 200, and a fair field.

“ Having shewn how squadrons may suffer under fire in two ranks, I will proceed to show how they escape injury when formed in one. On the 24th of January, 1833, Marshal Solignac attacked the enemy’s lines in front of Oporto and failed; our cavalry, which could then only muster two hundred lancers and one hundred light dragoons, had to cover the retreat in an intersected and wooded country, where it was very difficult to act. They were exposed to a most murderous fire, and had 27 horses killed and wounded; had they been formed in two ranks the loss would have been doubled. Shortly afterwards four squadrons of lancers being formed in a column of half squadrons at quarter distance, a 10-inch shell pitched into the centre of the column, exploded, and injured neither man nor horse. For this mode of formation (the column at quarter distance) I was indebted to the suggestion of major general Lovell, one of our best and most experienced cavalry officers. I never afterwards permitted any other; it was our established order for *close* column, and we found the benefit of it, especially upon the 4th of July following, at Oporto, when exposed to a cannonade upon both flanks. Again, upon the 24th of July, when marshal Bourmont

had assumed the command of the Miguelite army, and had assembled 40,000 men for the attack upon Oporto, six squadrons of lancers occupied the open ground in front of Buen Sucesso during the whole day, exposed, as before, in front and on both flanks; but the enemy's cavalry, although ten times as numerous as the lancers, would not try their strength, whilst the stockades prevented our getting at them.

“ On the 18th of August, 1833, (the day on which the siege of Oporto was raised, after a duration of thirteen months,) the enemy's posts in front of Oporto were driven in at daylight by four squadrons of lancers. In turning the corner of a wood they suddenly came upon a battalion of Caçadores, which had just retired behind a stone wall, under cover of the guns of one of their forts. The leading squadron having no rear-rank to tumble over or hurry them, leaped the wall into the midst of the enemy, and made them all prisoners. The second squadron was ordered on, and charged through the enemy's burning camp—an exploit very deservedly most highly spoken of. I did not see it, being engaged elsewhere; but Sir Charles Shaw, who did, spoke to me of it as a most gallant affair. The squadron was commanded by Captain John de Mello, a meritorious officer, who died recently in the command of the same regiment. Later in the day the enemy's cavalry, though five or six times our numbers, were driven in all directions from the field, the baggage all taken, and themselves pursued till our horses were completely knocked up. On the 11th of October following, at Loures, in front of Lisbon, six squadrons of lancers, supported by a battalion of Caçadores, were ordered to clear the left front of the ground intended to be occupied: this circumstance is most particularly alluded to because it proved the great advantage of placing the half-squadron leaders *in front* instead of on the flanks of their troops. From the position of the enemy the advance to attack was made in echelon of squadrons from the left; the leading squadron was composed chiefly of Portuguese recruits recently raised in Lisbon, and under a sharp fire of musketry, it wavered very much; the half-squadron leaders were consequently placed in front, and from that moment the squadron advanced as steadily as the older soldiers; the movement having turned the enemy's right flank, the rear of the echelon had to charge, and the leading squadrons, by changing direction to the right, became the support. On no occasion was the advantage of the rank-entire formation more essentially proved, for the movements were steady, and the enemy very superior in numbers, both of cavalry and infantry. Simultaneously with this operation a

gallant attack was made by captain, now colonel, Griffiths, of the Portuguese reserve, who had been left with a squadron of lancers to watch the high road. The orders invariably given to officers when detached were always to charge when they saw an opportunity, with one-half their men, leaving the other half in reserve. Thus 25 or 30 lancers drove two of the enemy's squadrons before them. Later in the day the right was threatened by 10 of the enemy's squadrons, about 1,000 horses. Four squadrons of lancers and two of light cavalry only could be spared to meet them—in all 360 horses. We rode fast at them, under a heavy cannonade, but they declined the encounter, retiring behind their artillery and infantry. They certainly had a respect for what some call the "weakness of our formation." On the previous day close to Lisbon, a charge was made by the squadron of Dom Carlos Mascarenhas, a very intelligent and good officer, now a general in his own service. He pounced upon some of the enemy's cavalry who had got entangled in a vineyard, and did considerable execution with his lances. The reserves kept off a more numerous body which was formed under cover of their guns and infantry. Four days subsequently, the day to which lord William Russell alludes in his letter published by captain Nolan in his "Cavalry Tactics," (page 327), we took up a position with 420 lancers and 350 light cavalry, on the large open heath that will be remembered by all old Peninsular soldiers between Cartaxo and Santarem, and offered battle to 3,000 of Dom Miguel's horsemen, but they declined the challenge. Having greatly the advantage of position, I moved on to the attack, when, much to my chagrin, I was called back by higher authority, and informed that not only had the rest of the cavalry not arrived at their destination, but that there was neither artillery nor infantry within ten miles of me, while the enemy had 20,000 men at Santarem. I was told that the fate of Portugal was in my hands; I urged that the best way to secure it was to beat the enemy, but all in vain, and thus was lost one of the finest opportunities for a cavalry action ever seen. I was pressed to retire, but this I positively refused to do, and I was right, for, as Lord William observed, the enemy was not to be tempted. At Servia, upon the 15th of January following, with one squadron of lancers and one of the 10th cavalry, we drove a body of the enemy's cavalry, which was attacking us, into a column of their own infantry, consisting of five skeleton battalions, some 1,500 men, and the reserve squadrons coming up, a large number were made prisoners, including the general, the officers of the

staff, the standards, baggage, &c. The 25th was the day we measured our lances with the regiment I have already alluded to (the Chaves corps), the colonel and 27 men only got home to tell the tale, after a chase for 10 miles; and on the 30th, after captain Wakefield's squadron had beaten two squadrons of the enemy, the entire 17th regiment was attacked and taken in square; the men who charged did not exceed thirty, but the reserves were formed on all sides and came up to secure the prisoners.

"I will conclude with one more instance, which occurred during the battle of Almoester, on the 18th February, 1834. A squadron of lancers, and one of the 18th light cavalry were formed in front of a heavy column of the enemy's cavalry, waiting the coming up of our main body, which had been previously employed on the extreme left of our position; the two leading squadrons of the enemy's column immediately burst out to attack, but not liking the looks of the lancers, changed their direction and fell upon the swordsmen. The lancers wheeled quickly to the right, rushed with great impetus upon the enemy's flank, and completely routed them, when the main body came up, and the work was ended.

"Should it meet your approbation, I should wish on a future occasion to say something in favour of the lance, which captain Nolan condemns; while I consider it the queen of weapons for a cavalry soldier,—*but he must know how to use it.*

"ANTHONY BACON,

"General late Port. Serv.

"Swanscombe Lodge, Aug. 3, 1854."

II.

To the Editor of the United Service Gazette.

"SIR,—The letter which you did me the favour to insert in your last number, had for its primary object to draw the attention of our cavalry officers to the rank-entire system, by bringing forward a few cases in which I had found it eminently successful, not only in attacks, but in exposing fewer men and horses to the effects of fire, and moreover to show that there is not that looseness or weakness in the formation, which has been thought would invite an attack.

"With regard to the attack upon squares of infantry, or any other bodies of troops, or batteries, I have ever entertained a strong conviction that where the rider is determined to go, there will the horse go; but

every rider is not of the determined class ; in the hunting field very few take a line of their own, and turn at nothing, although many will follow : so in a charge of cavalry ; some will go in earnest, others shut their eyes and ply their spurs, while a vast many will keep a tight rein, and horses so ridden will possibly pull up or turn aside according to circumstances and their ordinary habit ; besides, every man does not place the same confidence in himself or his horse ; all are not good horsemen ; all are not masters of their weapon ; nor do all ride good and well broke horses ; a man who is badly mounted, whatever may be his merit, must feel an inferiority, and a bad soldier upon a good horse is so much strength thrown away. As the action of cavalry depends very much upon its officers, they should never (if it can be avoided) be removed from their own troops, for knowing the qualities, temper, and disposition of every man and horse under their command, they know where the most dependence can be placed in cases of daring or difficulty, and a mutual confidence subsists. Most infantry and some cavalry officers are of opinion that the square cannot be broken by cavalry alone, but I have come to a different conclusion, and there are many instances on record to warrant it ; no doubt it is far more prudent to secure the aid of artillery or infantry, but there are occasions when a cavalry officer can have neither, while an attack must be made. In such cases there should be no hesitation—the nature of the ground, and position of the enemy with its supporting bodies, must determine the placing of the reserves—there can be no rules for these dispositions—all must depend upon the quick eye, instant decision, and distinct orders of the commander. But there are rules by which I should always be guided in making an attack ; these are to show no larger front than the side of the square—to attack with one rank only—the second rank to be brought up about fifty yards behind the first, and so on with the other ranks of the column formed for attack—that interval will be sufficient between the lines as they successively advance, either for the purpose of following up success, or of giving time for a clear front in the event of failure ; if three sides of the square can be attacked simultaneously, so much the better. By charging in rank-entire fewer horses will be knocked down to serve as a rampart to protect the square, and if forced to retire, the survivors, when unincumbered with a rear rank, will more readily get out of the way of those who are coming close after them, and again form in the rear of their column. By a succession of charges, I believe most firmly that the square can be broken, and possibly with a trifling loss, though most probably a very severe one, and I repeat,

that while entertaining this opinion, should I ever have the opportunity, I never would try it again myself, nor would any cavalry officer be justified in so doing without guns or infantry to help him, unless for very cogent reasons, and such in warfare must sometimes occur. In all charges the advance should be made at a steady gallop, and with a well-formed line to the last moment—sharp spurs and daring resolution must do the rest.

“ To make cavalry really effective, much time and great attention are required ; the soldier has much to learn, the horse should be well selected and thoroughly trained, and the equipment of both is of the highest importance. In every word that captain Nolan says about the horse furniture I most cordially agree ; our light cavalry saddles are the very worst that could have been invented ; they throw a man forward in his seat, thereby rendering it insecure, and then the bare tree with only the folded blanket to protect the horse’s back, is so liable to misplacement, that sore backs are of constant occurrence : there is no more melancholy sight to the eye of a cavalry soldier, than a corps on the line of march followed by a number of men leading their horses. In a long night-march especially the blankets frequently slip unobserved from underneath the saddle, and the result is inevitable ; in daylight such accidents are seen and remedied, but in a dark night, without frequent halts and inspections, for which there is not always time to spare, they are unavoidable, and only found out when the mischief is done. I will give as an instance, an occurrence in Portugal in the year 1834 : 100 lancers and a similar number of light cavalry were ordered upon a special duty to a distance of 50 miles in the rear of the enemy ; they performed the service required and returned in 48 hours. The following day the light cavalry, whose saddles are the same as those in use in the British service, reported 30 sore backs, the lancers not one ; the saddles of the latter were constructed under my own directions, different in shape, and all had *stuffed pannels* like those of the officers ; they cost more money, but there were no sore backs, and the superiority in the riding of the men was most remarkable. I can speak from personal experience as to the hussar saddle now in use, from having had to mount a troop horse at Waterloo after my own was shot, and I hope never to be in the same predicament again. Next in importance is the weight put upon a horse. This can and should be reduced. When men are found fault with in the ranks it would be highly desirable for the officers to mount the horses of such soldiers themselves, and they would at once see how necessary is the proper equipment and training of the horse. Keep

your hand low, is a constant exhortation in all riding schools ; with our regimental saddles the thing is impossible.

“ The clothing is to a great extent a matter of taste. It is a mistaken notion to condemn the hussar pelisse ; slung over the left shoulder it affords a protection to the swordsman’s weak side, and is no incumbrance. There is a variety of opinion as to armament. Fire arms are of little use to cavalry excepting upon outpost duty, but if they are to have carbines, let them have revolvers. Skirmishing with cavalry is absurd ; you may pop at one another all day without doing much harm. Small formed bodies, and the charge *en debandade*, spiritedly called by general Lovell the *wild hurra charge of light cavalry* would be better to check the advance of light troops. This was seen at Quatre Bras on the 17th June with the 18th hussars ; the rain very soon put a stop to all firing, when it became a personal affair between the French advanced-guard and the Irish hussars. It was a fine scene to witness. With a revolving carbine a heavy and rapid fire might be thrown into an enemy about to be attacked, and then the men charge themselves, or make way for others, whether lancers or swordsmen, and in this particular—Deane and Adams’s patent has a great advantage over Colt’s for one action cocks and discharges the piece as fast as a man can pull the trigger, whereas in Colt’s the lock must be pulled back after each shot. The lance is condemned by many, but I should be sorry to see it discarded. Its superiority over the sword in single combat has been established in the majority of experiments. I have used it myself and seen its effect upon many occasions, and am convinced that in good hands it is a more formidable weapon than the sword, although the latter is better adapted for a *mélée*.

“ The size of the men and horses has been much discussed. I will not enter further into that subject than stating that, from experience, I should prefer length of limb in the former, high breeding in the latter, and if, after the age of 35, the men who grew heavy were drafted into the heavy cavalry, we should perhaps have the finest reserve cavalry ever known—all tried and experienced soldiers.

“ The preparation of men and horses for actual service, when they are fit to take their places in the ranks, is of the first consideration. In England we are too careful of our horses—we have not sufficient mounted drills, or rather field days, from which no officer or man should be absent on any pretence whatever short of illness ; nor are the horses practised as they ought to be in broken ground, and amongst fences and ditches, and yet on actual service they are constantly employed in

an intricate country. I am not prepared to say that your suggestion of straw figures is not a good one, could means be found of keeping up a concentrated fire at the right moment, but at the same time I think that were the horses constantly practised to advance at a slow pace in the face of the fire of the artillery and musketry, they would never halt or turn of their own accord in a charge, whatever fire might be levelled against them. In all field days it would perhaps be better after a charge, that, instead of halting and forming to the front or wheeling outwards to retire, the squadrons should pursue for a short distance and then rally, whether to the front, flank, or rear—an operation always required after charging in earnest, therefore one which cannot be too often practised in the drill; besides, it teaches men to act independently, to which sufficient attention is not paid; they are taught to leap over the bar in the school, and in all probability never see another fence, nevertheless they are expected to follow their officers, who have, in all probability, some experience in the hunting field, and whose horses have not the same weight to carry. Having the finest material in the world, we ought to have the finest cavalry—the first is generally acknowledged, the second disputed.

“ I have the honour to be, sir,

“ Your obedient servant,

“ A. BACON.

“ Swanscombe, Aug. 29th, 1854.”

B.

COLONEL KINLOCH ON RANK ENTIRE.

From the United Service Gazette, March 12th, 1853.

“ In the *United Service Gazette* of the 8th May last, we noticed a very interesting pamphlet by colonel KINLOCH, on the subject of the constitution of a yeomanry force; and especially in reference to the organization of cavalry in ‘rank-entire.’ We have now the pleasure of publishing a letter from colonel Kinloch, embracing the opinions of the late duke of Wellington, lord Vivian, lord William Russell, and general Bacon, upon that momentous subject. It is peculiarly well timed, as at the present moment, great interest is taken in the question of increasing the efficiency of our present weak regiments of cavalry, and of rendering the yeomanry fit for active home service,

To the Editor of the United Service Gazette.

"SIR,—In a pamphlet I published last year on the 'Defence of the country by means of a volunteer force,' I ventured to recommend cavalry, and yeomanry in particular, to be formed in 'rank-entire' instead of in two ranks as is usual in most armies.

"I have lately found copies of the opinions of the duke of Wellington and several cavalry officers on the subject, which I could not lay my hand on at the time I wrote the pamphlet. These opinions were addressed to general Anthony Bacon, who commanded the cavalry of Don Pedro in Portugal, in 1833-34, and who was good enough to give me copies." *

I.

"Strathfieldsaye, 20th Nov., 1853.

"MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM,

"Although I suppose that it will never happen to me again to have anything to say to the discipline of the troops, I have passed too many years of my life in relations with them, and in reflections upon what was good and useful to their discipline and movements, not to feel an anxiety relative to the formation of the cavalry.

"In my opinion, the cavalry is useful and even safe only, by the use of very large reserves. It is essentially an offensive arm, whose efficiency depends upon its activity combined with its steadiness and good order. I think that the second rank of the cavalry, at the usual distance of close order, does not increase its activity. The rear rank does not strengthen the front rank, as the centre and rear ranks do the front rank of the infantry. The rear rank of the cavalry can augment the activity or even the means of attack of the front rank only, by a *movement of disorder*.

"If then, the attack of the front rank should fail, and it should be necessary to retire, the second or rear rank is *too close to be able to sustain the attack* or to restore order. The second rank must be involved in the defeat and confusion, and the whole must depend upon some *other body*, whether of cavalry or infantry in reserve, to receive and protect the fugitives.

* The letter from the duke of Wellington was addressed to Lord William Russell, and a correct copy *in extenso* of this highly interesting and important document, as quoted above, has been kindly furnished to me by general Bacon: the copy in colonel Kinloch's pamphlet, as given in the U. S. Gazette of March, 1853, appears to be an abridgment of the original letter.

"I have already stated that the second or rear rank can augment the means of the first rank only by a movement of disorder. This is peculiarly the case if the attack should be successful. In all these cases the second rank—at a distance sufficiently great to avoid being involved in the confusion of the attack of the front rank, whether successful or otherwise—could aid in the attack, or, if necessary, cover the retreat of the cavalry as a body; while by the absence of all impediments from the closeness of the rear rank, the activity of the front rank would be increased.

"But my opinion always has been that the whole practice of the cavalry ought to be one of reserves. I thought that the cavalry at *two deep* ought never to appear but in three lines. At one deep it follows that, if my reasoning be correct, three lines would still be sufficient, but I should be inclined to say, that four or six lines would be preferable to a smaller number.

"The facility of movement is so great, and the use of the arm can be rendered of so much importance by the aid of artillery that I should have no apprehension of not being able to bring up the lines from the rear to the front or to a flank, and to apply them to the most useful purposes of attack, if necessary: at the same time it cannot be denied that, till required for the actual attack, the less they are exposed the better. My notion of the distance of the lines of cavalry was, as much as a cavalry horse could gallop in a minute. I would have the second line pull up at a walk when the first should charge—that the third line, always in column, should deploy at the same moment, and then act as ordered for the second line, in support of the first: the supernumerary lines beyond these should all act as ordered for the third line.

"In Napoleon's great battles, he never charged with masses of cavalry. He used his cavalry, supported by great masses of artillery, to seize positions, and he afterwards occupied them with his infantry or his artillery, to operate on the *morale* of his enemy by turning a flank, or occupying a post in the centre of his army with celerity. He tried this maxim in the battle of Waterloo, but the British infantry was too steady and it did not answer. In all these operations the first movement of the cavalry is offensive, and the proper movement of that arm.

"But after the position is seized the cavalry becomes defensive. Its order—depth—the removal of the great body of it from the effect of the fire of the enemy; the security of the flanks from the attacks of

the enemy's cavalry—all become important, and can be only attained by reserves.

"I conceive that the one rank system would require a change, not only in the discipline, but in the organization of the cavalry. If I am not mistaken, it would render the use of cavalry in an army *much more general than it is at present*.

(Signed,)

"WELLINGTON."

II.

Extract from a letter addressed to general BACON by lieutenant general SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN, G.C.B., (afterwards LORD VIVIAN, and Master-general of the Ordnance.)

"I rejoice to find Don Pedro's cavalry has fallen under the orders of a man so capable of leading them. I again congratulate you on your very high and honourable station. In short, I feel confident you will do credit to yourself, your cavalry, and your Peninsular education.

"I quite entirely agree with you in all you say of the value of the lance. As to the rank-entire system, I am by no means certain that it would not always be a good thing, if, on advancing to an attack, or standing in line, the rear ranks were to form a reserve at the distance of, say 80 or 100 yards. When so circumstanced, they would be much better able to follow up an advantage gained by, or to repel a successful attack of the enemy on the first rank. The fact is that *the second rank is of little use but to fall over the first*.

"Let me congratulate you on your brilliant success and gallant conduct at Leyria. I will run over and pay you a visit.

(Signed,)

"R. HUSSEY VIVIAN."

III.

Extract from a letter to general BACON from lord WILLIAM RUSSELL, Colonel commanding 8th hussars.

"I wish you joy of your promotion and command. The cavalry will, I have no doubt, be in excellent order in your hands; but don't be rash—they are too numerous for you to cope with, and their horses are better fed.

"Anything that proves the efficacy of the single-rank-system is interesting to me; and it certainly was thoroughly proved on the 16th October, (1833,) when your force of cavalry imposed on more than treble your numbers. This quite destroys the argument that a single rank 'looks so weak,' and 'invites the enemy to charge.' Your adversaries were not to be tempted on the 16th. Keep notes of all the occurrences: we will one day put them in print.

"I am delighted to find that Vivian looked with a more favourable eye on the system. Depend upon it they will all come round. He wants to get off in the *mezzo termine* of leaving the rear rank behind. This I entirely disapprove, because *the rear rank so left would have no one to command it, and cavalry depends entirely upon its officers.*

"There is no doubt that, if cavalry is to act in one rank, a different organization is necessary. You must turn your mind to this, as the end of the war brings to your aid the practical reflections you can make now. The duke of Wellington is in our favour, but the prejudices of the cavalry officers are difficult to be overcome.

"I send you up and if you can convert him you will do wonders. He never in his life gave up a once formed opinion.

"Try Head's (sir Francis) plan with the lasso for your guns.

(Signed.)

"WILLIAM RUSSELL."

IV.

General Bacon to colonel Kinloch.

11th September, 1835.

"MY DEAR KINLOCH,

"I hope you stick to it—'rank-entire.' Depend upon it, it is the most efficient way of using cavalry. You are quicker and have more reserves. Enclosed are some extracts respecting my system with cavalry.* Lord Anglesea, Brotherton, and many other officers I could name, agree with me. As I am the only man who has tried it I give you a few of my reasons:—

"In one rank all movements are made with greater precision and more rapidity than in two ranks.

"When cavalry has to re-form after a charge, it is effected more readily and far quicker, for each man gets at once to his own troop, and, if such formation be required under fire, the value of *quickness* will admit of no argument against it.

* The preceding from the duke of Wellington, &c.

"I have tried this, in presence of a superior enemy very frequently, and at times when hotly pressed, and under a heavy fire of artillery and musquetry.

"A charge in one rank will be more *rapid*, consequently more likely to succeed, than one in two ranks, because the horses are more at liberty—not likely to be cramped by the endeavours of the rear rank to get to the front, and the men will have a more free use of their arms. Every one will do his duty; *skulkers* cannot so easily pull up, and such are found in all armies.

"In advancing in line for any distance—and before an enemy you have rarely a fine open country—the intervals are never preserved between squadrons, and it frequently happens that a line of two ranks becomes towards the centre a disordered column: in re-forming a rear rank is never sure of its *tellings off*.

"In all columns I should form my second rank in a column in rear of my first, that is, as a second regiment, and this will always be easy by keeping, when in line, a distance equal to the depth of a close column. You may always close your lines if you think it desirable; and when about to form columns, it is only to open your ranks, or instead of a column of squadrons,—to form on the centre, contiguous close columns of half squadrons.

"Another great advantage in the system, is that all your ranks are commanded by officers. Whenever you are asked for a *squadron*, remember it is a *troop*, and if you send two troops, they are two squadrons, and they become a proper command for a major.

"I could give you many other reasons for the system, but I hope to be with you, and perfect that which I have begun, and with a fair portion of success.

"Believe me, &c.,

(Signed,)

"A. BACON."

"A squadron of the 1st lancers of the British legion in Spain, under the command of major Hograve, and consisting of only 60 horses, charged 300 of the Carlist cavalry, (after they had defeated several of the Christino cavalry), pursued them above three miles, and killed nearly 100 of them. The squadron of the 1st lancers was formed in 'rank-entire,' the Carlists in two ranks, and thus proved triumphantly the efficiency of the former system.

“ From the above opinions of distinguished and experienced officers, supported as they are by facts, on the few occasions the ‘rank-entire’ formation has been tried, it appears worthy of consideration whether it should not now be acted on in the British army.

“ I find that in the regulations for the drill and exercise of the yeomanry cavalry they are recommended to adopt the ‘rank-entire’ system, which I was not aware of when I wrote my pamphlet last year. This formation is particularly suitable for yeomanry and all irregular and half-disciplined cavalry, on account of its great simplicity and freedom of action. As the duke of Wellington ‘conceived that it would render the use of cavalry much more general than it is at present;’ as sir Hussey Vivian said ‘that the second rank is of little use but to fall over the first;’ and as general Bacon observes, ‘a troop becomes a squadron, and each rank is commanded by officers,’ it appears that the effective strength of our cavalry may be greatly increased, *if not fully* DOUBLED, by adopting the ‘rank-entire’ system. The principal change in the organization called for by this alteration appears to be a *small* and *economical* addition to the officers. Captains commanding troops will, when in line, command squadrons, for a troop will occupy the same front in single rank that a squadron does in two. The interior economy of the troop remains as before. The officer who commands two troops or squadrons when in line, will have a fit command for a field-officer.

“ I would, therefore, suggest that, in order to carry out the advantages of the ‘rank-entire’ system, and render it thoroughly efficient, a second major should be restored to each cavalry regiment; and as a half-troop will become a half-squadron, there should be another subaltern to each troop.

“ Perhaps the two or three senior captains should have a higher rank than merely captain, as they may sometimes command two troops or squadrons; the higher rank of *chef d’escadron*, as in other armies, or brevet-major, might be given to them.

“ The only additional expense, therefore, would be a second major for each regiment, and a second lieutenant to each troop; a very small expense certainly, if, as it is assumed, the cavalry will be greatly increased in efficiency.

“ Let the troops be increased to 50 horses per troop, with the above addition to the officers, and adopt the ‘rank-entire’ formation; then our cavalry will be ready for any service that might be required of them; but at present the regiments are very weak in horses, and in double ranks are only about two good squadrons strong.

"I must apologise for troubling you so long ; but as the economical increase of the army is the great question of the day, and cavalry appears not much noticed, I trust the foregoing remarks and opinions on the organization and efficiency of that chivalrous and important arm of the service, will not be considered uninteresting to your military readers.

"I have the honor to be,

"Your obedient humble servant,

"JOHN KINLOCH."

P.S.—The following sentences are extracted from my pamphlet before referred to.—J. K.

"It was on his (general Bacon's) recommendation that I adopted this, which appeared to me to be the proper and common-sense formation of cavalry (and raw cavalry in particular) in the 1st or 'Reyna Ysabel' regiment of lancers in the British legion in Spain, which I had the honor to organize and command in 1835-36 ; and to that simple formation I attribute the very creditable and efficient manner in which they could go through the manoeuvres of a field day, and do their duty in the field, after very little practice and drilling. After being broken in a charge, or dispersed in pursuit, a squadron in 'rank-entire' may 'rally' and 'tell off' in much less time than the front and rear ranks would take to scramble into their places ; and thus much time, so valuable in cavalry movements, would be gained.

"Many smart soldiers dislike being in the rear ranks, and feel themselves placed in the back ground ; they are apt to become careless, and merely to follow their front-rank files, without knowing or caring what is going on ; whereas in rank-entire every man is under the eye of his officers, and *must* be on the *qui vive* and *wide awake*. Every man has an equal share in the attack, which is not the case with two ranks. 'Rank-entire' may appear loose, and show more 'daylight' between the files, but is not in *reality*, more loose ; on the contrary, cavalry accustomed to work in rank-entire will be found to be better closed together than with two, though the two ranks help to 'fill up' better, and make them *appear* closer and more solid.

"I consider that a charge of cavalry in rank-entire, on fair ground, fit for a good gallop, will 'hit harder,' and every man and horse 'tell' with greater effect, than if the rear rank were treading on their heels. The rear rank cannot give much assistance to the front, but may actually incommode them. In the rank-entire system, young and

untrained horses will be quieter and stéadier, and not so likely to be lamed by the rear rank treading on the front rank-horses' heels, and they in turn 'lashing out' and laming those behind. It may be said that the two ranks have answered very well on former occasions, but it may be a fair question to ask whether half the number would not have done as well? or whether the same number in two lines, instead of two ranks would not have done better?"

C.

NORTON'S PROJECTILES.

I.

To the Editor of the United Service Magazine.

"In pace, si sapiens, aptavit idonea bello."

Hon.

SIR,—The recent lecture upon fire arms at Cork, given during the Irish National Exhibition, by colonel Chesney, has, at length, rendered justice to a deserving officer, the merits of whose inventions I first had the honor of bringing before your editorial predecessor in 1832.

"It is naturally, a great satisfaction to me, even after this long interval of time, and when the inventor and his advocate have entered that 'vale of years' from whence 'no traveller returns,' to find that the original discoveries of captain Norton have obtained their proper place in the history of military projectiles, and that the famous *Minié* ball, and all its imitations, must, after all, be admitted to be nothing more or less than a modification of Norton's elongated-rifle-shot—the change or addition (for it cannot be called improvement) being merely the iron cup (*culot*) now found to be totally unnecessary.

"It is interesting and instructive to trace the progress of human invention—to observe the unaided struggles of genius—the frowns of fortune—the rebuffs of ignorant officials—the 'hopes deferred'—the assumption, presumption, and jealousy of rival aspirants, until the name and fame, and identity of the original inventor are mystified and overlaid by modern pretenders, and the public are left in the pleasing predicament of not knowing 'which is which.'

"In the present instance, however, thanks to colonel Chesney, no such difficulty exists. The date,—description,—the progressive

steps—the fundamental idea—the various changes and modifications arising as the natural result of experiment—all come before us in clear, consecutive, chronological order down to the present day; and as your influential journal was the first that generously took up the cause of captain Norton, and gave him the aid of that advocacy which the press alone can give—I feel that you will not consider it a trespass upon your pages, to call the attention of your readers to the leading facts which have enabled me to place the question of disputed priority of invention as regards the elongated-expanding-rifle-ball or more properly *shot*—fully and fairly before the public.

“ It appears, then, from details furnished by captain Norton himself, that so far back as the celebrated battle of Busaco, in September, 1810, where he was present with his regiment, the gallant 34th, the idea of constructing a small-arm-projectile capable of exploding ammunition waggons, was first suggested to his mind by the accidental effect of a shot or shell fired close by his side, from the Portuguese battery of major Victor von Arentsschildt, which shot, falling amongst the ammunition waggons of the French army, blew up several of them, igniting the long grass—afterwards a pine forest, and spreading the flames for miles around. This explosion drew forth a loud and simultaneous cheer from the whole British army, and the impression left upon captain Norton's mind was never effaced. But the personal duties of the war left him no time for invention, and it was not until after he had borne the sufferings and shared in the glories of six Peninsular campaigns—including the bloody Albuera,—that he thought of practically applying to small-arms, a power, the importance of which had been made manifest by the lucky hit of the gallant Hanoverian. A change of quarters to India in 1815, brought with it time and leisure, and here captain Norton, having been presented at Bangalore with a native tube and arrow, was struck by the applicability of the form and principle of this projectile to the object which he had so long in view, namely the construction of a musket or *rifle-shell*. The arrow used by the natives of South India, as well as by the Malays and Chinese, is made of the hard Areca palm, having a base formed of finely turned Lotus pith, as a substitute for feathers, and is blown through a long tube, acting like a pea-shooter, and launching the arrow on its flight, which, in calm weather, can be extended to 70 yards. In propelling this arrow by means of the breath, the fine elastic pith expands and fills the bore of the tube, preventing loss of power by windage, and retaining its impulsive force. These facts

suggested to captain Norton the principle of what he called his 'condensed arrow,' which he brought out in 1823, and submitted to the select committee at Woolwich. This projectile, intended for the musquet, was four inches long; the base, corresponding with the Lotus pith of the Malay weapon, was formed of sheet iron, and contained the charge, which expanded the base on ignition; and the head, forming the shell was armed with a percussion cap. The select committee reported—'that the idea of this projectile was taken from the poisoned (!) arrow of the Malays, and was totally inapplicable to the service.' Colonel (afterwards general) Miller, however, a member of the committee and one of the most scientific artillery officers of his day, observed that 'although such a projectile would be inconvenient to carry, yet that if captain Norton could contrive a shot or shell that would strike point foremost, it would be a contrivance of the greatest value.' The hint was readily taken; and in the autumn of the same year, (1823), the application of a percussion cap to Staudenmeyer's solid cone-pointed shot, fired from an air gun, at once convinced him of the practicability. Captain Norton then also ascertained the advantage of changing the centre of gravity to the front, and effected it by a hollow base, which also produced the required expansion. In the following year (1824) being then stationed with his regiment at Enniskillen, he completed an elongated rifle-shot and shell, the former being *precisely on the principle of the present so-called Minié ball*. In the summer of 1826, captain Norton, having obtained leave of absence from his regiment for the purpose, superintended the trial of these projectiles in Dublin, and afterwards at Woolwich, Sandhurst, and Addiscombe, besides numerous other trials, and in every instance with complete success. The Woolwich committee, however, consistent with their former decision, reported—'that although the percussion shell might answer captain Norton's purpose of blowing up ammunition waggons, yet that it could not be introduced with advantage into the service as part of the ammunition of rifle corps.' They also added the notable objection that the projections on the shot and shell, made to fit the grooves of the rifle, '*would be liable to wear out by friction in the soldier's pouch!*' Immediately previous to the last named experiments, captain Norton, then stationed at Portumna in Ireland, had the good fortune to make the acquaintance of colonel Bloomfield, a relative of lord Bloomfield, then commanding the artillery at Woolwich, before whom the powers of the new projectile were also exhibited. Colonel Bloomfield undertook to have some of

the shells conveyed to the crown prince (now king) of Sweden, who then held the chief command in the Swedish artillery and took a great interest in military science. This was accordingly done, and hence the ingenious baron Wahrenдорff—the inventor and manufacturer of improved britch-loading ordnance—may *possibly* have become acquainted with the principle which appeared in the shell of his 32 pounder at the great London Exhibition of 1851, which corresponds with that of the Norton shell.

"In the year 1828, Captain Norton, undismayed by the frowns of the Woolwich authorities, proposed for their adoption a rifle with *three* grooves—the 'regulation' rifle having then *seven* grooves; the committee reported as objectionable that captain Norton's rifle had '*only three grooves*,' and with admirable consistency, subsequently introduced into the service a *two-grooved* rifle and spherical belted ball! But this introduction, notwithstanding the elevated quarter from which it proceeded, had no effect upon those who were free to exercise their own discretion as to the form of shot; and the rifle-world—if that term may be applied to those interested in the improvement of the weapon—seeing the inferiority of the spherical-belted ball, gradually adopted an elongated or acorn-shaped shot, with projections to fit the grooves of the rifle; and this eventually, became general throughout Europe.*

"Captain Norton continued during the whole of this period perseveringly to advocate the *elongated* form of shot for the rifle, admitting that the spherical was best suited to the musquet. He maintained that his shot and shell would carry, even the light end foremost, for 300 yards; and that this fact—so opposed to the general laws of projectiles—was caused by the powerful spin or rotatory motion round its longer axis which was imparted to the shot by the grooves of the rifle. A remarkable fact was developed by these experiments, namely, that a solid leaden projectile of the cone or acorn shape, when fired from a rifle, will expand for half its length from the base, but will not carry its point foremost during the whole of its flight, unless the *centre of gravity* be in the *fore part of the shot*. It was also clearly established that a solid shot of the same form and weight as Norton's

* The acorn-shaped shot with projections, which is represented in Schaffern's celebrated "Treatise on Rifle Projectiles" as the shot adopted almost generally on the continent, and by amateur riflemen in Scotland and England, is the same as that recommended by captain Norton to the Woolwich committee previous to their introduction of the spherical belted ball.

elongated shot—many of which have been brought out with the assumption of originality by different amateurs, will not carry point foremost during the whole of its flight; the base being the heavier end, will, after the propelling influence has diminished, struggle to lead, and thus inevitably derange the accuracy of its flight; whereas the hollow shot, having the centre of gravity in the fore part, will invariably lead point foremost.

“ In the year 1832, having been presented by captain Norton with one of his shells and become acquainted with many of the foregoing facts, I felt that it was due to the service—as well as to the merits of a deserving but ill-treated officer—to submit the discovery to the then editor of the *United Service Magazine*, the late lamented major Shadwell Clerke, who ably seconded my efforts to place captain Norton's claims before the military authorities. The subject was also taken up with zeal by a talented nobleman who had directed much attention to engines of war—the earl of Orkney, at whose residence, Taplow, the following remarkable results were obtained:—

“ A box was prepared made of two elm planks, each one inch and half thick, and four inches apart; the space between was filled with water, and one inch behind the second plank was a deal board,—the interval being filled with gunpowder. Captain Norton fired his rifle shell at this combination of resisting elements, at the distance of sixty yards, when the shell penetrated the whole—passing through the water—exploding the powder, and perforating the deal plank. It remained to be seen whether *iron* was proof against such projectiles, and captain Norton, having been presented with the punch-formed steel head of an old English war-arrow—such as was used in the days of chivalry for piercing armour—adapted its form to a steel-front fitted to his rifle shot. Lord Orkney was afterwards kind enough to turn in his lathe at Taplow, a steel punch-formed front for the rifle shell, which was fired from the rifle-barrel of Staudenmeyer's air-gun, at a life-guardsman's cuirass, having the lining behind filled with saw-dust and gunpowder. The distance was 30 yards, and the shell perforated the cuirass and blew up the gunpowder!

“ Direct continuity of momentum was strikingly exhibited in all these experiments with elongated shot, shewing throughout the original character of the arrow from which the form had been derived, and the value of which captain Norton had tested in a variety of ways.

“ And yet the artillery *savans* pronounced that ‘ the more they considered captain Norton's remarks, the more they felt satisfied of their

fallacy!' He suggests a condensed arrow with exploding head, and is accused of wishing to introduce *poisoned* arrows into the service; he proposes an elongated rifle-carcase, and they tell him that 'such a projectile was only fitted for incendiary purposes.' It would be interesting to hear from such high authority what mortars and howitzers, Shrapnell shells and Congreve rockets were intended for?

"In 1833, captain Norton presented to the *United Service Institution* his oblong iron-pointed rifle-shot, which presentation was duly recorded in the *Mechanics' Magazine* of that year; and the shell fired at the Earl of Orkney's, together with the exploded box, were also lodged in the same depository. The various projectiles were also tested in the presence of the highest personages in the realm, namely, queen Adelaide; her present Majesty; prince George (now duke) of Cambridge; the marquis of Anglesea, &c.,—all of whom expressed their astonishment and satisfaction;—but the anathema of the artillery committee reigned triumphant.

"We will now proceed to later experiments:—Sir Howard Douglas had stated that an oak plank three inches thick was proof against a musquet ball fired with four drachms and a half of powder at 40 yards. Captain Norton therefore, exhibited the superior qualities of a rifle loaded with his shot; and although three sizes smaller in the bore than the military musquet, yet the elongated-shot fired from a two-grooved rifle, with a charge of two and a half drachms of sporting powder perforated an oak plank $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches thick, and passed $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches into a walnut plank placed behind it. Captain (now admiral) Chads of the Excellent, made most satisfactory practice at Portsmouth with the hollow shot at 1200 yards, the target, of oak and elm, being 40 feet long and 20 wide. The shot entered from one to $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches deeper than the musquet ball; and out of about 1500 fired, not one separated—all striking the target point foremost—a result pronounced impossible by the Woolwich committee of 1826: it may be mentioned here that the high sight of the *minié* rifle is only a modification of the cross bow sight recommended by captain Norton.

"On the 17th of March last, on the Pigeon House sands, Dublin, doctor Gilborne, of the royal artillery, fired one of Norton's rifle shells into a deal target $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches thick, at the distance of 1000 yards when the shell struck within 16 inches of the centre, exploded in passing through and was afterwards picked up in the sand. In May last two of the shells were fired by Mr. J. C. Hannigan, a celebrated rifle shot, in the same locality and at a similar target, from a rifled musquet at a

distance of 1200 yards. One of these struck the sand close to the target, and the other passed through it, exploding in passing through, and thus completely setting at rest the false statement which had been industriously circulated, that these shells exploded superficially, but did not perforate.

"It is due to two warm supporters and former comrades of captain Norton to state that the rifle with which his original experiments at Enniskillen were made in 1823, was a German rifle of 13 grooves, one turn in four feet, the property of colonel Nicholl, formerly of the 34th regiment; and the rifle used by him in the experiments at Belvelly and Cork, was a two grooved piece (of nearly the same calibre as the military rifle) the property of colonel Greaves, who had also served in the 34th, and is familiar with captain Norton's labours from the earliest period.

"I have thus traced the history of captain Norton's valuable inventions *ab ovo* * down to the present time, I have shewn how,—after distinguished services in the field extending over a period of nearly a quarter of a century—he devoted the subsequent period of his life to the improvement of those projectiles which must, naturally, influence the issue of future wars; how every successive step in a laborious investigation, founded upon deep thought and scientific induction, was crowned with success; and how a principle which was first fully enunciated, illustrated, and tested by him, was treated with want of candour, unmeaning objections, neglect, jealousy, and even derision by those who ought to have encouraged and aided his progress, until at length the adoption of this *very same principle* by a more generous nation has taught his opponents its value under another name.†

"But the meritorious inventor—he to whom honour is really and solely due—remains without reward—without acknowledgement, and almost without credit. Is this to continue? Are the changes to be rung on this injustice? Is the concession of official admission and royal acknowledgement to be withheld until—like the peninsular war-medal—its value has faded, or the intended recipient removed from the jealousy

* I cannot add '*usque ad mala*,' for the apples are still withheld from the gallant inventor.

† Two distinguished and lamented chiefs of departments must be specially excepted here—general lord Hill, then commanding in chief, and lieutenant-general sir George Murray, master-general of the ordnance. Lord Hill, to whom, as one of his division, captain Norton was well known, kindly presented him to the queen, as the successful inventor of various military projectiles, and sir George Murray declared to captain Norton that '*he had done more for the service than either Shrapnel or Congreve*.' O! si sic omnia!

and ingratitude of man; or, on the other hand, will her gracious majesty be advised, by a considerate exercise of her royal prerogative, to cheer the declining years of a gallant soldier, a public benefactor, and a loyal subject, by some honorary recognition of his unquestionable services,

"I respectfully submit this appeal to those who possess the ability to discriminate and the power to grant, and remain, sir,

"Your obedient servant,

"N. LUDLOW BEAMISH,

"Lota Park, Cork,

"Lieut.-Colonel.

"July, 1852."

"P.S.—It may not be generally known that captain Norton is the lineal representative of Parrice de Rynville, second brother of Thibbault, (Theobald) de Rynville, constable of Normandy in the time of William the conqueror. Parrice married the sole heiress of the baron of King's Norton, and took the name of *Norton*, according to the custom of the time. (See Burke's heraldry). In the family records nearly 300 years old, are the following lines, which may have had their influence upon the professional choice and labours of the gallant inventor:

"Est aliquid clarus magnorum splendor avorum
Illud posteritas emula calcar habet."

"To trace a noble line by history's light,
May lead to gallant deeds and honors bright."

"N. L. B."

II.

An account of recent experiments with NORTON'S PROJECTILES during the National Exhibition of Ireland, at Cork,

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL BEAMISH, K.H., F.R.S.,

MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

Some important experiments having been carried on at Cork, after the departure of colonel Chesney, with various projectiles invented by captain John Norton, late of Her Majesty's 34th Regiment, some of which afford strong corroboration of the remarkable law connected with the penetration of elongated rifle shot, which may be said to have been first developed, and clearly demonstrated by the late experiments made at Belvelly, under the direction of colonel Chesney,—the Executive Committee of the National Exhibition requested me to furnish a detail of these trials, which they are of opinion would add to the value

of the preceding Lecture.* Fully concurring in the views of the Committee, I shall, therefore, briefly state the nature and results of these experiments, the four first of which were carried on, in my presence, in the Iron-Steam-Ship-Building-Yard of Messrs. Lecky and Beale, kindly placed at the disposal of the Executive Committee by the Proprietors, and the latter in the Shooting Gallery of Mr. Thomas Carey, Maylor-street, Cork.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1852.

EXPERIMENT 1.—An iron boiler plate of the ordinary thickness, (3-8ths of an inch) such as is used for the top sides of iron steam ships, was fixed in a vertical position, against the external wall of a large store, having, at the distance of six inches behind it, a block of American elm. *Norton's elongated-cylindrical-steel-punch-fronted rifle shot*, weighing three ounces, was fired from colonel Greaves's two-grooved rifle, of the ordinary military calibre, charged with $4\frac{1}{2}$ drachms of sporting powder, by head constable Porter, of the Cork city constabulary, at the distance of 40 yards, when the shot perforated the plate, cutting out a portion of the iron, as if cut out by a punch, and entered half an inch into the wooden block.

2.—The same experiment was repeated at the distance of 60 yards, when the perforation was found to be *more perfect*, the sides of the aperture, as well as of the punched-out portion, being more smooth and sharp, and the shot entering $\frac{1}{2}$ inch into the wooden block—thus fully corroborating the experiments made by colonel Chesney for the purpose of ascertaining the comparative penetration at various ranges.

In addition to the representatives of the Executive Committee, consisting of the writer and Geo. F. Shaw, Esq., Professor of Natural Philosophy, Queen's College, Cork, the following gentlemen were present at these experiments :—Inspector Walker, Cork City Constabulary; Sub-Inspector Brownrigg, Constabulary Reserve; James Beale, Esq., Cork; and R. Pigott Beamish, Esq., Lota Park, Cork.

SATURDAY, JULY 10, 1852.

EXPERIMENT 1.—A block of well seasoned Irish oak, eight inches thick, was placed against an 18 inch stone wall. *Norton's iron-fronted rifle-shot* was fired from the same rifle as that used in the previous

* This account was originally appended to colonel Chesney's lecture on fire arms, published by the executive committee.—*Furcell, Cork, 1852.*

experiments, charged with four drachms of sporting powder, at the distance of 40 yards, when it perforated the eight inch block, and entered the wall to the depth of about three inches.

2.—*Norton's iron-fronted-rifle shell*, of the same form and proportions as the preceding, (being in fact the shot converted into a shell by drilling the head, filling the cavity with percussion powder, and stopping it with a wooden plug), was then fired from the same rifle, at the same distance and with the same charge of powder, against a block of the same description of timber, $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches thick, having a bag containing 2lb. of coarse powder, mixed with saw-dust, placed behind. The shell perforated the timber, exploded the powder, &c., and went through the wall, which, in this part, was about nine inches thick. The following gentlemen assisted the representatives of the committee on this occasion:—Major Cavendish Bentinck, 7th dragoon guards; captain Cowper, royal engineers; captain Townsend, Woodside, Cork; and James Beale, Esq., Cork; head constable Ewin Porter, Cork city constabulary, fired all the shots.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1862.

EXPERIMENT 1.—A trial was made this day of a more recent invention of captain Norton's, the main object in the construction of which appeared to be the prevention of that *leading* of the barrel and abrasion of the grooves of the rifle, which has hitherto prevented the application of rifle shells to cannon. To effect these objects, a cylindrical-conoidal-iron shot or shell is fitted with a lance-wood bolt, which, driven through the diameter of the projectile near the base, has the ends protruding on each side, to fit the grooves of the rifle.

This projectile, in its form of shot, $1\frac{1}{2}$ oz. in weight, and wadded with felt, was fired from the two-grooved rifle, employed in the preceding experiments, with two drachms of sporting powder, at the distance of 30 yards, when it perforated a target of deal and birch $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches thick.

The ends of the lance-wood bolt were not in the least affected by the explosion of the charge or flight of the projectile, nor did the shot, after the small dust-like particles of timber had been washed off, present any change of appearance after perforating the target.

2. A shot formed upon the same principle as that tried in the preceding experiment, and also convertible into a shell, had been prepared with a *dove-tailed channel* across the extreme base, and fitted with a lance wood protruding bolt, as before. This shot was fired under the same circumstances as No. 1, when the bolt held its place, and the shot penetrated the target $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches.

3. A similar shot, (convertible into a shell) but prepared with a *rectangular* channel across the extreme base, and fitted with a bolt, as before, was now fired, under precisely the same circumstances as at the two preceding experiments, when it was found that the bolt had separated from the shot, which entered the target $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches deeper than on the two former occasions.

The remarkable success of the latter experiment may readily be accounted for by the diminished resistance presented by the air after the separation of the protruding bolt, which, however—becoming detached on the shot leaving the mouth of the rifle—had retained its position sufficiently long to communicate the required rotatory motion or *spin*, to the projectile.

A shell upon this principle, applied to cannon, would accomplish what has been so long sought for without success. It would command a greater range, ensure greater accuracy of flight, more penetrating power, and a greater certainty of explosion by percussion, than the ordinary explosive projectiles. The greater portion of the shot or shell being of the cylindrical form, can be turned in a steam lathe, and thus the irregularity of figure avoided, which is inseparable from *cast* spherical shot. In fact, a shot or shell, constructed on the principle so successfully tested in the three last experiments, fired from a nine pounder gun, would, in consequence of its *elongated* form, greater weight, and the diminished resistance of the air with which it would be met,—produce all the effect of a *spherical* shot fired from an 18 pounder gun.

Direct continuity of momentum was conspicuous in all the trials with Norton's projectiles, shewing throughout the original character of the Malay arrow, from which they had been derived. As the principle of this weapon does not appear to be generally understood, and formed a frequent subject of enquiry on the part of visitors at the National Exhibition, it may not be out of place here to detail the form of, and mode, of propelling so singular and ingeniously constructed a projectile.

The arrow used by the natives of South India, as well as by the Malays and Chinese, is made of the hard Areca Palm, the shaft being about the thickness of bell wire, and eight inches in length, and the base formed of the pith of the Lotus (*nelumbium speciosum*) as a substitute for feathers. This pith is turned with the greatest skill, being gradually reduced towards the extremities of the base which thus becomes elastic, and expands on the mere application of the collected breath. The arrow is projected by means of a tube, which acts as a pea-shooter, launching the tiny arrow on its flight, which, in calm

weather, can be extended to 70 yards or more. In propelling the arrow, the mouth is applied to the hollow lotus pith base, the extreme points of which expand and fill the bore of the tube, preventing loss of powder by windage, and retaining the impulsive force. These facts suggested to captain Norton the principle of the musquet-arrow, which he submitted to the Select Committee on Fire Arms at Woolwich in 1823, and which may be considered the foundation of his present elongated-expanding-rifle-shells and shot.

In concluding this brief notice of captain Norton's most important inventions, specimens of the whole of which are to be seen in the Arms Department of the Exhibition, I would add, that amongst the many sources of satisfaction which the National Exhibition of Ireland has opened up to the Committee of Management, not the least is that of having been the means of illustrating the merits and establishing the claims of an ingenious, but neglected inventor, and a distinguished countryman.

* * * After the preceding pages were in type, the following announcement appeared in the *Times*, shewing that captain Norton's invention of 1823, which was rejected by the Woolwich Committee of 1826, is now brought forward in Prussia as a new discovery! :—

"An invention has been added to the Prussian Needle-gun, which, if adopted, will render it a still more formidable weapon. Some experiments have been lately made with an "explosive ball," or *Brandtkugel*, which may be fired from the gun as easily as its peculiar cartridge, and which explodes the moment it strikes the object, and if combustible, sets it on fire. Some experiments made on the 3rd instant before the Officers of the Alexander Regiment are reported as having been successful. Cases filled with powder or inflammable matter, were set on fire or blown up with certainty at several hundred paces distance, or nearly the full range of the weapon, which, as is well known, is a very long one. The object of the invention is to blow up the enemy's powder waggons by a weapon that can be more readily and easily handled than a rifle, if they come within reach. We may see a whole battery of cannon silenced by a few pricks of a needle."—*Correspondent of the Times, July 10th, 1852.*

D.

ON THE LANCE,

WITH A DESCRIPTION OF AN IMPROVED WEAPON,

BY LIEUTENANT AND ADJUTANT DYNON,

16TH (QUEEN'S) LANCERS.

During the experience of nearly 29 years' service in a lancer regiment, and amidst Indian warfare the greater part of the time, it has often occurred to me that the lance of our service would admit of some useful amendments and alterations, and might be used on certain occasions as a weapon of defense, independent of its superior advantages as one of assault.

I consider the lance, if properly handled, the *first* weapon of the light horseman, as the bayonet is of the infantry soldier; it gives him confidence from an assurance that its thrust is almost certain death to his adversary, while it enables him to reach the artillery-man when seeking refuge under his guns, or the foot-soldier over his bayonet; and thus possesses a decided advantage over the sword, from its length of reach, and the mortal effect of its wound.

The lance exercise as laid down by regulation, and practised in our service, is very imperfect and of little utility in shewing to the lancer the advantages or use of his weapon. Some parts of it are quite absurd. What, for instance, can be the object of twisting the lance between the fingers over the head, as in the movement called "St. George"—a most difficult operation, and of no possible use?

I would also ask why drill practice is not laid down for the lance, and taught with blunt weapons, as with the sword? The reason is that officers do not themselves use the lance in lancer regiments, and hence the weapon has been neglected and no attention paid to its improvement and advantages.

In the use of the lance I consider that much greater freedom is required than the confined formal method of our drill practice admits. I would combine the eastern with part of our own exercise, and feel confident that such a combination would enable the lancer to appreciate the advantages of his long deadly weapon, and give him greater command and facility in using it.

The lancer should be well instructed in the use of his weapon, both in confined situations, such as the *mêlée*, and in the single combat; he should place implicit confidence in its thrust—have a firm seat on his horse, and a light bridle-hand; his horse ought to be strong, active, and well broke—taught to leave the ranks freely—to disperse or attack independently as in skirmishing—rallying again at the trumpet's signal.

The other weapons of the British army have been considerably improved, from time to time, during the last few years; but the lance alone has been neglected.

There has been no improvement in this important weapon since the use of it was resumed by the British cavalry in 1816, with the exception of the removal of an iron ball from the blade in 1827.

The lance now proposed is constructed upon the Asiatic principle, and differs from those at present in use in our service, in the following respects, without adding to the length or weight of the weapon.

1st. Being balanced at two-thirds of its length, instead of in the centre or one-half, it will reach an object at a distance of 18 inches further than the present lance.

2nd. The butt-end being short (only one-third of the entire length) the lance can be used without interfering with the rear-rank, however close, or the adjoining files when carried at the "trail."

3rd. The weapon is easier to work, the action of the point not being counteracted by the long useless butt.

4th. The butt-end forms an effective guard or defence at close quarters, and will resist a sword cut.

5th. The butt-end being weighty, and armed with a strong steel spike, can be used to strike down an adversary in a *mêlée* and would prove a formidable weapon.

6th. When the lancer dismounts from his horse, the lance, owing to the steel-spike, can be fixed upright in the ground, instead of being laid down horizontally as at present, in which latter position, it is so liable to be broken by men or horses treading upon it, particularly when in camp or bivouac.

It has been urged that the lance is not suited for outpost duty, in consequence of being observable at a considerable distance; this objection is obviated by carrying the lance at the "trail," and when on vedette, fixing it upright on the ground close to the horse.

7th. The blade being short, and the pole being inserted some distance into the socket, makes it much stronger and less liable to break off.

8th. The flag is attached to the lance by a steel spring (instead of being fastened to it by a piece of tape or leather thong) and will free itself from the lance if seized; this also admits of its being instantaneously removed from the lance, if found to attract the observation of the enemy on vedette. The width of the flag is reduced, which causes less resistance to the air when the lance is in motion.

9. The leather sling is discontinued, being of little use and very inconvenient, often becoming entangled in the sword-hook, sword-belt, cantle of the saddle, corner of the gauntlets and cap during exercise; it also wears out the chevrons and arms of the jacket by its friction when the lance is slung.

10. The new lance is carried in a bucket suspended from the side of the saddle-tree, behind the right thigh, instead of on the stirrup. This admits of the lance riding easier, and enables the lancer to have the free use of his right leg and spur, to aid or impel his horse, which is in a great measure prevented when the bucket is fastened to the stirrup.

11. When riding at ease, the lance rests against the hollow of the shoulder, where it is more available, if suddenly required, than when slung to the arm behind the body.

12. The lance pole is much stronger and less liable to break, in consequence of being gradually tapered from butt to point, one end being more firm and the other more elastic; and the fulcrum having, therefore, greater substance and power. The "regulation" lance is very weak, owing to its being of an equal thickness throughout or nearly so: this will be better understood by handling both weapons.

13. An iron guard is placed at the balance, to protect the hand from a sword-cut when delivering the point, or in using the butt as a defence.

E.

LETTERS OF LORDS LUCAN AND RAGLAN.

I.

*The EARL OF LUCAN to HIS EXCELLENCY the COMMANDER OF
THE FORCES IN THE CRIMEA.*

"Balaklava, Nov. 30, 1854.

"MY LORD,—In your lordship's report of the cavalry action of Balaklava of the 25th Ult., given in the papers which have just arrived from England, you observe 'that from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the lieutenant-general considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered lord CARDIGAN to move forward with the light brigade.' Surely, my lord, this is a grave charge, and an imputation reflecting seriously on my professional character. I cannot remain silent. It is, I feel, incumbent on me to state those facts which I cannot doubt must clear me from what I respectfully submit is altogether unmerited. The cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry, when captain Nolan, the aide-de-camp of the quartermaster-general, came up to me at speed, and placed in my hands this written instruction :—' Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left.—R. AIREY.—Immediate.' After carefully reading this Order, I hesitated, and urged the uselessness of such an attack and the dangers attending it. The aide-de-camp, in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were lord Raglan's orders that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked him, 'Where, and what to do?' as neither enemy nor guns were within sight. He replied, in a most disrespectful but significant manner, pointing to the further end of the valley, 'There, my lord, is your enemy; there are your guns.' So distinct, in my opinion, was your written instruction, and so positive and urgent were the orders delivered by the aide-de-camp, that I felt it was imperative on me to obey, and I informed lord Cardigan that he was to advance; and to the objections he made—and in which I entirely agreed—I replied that the order was from your lordship. Having decided, against my conviction, to make the movement, I did all in my power to

render it as little perilous as possible. I formed the brigade in two lines and led to its support two regiments of heavy cavalry, the Scots greys and Royals, and only halted them when they had reached the spot from which they could protect the retreat of the light cavalry in the event of their being pursued by the enemy, and when, having already lost many officers and men by the fire from the batteries and fort, any further advance would have exposed them to destruction. My lord, I considered at the time—I am still of the same opinion—that I followed the only course open to me. As a lieutenant-general, doubtless, I have discretionary power; but to take upon myself to disobey an order written by my commander-in-chief within a few minutes of its delivery, and given from an elevated position commanding an entire view of all the batteries and the position of the enemy, would have been nothing less than direct disobedience of orders, without any other reason than that I preferred my own opinion to that of my general, and in this instance, must have exposed me and the cavalry to aspersions against which it might have been difficult to defend ourselves. It should also be remembered that the aide-de-camp, well informed of the intentions of his general, and the objects he had in view, after first insisting on an immediate charge, then placed himself in front of one of the leading squadrons, where he fell the first victim. I did not dare so to disobey your lordship, and it is the opinion of every officer of rank in this army to whom I have shown your instructions that it was not possible for me to do so. I hope, my lord, that I have stated the facts temperately and in a becoming and respectful manner, as it has been my wish to do. I am confident that it will be your desire to do me justice. I will only ask that your lordship should kindly give the same publicity to this letter that has been given to your report, as I am sensitively anxious to satisfy my sovereign, my military superiors, and the public, that I have not on this unhappy occasion shown myself undeserving of their confidence or unfitting the command which I hold.

“I have the honour to be, &c.,

“LUCAN, Lieutenant-General,

“Commanding Cavalry Division.

“To His Excellency the Commander of the Forces.”

II.

LORD RAGLAN *to the* DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

" Before Sebastopol, Dec. 16, 1854.

" MY LORD DUKE—I regret to be under the necessity of forwarding to your grace the copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by lieutenant-general the earl of Lucan. When I received it, I placed it in the hands of brigadier-general Airey, the quartermaster-general, and requested him to suggest to his lordship to withdraw the communication, considering that it would not lead to his advantage in the slightest degree; but lord Lucan having declined to take the step recommended, I have but one course to pursue, that of laying the letter before your grace and submitting to you such observations upon it as I am bound in justice to myself to put you in possession of. Lieutenant general the earl of Lucan complains that, in my despatch to your grace of the 28th of October, I stated that 'from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the lieutenant general considered that he was bound to attack at all hazard.' His lordship conceives this statement to be a grave charge, and an imputation reflecting seriously upon his professional character, and he deems it to be incumbent upon him to state the facts, which he cannot doubt must clear him from what he respectfully submits is altogether unmerited. He has referred to my despatch, and far from being willing to alter one word of it, I am prepared to declare that not only did the lieutenant general misconceive the written instruction that was sent to him, but that there was nothing in that instruction which called on him to attack at all hazards, or to undertake the operation which led to such a brilliant display of gallantry on the part of the light brigade, and unhappily, at the same time, occasioned such lamentable casualties in every regiment composing it. In his lordship's letter he is wholly silent with respect to a previous order which had been sent him. He merely says that the cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry. That previous order was in the following words:—'The cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by infantry, which have been ordered to advance on two fronts.' This order did not seem to me to have been attended to, and therefore it was that the instruction by captain Nolan was forwarded to him. Lord Lucan must have read the first order with very little

attention, for he now states that cavalry was formed to support the infantry, whereas he was told by brigadier-general Airey 'that the cavalry was to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights, and that they would be supported by infantry'—not that they were to support the infantry; and so little had he sought to do as he had been directed, that he had no men in the advance of his main body—made no attempt to regain the heights, and was so little informed of the position of the army, that he asked captain Nolan 'where and what he was to attack, as neither enemy nor guns were in sight.' This, your Grace, will observe, is the lieutenant-general's own admission. The result of his inattention to the first order was, that it never occurred to him that the second was connected with and a repetition of the first. He viewed it only as a positive order to attack at all hazards (the word 'attack,' be it observed, was not made use of in general Airey's note) an unknown enemy, whose position, numbers and composition he was wholly unacquainted with, and whom, in consequence of a previous order, he had taken no step whatever to watch. I undoubtedly had no intention that he should make such an attack; there was nothing in the instruction to require it, and, therefore, I conceive I was fully justified in stating to your grace what was the exact truth, that the charge arose from the misconception of an order for the advance, which lord Lucan considered obliged him to attack at all hazards. I wish I could say, my lord, that having decided against his conviction to make the movement, he did all he could to render it as little perilous as possible. This, indeed, is far from being the case in my judgment. He was told that the horse artillery might accompany the cavalry. He did not bring it up. He was informed that the French cavalry was on his left. He did not invite their co-operation. He had the whole of the heavy cavalry at his disposal. He mentions having brought up only two regiments in support, and he omits all those precautions either from want of due consideration or from the supposition that the unseen enemy was not in such great force as he apprehended, notwithstanding that he was warned of it by lord Cardigan, after the latter had received the order to attack. I am much concerned, my lord duke, to have to submit these observations to your grace. I entertain no wish to disparage the earl of Lucan in your opinion, or to cast a slur upon his professional reputation, but having been accused by his lordship of having stated of him what was unmerited in my despatch, I have felt obliged to enter into the subject, and trouble your grace at more length than I could have wished in

vindication of a report to your grace, in which I had strictly confined myself to that which I knew to be true. I had indulged in no observations whatever, or in any expressions which could be viewed either as harsh or in any way grating to the feelings of his lordship.

"I have, &c.,

"RAGLAN.

"To his Grace the Duke of Newcastle."

F.

THE NEEDLE-RIFLE.

Since the preceding pages were written, and the greater part in type, some admirable letters have appeared in the *Daily News*, on the organization and equipment of cavalry, written evidently by an officer of great intelligence and considerable professional experience. From one of these letters, dated London, April 9, 1855, the following extract has been made, as it will be found to support the opinions which have been expressed in this work on the expediency of arming our cavalry with a needle-breech-loading rifle in place of the clumsy, inconvenient, and inefficient carbine now in use. Other views of cavalry reform, bearing a striking resemblance to those which have been here advanced, appear also to have suggested themselves to the mind of this officer; and it is a source of no small satisfaction to me, to find myself thus unexpectedly and ably supported from an unknown quarter, without any previous concert or communication.*

"As regards fire-arms, I would certainly furnish every dragoon with a Colt's revolver. This weapon should be attached to the soldier's person, not to the horse, nor in a holster. It should be kept as a sort of reserve in case of a hand-to-hand fight like that at Balaklava, when the light brigade charged, or—which our dragoons stand sorely in need of—as a means of defence when the soldier is dismounted. I would also give the cavalry soldier a carbine. Not the cumbersome, heavy, useless weapon now in use, which is called 'the Victoria' carbine, but a light handy breech-loading gun. I have examined every sort of carbine in England during the last few months, and I infinitely prefer the

* These letters bear the signature of "One who has served six years in the cavalry and the same time in the infantry," and details are given shewing that the writer is no mere theoretical soldier, but a practical man, who has been in seven general actions, twenty-five times under fire, and thrice wounded.—See *Daily News*, April 10, 1855.

carbine on the Prussian-needle-principle, with certain English improvements, as manufactured by Mr. Holland, gunsmith, of King-street, Holborn, to all other weapons of the kind, for mounted men. As an old sportsman with the rifle, having been accustomed in India to follow deer on horseback, and also as an old cavalry officer, I can safely say that no fire-arm yet invented is as good as the one I have mentioned for use on horseback—of this I feel quite certain. The 'Victoria carbine' weighs nearly 5lbs., the weapon I recommend less than two-and-a-half.* The latter could be loaded and fired as quick as the former could be primed. Every cavalry soldier knows the trouble and difficulty experienced in teaching a horse to stand still whilst the rider uses his ramrod, but in the carbine I mention no ramrod whatever is required. This Prussian-needle gun or carbine may, some time or other, be adopted in the English army. I was so struck with the weapon a short time ago, that I made every possible inquiry regarding it, and found that it had been *only* three years 'under consideration' by the Ordnance-department, Horse Guards, &c. The king of Prussia has lately armed a hundred thousand men—cavalry and infantry—with this weapon. We should do well to take a lesson of him."

The same writer thus illustrates the necessity of a leather or wood-lined scabbard :—

"I quite agree with the opinion expressed by captain Nolan, in his book on cavalry, that if we want effective dragoons we must give them swords sharp as razors; and to preserve the edges the present steel scabbard should be entirely done away with, and leather scabbards, lined with wood, substituted in their place. With steel scabbards it is impossible to keep swords as sharp as they ought to be, and the noise they make rattling against the men's spurs and stirrups, has many a time forewarned the enemy and prevented a surprise. I once saw this exemplified in India :—A small detachment of cavalry and horse-artillery had moved out at sunset to surprise a Chief whose village was sixty miles from our camp. The party was commanded by that admirable cavalry officer, the late colonel Cureton. Everything was well managed,

* There is some mistake here: the Victoria carbine weighs 7lb. 10oz, and the smaller carbine, lately issued to the 3d and 15th hussars, and 6th dragoon-guards (carbineers) 6 lb. 11½ oz. On the other hand no needle-rifle has been made so light as 2½ lbs., which would be about the weight of a *pistol* on that construction. The lightest rifle-carbine, made on the needle principle with which I am acquainted, is that sold by Mr. Holland, of King-street, Holborn, (Kafall's Patent), which weighs 5½ lb., taking a cylindro-conoidal bullet of 26 to the lb., and is two feet three inches in the barrel.

and we arrived at our destination just before day-light, but the bird had flown. We learned afterwards that some of his men had heard, in the clear air of an Indian night, the jingle of the men's scabbards against the stirrups when we were several miles off, and warned their Chief that an English force was on its way to the village. The noise we made gave both the chief and his men ample time to get ready and make off."

G.

SUMMARY OF THE SERVICES OF

THE KING'S GERMAN LEGION.

From Colburn's United Service Magazine, for Feb., 1855.

SIR,—Some disparaging observations having been lately made, as well in Parliament as in the daily papers, upon the character and conduct of German troops, in which the late king's German legion appear to be but partially excepted, allow me to place on record in your standard periodical a few facts and extracts from official documents, which will be found to convey a more correct idea of the qualities of these troops than anything which prejudice might dictate, or partiality call forth.

"On the 5th of May (1809), the army being at length assembled, a grand review took place, and a most magnificent spectacle it presented. To some of the troops which stood that day under arms, it is not going too far to affirm *that the whole world can produce none superior*. Of this description were the brigade of guards, the 29th, the 83rd, and *the four battalions of the king's German legion*; and the rest, if in a few minor points they fell short, were such as any general might be proud to command."—*Narrative of the Peninsular War, by the Marquis of Londonderry*, i. 325. 8vo. edition.

TALAVERA.

The four battalions of the German legion alluded to by lord Londonderry, were the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 7th of the line, which formed two brigades, the one under brigadier-general von Langwerth, and the other under colonel von Löw. These brigades nobly justified the encomium passed upon them at Coimbra, by their distinguished conduct at Talavera in the following July, when six officers, eight non-commissioned officers, and 176 men were killed; forty-one officers, fifty-eight non-commissioned officers, and 843 men wounded; and 275 men taken prisoners, making

a total of 1,407. The problem of "crossing bayonets" was here solved by the 5th battalion, which came into such close quarters with the 28th French regiment, that not only bayonets but the butt ends of the muskets were brought into play, and the slaughter was terrific; nearly 400 of the French regiment are stated to have fallen before the 5th battalion of the Legion upon this occasion, and the capture of three eagles attested the intensity of the struggle. General von Langwerth was killed, and a monument in St. Paul's cathedral (a rare honour to a foreign officer) records his loss.

"Val de la Mula, July 5, 1810.

"Brigadier-general Craufurd, in making his report to Lord Wellington of the affair that took place yesterday, did not fail to mention, in terms of merited praise, the gallant manner in which captain Krauchenberg and cornet Cordemann, of the 1st German hussars, with only part of a squadron, charged *about three times* the number of the enemy's cavalry close in front of a column, and he begs that captain Krauchenberg, cornet Cordemann, and the non-commissioned officers and privates that were engaged in this action, will be assured that it caused the admiration of the brigadier-general, and all who saw it."

Lord Wellington thus writes to general Craufurd on the same exploit:

"I have received your letter of the 4th inst., and am highly satisfied with the conduct of captain Krauchenberg, cornet Cordemann, and the squadron of hussars. I request you will inform lieutenant-colonel von Arentsschildt that I shall take the first opportunity of laying before his majesty my opinion of the conduct of his excellent regiment, during the long and fatiguing period that it has been upon outpost duty with you."

BARROSA, (MARCH, 1811).

Two squadrons of the 2d hussars of the legion, under major von dem Bussche, were much distinguished in this battle, as also at Aroya Molinos in the following October.

ALBUERA, (MAY, 1811).

Colonel Hartmann, of the king's German artillery, commanded the allied artillery at Albuera, and the light brigade of the legion (1st and 2d riflemen), under count Charles von Alten, held the village and bridge of Albuera during the action.

BADAJOS.

At the first siege of Badajos (June, 1811), captain Cleaves conducted the artillery operations on the right bank of the Guadiana, and is thus mentioned by lord Wellington:

"Captain Cleaves, of the Hanoverian artillery, conducted that department on the right of the Guadiana with great success."—*Despatch*.

EL BODON, (SEPTEMBER, 1811).

* * * * "While these actions were performed, major-general Alten's (Victor) brigade (1st Hussars, K.G.L., and 11th light dragoons), of which there were only three squadrons on the ground, were engaged on the left with numbers infinitely superior to themselves. These squadrons charged repeatedly, supporting each other, and took above twenty prisoners, and notwithstanding the immense superiority of the enemy, *the post would have been maintained*, if the commander of the forces had not ordered the troops to withdraw from it."—*General Orders, Richosa, October 2, 1811.*

GENERAL ORDERS.

"Adjutant-general's office, Celerico, March 31, 1811.

"Lieutenant-colonel Offeney, of the seventh line battalion of the king's German legion, is appointed to act as assistant in the department of the quartermaster-general."

"Adjutant-general's office, Villa Formosa, May 9, 1811.

"Captain Heise, of the second light battalion, king's German legion, is appointed to act as brigade-major to the brigade of infantry under the command of major-general Alten."

"Adjutant-general's office, Fuente Guinaldo, Aug. 23, 1811.

"Captain baron Decken, of the 1st hussars, king's German legion, is appointed aide-de-camp to lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton."

"Adjutant-general's office, Fuente Guinaldo, May 2, 1812.

"Major-general Charles baron Alten is appointed to command the light division."

DESTRUCTION OF THE RETIRO AT MADRID.

This highly responsible and difficult duty was entrusted to colonel Hartmann, and executed with complete success, arrangements having been previously made by him, according to directions, either to preserve the ordnance and stores, or to destroy the whole at a short notice.

GARCIA HERNANDEZ, (SALAMANCA), JULY, 1812.

"I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than was made upon the enemy's infantry by the heavy brigade of the king's German legion, under major-general von Bock, which was completely successful, and

the whole body of infantry, consisting of three battalions of the enemy's first division, were made prisoners."

" War office, 10th August, 1812.

" In consideration of the king's German legion having so frequently distinguished themselves against the enemy, and particularly upon the occasion of the late victory obtained near Salamanca, his royal highness the prince regent is pleased, in the name and on behalf of his majesty, to command that the officers who are now serving with temporary rank in the several regiments of that corps, shall have permanent rank in the British army from the date of their respective commissions."

" L' Angleterre entretenait aussi deux regimens de dragons et trois de hussards, appartenant au corps étranger, dit king's German legion. Ils ont surpassé la cavalerie nationale pour le service des avant-gardes et pour la bataille. La charge la plus audacieuse de la guerre d' Espagne a été fournie le lendemain de la bataille des Arapiles, par l' Hanovrien Bock, à la tête de la brigade pesante de la légion Allemande."—*Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon, &c., par le Général Foy*, i. 290, 291.

MAHALAJONDA, (AUGUST, 1812.)

The heavy cavalry brigade of the legion,—suddenly and unexpectedly exposed to superior numbers of French horse, by the flight of the Portuguese cavalry through Mahalajonda, and their abandonment of the outposts,—repulsed the enemy in a remarkable combat on the 11th of August, losing fifty-five officers, sergeants, and dragoons, and twenty-two horses in killed, wounded, and missing. As an acknowledgment of their singularly prompt and intrepid conduct, they were honoured by lord Wellington with the position of advanced guard of the allied army upon its entrance into Madrid on the following day.

BURGOS, (OCTOBER, 1812.)

The troops selected to storm the breach on the 18th October, were 300 of the legion infantry (1st, 2nd, and 5th line battalions,) under major von Wurmb, while 200 of the guards were to enter by escalade. Their conduct is thus described by lord Wellington :—

" It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the guards and German legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have maintained them."—*Despatch*.

The loss of the three line battalions in this siege was no less than 358 killed, wounded, and missing, amongst whom were five officers killed.

VENTA DEL POZO.

On the retreat from Burgos, the light brigade of the legion, under Colin Halkett, retired for two hours before superior numbers of the enemy's horse, which had driven in the British rear guard of cavalry, and threatened to overwhelm the battalions; but, forming square on every attempt, they defeated the French horsemen, and secured the retreat of the allied army, receiving the thanks of Lord Wellington for their resolute and effective conduct.

TOLOSA, (JUNE, 1813.)

The light brigade of the legion, with the 1st, 2nd, and 5th line battalions, under sir Thomas Graham, took the fortified town of Tolosa, losing nineteen non-commissioned officers and men killed, and fourteen officers and 114 men wounded.

ST. SEBASTIAN, (JULY, 1813.)

Colonel Hartmann commanded the artillery of the left wing of the besieging batteries. Two hundred of the legion, light and line battalions, were engaged as volunteers in the final assault, losing nineteen officers and soldiers killed, and forty-eight wounded. Captain Augustus Heise, of the second light battalion of the legion, served as deputy assistant-adjutant-general to the second division during these operations, and was mentioned in terms of high commendation by major-general Pringle, on whom the command of the division devolved in the attack of the 31st.

THE GÖHRDE, (SEPTEMBER, 1813.)

The 3rd hussars of the legion broke two squares of French infantry, and having failed in a charge upon a third square, in consequence of a hollow way, which covered the enemy's front, this square was broken by Hugh Halkett's Hanoverian landwehr brigade (battalions Lauenburg, Langrehr, and Benningesen,) at the point of the bayonet.

BAYONNE, (APRIL, 1814.)

The light brigade of the legion, with the 1st, 2nd, and 5th line battalions, under general von Hinüber, retook the village of St. Etienne, after the first brigade of the fifth division, which originally held it, had been driven out. The killed, wounded, and missing of the legion

amounted to 386. Colonel Hartmann * was entrusted with all the artillery arrangements connected with the intended siege, and this year was placed at the head of the reserve artillery of the Anglo-Portuguese army.

WATERLOO.

The second light battalion of the legion, under major (afterwards general Baron) Baring, held the farm-house of *La Haye Sainte* until every cartridge was expended, and nearly 400 men reduced to forty-two! This devoted soldier had three horses killed under him, and was severely wounded. Kielmansegge's Hanoverian brigade (new levies) held the centre of the allied line with the firmness and gallantry of old soldiers, resisting, in square, every effort of the French cavalry to break their ranks. The 3rd hussars were reduced to 60 files, in a desperate contest with the enemy's cuirassiers and dragoons. The eighth line battalion of the legion—suddenly fallen upon by the French horse, when in the act of charging—was cut to pieces; ten officers and 130 sergeants and soldiers of the fifth battalion were struck down; Hugh Halkett captured Cambronne; and two battalions of the Chasseurs of the old guard surrendered to his gallant *landwehr*.

"Of the troops of the king's German legion," says Siborne, "whether cavalry, infantry, or artillery, it is impossible to speak in terms of too high praise; suffice it to remark that their conduct was, in every respect, *on a par with that of the British*. Of the four Hanoverian infantry brigades, that of Kielmansegge and a part of Halkett's were the most actively engaged. . . . They had been but recently and hastily raised, and yet the manner in which such raw soldiers withstood, as Kielmansegge's brigade did, for so great a length of time, the most furious assaults made by the gallant and well-disciplined troops of France, would have conferred honour on long-tried veterans."—*Siborne*, 393.

In conclusion, I would recommend to the consideration of those who deem it to be not unworthy of a statesman, soldier, or journalist, to institute invidious comparisons between the troops of Great Britain and her continental allies, more particularly between the British soldiers of the Peninsula and Waterloo, and those of the king's German legion, the following generous sentiment of a veteran guardsman:

"As to controversies concerning the merits of individual corps in relation to each other, I confess I condemn them. Where all act well

* Now General sir Julius Hartmann, K.C.B. and G.C.H.

and perform their duty, the only cause of emulative dispute should be how to serve their country best by licking her enemies the most. This is the goal to be reached ; the rest is all twaddle."—*Sketches of Campaigning Life, by a Veteran Guardsman*, pp. 175, 176.

I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

N. LUDLOW BEAMISH,

Lieut.-Col. Hanoverian Service.

Lota Park, Cork, January 10th, 1855.

H.

CURVED SABRE AND CARBINE-BUCKET.

ADJUTANT DYNON to the AUTHOR.

" Cahir, May 3d, 1855.

" MY DEAR COLONEL,

" I still think that a sword, to be effective for cutting should be *curved*. The practice of most of the warlike nations and tribes bears me out; and you will find that in manufacturing and agricultural implements, &c., where cutting alone is required, the instrument is generally curved or semi-circular; witness the scythe, reaping hook, leather-cutters' tools, chaff-cutter, &c.: even in the butchers cleaver, where only a downward blow is made, the instrument is somewhat curved; so that the weight or power of the blow is concentrated at first upon a small portion of the edge, at the exact point of resistance. This causes the first incision, the enlargement of which is afterwards comparatively easy, by merely drawing the instrument through, or if descending, its own weight and impetus effect the object.

" The present regulation sword ('cut and thrust') is common to all our cavalry regiments, whether heavy or light—hussars or lancers. I don't think there is a curved cutting sabre in our cavalry service. There have been several modifications invented by London sword-makers, in the cavalry-officer's sword, tending towards the curve, but "*regulation*" stops them at a certain degree.

" The needle-carbine, as you describe it, will be a manifest improvement upon our present carbine, which is very cumbrous, and next to useless. I have carried one many a day, and have used it in every manner, from skirmishing at a field-day to fowling in the jungles of India, and invariably found it a very poor tool.

"I would recommend your carrying the carbine when mounted, as I do the lance, with the butt in a bucket, behind the right thigh—the barrel elevated behind the shoulder. This leaves the sword arm free, and saves the muzzle of the carbine from friction, to which it is so much exposed at present. This I recommend for ordinary marches; at field days, or in the vicinity of an enemy it might be slung to the back, as you propose. My objection to the latter mode is that you cause both man and horse to carry the weapon at the same time, without relieving either of any part of the weight.

"The bucket which I suggest, is fixed firm to the saddle (but may be removed at pleasure), and will keep the lance or carbine perfectly steady. A sling bucket, such as you saw here, is bad, as it allows the weapon to sway and knock about by the motion of the horse.

"I remain, my dear Colonel, your's very truly,

"P. DYNON.

"To Lieut.-Colonel Beamish, K.H., Lota Park, Cork."

I.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT.

Note page 274.

The debate in the House of Commons on the 27th April last, enables me to correct a statement made in page 274, on the authority of a Parliamentary Return, quoted by the *London Examiner*, as to the number of officers on the staff of the army during the last 20 years who had obtained certificates of qualification at the senior department of the Royal Military College.

It appears by the speech of Mr. Frederick Peel, that the return first moved for, was presented without the name of *Major Ewart* who had received a special certificate for military drawing; a supplemental return was, therefore, ordered, and the only name *on that return* was the name of the officer in question; whereas the original list contained the names of eleven gentlemen, five of whom were mentioned by name in the speech of the Honourable Mr. Hardinge. Now *five* or even *eleven* officers in 20 years—the greater number of these having been probably appointed after the war had commenced and the agitation on the subject of

favoritism had sprung up—does not say much for the value attached to Sandhurst certificates by those who have the selection of Staff officers, and the reasoning on this subject in the passage to which reference has been made, stands unaffected by the error. For the question still remains:—Did the Sandhurst certificates lead to the appointment of these officers, or was it merely a *coincidence*; and would they not, equally well, have been placed on the staff without the qualification? *

Thus much as regards appointments on the *General Staff*. With regard to *Aides de camp* and extra *Aides de camp* it is not denied that these are appointed without any reference to Sandhurst certificates, but solely on the ground of family connexion, private friendship, and that sort of patronage which goes under the general name of “interest.” But the way in which the senior department is regarded by the authorities may be best seen by reference to the number of staff appointments at present held by officers of the foot-guards. In this favored brigade, no less than 25 officers,—according to the May army list—hold appointments on the staff of the army; and the Returns of the college shew, that *not one of these officers obtained a first class certificate at Sandhurst.*

But this is not all—*no officer of the guards has ever obtained a first class certificate at Sandhurst*, and very few have studied at the senior department at all.† Captain Spearman furnishes us with some curious details on this subject in his admirable little work on military education, ‡ according to which it appears that out of *ninety-one* officers employed on the general staff of the army in 1852, *seven* only had graduated at the senior department; and that amongst *one hundred and seventeen* staff officers of pensioners—appointments to which Sandhurst certificates might naturally be expected to lead—*three* only had obtained certificates! §

What a contrast does this state of things present to the qualifications of the staff officers of the British army during the Peninsular war, when those who had *not* graduated at Sandhurst were the

* I have reason to believe that from 1815 to 1854, a period of 39 years, *not one single appointment* on the Staff of the army has been made *in consequence* of the officer having graduated at Sandhurst.

† I can only make out *five* during the last 20 years, namely:—Colonels air W. Hamilton, Hardinge, and Cameron; Brevet Major Wetherall, and Captain Dawkins: Major Wetherall, however, when at Sandhurst, was in the 1st foot.

‡ Notes on military education by captain J. Morton Spearman, R.A.—Parker, London, 1853.

§ Spearman, pp. 16, 22.

exceptions; * and how prophetic the doubt expressed by the same intelligent author, as to the probable qualifications of British staff officers in the event of renewed hostilities in Europe. † And why? Because staff appointments are made without any reference to scientific qualification—because the wish of a lord is more potent than the judgment of a professor, and the most distinguished Sandhurst students have been left to look in vain for congenial professional employment, and some reward for their many hours of labour and anxious preparation. ‡

How different is the practice with our enlightened neighbours!—Staff employment in France is the reward of *merit alone*. It is sought for by the *élite* of the army and obtained only by the severest study, and the most indisputable proofs of the possession of the highest degree of professional excellence and general intelligence. Thus are formed those well instructed officers who constitute the *état-major* of the French army, and afterwards become their most distinguished generals of division and brigade.

The low appreciation of scientific attainments by the British military authorities of the present day is strikingly exemplified by the late, anomalous institution of MILITIA ARTILLERY. Here we have young men—often of the most ordinary—nay limited capacity, without any previous education beyond the range of a country school, or, perhaps, a provincial university—transformed, as if by the magic touch of an enchanter's wand, into officers of one of the most scientific branches of the service, decorated with great-guns and pouches, and called artillery! One could readily understand the formation of extempore riflemen, whose duties being entirely practical, require no scientific

* "It is a curious fact, and contrasts oddly with the present state of this department, that during these years of war, there was only one officer employed in the quarter-master general's staff in the Peninsula, who was not a graduate of the senior department of the royal military college."—*Spearman*, p. 35, note.

† "It is by many doubted whether, in the event of a new war, there exists in the British army the necessary materials for the construction of an efficient *état-major*, or corps of staff officers, such as that which accompanied the troops under sir Ralph Abercrombie to Egypt, and sir Arthur Wellesley to Portugal."—*Ibid.* p. 16.

‡ "As an introduction to staff employment, the officers of the army have long since abandoned it (the senior department) in hopeless despair. To what then is to be attributed the disinclination, not to say repugnance, so generally evinced by British officers, to devote themselves to the study of war as a science? Clearly to the want of due encouragement,—to the practical denial of the usual rewards of such devotion and toil."—*Ibid.* pp. 19, 27.

education ; but to entrust nine pounders and ten-inch howitzers—the charge of forts and batteries—(It is to be presumed they will not yet be employed in sieges.)—to raw lads just emancipated from scholastic duties, or fresh from the freedom of country sports and leisure unbroken by study or cultivation of the mind,—is the severest blow that military science has yet received at the hands of authority.

An analogous, but far more excusable, mistake was committed by the heads of departments prior to 1806, when the Woolwich academy was found unequal to the demands upon it, and a number of young gentlemen, principally taken from the public schools and universities, were appointed to the ordnance corps ; and what was the result ? “ Of this well intentioned effort,” says captain Spearman, “ to supply the deficiencies of the academy, it may, with truth, be asserted, as regarded the artillery, that of the many accomplished gentlemen thus added to the strength of that corps, *but ONE ever proved himself an Artillerist*. The last non-graduate was appointed in 1806, by earl Moira. By this time the evil effects of the practice upon the service, had become too apparent to permit of its continuance. His lordship, in consequence, augmented the strength of the cadet company, and since that time, *the anomalous and injurious practice* has been altogether abandoned. The incorporation of the Irish artillery with the British in 1801, may be cited in further illustration of this position. The experiment proved, in the latter case, even still more unfortunate.” *

It may, perhaps, appear ungracious to undervalue the voluntary services of gentlemen who come forward to aid the defenses of the country at a critical moment like the present, and sacrificing their personal convenience and home enjoyments, submit to all the discomforts of barrack life, and the restrictions of military discipline, from a feeling of loyalty and a desire to uphold the honor of the British name. But we must not shut our eyes to the results of experience. *The attempt to form artillery officers without scientific instruction has been tried and failed*, and there is no reason to suppose that it will be more successful at present. Would it not then be more rational to extend the Woolwich academy—increase the number of cadets—render the examinations less severe—send intelligent officers of the line to Chatham for instruction in the nature of field works, &c., and thus form a supplemental corps of *educated* young men, who would be sure eventually to become good artillery officers—than attempt to supply deficiencies in a scientific branch of the service by mere *amateurs* ?

* Spearman, p. 25.

Militia artillery could then be dispensed with, and the officers and men now enrolled for that service, might, without any change in uniform, be armed with rifles—taught the principles of high sights and the cylindro-conoidal shot, and thus obtain practice in the use of an incomparable weapon, with the knowledge of which they are much more likely to become readily familiar than with the difficult services of either field or siege artillery.

Since the above was written, a Parliamentary return of the staff in the Crimea, “distinguishing such as have obtained certificates at the royal military college, Sandhurst,” has appeared in the *Naval and Military Gazette*, (May 12, 1855), from which the following summary has been made :—

STAFF OFFICERS (CRIMEA.)

A PARLIAMENTARY RETURN OF THE NAMES OF ALL OFFICERS SERVING ON THE STAFF IN THE CRIMEA, DISTINGUISHING SUCH AS HAVE OBTAINED CERTIFICATES AT THE SENIOR DEPARTMENT OF THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, SANDHURST:—

Commander-in-Chief—Field-Marshal Lord Raglan.

Lieutenant-Generals—Sir G. Brown, Sir R. England, Sir C. Campbell, Pennefather, Sir J. Burgoyne.

Major-Generals—Bentinck, Hon. Yorke Scarlett, Sir J. Campbell, EYRE, (SANDHURST DEC. 12, 1829);

Buller, Torrens, Codrington, Barnard, Lord Rokeby, H. D. Jones.

Brigadier-General—Lockyer, 97th foot.

COLONEL CAMERON, 42d foot, (SANDHURST, DEC. 10, 1831).

Lieut.-Colonels—Dacres, Royal Artillery, and Irving.

Commandant at Balaklava—Brevet Lieut.-Col. Harding, 22d foot.

Commandant at Smyrna—Colonel Storks, unattached.

Commandant in the Bosphorus—Brigadier-General Lord W. Paulet.

Chief of the Staff—Lieutenant-General James Simpson.

Adjutant-General—Major-General Estcourt.

Assistant Adjutants-General—Lieut.-Col. Hon. W. Pakenham, unatt. ; Colonel Sullivan, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Blane, Lieut.-Colonel Wilbraham, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Wood, 13th foot ; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Adye, Royal Artillery ; Lieut.-Colonel Brownrigg, Grenadier Guards ;

LIEUT.-COLONEL STERLING, unattached, (SANDHURST, MAY 19, 1832) ;

Major Sillery, 30th foot ; Major Shute, 6th Dragoons ; Brevet-Major Smith, 3d foot.

Quartermaster-General—MAJOR-GENERAL AIREY, (SANDHURST, DEC. 14, 1826).

Assistant-Quartermasters-General—Colonel Hon. A. Gordon, Grenadier Guards ; Lieut.-Colonel Cunynghame, half-pay ; Lieut.-Colonel H. P. Herbert, unattached ; Lieut.-Colonel Airey, Coldstream Guards ; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Colborne, 15th foot ; Col. Windham, unattached ; Brevet Major Shadwell, 19th foot ; Acting Lieut.-Colonel Mayow, unattached ; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Napier, 25th foot.

Deputy Assistant-Adjutants or Quartermasters-General—LIEUT.-COL. HON. A. HARDINGE, COLDSTREAM GUARDS, (SANDHURST, MAY 22, 1850) ;

BREVET-MAJOR SANKEY, 47th foot, (SANDHURST, NOV. 6, 1852) ;

BREVET-MAJOR HACKETT, 77th foot, (SANDHURST, NOV. 7, 1851) ;

BREVET-MAJOR WETHERALL, SCOTS FUSILIER GUARDS, (SANDHURST, MAY 18, 1849) ;

CAPTAIN BARNSTON, 99th foot, (SANDHURST, MAY 19, 1853) ; Major Weare, 50th foot ; Major Woodford, Rifle Brigade ; Brevet-Major Hallewell, 28th foot ; Brevet-Major Stuart Wortley, 1st Drag. Guards ; Brevet-Major Hamilton, 47th foot ; Lieut.-Colonel Maitland, Grenadier guards ; Brevet-Major Fellowes, 11th Hussars ; Brevet-Major Thompson, 10th Hussars ; Brevet-Major Kirkland, 21st foot ; Major Campbell, 23d foot ; Capt. Sir C. Russell, Grenadier Guards ; Brevet-Major M'Kenzie, 92d foot ; Brevet-Major Hon. G. Elliott, Rifle Brigade ; Brevet-Major Hon. A. M. Cathcart, 93d foot ; Captain Bellairs, 49th foot ; Capt. Ross, 93d foot ; Captain Lowry, 47th foot ; Captain Field, Royal Artillery ; Captain Ireland, 3rd West India ; Captain Mundell, 96th foot ; Captain Eagar, 40th foot ; Captain Hutton, 31st foot ; Lieutenant Dick, 78th foot ; Lieutenant Macdonald, 3rd West India.

Military Secretary—Lieut.-Colonel Steele, Coldstream Guards.

Assistant Military Secretary—Captain Hon. L. Curzon, Rifle Brigade.

Staff Officers—Captain M'Crea, 45th foot ; Captain Blacklin, unatt. ; Capt. Gordon, East India Company ; Capt. West, East India Company ; Captain Henderson, East India Company ; Captain Ryan, East India Company ; Lieutenant Ayton, 84th foot ; Lieutenant Moreland, East India Company ; Lieutenant Davidson, East India Company ; Ensign Pennefather, 55th foot ; Brevet-Major Laye, 58th foot ; Brevet-Major Heaton, 37th foot.

Aides-de-camp—Captain Whitmore, 62d foot ; Captain Pearson, 7th foot ; Lieut.-Colonel Lord Burghersh ; Lieut.-Colonel P. Somerset, Coldstream Guards ; Brevet-Major Kingscote, Scots Fusilier Guards ;

Lieutenant Hon. S. Calthorpe, 8th Hussars; Brevet-Major M'Donald, 92d foot; Brevet-Major Graham, 41st foot; Captain the Hon. W. Wellesley, Coldstream Guards (extra); Brevet-Major Neville, Scots Fusilier Guards; Captain Snodgrass, 38th foot; Captain England, 55th foot; Captain Hon. H. Clifford, Rifle Brigade; Brevet-Major de Morel, 67th foot; Captain Elliot, 5th Dragoon Guards; Lieutenant Hon. H. Campbell, Rifle Brigade; Captain Torrens, 23d foot; Lieutenant Hon. C. Keith, 4th Dragoons; Lieutenant Stopford, Royal Engineers; Lieutenant Jervoise, 42nd foot; Brevet-Major Burke, 88th foot; Captain Viscount Balgonie, Grenadier Guards; Brevet-Major Hon. W. Scarlett, Scots Fusilier Guards; Captain Montgomery, 42d foot; Captain Hon. J. Bourke, 88th foot; Captain Hume, 38th foot; (extra temporary); Captain Damer, Scots Fusilier Guards; Lieutenant Jameson, 2d Life Guards; Captain Legh, 97th foot.

Brigade Majors—Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Hon. A. Hope, 60th foot; Brevet-Major Thackwell, 22d foot; Brevet-Major Conolly, unattached; Major Armstrong, 49th foot; Brevet-Major Ellison, Grenadier Guards; Brevet-Major C. F. T. Daniel, 38th foot; Brevet-Major Glyn, Rifle Brigade; Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Hon. R. Rollo, 42d foot; Captain Hon. B. Gage, Royal Artillery; Brevet-Major Lovell, Royal Engineers; Capt. Bouchier, Royal Engineers (acting); Major Elrington, Rifle Brigade; Captain Tomkinson, 8th Hussars; Captain Earle, 57th foot.

Provost Marshal—Captain W. Johnston, 41st foot.

Quartermaster—Ensign Deacon, 1st foot.

Town Adjutant—Lieutenant Webber, 42d foot.

It will be observed that amongst the whole number of officers in this very long list, numbering 135 individuals, no more than *nine* have obtained certificates at Sandhurst—that *not one* single assistant-quarter-master-general—the department for which Sandhurst instruction is supposed to be more particularly required—has graduated at the college;—that all the majors of brigade, and aides-de-camp are in the same position;—that *only one* assistant-adjutant-general out of *eleven* is so distinguished; and that amongst 29 deputies in the two departments of the adjutant and quartermaster-general, *five only* have obtained certificates of qualification at the senior department of the royal military college!

I regret to find that in the evidence given before the committee of the House of Commons, now sitting on the subject of the Royal Military College, strong recommendations appear for the separation of the senior from the junior department, and the return of the former to its old

station at Farnham. The policy of such a measure is extremely doubtful. Independent of the very heavy expense attendant upon the erection and organization of an entirely new establishment, with a distinct staff of officers and professors, great local advantages would be sacrificed:—the library, the collection of models, the observatory—the lake, so admirably adapted for instruction in pontooning—the wide-spread heath, where field works to any extent might be constructed, and the most detailed operations of Engineering carried out—could either not be supplied at all, or not without heavy cost and considerable delay at Farnham. Besides, if the present system of disregarding Sandhurst certificates in the appointment of staff officers be continued, it becomes a question whether a sufficient number of candidates would in future offer themselves for admission to keep up the expense of a separate insulated department, and the ludicrous appearance might possibly present itself of *Professors without pupils*, buildings without inmates, and mathematical instruments without mathematicians.

The reasoning of some of the witnesses on the present enquiry is strangely discordant; one proposes that the course of study should correspond with that followed at the *Ecole Speciale d'Etat Major* of France, while another considers that the Sandhurst mathematical course—which is confessedly inferior to that of the French school—is *too high*. One wants the course of study to be abridged, while, from ignorance of the facilities which algebraical processes afford, he desires, that all demonstrations and investigations should be conducted on strictly geometrical principles. Another witness would substitute *Military* for *General History*, and yet insists upon an officer having the education of a gentleman. Again, the examinations of candidates for commissions are said to be “worse than useless,” when they at least secure *some* knowledge of arithmetic, algebra, history, geography, and languages. Improve the Senior department if you will. Make the course of instruction more practical and less mathematical—found a distinct professorship of modern languages, so that a competent knowledge of French and German may be secured to the students—engage the services of a member of the corps of royal engineers for practical instruction in fortification and field works—forbear to impose upon too willing, kind, and ever-labouring hands, duties which even in a seminary of less pretension, would be shared by other professors; but to transfer the establishment to Farnham—to set it up on a new foundation, with buildings, library, observatory, models, and other costly accessories, having in view its increased efficiency,

would be an unwarrantable expenditure of public money, and one which the legislature could never honestly sanction.

We apprehend the committee have not applied themselves to the real evil, namely, the utter neglect of students who have obtained certificates at the senior department, and the nomination to staff appointments without any reference to scientific qualifications. It is not that the students are not sufficiently educated—that the department would be better carried on at one place than another—that there is too much algebra, or too little geometry—but that the highest qualifications and acquirements are as nothing compared with family connexion, aristocratic influence, and unscrupulous patronage. This is the root of the evil; and unless the House of Commons applies itself, with an unflinching hand, to this crying abuse, it is vain to look for improvement in mere matters of detail, locality, or minor modifications.

K.

THE HEAVY CAVALRY BRIGADE AT BALAKLAVA.

Note page 280.

In the various accounts which have been published of the part taken by the British heavy cavalry brigade at the combat of Balaklava, due credit has not been given to the distinguished conduct of the Royal Irish Dragoon Guards. The following details, therefore, which have been obtained from the unquestionable authority of an eye-witness of, and an active participator in, this remarkable combat, may prove acceptable to those who uphold with the author the well-known sentiment of

"Palmam qui meruit ferat."

The heavy cavalry brigade of the British army on the memorable 25th October, 1854, was composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th dragoons (Royals, Greys, and Enniskillens), the 4th (Royal Irish) and the 5th (Princess Charlotte of Wales's) dragoon guards. The whole, numbering about 800 horses, being under the command of the Honorable Major-General Scarlett. The Turkish redoubts had been taken by the Russians, and the heavy brigade were directed to retire out of the range of the guns, now directed upon them from the captured earthworks.

The brigade marched in two columns, the 4th and 5th Dragoon guards, under Colonel Hodge, forming the leading column; while the Greys and Enniskillens, under the immediate direction of Major-

General Scarlett, formed the rear column: the Royals marched more on the left.

Little time had elapsed after the capture of the redoubts, when dense masses of Russian cavalry, estimated at 3,000 sabres, appeared upon the crest of the hill in rear of the British brigade. There was no time for reference to higher authority; the gallant general of the brigade and his subordinate commanders were left to the exercise of their own judgment, and well did they justify the confidence which was placed in their bravery and discretion.*

Scarlett, without hesitation, put the rear column about—formed line instantly to the new front, and leading forward the Greys and Enniskillens—worthy representatives of the old "Union brigade," dashed into the imposing masses of his formidable assailants, and drove them back. Hodge, in like manner, reversed his order of march—one of the most difficult manœuvres in presence of an enemy—and seeing that the right flank of the Russian attacking column was unprotected, he judiciously inclined to the left—formed squadron to the front, and coming unexpectedly upon the enemy's exposed right flank with an impetus which could not be resisted, completely overthrew the leading squadrons—the gallant Royal Irish interposing between the enemy and the Greys, who would, otherwise have been overwhelmed by superior numbers.

The Russians, panic-stricken at this determined and unexpected flank attack of the 4th dragoon guards, now broke and fled:† even their strong reserves made no effort to arrest their flight, but carried away by the rest, crowded to the rear without once attempting to resume the offensive; and Scarlett's gallant brigade had thus the distinguished honor of plucking the first laurel from the Muscovite horse on the memorable field of Balaklava.

* Lord Lucan, in reply to a recent sympathizing address from the inhabitants of the county of Mayo, says—"It cannot be denied me that that great feat of arms, the repulse and dispersion, by our gallant heavy brigade, of so preponderating a force of the enemy's cavalry, *originated with and was directed entirely and solely by myself*." On the other hand, my informant states:—"The enemy attacked us so suddenly that no general order was given; each commanding officer took his brigade or regiment into action as he thought proper."—*Notes of an eye-witness, MSS.*

† "I have no hesitation in stating that the flank attack of the 4th dragoon guards caused the overthrow of the Russians."—*Ibid.*

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the foregoing pages were printed, I have learned with much satisfaction, that the lance invented by adjutant Dynon, of the 16th lancers, a description of, and observations upon which will be found in pages 153 and 422, has been recommended by the Board of officers, directed to enquire into, and report upon, the equipment and armament of the British cavalry, for general adoption in our lancer regiments; other useful changes are likewise mentioned as having been decided on; and it is to be hoped that the dress, arms, and appointments of our gallant cavalry will—without unnecessary disfigurement—eventually assume a really practical character.

N. L. B.

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
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
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
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